Property rights in fishing; Effects on the industry and effectiveness for fishing management policy by Davidse, W.P. et al.
W.P. Davidse (coordinator), the Netherlands Onderzoekverslag 159 
H. Harmsma, M.O. van Wijk, the Netherlands 
L.V. McEwan, United Kingdom 
N. Vestergaard, H. Frost, Denmark 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHING 
Effects on the industry and effectiveness 
for fishery management policy 
November 1997 
This study has been carried out with financial assistence from the European 
Commission, in the famework of the FAIR programme 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO) 
Sydjysk Universitetcenter (DIFER) 
Seafish Industry Authority (SFIA) 
~* ,-
ABSTRACT 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHING; EFFECTS ON THE INDUSTRY AND EFFECTIVENESS FOR 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT POLICY 
Davidse, W.P. (ed.) 
The Hague, Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO), 1997 
Onderzoekverslag 159 
ISBN 90-5242-423-3 
329 p., tab., f ig., appendices 
The study identifies measures that have created property rights in the Danish, 
Dutch and UK fishery sector. Property in this respect is not considered as an asset in the 
stock of fish but as a stream of benefits, resulting from the right to fish. 
The limited access to the fishery by the vessel licence and by the recognition as 
a commercial fisherman have created two forms of property rights in the Danish fish-
ery. 
In the Netherlands, the national TACs for the individual species have been trans-
formed into transferable individual quota (ITQs). 
In the UK, gradually more and more fleet segments and species were brought 
under restrictive licencing schemes. The approach varies by species and sector wi th the 
licences giving access to the fisheries reflecting this. 
The study assesses the consequences of property rights on individual enterprises 
and on the fishing industry as a whole. These consequences have been most important 
for the Dutch and UK fishing enterprises. Transfers of rights have led to high prices of 
ITQs, Track Records and licences. Valuable rights may hamper the transfer of the enter-
prise to the next generation or to other family-members in these two countries. 
Some concentration of rights i.e. ITQs has occurred in the Netherlands, though 
not as intensively as in the New Zealand and Iceland ITQ regimes. 
Finally, the study evaluates the effectiveness of property rights for fisheries man-
agement policy, wi th in the framework of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). 
The study also compares the property rights systems in Denmark, the Nether-
lands and the UK on a scale, running from 'state property' towards 'private property' 
of the resource flow. Although there are big differences, all three systems have moved 
or seem to move into the direction of private rights. 
Fishery management/Common Fisheries Policy/Property Rights/Denmark/The Nether-
lands/United Kingdom 
Overname van de inhoud toegestaan, mits met duidelijke bronvermelding. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Description 
Objective 
The main objectives of this study are: 
to identify measures that have created property rights and to distinguish 
the main types of property rights in the Danish, Dutch and UK fishery 
sector; 
to assess the consequences of property rights on individual enterprises 
and on the fishing industry as a whole; 
to evaluate the effectiveness of property rights for fisheries management 
policy in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, within the 
framework of the Common Fisheries Policy. 
Main types of property rights 
The study considers property not as an asset in the stock of fish but as a 
stream of benefits. Subject of the research are protected rights to a benefit 
stream, generated with fishing. Rights are considered as 'property rights' when 
they are exclusive. 
Three types of property rights can be distinguished: 1) state property 2) 
private property and 3) common property. Open access can be seen as a situa-
t ion of non-property. 
The Danish fishery is characterized by a flexible, multi-purpose fleet, 
which relatively easily can move from one fishery to another. There is an overall 
limited access to the fishery by the vessel licence and by the requirement to be 
recognized as a commercial fisherman. These two entitlements are a form of 
property right, giving access to the benefit stream. 
In the Netherlands, the different national TACs have been transformed 
into individual quota for sole and plaice (in 1976), entitlements to fish on cod 
and whit ing, and permits for the herring- and mackerel fishery. The MAGP has 
led to a capacity limitation in the form of horsepower licences. All these limita-
tions have evolved towards tradable, valuable private property rights. 
The UK had a tradition of virtually open access to fisheries until CFP was 
established. After that, gradually more and more fleet segments and species 
were brought under restrictive licencing schemes. Currently, the UK approach 
varies by species and sector wi th the licences giving access to the fisheries re-
flecting this. All licences are subject to Ministerial discretion which means that 
uncertainty remains about the quality and duration of this property right. 
The study also intends to draw lessons from property rights in other, non-
EU countries. Therefore, ITQ systems in Iceland, New Zealand and Australia and 
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a variaty of property rights regimes in Norway, North America and Japan have 
been investigated. 
Property rights explored in models 
A model has been developed for the Danish fishery to estimate the ef-
fects of a possible introduction of l(T)Qs. 
The Dutch sole and plaice ITQs dropped sharply in 1996, following the 
national part in the TACs. A financial economic vessel simulation model has 
been used to explore how many individual enterprises will not survive under 
these circumstances. 
For the UK, two possible future scenarios have been analyzed. The first 
scenario explores the impact of investments in property rights when new own-
ers replace those who had the licences originally. The second scenario assumes 
that the government charges an annual licence fee to compensate for adminis-
trative and management costs. 
Results 
Economic characteristics of property rights 
In the Danish fishery, the market for licences is difficult to separate from 
the market for vessels and therefore not very transparent. The decommission-
ing scheme sets, generally spoken, the minimum market price for a vessel 
licence. 
Property rights have become a separate production factor in the Dutch 
cutter fishery. Effective enforcement of the individual quotas has led to a scar-
city of this production factor since 1988. Hence, high prices for ITQs and for 
other rights were paid, i.e. at least four times the auction price per kg for 'per-
manent' ITQs for sole and plaice. Investments in rights exceeded those in vessels 
in the early nineties. 
In the UK, property rights generally are not considered to be a significant 
entry barrier for newcomers in the industry. There are some exceptions, how-
ever, in the pelagic and beam trawl sector where licences can be worth around 
30% of the value of the vessel. The existence of the necessary licences is taken 
by bankers as a pre-requisite in allowing loans but the value of the licences 
(except when realised in a sale of the vessel) is generally not regarded as part 
of the capital structure by them. 
Structural implications of property rights 
The implementation of a decommissioning scheme in 1987 has had a ma-
jor influence on the structure of the Danish fleet, rather than the property 
rights mentioned before. 
The structure of the Dutch cutter fishery has changed importantly since 
1983, whereby private property rights have played an important role. Decom-
missioning of vessels has been stimulated, since the leavers could get extra pro-
ceeds by selling their ITQ. Quota hopping has arisen, induced by lower prices 
of rights abroad. Some concentration of rights i.e. ITQs has occurred, though 
not as intensively as in New Zealand and Iceland. For example, the 3% owners 
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of the largest ITQs possess 47% of the national quota in Iceland (1994) whereas 
this percentage is 17.5% for the Dutch flatfish quota (1997). 
The UK, experience seems to indicate property rights having relatively 
little influence so far on structural developments. The relevant factors appear 
to be technical changes, profitability and decommissioning payments. One fea-
ture which does derive from UK property rights has been the reflagging of 
foreign vessels by acquiring UK licences. Another feature related to property 
rights has been the increasing strength of POs. 
Effects of property rights at enterprise level 
Limitations in the fisheries for human consumption in Denmark have re-
sulted in more investments in industrial fisheries. The restrictions on extension 
of capacity add an extra cost to consider in investment decisions. These extra 
costs cause uncertainties for individual enterprises since future fishing possibili-
ties are not secured enough by fishing rights. 
Investments in Dutch flatfish ITQs can only contribute to profits through 
a marginal approach, when only variable costs are matched against the extra 
proceeds from the purchased ITQ. A net present value analysis points out that 
the pay-back period for these investments exceeded eight years in 1994. On the 
other hand, the present (capitalized) value of a large, a 'full' ITQ would only 
be some 40% of its purchase cost for the 1994 situation. This shows that exist-
ing ITQ holders have a strong preference to continue their enterprise. They 
could indeed sell their right and realize a much higher proceed than they 
would get from future fishing activities. 
Valuable rights may hamper the transfer of the enterprise to the next 
generation or to other family-members. Fiscal allowances, in force for produc-
tion rights in the Dutch agriculture, have partly been applied for fishery enter-
prises. 
In the UK, the most obvious effects of property rights at the enterprise 
level are in increasing the costs to new entrants and those vessel owners ex-
panding their businesses. The returns from such investments would appear to 
be negative at the current cost of licences. Equally property rights have intro-
duced a new economic dimension for those wishing to leave the industry. Be-
sides of the vessel their assets now include the value of the licence. 
Succession of ownership has become more difficult. It contains more com-
plicated effects where families or other close knit groups are involved. 
Property rights explored in models 
The results of the Danish ITQ model indicate that the adjustment of the 
fleet, which has taken place since 1987, is not finished yet. Implementation of 
an ITQ-system could increase the gross margin of the fleet by about 12%. In 
case of a comprehensive ITQ-system, covering the vessels catching a significant 
amount of roundfish in the North Sea and/or Skagerrak, the gain in gross mar-
gin could be up to 70 million DKK per year. 
The Dutch model exploration regarding the low 1996 flatfish quota learns 
that in the short term (1-3 years) about 50 to 90 vessels, on average some 12% 
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of the horsepower capacity, will run into serious financial problems. This situa-
t ion has worsened on the basis of the again lower 1997 quota. 
New owners of UK fishing rights have to make more profits to compen-
sate for higher costs related to purchased licences. The impact of deducting 
charges based on a purchased licence would be considerable in the pelagic 
sector. 
The second scenario assumes that the government charges an annual 
licence fee to compensate for administrative and management costs. It seems 
certain that pressure to reduce capacity would be even greater under this pol-
icy compared with the first scenario. 
Effectiveness of property rights for fisheries policy 
The effects of property rights on the realisation of the goals of the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy can be considered as being minor in Denmark. With re-
spect to stock conservation it can be said that the Danish TAC-share has not 
been overfished in recent years. The MAGP-objectives have been achieved by 
Denmark due to decommissioning schemes and overall capacity limitations. 
A central element in the Danish regulation up to now has been open 
access to the different fisheries and this wil l remain important in future. This 
may explain to some extent the Danish position regarding the CFP-review in 
2002, which shows a preference to change the current quota management 
system into an effort or fishing day based system. 
For the Dutch situation, the regime of individual rights (ITQs) has devel-
oped to an adequate TAC distribution system, supported by heavy enforcement 
and co-responsibility through the co-management groups of the industry. 
The Dutch sea fisheries policy, bound by agreements made within the EU 
framework, has the own responsibility of the industry as a specific approach. 
This explains the development towards individual rights and also the co-man-
agement by the groups of right holders. Interviews that were held for this 
study in 1995 and 1996 revealed that the individual rights have led to vested 
interests and that a change from a hunting behaviour towards an attitude of 
a calculating manager is developing gradually. 
Future developments of the Dutch property rights wil l probably include 
a further concentration of rights. Different scenarios with respect to a possible 
review of the CFP in 2002 are thinkable and it seems now that the Dutch sys-
tem of rights is enough flexible to meet possible changes at that time. 
It is clear on balance that the emergence of property rights in the UK 
industry is helpful in achieving CFP objectives. Property rights ensure that the 
UK fleet is restructured in a way that reduces capacity. 
Regarding CFP-review, the most likely scenario is that the new system will 
be broadly the same as the current approach. The current property rights in 
track records or fixed quotas provide a basis for further development. The ben-
efits of having an annual charge on property rights to pay for the enforcement 
and other costs seem clear both in terms of equity and of encouragement to 
reduce capacity. 
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Comparison of property rights regimes 
The study compares the property rights systems in Denmark, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom on a scale, running from 'state property' to-
wards 'private property' of the resource flow. The Danish system has the fea-
tures of state property whereas, on the other hand, the Dutch one is a regime 
of private rights. The UK system can be situated in the middle, having charac-
teristics of common property, apart from private rights. All three systems have 
moved or seem to move into the direction of private rights. This confirms state-
ments in literature (Christy, 1996 and Hannesson, 1994) including that the tran-
sition to (individual) property rights regimes in fisheries is 'inexorable'. 
However, the study concludes that property rights systems are to a certain 
extent dependant variables, but on the other hand they may induce develop-
ments (e.g. concentration of rights, quota hopping) after their implementation. 
Lessons from property rights in other countries confirm that that systems 
of rights have to be considered in a political and fishery environment. 
Juridical aspects with respect to property rights 
There are important juridical aspects in defining the fishing rights as 
state-, common- and private property. 
An Article in the EEC-Treaty (nr. 222) regards property ownership in gen-
eral in the context of European and national laws. The article is 1): 'This Treaty 
leaves the regulation of the property ownership in the Member States unim-
peded'. The study investigates brief ly jurisprudence proving that national rules 
on property ownership are bound by EU principles, such as 'competence of 
harmonisation' and 'free movement of goods, persons and services'. 
On the other hand, article 222 does not mean that the Commission of the 
EU does not have the competence to implement rules on property owner-
ship.The relevancy for the fishery sector is that the Commission may have the 
competence to establish or influence private property rights, such as (EU) licen-
ces, on the basis of EU Regulations. 
Conclusions regarding property rights in the fishery sector 
A useful definition for property rights in fishing is (Bromley, 1991): 'Prop-
erty is not an object such as land but is rather a right or group of rights 
to a benefit stream that is only as secure as the duty of all others to re-
spect the conditions that protect that stream'. 
This definition means for fisheries that the right can be defined in terms 
of harvest and not in terms of stocks. 
'...the duty of all others...' is a key element in this definition and this 
makes clear that the security of the rights importantly depends on en-
forcement. 
1) Translated from Dutch. 
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Property rights in fishing are frequently confused with individual rights. 
It is, however, necessary to distinguish between three types of rights: 
state-, common- and private or individual property rights. 
Fisheries management should firstly define the property rights and make 
a choice between these three types of rights, or combinations of them, 
and from this basic choice necessary measures can be taken. 
Property rights which exist in the Danish (mainly state property), Dutch 
(individual property rights) and UK fisheries (combination of the three 
types) are not or hardly the result of a well-considered policy choice, but 
have gradually developed from the implementation of limiting measures. 
Management systems tend to evolve unavoidably into the direction of 
individual property rights regimes from the moment that a limitation has 
changed into a right and vested interests have arisen. 
Property rights don't have advantages in itself, but they have to be con-
sidered against a background of preferences and attitudes of policy mak-
ers and fishermen. 
An important advantage of ITQs mentioned in literature, stimulating 
management behaviour of fishermen, is supported by evidence in the 
Dutch beam trawl sector. 
Under a regime of individual property rights effective protection of the 
rights leads to proper protection of the fish stock. 
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1. OBJECTIVE 
The main objectives of this study are: 
to identify measures that have created property rights and to distinguish 
the main types of property rights in the Danish, Dutch and UK Fishery 
Sector; 
to assess the consequences of property rights on individual enterprises 
and the Fishing Industry as a whole; 
to evaluate the effectiveness of property rights, allocated by public and 
private sector organisations in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, within the framework of the Common Fisheries Policy. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
The implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy in 1983 has resulted 
in different kinds of limitations for the fishing industry. Total Allowable 
Catches (TACs) and Multi-Annual Guidance Programs (MAGPs), aiming at limit-
ing the fishing effort, determine the 'economic space' for EU fishing enter-
prises. 
The developments since 1983 show that some limitations, more or less 
unintentionnally, have evolved towards rights for individual fishermen or for 
their communities. In fact, limitations and rights may be two sides of the same 
coin, i.e. the regulations. This study focuses on the right aspect of the regula-
tions. 
The report starts with an analysis of the concept of property rights. Hav-
ing defined this concept, different types of rights in Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, and also in some non-EU countries, are identified. 
Limitations create scarcity so that property rights have economic charac-
teristics. This is the subject of chapter 6 and chapter 7 explores whether lessons 
for the fishing industry can be drawn from property rights, i.e. milk quotas, in 
agriculture. 
Chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to the second objective of the study, i.e. 
structural implications of property rights in the three countries mentioned be-
fore and consequences of the rights at enterprise level. 
The use of models in chapter 10 intends to explore possible future aspects 
of property rights from the questions: 
What would happen if individual transferable quotas would be intro-
duced in the Danish fishery? 
What are the possibilities for survival for individual Dutch beam trawlers 
in view of their much lower individual flatfish quotas in 1996 and 1997? 
What could be the consequences in the long run for British vessels of 
taking over all the necessary rights (licences) in case of succession and, as 
a second scenario, which could be the effects of a licence fee, imposed by 
the Government? 
Finally, chapter 11 assesses the effectiveness of property rights in the 
three countries for fisheries management policy, which concerns the third ob-
jective of the study. 
Conclusions, attached to the summary, intend to express that imposing 
limitations by fisheries management means creation of rights and that not all 
rights are property rights. 
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3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The workprogramme for this study distinguishes eight different parts. 
These parts correspond nearly completely with the chapters 5-11 in this report. 
The methodology of the study will be described, following these eight differ-
ent parts, which will be characterized in this respect as 'tasks'. 
Task 7, Description of measures which have created property rights in Den-
mark, the Netherlands and the UK 
This task has been has been carried ot by conducting of literature re-
search. The results have been included in chapter 5. General concepts of prop-
erty rights are described by Bromley in his book 'Environment and Economy' 
(1991) and Scott in his contribution to the NATO Advanced Research Workshop 
on Scientific Foundations for Rights Based Fishing (1988). A more general con-
cept of property rights concerning the exploitation of environmental resources, 
has been the basis of this study on property rights in the fishery sector. Thus, 
the situation in this sector can be compared with problems and solutions else-
where in environmental economics. 
The relevant fishery limiting measures and the property rights resulting 
from them have been derived from the description of the EU policy by Holden 
in 'The Common Fisheries Policy' (1994), and the relevant Danish, Dutch and UK 
legislation. 
Task 2, Characteristics of property rights 
More juridical characteristics (contents of entitlements etc.) have been 
included in chapter 5. Furthermore, the focus have been on the economic char-
acteristics of the rights. 
The study on this subject has been based upon available files, containing 
vessel- and fishing rights data, from the ministries in the three countries, on 
own expertise, on collection of price data of property rights and to a limited 
extent on talks with representatives from the industry (the explanation on task 
8 contains more about these interviews). 
Literature research (appendix 1) has been carried out to study economic 
characteristics of property rights in other countries, i.e. Iceland, Norway, Can-
ada, the US, New Zealand, Australia and Japan. Furthermore, extensive infor-
mation about the Icelandic situation was obtained during a seminar in Septem-
ber 1995 in Reykjavik. The proceedings of this seminar ('Property rights in the 
fishing industry', appendix 1) contain a description of economic and juridical 
aspects of the Icelandic property rights in fishing. 
Chapter 6 includes all these economic aspects of property rights. 
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Task 3, Property rights in Agriculture 
The description and analysis of the Danish milk quota system is based on 
annual reports from the Danish milk agency and discussions with agri-research-
ers. 
For the Dutch part of the study researchers of the department 'Agricul-
ture' of LEI-DLO have contributed to the subject 'property rights in agriculture'. 
Costs and earnings investigations for dairy farms, studies about trade in milk 
quota, about effects of quota on the dairy industry and about alternatives for 
the superlevy have been the basis for this contribution. 
The Agricultural Departments of MAFF have been a useful source on the 
statistics of the UK dairy industry. Furthermore, much of the information has 
been derived from literature, i.e. the volume edited by Burell (Milk Quotas in 
the EC, 1989). 
The three country contributions on the agricultural property rights are 
analyzed and compared with the fishing rights. The resulting conclusions are 
included in chapter 7 of this report. 
Task 4, Effects of property rights on the structure of the Fishing Industry 
For the Danish part of the study, data about catches and prices and about 
costs development have been collected for the main fisheries of the fleet seg-
ments which were mostly reduced in the period 1985-1992. 
The Dutch part measures the structural changes in the near-water fisher-
ies ('cutter fleet') mainly in terms of fleet number, number of enterprises, en-
gine capacity and external organisation of the industry. Data about these issues 
have been collected and files of the ministry 1) containing fishing rights have 
been the basis to analyse the impact of property rights on the industry's struc-
ture. 
For the UK an important source has been the Fisheries Departments which 
have responsibilities for licensing vessels, supervising quotas, collecting statistics 
and administering the decommissioning schemes. Data from the Departments 
have been used in examining the effects of property rights and other influ-
ences on structural changes in the industry. Similarly, the Producers Organisa-
tions and other associations of fishermen play a role in negotiating and distrib-
uting the rights; they thus contributed to the understanding of developments. 
Chapter 8 contains the results of this part of the study. 
Task 5, Investments in property rights, profitability and financing aspects 
Task 6, Consequences of property rights for succession of ownership 
These two tasks have been combined to the subject 'property rights at 
enterprise level', included in chapter 9 of this report. 
Costs and earnings studies in the three countries have been the main 
source for the analyses of effects of property rights at enterprise level. These 
effects are most important in the Dutch fishery, so that this part has become 
most elaborated. A discounted cash f low analysis, in LOTUS spreadsheet, has 
1) Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
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been carried out to investigate the relationship between investments in rights 
and the present value of the possible future proceeds. 
The guidelines of the International Accountancy Standard Committee 
(IASC) have been studied to consider how property rights in fishing can be 
dealt with for profit calulations. 
Interviews, on a limited scale, wi th representatives from the industry, 
bankers and accountants have been held to get more insight of the effects of 
property rights at enterprise level. 
Task 7, Exploring effects of property rights in models 
Property rights only play a minor role in the Danish fishery up to now 
(spring 1997). Therefore, the purpose of this part of model analysis has been 
to explore what would happen if private property rights, i.e. individual (non-
transferable quotas would be introduced in the Danish fisheries. A lineair pro-
gramming model has been constructed to carry out this analysis. Appendices 
3 and 4 contain more details about this model. 
For the Dutch part, a financial economics simulation model (in FORTRAN) 
has been used to investigate how many vessels wil l be in danger of survival 
because of the much lower flatfish quotas in 1996 and 1997. Therefore, an 
existing model has been adapted for this more recent situation. Chapter 10.2 
explains this model briefly. 
For the UK situation, calculations have been made on the basis of costs 
and earnings data to explore the questions 1): What could be the consequences 
in the long run for British vessels of taking over all the necessary rights (licen-
ces) in case of succession and 2) which could be the effects of a licence fee, 
imposed by the Government? 
The outcomes of the model analyses have been included in chapter 10. 
Task 8, Implications of property rights for the Common Fisheries Policy and for 
national management measures 
This task has been elaborated in chapter 11. Therefore, relevant policy 
documents have been studied and recent discussions on property rights (i.e. 
Hannesson, 1994 and Christy, 1996) have been a source for reflection. 
Furthermore, interviews have been an important source to evaluate the 
existing property rights regimes in the three countries and also to investigate 
the opinions on the possible review of the CFP in 2002. Filling in a question-
naire has not been the method, therefore, but talks have been held whereby 
a questionnaire has served rather as a checklist. 
For the Danish situation, interviews have been held, on a limited scale, 
wi th fishermen (10) and their representatives, accountants (5) and bankers. 
These categories of persons have also been contacted for the Dutch situa-
t ion. The number of fishermen has been more extensive (31) and the chair-
man/member of the Board of each of the two Unions of fishermen has been 
interviewed. 
For the UK part a questionnaire was used to structure various discussions 
with the industry over the period of the study. Those in the industry included 
fishermen, fishing companies and fish salesmen, as well as the executives of 
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Producers Organisations and National Associations of fishermen. Those in re-
lated areas were mainly fishermen's agents, bankers, accountants and brokers. 
Government departments were also involved because of their input to en-
volving policy on fishing entitlements and property rights. 
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4. PROCEDURE 
This FAIR-project on property rights has been carried out by: 
the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (coordinator), The Hague; 
the Danish Institute of Fisheries Economics Research of the South Jutland 
University Centre, Esbjerg; 
Seafish Industry Authority, Edinburgh. 
The study started by November 1st, 1993, after signature of the contract 
between the three partners and the Commission of the European Union by 
October 28ht, 1993. 
The coordinator has proposed guidelines for each part of the study to get 
as much as possible a common approach for the different subjects. Thirthy two 
documents have been prepared by the coordinator for this common approach, 
for discussion otherwise or as minutes of the meetings. 
Seven meetings were held in the course of the project, until May 1997: 
The Hague, January 1994, for discussing of the general approach of the 
study and for deciding the contents of chapter 5 'Property rights and 
legal framework'; 
Crete, March 1994, during the annual conference of the European Associ-
ation of Fisheries Economists, for discussion of the completed texts of 
chapter 5 and the proposal for chapter 6 'Economic characteristics of 
property rights'; 
Billund, Denmark, November 1994, to finalize the texts of chapter 5 and 
discuss the study of the economic characteristics of property rights. Fur-
thermore the contents of the interim report was decided and a proposal 
of the coordinator for the study of property rights in agriculture (ch. 7) 
has been discussed in Billund also; 
Edinburgh, March 1995, to finalize the texts of chapter 6 and to discuss 
the draft text of chapter 7. A proposal for the chapters on 'structure' (8) 
and 'enterprise level' (9) was also discussed; 
Reykjavik, September 1995, to discuss the chapter on 'structure' (8) and 
to decide the contents of the second progress report. Furthermore, pa-
pers were presented by the members of the project team during a semi-
nar on property rights in the fishing industry, held in Reykjavik by Sep-
tember 6th. This seminar has been organised by the Fisheries Research 
Institute of the University of Iceland in cooperation with the coordinator 
of the property rights project; 
The Hague, October 1996, to discuss the contributions on property rights 
in 'other countries', chapter 9 'enterprise level' and the Danish contribu-
t ion, the ITQ model, for chapter 10. Furthermore, the contents of 
chapter 11 'property rights and policy' was discussed; 
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Esbjerg, February 1997, to complete the parts 'property rights on struc-
ture' and propertty rights at enterprise level'. Furthermore, the chapter 
on policy (11) was dicussed. 
The draft final report has been completed in the period April/May 1997 
by the coordinating institute. 
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5. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
5.1 Defining the concept of property rights 
5.1.1 Property rights and institutions 
A definition of property rights is needed so as to set limits to the extent 
of this study. It is helpful to start by considering the two elements, property 
and rights. Property may be regarded loosely as something which can be 
owned. It may be a material thing, such as land and buildings or it may be im-
material such as a patent or a copyright. Similarly ownership may reside in an 
individual, a group, a community or the state but it should be stressed that 
without potential ownership, property does not exist. The Roman legal code 
of Justinianian (6th century AD) helpfully provides four categories, other than 
privately owned property: 
res communes : held by the law of nature to be common to all humanity 
such as the air or the sea; 
res publicae : dedicated to public use such as roads; 
res universitatis : held by the municipality such as theatres; 
res nullius : held by no-one such as wild animals. 
The middle two categories define state property either at the national or 
local level while the last category indicates that animals in the wild (including 
fish) can not be regarded as property unless and until they have been captured. 
Rights are entitlements under the law to engage in certain actions, 
whether they relate to personal behaviour having no relation to property, such 
as merely existing, or to the use of property or other resources, as in industry 
or commerce. It is of course possible to have different rights in the same thing, 
as the owner, as the user under lease and as the creditor who funded the ac-
quisition. The reference to the law indicates that rights do not lead an inde-
pendent existence as physical facts but may be regarded only as claims that the 
courts may recognise and enforce. Without potential enforcement, there can 
be no guaranteed rights except briefly for the strong. 
Property rights bring the two concepts together. In general they can be 
thought of as a bundle of legal and customary rules that define (a) who is enti-
tled to use a particular asset, resource or invention, (b) how, where and when 
it may be used, (c) what creates, transfers and extinguishes ownership and (d) 
who the owner is or owners are. On the one hand property rights are con-
ferred and defined by rules while on the other hand rules may constrain the 
exercise of those rights. In the housing market, for example, the rights of the 
owner or the tenant may be restricted in terms of use by zoning regulations 
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which forbid commercial activities or the owner may face joint responsibilities 
for repair and maintenance. 
The legal context makes it clear that property and associated rights are 
institutions. Scott (1989) defines the latter as '... socially recognised and sup-
ported procedures and rules. They are unchanging relative to the fluctuating 
economic activities that they guide and constrain. In a society the structure of 
Government itself is one institution. Another is the system of property rights'. 
While the implication that institutions are unchanging needs qualification in 
the light of regulatory and governmental flux, the relationship with economics 
underlines the relevance of the discipline of institutional economics. Such in-
sights as those by North on historical aspects are helpful; he ascribed the supe-
rior economic development of the Netherlands and the UK compared with 
Spain in the 16th and 17th centuries to their better guaranteed property rights. 
5.1.2 Property rights in the fisheries sector 
In terms of the current fisheries sector, the concept of property rights 
needs more specific definition. It is perhaps helpful to regard them less as relat-
ing to an asset in the stock of fish but more as concerning a resource flow (in 
the harvest or catch over time). Bromley (1991) suggests that 'Property is not 
an object such as land but is rather a right or group of rights to a benefit 
stream that is only as secure as the duty of all others to respect the conditions 
that protect that stream'. Such an approach applies to all kinds of management 
regimes for natural resources, not just for fisheries. 
Consideration of open access provides a way to understand property 
rights better. Open access means that everybody is free to exploit the natural 
resource in the fish stocks. No-one is excluded from the common pool and this 
situation has often been called 'common property' which is a misunderstanding 
of the concept (Bromley, 1991). Common property stands for a regime where 
a certain group has the right to a benefits stream with all those outside the 
group excluded. Open access exists where there are no property rights recog-
nised in an exhaustible resource. (Some might maintain that open access to a 
virtually inexhaustible resource, such as air to breathe and space for navigation 
on the sea, is in a special sense a property right of the earth's population but 
this is irrelevant in fisheries.) 
Two basic conditions are thus needed for the existence of property rights: 
the exclusion of those outside the owner, user or group concerned and the 
protection of those rights by authority. The absence of protection and enforce-
ment would lead by default to a situation of open access in practice. This is 
brought out in the definition: 'A right is the capacity to call upon the collective 
to stand behind one's claim to a benefit stream (that is to one's property)' 
(Bromley, 1991). 
Bromley (1991) indicates four broad regimes reflecting ownership of 
property and the constraints implicit in the associated rights. These are in 
slightly altered form: 
a. state property, where managing agencies have a right to determine rules 
of access or use and individuals have a duty to observe them, in exercising 
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their right of access or use (Similar descriptions cover municipal and other 
local authorities); 
b. private property, where the individuals have rights for socially accepted 
uses of their property and duties to avoid the socially unacceptable while 
the rest of the community have a duty to support socially accepted uses 
and a right to expect only those uses (individuals include companies or 
firms); 
c. common property, where in addition to the relevant elements relating 
to private property and its socially accepted uses, there are balances to be 
maintained between the group and the rest of the community as well as 
within the group in terms of individual behaviour in using and maintain-
ing the resource; 
d. non-property, where the individuals have no rights but the resource is 
open to all subject only to constraints of a wider nature relating to indi-
vidual behaviour within a society (navigational or safety regulations give 
examples of such constraints). 
These various categories can be exemplified in the EU fisheries sector. The 
move towards extended Exclusive Economic Zones in the 1970s led to state 
property in the sea bed out to 200 miles or medians and to a kind of EU prop-
erty in the waters around member states. Legislation in the Netherlands al-
lowed the creation of transferable individual quotas which are clearly private 
property as are the individual vessel licences in the UK. Management of parts 
of the TAC by Producers' Organisations shows the characteristics of a common 
property regime. As for non-property, this is seen in certain un-regulated fish-
eries, whether for some shellfish species or in recreational activities. 
The holders of property rights in fishing may have a diverse bundle of 
rights. The rules creating those rights, and constraining them as well, may spec-
ify the capacity in power or tonnage and the restrictions on t iming, area, gear 
and other aspects, as well as the catch of fish allowed. The constraints may be 
on inputs or on outputs. This in turn affects the way that fishermen re-act and 
whether their re-actions lead to efficient outcomes or not. 
5.1.3 Characteristics of property rights 
It is suggested by Scott (1989) that the bundles of right, together with the 
associated rules, can be evaluated in terms of the presence or absence of cer-
tain characteristics. He lists six but his ordering of 'duration, flexibility, exclusiv-
ity, quality of tit le, transferability and divisibility' is presumably arbitrary 
(figure 5.1). 
Quality of title seems likely to be paramount as questions as to who really 
owns the property are critical. Quality is best where ownership can not be con-
tested and worst where there is uncertainty and conflict. All the other dimen-
sions seem self explanatory except flexibility which presumably means that the 
property is not constrained as to how it may be used, perhaps as in being free 
to live in a house or lease it to someone else or in using an allocation of days-
at-sea in whatever way suits the fisherman and his vessel. The concept embod-
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ied in figure 5.1 is that each characteristic may be rated up to 100% depending 
on the type of property right conferred. 
Flexibility 
Duration 
Divisibility 
Exclusivity 
Quality of Title 
Transferability 
Figure 5.1 Characteristics of property rights 
Figure 5.1 covers the elements which describe individual property rights 
and help to establish their value. It is, however, essential to bring all the other 
aspects of property rights into consideration and this is done in summary form 
in figure 5.2. 
This study will concentrate on property rights along the lines of Bromley's 
definition in considering only protected rights to a stream of benefits gener-
ated within fishing. This covers resource regimes which may vary from the very 
general, such as restricting entry to the fishing grounds by allowing access only 
to fishermen of the state concerned, to the very specific, as in an individual 
transferable quota. While much will depend on the legislation creating these 
very general and very specific property rights, it would be expected that the 
scaling on figure 5.1 would differ greatly. The general licence would result in 
points near the origin on the six axes, enclosing a small area, as against an ITQ 
with more elements tending towards 100% giving a larger area. It should be 
stressed that continual change in detailed policy on catch allocations with lon-
ger stability in restrictive vessel licensing may alter this outcome; uncertainty 
may result in some discounting of the duration and quality of tit le elements. 
Stability in vessel licensing may in turn diminish the superiority of the ITQ to 
the general restrictive licence. 
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conditions: 
1. exclusion 
2. enforcemnt 
Value 
Authority 
(limiting) rules 
property rights 
= right to a benefit 
stream 
types of p.r's: 
state 
private 
common 
property 
Constraints 
characteristics: 
-durat ion 
-f lexibi l i ty 
-exclusivity 
-qual i ty of t i t le 
-transferability 
-divisibil ity 
Figure 5.2 Aspects of property rights 
The definition of rights in terms of benefit streams makes them goods in 
an economic sense. The pre-requisites of scarcity and utility are met because 
creating a property right excludes certain potential users from their desired 
access to a resource thereby causing scarcity in an economic sense. As for utility 
it is clear that the rights enable economic activity to proceed and generate 
additional welfare. Thus economic theory can be applied and tested on this 
subject. 
In the following, the concept of property rights wil l be used for rights 
that meet Bromley's definition. When also other (not quite exclusive) rights are 
concerned the concept 'fishing rights' is used. 
5.2 Limitations for the fishing industry resulting from the Common 
Fisheries Policy 
5.2.1 End of open access and creation of property rights 
Figure 5.2 illustrates that property rights may result from limitations and, 
therefore, it is useful to consider firstly limitations in fisheries. 
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The decrease in open access for the individual fisherman is a process, that 
has been going on for a longer time. The area that came under the jurisdiction 
of a managing authority has grown continuously. 
The first international agreed limitation was already in 1882. The North 
Sea Fisheries Convention allowed the North Sea countries to establish an exclu-
sive three mile zone for fisheries. Fishing in this zone could be reserved for citi-
zens of the country in question. 
The situation remained about the same until 1964. Until then most of the 
fishing outside the three mile zone was free. The NEAFC 1), a cooperation be-
tween all the coastal states in the Northeastern Atlantic, could only give recom-
mendations to the Member States about fisheries management issues. In the 
early sixties some countries (especially the UK and Nordic countries) wanted to 
extend their coastal zone in order to protect their local fishermen. The Euro-
pean Fisheries Convention 2) allowed the coastal countries to enlarge their 
coastal zone to six or twelve miles. Extending of the zone to twelve miles was 
only permitted, if also the historic rights of other countries fishing in these wa-
ters (between six and twelve miles) are taken in account. Not all countries ex-
tended their zone to six or twelve miles. Some countries (West Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium) made bilateral agreements that even permitted fish-
ermen to fish inside the coastal zone. 
EEC jurisdiction 
The result of all these agreements is that the width of the coastal zone 
differed a lot within and among the countries. This has had also consequences 
for the jurisdiction of later Common Fisheries Policy. The legislation on fisheries 
started only very late because there was very limited interest in such policy by 
the six Member States 3). This changed due to the accession negotiations with 
Norway, UK and Denmark. In 1970 the Six agreed on a Structural Regulation 
(2141/70), which also established the principle of equal access. This Regulation 
(later on replaced by 101/76) stated that 'Member States shall ensure equal 
conditions and access to and the use of fishing grounds ... for all the vessels 
flying the flag of a Member State'. 
The article on the principle of equal access caused a lot of difficulties in 
the access negotiations with the UK, Norway and Denmark. The three countries 
asked for a bigger coastal zone than the EEC would allow them. In the end a 
transitional period was agreed until 1983 which meant that some areas were 
derogated from the general principle of equal access. All the countries could 
keep their coastal zone and some zones were extended further (e.g. Norway 
Pout Box, Shetland Box) in order to protect the interest of local fisheries com-
munities. The derogation had to be reconsidered after the transitional period 
ending on 31 December 1982. The derogation is still in force and the next revi-
sion will be in 2002. 
1) North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, founded in 1959. 
2) Countries from EEC and EFTA represented. 
3) The six Member States in the fifties and sixties. 
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The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1974) al-
lowed coastal states to establish a coastal zone of 200 miles. This led in 1976 to 
the decision of the EEC also to establish a coastal zone of 200 miles (starting on 
1 January 1977). The 200 miles zone, apart from the smaller national zones 
(three to twelve miles), came more or less under the jurisdiction of the EEC. For 
the first time the Community could have substantial influence on the manage-
ment of fisheries resources. Even then the real Common Fisheries Policy could 
only start in 1983, because of the difficulties in negotiating access to the water 
of Member States. 
The accession of Spain and Portugal caused another change in the access 
regulations of the EC. Until 2002 only 300 listed vessels are allowed to fish in 
the (old) EC waters 1). No Spanish nor Portuguese vessel is allowed to fish in 
the North Sea or Baltic Sea (also until 2002). 
The succession of regulations limited further the access of the individual 
fishermen to existing and new fishing areas. For some areas the citizenship of 
a certain country became more valuable, because of the potential fishing 
rights. Therefore, citizenship also represented a kind of property right. Some 
local fishermen could have benefits from their citizenship because other com-
panies were prepared to pay a sum for their service being a citizen of the coun-
try in question. A good example is the invasion of Spanish ships re-flagged in 
the UK. The Anglo - Spanish companies used enough British labour and services 
to fulf i l l the British legal requirements. 
5.2.2 Establishment of the Common Fisheries Policy 
On January 25 1983 the Council agreed on the new Common Fisheries 
Policy. The new regulations gave the EC more power because the Member 
States had agreed on the area that came under the jurisdiction of the Commu-
nity. Three new regulations were adopted by the Council namely: 
Regulation 170/83 establishing a Community system for conservation and 
management of fisheries resources. Later on replaced by Regulation 
3760/92; 
Regulation 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conser-
vation of fisheries resources. Later on replaced and amended by Regula-
tions 3094/86 and 345/92; 
Regulation 172/83 -181/83 fixing for certain fish stocks and groups of fish 
stocks occurring in the Community's fishing zone, total allowable catches 
for 1982, the share available to the Community, the allocation of that 
share between Member States and the conditions under which the total 
allowable catches may be fished. 
These three regulations also form the framework of the Common Fisher-
ies Policy of the present EU. The goal of the CFP is stated as follows: 2) 
1) Not more than 150 at one time, art. 159/160 Iberian Act of Accession. 
2) Regulation 3760/92. 
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'as concerns the exploitation activities the general objectives of the com-
mon fisheries policy shall be to protect and conserve available living ma-
rine aquatic resources, and to provide for rational and responsible exploi-
tation on a sustainable basis, in appropriate economic and social condi-
tions for the sector, taking account of its implications for the marine eco-
system, and in particular taking into account of the needs of both pro-
ducers and consumers'. 
Three main goals that can be derived from this Regulation: 
1. conservation of resources - conservation policy; 
2. viable fishing industry - structure policy; 
3. stable market conditions - market policy. 
These three goals are also reflected in the names of the various EU regu-
lations, although some of the regulations are a more mixture of the different 
policies. 
5.2.3 Conservation policy 
The following measures and instruments are part of the present EU policy 
on conservation of resources: 
1. total allowable catches (TAC) and national quotas 
In January 1983 the Member States agreed on a system of TAC and na-
tional quota. Before 1983 the NEAFC (see note 1) only made recommen-
dations on national quotas. Some Member States used these advisory 
quotas as a base for their national fisheries management (e.g. ITQ plaice 
and sole in the Netherlands). The responsibility for the management of 
national quotas is at the national authorities, like it was in the forerunner 
of the Community quota system. 
Important issues of the agreement of 1983 are the definition of the fish-
ing regions (Reg. 171/83) and the national shares in the overall TAC (Reg. 
172/83-181/83). The base for the division of theTACs into national quotas 
is the average landings in the period 1973-1978. Some areas got extra 
quotas because of losses of fishing grounds outside EC waters (e.g. Ice-
land). There is also an allowance for regions that are heavily dependent 
on fisheries (mainly in the UK and Ireland) 1). These regions get a larger 
share when the total TAC falls below a certain level. 
The next revision of the shares of the Member States will be in 2002, but 
there is also a possibility for revision in 1996. 
2. technical measures 2): 
a. minimum mesh sizes for the different species and fishing areas (first 
EC regulation on this subject from 1977). Most of these regulations 
1) The Hague Preference Zone, 1976. 
2) Reg. 171/83, later amended by reg. 3094/86 and reg. 345/92. 
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are based on the forerunner NEAFC regulations, that already had 
more impact than only a recommendation; 
b. limitation in fishing in certain areas. There are large number of fish-
ing areas with special regulation. There are seasonal bans for in-
stance fishing of mackerel in the western end of the English Channel 
or cod in the German Bight. There also areas with restrictions on 
gear or engine power. In the twelve miles zone along the continent, 
fishing is only allowed for a listed group of vessels wi th engine 
power of 300 BHP or less (Eurocutters) 1). Due to this limitation a 
place on the EU list, 'an Eurocutter licence', also has become a prop-
erty right (see also section 5.3-5.5); 
c. limitations in the use of gears. For instance maximum beam length 
of 24m outside and 8m inside coastal zone (since 1989); 
d. tie up schemes. The Council imposed in 1991 and 1992 a tie up 
scheme for vessels fishing for cod, because of the very low stocks. 
3. enforcement measures 
The responsibility for the enforcement of the Community measures rests 
with the Member State. There is no direct control of fishermen by Com-
munity inspectors. The task of the Community inspector concerns wether 
the Member State carries out the control measures in the right way. Sev-
eral regulations have been made on how to carry out the control e.g. on 
logbooks (reg 2241/87) and vessel registration (reg 109/94). 
However, the Community has very limited possibilities to 'punish' Mem-
ber States which do not comply wi th the rules, apart from instituting 
Article 169 proceedings. 
5.2.4 Structure policy 
The aim of the first EU Structural Regulation (2141/70) was mainly on 
expanding the total production of the fishing industry. Gradually other goals 
have become more important, especially the process of adapting the capacity 
to the fishing possibilities. In the last regulation (3760/92) conservation, socio-
economic and regional aspects are also taken in account. Most of the structural 
policy is laid down in the MAGP. The core of the MAGPs are the goals on the 
capacity for the national fishing fleets. The goals on capacity of the MAGP of 
1987 was a reduction in 1991 of the overall tonnage by 3% and installed en-
gine power (kW) by 2%. For some Member States this was a reason to set up 
a licensing system or to limit the issue of licences in order to meet the targets 
of the MAGP. Therefore, the MAGP created indirectly a property right linked 
with the licences. A more detailed description of the licensing systems is in sec-
tion 5.3-5.5 of this chapter (national limitations). 
Although some effort was made, not all Member States succeeded to 
meet the objectives. The Community has no real means to make Member States 
1) Art. 20 of 171/83. 
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meet the goals. The only tool is to restrict the grants only to countries or fish-
ing fleets that meet the capacity requirements. 
The goals of the MAGP (1992-1996) are reduction of the capacity of 20% 
for demersal bottom trawl and 15% for benthic stocks (nephrops). It is allowed 
to realize 45% of the total reduction by other means like limiting the number 
of days-at-sea. This may give an impetus to the creation of another property 
right, the number of days-at-sea. 
Other measures and instruments of the Community Structural Policy are: 
a. funds for restructuring, renewal and modernization of fishing fleets. 
These funds are only available for Member States and fishing fleets that 
meet the targets of the MAGP; 
b. funds for development of aquaculture, processing and marketing; 
c. community support for adjustment of fishing capacity by temporary or 
permanent withdrawal of fishing vessels from fishing activities. There is 
a possibility of a Member State to ask the Community for financial sup-
port for the national decommissioning scheme; 
d. funding for the search for new outlets of surplus products (species that 
are abundantly available); 
e. support for regions lagging behind because of industrial decline and un-
derdeveloped areas (also money from EU Regional Fund); 
f. social policy: training, health care. 
5.2.5 Market policy 
An important part of the Market Regulation is derived from agriculture, 
which is especially reflected in the first Regulation (2142/76). Even though 
there are some important differences, the amount and the share of price sup-
port is much lower than in the field of agriculture. Only a decreasing share of 
the total costs for withdrawal of fish is reimbursed to the PO by the Commu-
nity. 
The Producer Organization (PO) plays a vital role in the Market Policy. A 
PO can carry large number of legislative and coordinating activities. One of the 
goals of the market policy is to encourage the formation of POs. 
Measures and instruments of the present Market Regulation 1) are: 
a. System of withdrawal and guiding prices: 
the EU sets guide prices for large number of fish species and fish prod-
ucts. This guide price plays an important role in the import regulations 
(minimum important price, tariff contingent). 
The guide price is the basis for the minimum price that PO is allowed to 
set (maximum 90% of the guide price). The PO gets the storage cost and 
a decreasing share of withdrawal cost reimbursed. The maximum support 
is limited to 20% of the total landings; 
b. specification of marketing standards for grading (size classes) and fresh-
ness for major commercial species; 
1) Regulation 3759/92. 
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c. support for formation of producers organizations; 
d. setting up a system of import regulations. 
5.2.6 Relationship wi th property rights 
Limiting measures may create rights, more as certain groups or individuals 
are exempted from constraints. It seems that in many cases on EU and on na-
tional level limiting measures have unintentionally created (property) rights. 
The scheme in figure 5.2 may clarify the relationship between limiting 
measures and property rigths. 
The EU structural and market policy have resulted in different kinds of 
support for the industry. This also may create rigths, more valuable as the 'ben-
efit stream' (from Bromley's definition in section 5.1) is more exclusive. 
It will considered in sections 5.3-5.5 to which extent property rights have 
been created in the Danish, Dutch and British fishing sector. 
5.2.7 Possible changes which may affect property rights 
Although it is difficult to foresee the future of the EU fisheries policy (leg-
islation), some future changes in the policy can be expected on the basis of 
developments already going on or simply because these revisions have been 
built in the system. 
It can be expected that the following issues wil l play a key role in the 
coming years: 
a. changes built in the CFP 
There are several derogations and transitional periods in the EU fisheries 
regulation. Many of them wil l have to be reconsidered. For instance the 
transitional period on the access of Spain and Portugal into the 'old' 
Community waters will end in 2002 for Community waters except the 
waters west of Ireland. It is obvious that the granting of fishing rights to 
the 'newcomers' will have consequences for the fishing possibilities of the 
current users of the resources; 
b. discussion on the principle of relative stability 1) 
The reconsideration of national quotas is planned to take place in 2002. 
The share of the national quotas in the total TACs is supposed to be un-
changed until 2002. The present scheme of fixed shares based on the 
general principle of 'relative stability', means that Member State get a 
fixed share of the TACs; 
The division of TACs into national shares which are supposed to be 
caught by national fishermen is a derogation of the general Community 
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. Therefore, the 
principle of relative stability should be abandoned but strong opposition 
of member countries could prevent or ease this abandonment (Holden, 
1994, p. 242). 
1) Laid down in Regulations 172-181/83. 
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c. more attention for input control; 
At this moment the MAGP goals on capacity are not enforceable. This 
situation might change when a Community licensing system is intro-
duced. A beginning is made wi th the new legislation on vessel registra-
tion 1). Starting from 1 January 1995 all fishing vessels need to be regis-
tered and information from the register need to be handed over to the 
Community. Changes in the registers must be reported within a certain 
time limit. 
In the future this Community vessel register could probably be used as an 
instrument to regulate the total fishing capacity (Holden, 1994, p. 246). 
A better adjustment of fishing capacity to fishing possibilities would re-
sult in better protection of fishing rights; 
d. effort control 
Control on effort might become more important in the future. In the 
present MAGP also a reduction of days-at-sea is allowed to reach the 
goals on capacity. For the control of such a system the Commission al-
ready proposed to install satellite equipment (Holden, 1994); 
e. changes in the quota system 
There is discussion and research on how to increase the flexibility of the 
quota system. A problem within the present system is that by-catches 
often do not match with quota. Multi-species quota might offer the nec-
essary flexibility. 
Another way to increase flexibility is to introduce multi-annual TACs 
which would prevent large variations in the level of the TAC. 
5.3 Property rights and legal f ramework in Denmark 
5.3.1 Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy in Denmark 
The Member States are responsible for the implementation of the CFP in 
their countries. 
The fish stocks situated inside the Member States Economic Zone are 
property of the EU and the Member States. The resource and conservation 
management of these fish stocks is the responsibility of the Community, i.e. the 
Commission and the Council, while the national Governments, in consideration 
of the management of Community, regulate the fishing activities of the na-
tional fleets. The national fishing policy most be at least as restrictive as the 
Community policy, because the national policy must respect the Community 
policy. 
The mean measures in the resource and conservation policy are Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) for the important stocks (the quota based species) and 
technical measures. The TACs set a upper limit for the Danish catches of the 
species in question, while the technical measures regulate the distribution and 
1) Art. 5 of Regulation 3760/92. 
36 
composition of the fishing activity. Whether it is fair to say that this limitation 
is only due to the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) can be discussed, because with-
out the CFP another regulation system should have been in force, probably 
including some kind of distribution of the catch possibilities. 
The Structure Policy, particular the MAGP with fixed objectives for reduc-
t ion in the capacity of the fleet, has been implemented by a decommissioning 
scheme in Denmark. In the first years (until) 1987 the funds allocated to the 
structure policy were mainly used to restructure and extend the Danish fleet, 
while after 1987 the main part of the funds has been used to fulf i l l the goals 
of the MAGP. The effect of the MAGP for 1987-91 have been a reduction in the 
capacity of the Danish fleet by 15.7% in terms of GRT and 14.6% in terms of 
kW. The MAGP for 1992-96 operates with reductions in GRT and kW of the 
Danish fleet by 4.5% and 15.3%, respectively. 
There are more measures resulting from the CFP which importantly affect 
the operation of the Danish vessels, but this short description refers only to 
measures which can be assumed to form the basis of more or less individualized 
property rights in Danish fisheries. 
5.3.2 Limitations for the industry resulting from the Danish fisheries policy 
There is at least one characteristic of the Danish fishery and management 
that must be taken into account, when dealing with limitations from the Dan-
ish Fishery Policy. The Danish fishery is characterized by a flexible multi-purpose 
fleet, which relatively easy can move from fishery to fishery, i.e. they can 
change area and target species, which all things equal affects the possibility for 
an effective regulation. Moreover, many of the fisheries are multi-species fish-
ery, i.e., more than one species are caught during the fishing action. 
National quota management 
The basic for the Danish regulation of the fishery is the yearly TACs deter-
mined by the Community, of which Denmark is allocated a certain share. Ac-
cording to the Danish law of regulation of the fisheries is the purpose of the 
Danish regulation to achieve a better exploitation of the resources compared 
to the outcome of a free fishery, which in practice means division of the avail-
able resources/quotas in time periods and on fleets/vessels. 
At the output side the main instruments are, in general, when dealing 
with quota based species, i.e. cod, haddock, saithe, whit ing, plaice, mackerel, 
herring, hake, sole, deep water prawn, salmon and sprat: 
1. quarterly based (total) quotas; 
2. allocation of individual vessel rations for a given period; and 
3. fishing stops. If the national quota is fished up before the end of the 
year, then the fishery is simply closed. 
Quarterly quotas (1) secure that the Danish quotas and consequently the 
fishing activity are spread over the year, while assignment of rations (2) divides 
the quotas among the fishing vessels normally by gear and length. If the land-
ings during the season are above the quarterly quotas the fishery is in many 
37 
cases closed (3) until the landings for the rest of the season are believed to be 
within the total Danish quota. 
For the non-quota based species there is no regulation on the output 
side. 
Another restriction on the output side is minimum landing size (see sec-
t ion 5.2). Here Denmark has for several species chosen more restrictive mea-
sures. 
National capacity management 
It is appropriate to divide the description of the national capacity man-
agement into two different parts according to whether the time horizon is 
short or long. Long term capacity management deals with entry and exit to the 
fishery, in economic terms changes in the fixed costs, while short term capacity 
management regulate how, where and when to use the current capacity. Fi-
nally the effort regulation (days-at-sea) will be described. 
Long term capacity management 
Access to the Danish fishery sector is nowadays limited. To achieved the 
right to access the fishery sector two authorizations are needed, first a recogni-
t ion as a commercial fisherman and second a vessel licence. 
To become authorized as a commercial fisherman three conditions must 
be fulfi l led: 
1. Danish citizenship or affiliations to Danish fishery. 
2. Been occupied by commercial fishery in the last 12 month. 
3. Over 3/5 of last year personal gross income came from fishery. 
A company can also be registered as entitled to conduct commercial fish-
ery, if at least 2/3 of the participants are registered as commercial fishermen. 
To become entitled to insert (a vessel) capacity into the Danish fleet de-
pends on two things: 
1. An authorization from the ministry of fisheries to use the vessel to com-
mercial fishery. In practice the Ministry only gives a permission if either 
corresponding capacity leaves the fishery or the capacity is directed to-
wards definite species. However, the last possibility is seldom used. 
2. The capacity (vessel) must for the part of 2/3 be owned by persons, who 
are authorized as commercial fishermen. Or the vessel must be owned by 
a company, which is entitled to conduct commercial fishery. 
There is at the overall level limited access of vessels to the Danish fishery 
sector, while there are restrictions at whom can conduct commercial fishery. 
The regulation of the total existing capacity is based on control of the 
capacity of the individual vessels. Only wi th a permission from the Ministry of 
Fisheries it is allowed to extend the capacity of the existing vessels. The capacity 
is measured along six dimensions: GRT, length, width, depth, hold capacity and 
power of the engine. It is allowed the change gear wi thout permission, how-
ever, it is not allowed without permission to rebuild the vessel, which make 
fishery with beam trawl (only if engine power >500 HP) and (purse) seine gear 
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possible. It should be pointed out that the capacity of vessels can be changed 
in other directions than the six mentioned above, e.g. through improvement 
of storage or catch technology. 
Short term capacity management 
In principle all the vessels are allowed to participate (sometimes a per-
mit/licence is required) in the fisheries (defined by target of species and area). 
The exceptions in 1993 were: 
a. the purse seiners which are not allowed to fish in the Kattegat, the inner 
Danish waters and the Baltic Sea; 
b. vessels wi th engine power >300 HP are not allowed to fish in the ICES 
area Ilk, i.e., inner Danish Water; 
c. vessels longer than 22m are not allowed to participate in the sprat fishery 
in the Skagerrak; 
d. vessels longer than 19m are not allowed to participate in the sprat fishery 
in the Kattegat; 
e. a fishery in the North Sea targeting sole is not allowed in the month of 
marts; 
f. in the Kattegat fishery after herring is not allowed in the months of June 
and July; 
g. in the ICES area Ilk is fishery after herring and sprat not allowed in the 
period 1th of July to 15th of August. 
Participation in some of the fisheries requires an special permission from 
the Ministry. The fisheries are: 
a. the herring fishery; 
b. the mackerel fishery (not required in 1994); 
c. the cod fishery in ICES areas 23-32, if the vessel is longer than 12m; 
d. the sprat fishery in the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and ICES areas 23-32. 
A permission is given for a certain time period and specifies an individual 
ration given for that period. Decision about the number of issued permissions 
in the individual fishery depends on the supply situation and rational exploita-
t ion of the quantities that are available at a given time. When selection be-
tween applicants are necessary, the Ministry of Fisheries can give priority to 
whose that are depended on the fishery in question. 
Entry and exit of the fisheries, in which the target of specie(s) are species 
without quota, are not regulated. For fisheries, in which the target of specie(s) 
are quota based species, it is possible to change fishery during a ration period. 
In fisheries on human consumption species a vessel can change from one area 
to another, given that the catch corresponds to the ration at the time of 
change in the ration period. The ration in the new area is proportional ad-
justed based on the time of change. (Only) one change between a fishery on 
human consumption species and a fishery on industrial species is possible dur-
ing the ration period for the fishery on human consumption species. Again the 
rations are adjusted corresponding to the time of change and when changing 
to a fishery on human consumption species by-catches of human consumption 
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species sorted out in the industrial fishery are included in the landings from the 
human consumption fishery. For the TAC-regulated species only in the herring 
fishery a licence is required. 
Licence is, however, also required to participate in: 
a. the common shrimp fishery by the Westcoast of Jutland; 
b. the mussel and oyster fishery; and 
c. the mussel and cockle fishery in the Wadden Sea. 
Among the conditions for obtaining these licences are special demands 
to the equipment of the participating vessels, limits in fishing time and areas, 
and maximum allowed catch per vessel per time period. 
Other restrictions on the input side is mesh size regulations, by-catch rules 
and boxes/closed areas (see section 5.2). 
National effort (days-at-sea) management 
In three fisheries some kind of effort management was in force in 1993. 
In the herring and mackerel fishery each participating vessel is required to ap-
ply for a certain amount of fishing days within rationperiods of 120 days. The 
vessels can apply for less than 120 days. On days which are not 'herring or 
mackerel fishing days' the vessels can participate in other fisheries under the 
regulations that are in force for the fisheries in question. After deciding the 
number of fishing days, the vessels are then assigned a maximum allowed catch 
of herring or/and mackerel for the ration period depending on the number of 
fishing days and the length of the vessel. Thus these fisheries are regulated by 
both an output and input measure. 
As an experiment effort regulation was introduced in the sole fishery in 
the Kattegat in the month of November 1993. Within a period for 14 days the 
vessels are allowed to have maximum 7 days-at-sea, and have only obligations 
concerning the regulation of the Community (i.e. minimum landing size, mesh 
size and so on) and the Danish regulation of other species which are by-catches 
in the sole fishery, mainly cod. The vessels were allowed to participate in other 
fisheries during the period, but days used in other fisheries were deducted 
from the allocated number of days to the sole fishery. 
5.3.3 Property rights in the Danish fishing industry 
In this section the existence of property rights will be considered from the 
viewpoint of the different fleets segments. The fleet segments wil l be defined 
following the division used by the EEC in the MAGPfor 1993-1996. The main 
segments for Denmark (Commission decision 92/558/EEC) are (1) purse seiners, 
(2) trawlers fishing in Greenland waters, (3) trawlers and Danish seiners and (4) 
Gill-netters and others. However, the segments should fol low three different 
categories depending on the target species, of which the fishing effort should 
be reduced by 20%, 15% and 0%, respectively: 
1. vessels fishing after demersal stocks with pair bottom trawl net or otter 
bottom trawl net; 
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1,273 
1,463 
2 
11 
16,433 
88,064 
3,480 
6,949 
93,998 
374,655 
3,810 
15,815 
2. vessels fishing after flatfish stocks with beam trawl net; 
3. others (e.g. vessels fishing after pelagic stocks). 
Table 5.1 Danish fleet in main fleet segments by numbers, GRTand kW (92/558/EEC) 1.1.1992 
Numbers GRT kW 
Gill-netters etc. 
Trawlers a) and Danish seine b) 
Trawlers, Greenland waters 
Purse seine 
a) Must be further divided into demersal, pelagic and specialized trawlers in order to determine 
the reduction according to the MAGP; b) The final reduction figure depends on evaluation of 
selectivity and catch composition. 
As described in section 5.3.2 there is an overall limited access to the Dan-
ish fishery and limited possibilities to extend the existing vessel (capacity). Since 
1987 it has not been possible to insert a vessel or extend existing vessels in cer-
tain directions (new capacity) without taking just as much capacity out of the 
fleet. All things equal this situation should increase the value of the resource 
for the fishermen, that are in the sector, because the limited access to the ben-
efit stream from the resource may increase exclusivity. The decommissioning 
scheme in Denmark has, given this system of limited access, contributed effec-
tively to reduce the number of fishermen/vessels and the capacity in terms of 
GRT and kW in the sector. 
The Danish regulation of the vital human consumption species is based 
on quarterly based quota, rationing and fish stops and to a limited extent per-
missions, while the only fishery of the industrial fisheries in the EEC-zone, that 
is national regulated, is the sprat fishery. In the Norwegian zone Denmark is 
allocated a quota of sand-ell and norway pout. Only if the quotas are exploited 
to a certain extent within a given period, national regulation is carried out. 
This system can regulate the individual vessels fishing possibilities, but the 
system can not control the total fishing effort in the fisheries, because the ac-
cess to each fishery, in general, is non-regulated. The most economic attractive 
fisheries will attract effort and each fisherman wil l try to fulfi l l his ration first, 
because when the quarterly quota or the total Danish quota is exhausted the 
fishery is stopped. The conclusion is, therefore, that the overall limited access 
to the Danish fishery and limited possibilities to extend the existing capacity 
wi l l not reduce the overcapacity in the most profitable fisheries, maybe the 
effort in the least attractive fisheries are reduced. The result is still that too 
much effort is attracted into certain fisheries. 
Property rights in the purse seine sector 
The purse seiners participate in the herring and mackerel fishery in the 
North Sea and the Skagerrak. They are not allowed to fish in other Danish Wa-
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ters. The regulation of both fisheries is based on allocation of special permis-
sions, which specify: 
a. a number of fishing days within a given ration period where the vessel 
can participate in the fishery; and 
b. a maximum allowed catch for the ration period depending on the num-
ber of fishing days, the length of vessel and the type of fishery (human 
consumption fishery, mixed human consumption and industrial fishery). 
However, to participate in the herring fishery a general licence is re-
quired. The licence gives only a general access right to the fishery and if a vessel 
obey certain technical standards the vessel is entitled to a licence. 
Also trawlers participate in the herring fishery, while only purse seiners 
participate in the mackerel fishery. 
Property rights in the trawler sector 
This sector is very heterogeneous in two ways. First the vessels participate 
over the year in several fisheries, i.e. multi-purpose fleet. Second the vessels 
participate in different fisheries, i.e. they don't have the same fishery pattern. 
However, there seems to a connection between the size of the vessels and the 
fisheries they actual participate in. 
The access to the trawler fleet is a certain degree limited (gill-netters and 
Danish seiners can change the gear to trawl), but the access to the different 
fisheries are, in general, not limited, which implies that in the different fisher-
ies no property rights in terms of exclusivity exist. However, allocation of indi-
vidual vessel rations can be viewed as a right to fish a given amount within a 
given period, i.e., a kind of an individual non-transferable quota. 
The main fisheries after industrial species for the trawler fleet are (Re-
mark that in general all the fisheries are multi-species fisheries): 
Norway Pout (by-catch of roundfish) in the North Sea (Fladen); 
sandell (almost pure) in the North Sea; and 
sprat (by-catch of herring) in the North Sea and in ICES MIA. 
The main fisheries after human consumption species are: 
herring (almost pure) in the North Sea and Skagerrak; 
mixed roundfish in the northern North Sea and in Skagerrak; 
plaice (with other human consumption species as well) in the North Sea 
and in Skagerrak; 
mixed human consumption in the North Sea; 
shrimp (by-catch of roundfish, lobster and monk) in the North Sea and in 
Skagerrak; 
lobster (by-catch of human consumption species in general and of sole in 
particular in Kattegat) in Skagerrak and Kattegat (ICES IMA); and 
cod in Inner Danish Waters (ICES IIIBC). 
The smaller trawlers (<20 GRT) are represented in all the fisheries after 
human consumption species expect in the herring fishery and only a very small 
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part of the smaller trawlers participates also in the fisheries after industrial 
species: the sprat fishery in ICES IMA and the sandell fishery in the North Sea. 
Only vessels greater than 100 GRT participate in the fisheries after indus-
trial species all year round. Only a few of the trawlers (>100 GRT) are human 
consumption trawlers, i.e. participate only in fisheries after human consump-
tion species (the main fisheries are herring, shrimp, lobster and mixed roundfish 
and human consumption). 
But from a technological point of view nearly all the trawlers can partici-
pate in every fishery after industrial and human consumption species. Which 
fisheries the vessels actually participate in depend on, in part of the relative 
profitability between the different fisheries and in part of the regulation. In 
the North Sea only the Herring and Mackerel fisheries are access regulated. In 
ICES lllbcd also the Sprat (an industrial species) fishery are access regulated and 
in ICES lllbd the cod fishery is access regulated as well for vessels with length 
larger than 12 metres. Expect from these fisheries it is possible to participate 
in all the other fisheries, if of course the other parts of the regulation is re-
spected (e.g. minimum mesh size, vessels restrictions, rations, boxes). 
Property rights in the Danish seine sector 
The Danish seine vessels participate in fishery after plaice mainly in the 
North Sea and Skagerrak, and to a smaller extent in Kattegat. The most impor-
tant by-catch species are cod and haddock. The proportion of the by-catch var-
ies over the season and area. The fishery after plaice is not subject to any na-
tional regulation at the beginning of the year. Only if the quota of plaice is 
exploited to a certain extent within a given period, national regulation is car-
ried out by imposing rations. So the main restrictions (if any) in the Danish 
seine fishery are coming from the regulation of the by-catch species. 
Property rights in the gill-net sector 
The main fishery for the gill-netters is the cod fishery in the North Sea and 
the Skagerrak. The by-catch of other species in this fishery is relatively small. 
Some of the vessels greater than 20 GRT combine the cod fishery with a turbot 
fishery and/or a sole fishery. The two latter fisheries are season fisheries and 
take normally place from April to July. The vessels smaller than 20 GRT partici-
pate besides the cod fishery in the sole fishery, the turbot fishery and the plaice 
fishery with by-catch of mainly cod and sole. The most typical fishery patterns 
are (a) cod fishery the whole year (b) cod and turbot fishery (c) plaice and sole 
fishery and (d) cod and sole fishery. 
There are no special regulations for the gill-netters. They are restricted 
mainly by the rations in the cod fishery and the sole fishery. 
In figure 5.3 the different measures with respect to fleets and type of 
regulation resulting in some source of property rights are shown. 
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Licence: 
- Vessel 
- Herring 
- Common shrimp 
- Mussel and Oyster 
- Mussel and Cockle 
Permission to fish: 
- Herring 
- Mackerel d) 
- Sprat (ICES lllabcd) 
- Cod (ICES lllbd) 
- Industry fishery (ICES lllbcd) 
- ICESIIIc 
Area restrictions: 
- ICES lllbcd + Kattegat 
Vessellength restrictions: 
- Sprat (Skagerrak) 
- Sprat (Kattegat) 
Engine power restrictions: 
- ICESIIIci) 
Rations per time period 
depending on vessellength: 
- Cod (North Sea, Skagerrak, ICES bed) 
- Sole (North Sea) 
- Mackerel 
- Herring 
- Sprat (North Sea) 
- Sprat (lllbd) 
Rations per timeperiod: 
- Cod (Kattegat) 
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- Saithe 
- Hake (ICES Ilia) 
- Sole (lllabcd) 
- Sprat (lilac) 
Permission to rebuilding: 
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Figure 5.3 Survey of fishing rights in Danish Fishery Industry 
a) Expect gill-netters with vessellength <12m; b) In the Wadden Sea; c) Expect gill-netters with 
vessel length <12m in the Kattegat and ICES lllc; d) Only if the catch is over 50 tonnes per 
month; e) Expect vessels with length <12m; f) Not allowed; g) Only vessels with length <22m are 
allowed; h) Only vessels with length <19m are allowed; i) Vessels with engine power >300 HP 
are not allowed; j) Only if rebuilding to beam trawler with engine power >500 HP. 
Institutional environment 
The fishermen's associations have a statutory status in the decision-mak-
ing process, when the Danish fishery policy is formulated. This status is given 
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both when the Danish fishery policy wi th respect to the Community is estab-
lished and when the internal Danish policy is formulated. 
In both cases a consultative committee advises the Minister. In the case 
of the Community the committee advises the Minister about the Danish atti-
tude to proposals from the Commission. Further, the committee advises about 
the regulation, which is necessary in order to implement the Common Fishery 
Policy. In the case of the internal Danish fishery policy the committee advises 
the Minister about the design of the regulations of the different fisheries and 
about the capacity of and changes in the fleet. 
It should be emphasized that the Minister can disregard the advise from 
the committees, but traditional the Minister follows the advise. 
Final and concluding remarks 
In figures 5.3 and 5.4 the measures creating property rights are divided 
into measures regulating input and output, respectively, and the different 
property rights are described with respect to certain characteristics. It should 
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Figure 5.4 Fishing rights referring to inputs in Danish fisheries 
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be noted that the restrictions mentioned in figure 5.2 is not included here, 
because they do not explicitly refer to neither input nor output rights. The re-
strictions in figure 5.3 and 5.4 give the vessels in question some rights. 
When looking at the fishery sector, property rights have been created on 
a sector level, because of the limited access to the Danish fishing industry. The 
participating fishermen and vessels have rights to the benefit stream from the 
resources and by controlling also the existing capacity the income distribution 
of the stream is stabilized. 
On the individual level, however, only a few property rights have be es-
tablish. The herring licence is an example of this, but also the permits to fish 
can be applied to control to access to specific fisheries, which for the participat-
ing fishermen creates rights to the benefit stream. The instrument of permit's 
is not at present used to fulfill such an objective. Instead, in principle, permit's 
are issued to all the applicants. This implies that the rations per time period 
must be set so the national quota is respected, which means that certain vessel 
groups that can not make a profit of the rations are implicitly excluded from 
the fishery in question of economic reasons. The permission measure is, there-
fore, more an administrative measure with the purpose to monitor the fishing 
activity than a measure with the purpose to regulate the fishing effort. How-
ever, there are a few exceptions. Getting a permission to participate in the 
sprat fishery in ICES Ilia and in the fishery in ICES lllc is depended on whether 
the fishermen also have had a permission in the previous years. 
Rations a) 
Objective 
Issued by 
Right to 
Allocated to 
Period 
Transferable 
Enforcement 
To allocate the quota over the year and vessels 
Ministry 
Catch a given amount of fish per ration period 
Vessel owners 
Definite 
No 
Fishery inspections 
Figure 5.5 Fishing rights referring to outputs in Danish fisheries 
a) The measure is applied to cod, haddock, saithe, hake, sole, mackerel, herring and sprat. 
5.3.4 Changes in the Danish situation relating to property rights in the pe-
riod 1994-1996 
In a report (dated May, 1993) from a working group with participation 
of representatives from the fisheries association, the labour union and the min-
istry, it is recommended among other things: 
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that the regulation of the Danish fishery for the main part of the fleet 
should be based on individual transferable quotas. Only the smaller ves-
sels should be operating without national regulation, however, in a tran-
sition period the number of landings is proposed regulated; 
that the use of technical measures is given a higher priority, especially the 
use of measures that can improve the selectivity; 
that specific trials of different types of regulation are tested; 
that the existing quota-system is given a higher flexibility through the use 
of multi-annual and multi-species quotas. 
These recommendations are so far not implemented in the actual regula-
t ion, but they can indicate into which direction the future regulation will 
evolve. However, some trials of new types of regulation have been executed. 
As mentioned in section 5.3.3 a days-at-sea regulation system has been tested 
in the sole fishery in the Kattegat in 1993. This system continued in 1994 and 
1995 and it was expanded in 1994 to include Inner Danish Waters (ICES Ilk). In 
1995 a trial system was conducted where the normal rations on cod were lifted 
for vessels operating under the days-at-sea system. Since cod is an important 
by-catch species in the sole fishery, discards and illegal landings of cod seem to 
be a problem, if cod is not included in the days-at-sea system. One of the pur-
poses with days-at-sea regulation is to allow the fishermen to land all their 
catches, which is believed to be impossible under the ration system. The system 
has so far not created property right, because the system is open for all fisher-
men/vessels and because it was still possible to conduct sole fishery under the 
ration system. 
In 1994 a trial with individual quotas in the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea 
has been tested. This regulation is also planned to be an alternative to the ex-
isting regulation. The system has continued in 1995 and 1996. The purpose of 
this system is to provide the fishermen a better opportunity to plan the fishing 
activity over the season. The individual quotas are allocated according to the 
length of the vessels (however, it is possible to adjust the quota the fol lowing 
year if the quota is not fulfilled). This system has the potential to develop to a 
property right based regulation system. However, the regulation has adminis-
trative features since all applicants can get access to an individual quota and 
in case the applications exceed the allocated total quota, the quota is set aside 
to fishery under ration. 
Also in the herring and mackerel fishery in the North Sea and Skagerrak 
regulation by means of individual (yearly) quotas is planned for 1994. This reg-
ulation is planned to replace the existing one. The system has continued in 
1995 and 1996. This system is limiting the access to the fisheries since the indi-
vidual quotas are only assigned to vessels already fishing herring and mackerel. 
The herring and mackerel fleet fishing in the North Sea and Skagerrak consists 
of specialized and relatively large vessels depending to a very large extend on 
these species. Assignment of individual quotas seems to be a reasonable regu-
lation measure in such a case. 
All these trials are evaluated against considerations about the future reg-
ulations. 
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5.4 Property rights and legal framework in the Netherlands 
5.4.1 Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy in the Netherlands 
For the Dutch Fishery Sector free entry to the fishing grounds ended 
roughly spoken, in 1976. In this year the EU Member States decided to establish 
the 200 miles Economic zone, following the declaration of the 200 miles exclu-
sive economic zones in 1974 during the UN conference about the international 
Law of the sea. 
The implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983 was an 
important event for the Dutch fishery sector. Since 1976 an Individual Quota 
(IQ) system for flatfish had been in force which was transformed into an indi-
vidual transferable quota (ITQ) system in 1985. The implementation of the CFP 
meant gradually a heavier enforcement for this system. 
Measures of this CFP mostly affecting now Dutch fisheries are: 
the Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for sole, plaice, herring, mackerel and 
cod; 
the MAGPs, which should reduce the fishing effort in terms of HP by 22% 
(cutter fisheries) in the period 1988-1991 and by 15% in the period 1991-
1996; 
the restriction of fishing in the 12 mile zone to vessels wi th a HP of 221 
kW (300HP) at maximum. 
There are more measures resulting from the CFP which importantly affect 
the operation of Dutch vessels, but this description refers to measures which 
have been the basis of more or less individualized property rights in Dutch fish-
eries. 
It should be noted that limitations resulting from the CFP may fluctuate 
to a large extend. The TAC for sole is a good example of this, showing a level 
of 9,700 tons in 1989 and 19,500 tons in 1991. Of course this reflects the differ-
ences in size of the stock. 
This makes clear that the benefit stream in the definition of Bromley (de-
scribed in chapter 5) to which property rights refer, may fluctuate very strongly. 
5.4.2 Limitations for the industry resulting from the Dutch fisheries policy 
5.4.2.1 National quota management 
For the Dutch fishing industry, the most important TACs expressed in 
terms of value, are the ones for sole, plaice, herring, mackerel, cod and whit-
ing. In order to avoid overfishing of these TACs, national Dutch fishery man-
agement contained the fol lowing limiting measures in 1993: 
a) Individual transferable quota for sole and plaice. Basis of these ITQs has 
been the historical catch of these species of the individual fisherman, 
adjusted in some cases for differences in capacity. 
48 
The flatfish ITQ is expressed yearly as a maximum quantity of kg sole and 
plaice to be caught for each vessel. This quantity fluctuates yearly, reflect-
ing annual variances in the TACs. 
b) Entitlements to fish on herring and mackerel. Herring entitlements have 
been split between the cutter fisheries and the freezer trawler sector. For 
the part of cutter fisheries in the herring TAC (22,400 tons in 1993) the 
Commodity Board for Fish and Fishery Products has allocated, on the basis 
of mutuel agreement, the herring entitlements to a limited number of 
skipper-owners. Historical rights have been the basis of this allocation. 
The freezer trawler section is entitled to catch the major part (58,700 tons 
in 1993) of the Dutch herring TAC and the full mackerel quotum has been 
reserved for this sector. The herring entitlements of the freezer trawlers 
are attached to the mackerel entitlements. These herring and mackerel 
fishing rights are managed by the Association of Shipowners on a private 
basis. This organisation represents a very limited number (four) of big 
fishing companies involved in fishing as well as in trading and processing 
activities. 
c) Specified fishing rights for cod and whit ing. These rights were not yet 
individualized in 1993, but allocated to three categories of fishing vessels: 
a) vessels which used to fish the full year on these species b) vessels wi th 
seasonal effort on cod and whiting and c) vessels landing both species as 
a by-catch in beam trawl or other fisheries. 
Fishing rights for cod and whit ing were, at the end of 1993, specified as 
the right to land a certain amount of boxes monthly. This number of 
boxes differed for the three categories mentioned above: category a) 600 
boxes, category b) 550 and category c) 75 boxes a month. Given the cate-
gory the number of boxes to land is the same for each size level of the 
vessel. These cod/whiting entitlements were not transferable in 1993. 
5.4.2.2 National capacity management 
The following measures aiming at limiting fishing capacity were in force 
in 1993: 
a) A licence per vessel on the basis of the HP of the vessel. Vessels fishing on 
quota species are obliged to have such a licence, which are transferable. 
The licence may be withhold from the vessel when the vessel is sold to 
another skipper-owner. 
This system of licences limits total engine power of the cutter fleet and 
also the engine capacity of the freezer trawler sector. The system was 
implemented in 1984 and aims at fulfi l l ing the goals of the Dutch part of 
the MAGPs. 
It is allowed to own a licence wi thout having a vessel, but only during a 
certain period (18 months at maximum in 1993). A HP reduction of 10% 
is applied when the licence is sold during this period of reservation. 
b) Maximum HP per vessel. Since 1987 maximum HP has been limited to 
2,000 HP per vessel, for new vessels. Those already in operation equipped 
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with an engine exceeding 2,000 HP (a small number) received dispensa-
t ion, but only for the current engine. 
c) Maximum length of beam trawl of 12 metres, in force since 1988. 
d) A decommissioning scheme, in force since 1988. This has resulted in re-
moving some 90,000 HP from the fleet up to 1993. For vessels which be-
came eligible for the decommissioning premium the engine power 
licence had to be sent in to the Ministry and the same applied for the 
cod/whiting entitlements. 
e) Entitlements to fish within the 12 miles zone for a certain number of ves-
sels. In fact this is an EU measure (Regulation nr. 55/87) and there are two 
vessel files in this respect: 1) a file of vessels which are allowed to fish 
within the 12 miles zone, engine power not exceeding 221 kW, and a file 
of vessels that are allowed to use beams of over 9m when fishing on sole. 
Only vessels with an ITQ for flatfish and also having shrimp fisheries as an 
important (50% or more of earnings) activity are admitted to this latter 
file. 
5.4.2.3 National effort management 
A maximum numbers of days-at-sea applies for each cutter fishing on 
quoted species. This regulation, implemented in 1987, contains a basic number 
of days (in 1993 120) and exemptions to meet the level of individual fishing 
rights for flatfish and roundfish. This basic number of days has been broken 
down quarterly. 
For the beam trawlers the days-at-sea entitlements are attached to the 
ITQ for flatfish, in combination with the size of the vessel. A separate number 
of days-at-sea has been attached to the cod/whiting entitlements. The days-at-
sea are not transferable in itself. 
5.4.2.4 Other national measures resulting in property rights 
In addition to regulations on the basis of the CFP, there are fishery limita-
tions for non-quota species: 
Entitlements to fish on shrimps. Two categories exist in this respect: The 
'GK' entitlement, aimed at limiting the number of fishers (98) in the 
Wadden Sea and the 'GV' entitlement, which limits the number of shrimp 
vessels in the 12 miles zone (223 at the end of 1993). 
Concessions for shellfish cultures and fisheries. This sector comprises a 
mixture of fisheries (cockles, mussel/ oyster seed) and culture (mussels and 
oysters). Though these concessions are relevant for the creation of prop-
erty rights, they will not be subject of further study in this respect. 
5.4.3 Property rights in the Dutch fishing industry 
In this section the existence of property rights will be considered from the 
viewpoint of the different fleet segments. The description wil l be focused on 
the situation in 1993. Five fleet segments have been distinguished in this re-
50 
speet (figure 5.1). These numbers have been derived from the file, containing 
right holders, of the Ministry of LNV. This segmentation is more detailed com-
pared with the fleet segments (3) in the Dutch MAGP. 
Limitation is one aspect of the measures described in 5.2, the other aspect 
is the creation of rights by all these rules. 
Probably the creation of these valuable rights has been a not intended 
result, considering the objectives of these measures 1) the allocation of the 
Dutch TAC to individual vessel owners and to fleet segments and 2) to limit the 
fishing effort. 
5.4.3.1 Property rights in the cutter sector in 1993 
All vessels 
All vessels in the cutter sector fishing on stocks, regulated by TACs, need 
a licence which specifies the engine power of the vessel. In 1993 this licence 
system regarded a total of 504,000 HP (371,000 kW) of which a small part 
(28,000 HP) was 'floating'. The remainder 476,000 HP was distributed over 470 
vessels. These right holders could own 2,000 HP per vessel at maximum, apart 
from a small group of big cutters equipped wi th an engine already exceeding 
2,000 HP at the time when the maximum HP rule was implemented (1987). 
The HP-licences are fully transferable, either as a whole or separate parts 
of it. Thus the skipper-owner is allowed to buy a bigger vessel if he also buys 
additional HP-licence(s) from others, who wish to decrease their engine capac-
ity or wish to leave the industry. 
New engine power licences are not issued; in fact total HP of the cutter 
fleet is diminishing, since total HP amounted to 598,000 HP in 1987. 
It is allowed to hold the licences without a vessel, but only for a period 
of 18 months at maximum. This rule respects the practice in so far skipper-own-
ers don't have a vessel in operation when a new cutter is being build. 
The engine power licences are registered by the Fisheries Directorate of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (Ministry of 
LNV). Transfers of licences have to be reported to this Directorate. 
Beam trawlers 
The major part of the Dutch cutter fleet, 212 vessels in 1993, consists of 
beam trawlers. Total engine power of these vessels made 85% of total engine 
power of the Dutch cutter fleet in that year. 
Measure (a) described in section 5.4.2.1, has resulted in the major part of 
the Dutch property rights, the individual transferable quota for flatfish (ITQs 
of sole and plaice). 
Skipper-owners of beam trawlers receive annually such a flatfish ITQ by 
means of a document expressing a number of kilograms sole and plaice to be 
caught at maximum in the concerning year. 
Those skipper-owners receive this document which had already a docu-
ment at 31 December of the previous year. The right is formally allocated only 
for one year, but in practice the same skipper-owners, apart from transfers, 
have been owner of the flatfish rights since 1976. 
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The right refers to the person (or the enterprise) as well as to the vessel, 
but the ITQ may be withhold from the vessel. In case of individual quota over-
shooting in 1991 and 1992 the quantity for 1993 has been reduced wi th these 
quantities in excess. 
The level of the (kilograms) rights of the individual holders is very differ-
ent, even comparing vessels of the same size. These differences are the result 
of historical allocations, based on individual catch performances and of trade 
in kilograms sole and plaice afterwards. 
The individual quantity of kg sole and plaice varies annually wi th the 
variances in Dutch TACs of sole and plaice. So, in fact each ITQ holder has a 
right on a fix part of these flatfish TACs. The holder is allowed to rent his ITQ 
to another skipper-owner or to hire additional kg of flatfish. This kind of 
agreements is allowed only during a certain period; in 1993 requests for such 
transfers had to be submitted before 1st March. 
The flatfish ITQs are only transferable as a whole to one or more other 
vessel-owners. Another constraint is that only transfers are allowed referring 
to ITQs taken up by less than 90% in the relevant year. Enterprises owning 
more than one vessel are allowed to add the individual vessel quota together 
resulting in a quotum for the enterprise as a whole. This total quotum is con-
trolled then and not the quota per vessel. 
It is allowed to own a flatfish ITQ without a vessel, but only for a period 
of two years at maximum. 
Since 1988 a heavy control and inspection system (some hundred inspec-
tors) is in force to keep the individual landings of quoted species within the 
individual or national quota. Punishments in case of infringements became 
more and more severe. 
Since 1 January 1993 by far most of the ITQ holders are member of a 
'Group', which has a task in co-management of the quoted species. 
To create a 'Group' fishermen have to send in a request to the Ministry 
of LNV, which has to approve the relevant 'Group'. After approval the ministry 
allocates a 'Group quotum' under several conditions of which most important 
are: 
the 'Group' consists of at least 15 and at maximum 100 vessel owners; 
all catches of 'Group' members are landed and sold via the auction; 
a fish plan has been made by the 'Group', specifying the distribution of 
the days-at-sea over the year; 
the fishing plan specifies the measures aiming at adjusting the fishing 
effort of the members to the available sole and plaice quota; 
management of the 'Group' forbids fishing on sole and plaice when total 
quotas of the 'Group' are taken up. 
In this way each 'Group' manages a part of the Dutch quota for its mem-
bers. Such 'Group' allows clearances of ITQ quantities between members in case 
of differences between landed and quoted quantities. It has to be stressed that 
ownership of the ITQs remains at the individual vessel owners. An important 
advantage of group member ship is that lease and rent of ITQs is allowed 
throughout the year, instead of only in the first two months of the year. 
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Owners of the beam trawlers have also the right to land a certain quan-
tity of cod and whiting monthly, since June 1993 75 boxes. Both species are a 
by-catch of the beam trawlers and, therefore, this right has been allocated to 
the owners of these vessels. In fact this right has been allocated to all vessels 
not having a roundfish entitlement, but entitled to fish on quoted species by 
means of a licence. It is allowed, however, not an undependent right since it 
is not transferable in itself. It is a kind of a property right because it is a right 
to a stream of benefits with exclusion of those who do not have a licence it is, 
however, not an independent right since it is additional to flatfish ITQs or to 
the licence for those who do not possess such ITQs. 
Maximum number of days-at-sea. This regulation (mentioned in section 
5.4.2) consists of a basic number of days-at-sea (120 in 1993) and dispensations 
for vessels to which high ITQs have been attached. In these cases the number 
of days-at-sea has been linked to the level of the flatfish ITQ. Apart from these 
dispensations the number of days-at-sea has been increased by 10% for mem-
bers of the 'Groups'. 
The entitlement to fish annually a certain number of days is not transfer-
able in itself. It is attached to the ITQ, roundfish herring, or shrimp entitle-
ments. As such the number of days-at-sea is not an independent property right 
in accordance with the definition in chapter 5. 
Vessels fishing on cod and whiting 
Entitlements to fish on cod and whiting, measure (c) in 5.4.2.1, are the 
basis of the fishing possibilities for these vessels. The 'roundfish-sector' is a 
rather separate sector of the cutter fisheries. In 1993 this sector consisted of 52 
vessels (70% or more cod and whit ing earnings of total potential earnings), 
representing 5.2% of total licensed HP of the cutter fisheries. Entrance to this 
sector is not possible, apart f rom buying the entitlements. 
Officially these rights were not transferable in itself in 1993, but the in-
dustry could exchange the 'documents' together wi th the vessel. 
The entitlements refer to either ful l year or seasonal fishing on cod and 
whiting and were expressed as a number of kilograms cod and whit ing (5,400 
in the first half year of 1993) to be landed weekly. In June 1993 this quantity 
was changed in a monthly quotum of 600 boxes for ful l year documents and 
550 boxes for seasonal ones. For the latter documents this quantity applies for 
a period of three months, for the remaining months of the year the lower by-
catch quantity of 75 boxes applied for the seasonal documents. Within the dif-
ferent categories there is no difference in number of boxes related to capacity. 
Smaller and bigger vessels are entitled to land the same number of boxes. 
Full year documents have been split up between two categories: 'R-docu-
ments' and 'K-documents'. This is of significance because total cod TAC is dis-
tributed annually between different categories (R, K, seasonal and by-catch 
quantities). From 1 January 1993 the documents are aggregable per vessel, but 
only within the both categories ('R' and 'K'). 
These entitlements to fish on cod and whit ing can be considered clearly 
as property rights according to the definition in chapter 5. 
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The days-at-sea regulation for vessels fully entitled for cod/whiting fishery 
contained an annual number of 172 days-at-sea in 1993 and for the seasonal 
documents this number was 155. 
Most of the vessels belonging to the roundfish sector are member of a 
previously mentioned 'Group' wi th co-management responsibilities. 
Multi-purpose vessels 
A number of vessels (79 in 1993) was involved in more than one fishery. 
The major part of the multi-purpose sector consists of vessels ranging from 300-
1,100 HP (220-810 kW). Total engine power of the multi-purpose sector made 
5.9% of total licensed HP of the cutter fleet by 31 December 1993. 
The fishing activities of the multi-purpose vessels comprise: 
beam trawling. These skipper-owners receive annually an ITQ allocation 
for this fishery, with the same characteristics as the ITQs of the specialised 
beam trawlers; 
seasonal fishery on cod and whit ing. The seasonal entitlements for cod 
and whiting apply for this fishery. These documents allow this seasonal 
fishing in a specified period (three months) of the year. Just like the full 
year documents the seasonal ones are transferable only together with the 
vessel; 
herring fishery. In 1993 nineteen vessels were in possession of a herring 
permit, issued by the Commodity Board for Fish and Fishery Products. 
These permits are transferable, but aggregation of more permits per ves-
sel is not allowed. The herring permit contains the right to fish and land 
a certain quantity of herring in or from a certain area during a specified 
period. It is allowed to hire a quantity of herring from other skipper-own-
ers. Skipper-owners who exceed their quantity have to pay a fine of NLG 
0.50 per kg fish in excess (a sanction of the Commodity Board). 
Two Producers Organisations, wi th permit-holders amongst their mem-
bers, were in 1993 responsible for the management of the herring per-
mits; in this respect they were bounded by the rules of the Commodity 
Board for Fish and Fishery Products. Allocating individual quantities of 
herring to permit-holders is a matter of the PO, within the context of a 
fish plan, to be approved by the Commodity Board for Fish and Fishery 
Products; 
shrimp fishery. Shrimp is not a quota species, so that the limiting mea-
sures for this fishery are not based on the CFP. Limitations in this respect 
concern the necessity of a shrimp permit to be issued by the Ministry of 
LNV. Most of the multi-purpose vessels are entitled to fish on shrimps by 
means of a 'GV' shrimp permit. This permit contains the right to fish on 
shrimps in the coastal zone. These shrimp permits are transferable. 
Multi-purpose vessels equipped with an engine up to 300 HP ought to be 
registered on a special file: 'Lijst I' or/and 'lijst II'. This gives them the exclusive 
right to fish within the 12-miles zone and in case of 'Lijst II' to fish with beams 
of over 9m when fishing on sole. This file registration can be transferred to 
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other vessel owners and can be considered as a property right according to the 
definition in chapter 5. 
For the Dutch fleet this registration contains some 275 vessels, mainly 
multi-purpose and specialised shrimp vessels. 
Specialised shrimp vessels 
A shrimp permit system is in force to the 126 vessels operating in this 
branch of fishery in 1993. As stated before, these permits are issued by the Min-
istry of LNV. Two types of permits consist in this respect: a 'GV' permit, giving 
the right to fish on shrimps in the coastal zone and a 'GK' permit which only 
has been allocated to shrimp fishers operating in the Wadden sea. This 'GK' 
permit regards a fixed number of 98 fishermen and wil l be in force up to the 
year 2000. 
However, this 'GK' permit is transferable just like the 'GV' permit. 
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Figure 5.6 Survey of property rights in the Dutch Fishery Industry, per fleet segment, in 1993 
a) Small number (19) of cutters, mainly involved in beam trawling. The herring permits of the 
freezer trawlers are attached to the mackerel permits; b) +/_ sign: not all the fishermen/ vessels 
own the right. 
Not all specialised shrimp fisher are in possession of a engine licence be-
cause their target species is a non-quota species. 
A registration on the EU vessel file for the coastal zone 'Lijst I' is another 
kind of property right owned by the shrimp fisher, as has been stated before. 
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The days-at-sea regulation contains for the specialised shrimp vessels 
(over 70% of earnings in shrimp fisheries in previous year) a dispensation, on 
request, up to 200 days per year. 
5.4.3.2 Property rights in the freezer trawler sector 
The freezer trawler sector of the Dutch fisheries consists of a very small 
number of vessels (13 at the end of 1992), involved in pelagic fisheries (mack-
erel and herring). These vessels, with a GRT size ranging from 1,080-7,150, are 
exploited by companies which integrate fishery, processing and trading. The 
freezer trawlers operate mainly in EU waters, though activities outside these 
areas can be important. The trawlers need an engine power licence, which 
gives them the right to fish in the EU sea on quota species (herring and mack-
erel). These licences are transferable, just like the ones in the cutter sector. 
The engine power of the freezers totalled 73,800 HP (54,300 kW) in 1993. 
Beside these engine power licences the companies own permits for the 
mackerel and herring fishery. In this case the herring permits are attached to 
the mackerel permits. The Association of ship-owners is responsible for the 
management of the Dutch mackerel TAC and a part (58,700 tons) of the Dutch 
herring TAC. 
The four companies owning the 13 trawlers (1993) cooperate in fishing 
and trading activities in the rather long established organisation called 'the 
Group'. This 'Group', not quite comparable with the 'Groups' in the cutter fish-
eries, carries out a kind of self-management to meet the requirements of the 
CFP measures for this sector. 
5.4.3.3 Institutional environment 
Fishing enterprises, owning property rights, don't operate in a vacuum. 
There are a number of institutions in the Dutch Fishery Sector which influence 
the policy of the individual skipper-owner. On the other hand the skipper-own-
ers may influence more or less the policy of institutions, especially via their pro-
fessional organisations. The representatives of these organisations participate 
in the policy and in the design of regulations of the Commodity Board for Fish 
and Fishery Products, the POs and the co-management Groups. Section 5.4.3.1, 
'Beam trawlers' describes briefly the tasks of these co-management Groups, 
which are mostly connected with a PO. Figure 5.7 is a display of the institu-
tional environment of the individual entrepreneurs in the Dutch Fishery Sector. 
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EC Ministries 
Fisheries 
Directorate 
Commodity 
Board for 
Fish and Fishery 
Products 
P.O.s 
Fishing enterprises 
Co-
management 
Groups 
Professional 
Organisations 
General 
Inspection 
Service 
Law Courts Tax Authorities 
Figure 5.7 Institutional environment of Dutch fishing enterprises 
5.4.3.4 Summary of property rights characteristics 
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 contain the characteristics of the different property 
rights. Rights referring to the inputs have been distinguished in this respect 
from rights concerning the outputs. This distinction is relevant, because it is 
important for the policy of the entrepreneurs and of the Government how the 
rights has been defined. Rights on inputs, a kind of entrance billet to the fish-
ery, means for the skipper-owner maximizing the outputs, given the inputs. 
Rights on outputs, a clearly defined right on a 'benefit stream', means minimis-
ing inputs given the outputs, assuming profit maximisation. 
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Objective 
Issued by 
Right to 
Allocated to 
Period 
Transferable 
Enforcement 
Engine power 
licence 
limiting capa-
city 
Ministry 
fish on TAC 
species specif. 
kW 
all owners vess. 
fish, on TAC 
species 
indefinite 
yes 
Gen.lnsp. 
Service/Justice 
Herring 
permits a) 
limiting effort in 
herring fishery 
Fish and Fish 
Prod. Authority 
fish on herring 
specified period 
all owners cut-
ters and traw-
lers fishing on 
herring 
indefinite 
yes b) 
firstly by 
Groups/Assoc. 
Ship-owners 
Shrimp permits 
limiting capa-
city in shrimp 
fisheries 
Ministry 
fish on shrimps 
all owners 
involved in 
shrimpfish. 
indefinite/ 
-year 2000 
yes 
Gen.lnsp. 
Service/Justice 
Permits for 
coastal zone 
limiting capa-
city in coastal 
zone 
Ministry 
fish in 12 miles 
zone with 
beam trawl 
all owners 
vessels up to 
300 HP c) 
indefinite 
yes 
Gen. Insp. 
Service/ 
Justice 
Figure 5.8 Characteristics of property rights referring to inputs in Dutch fisheries; situation 
in 1993 
a) Attached to mackerel permits regarding the 13 freezer trawlers. Mackerel permits are owned 
by 4 companies involved in distant water fisheries. Their professional organisation is responsible 
for the management of these mackerel fishing rights; b) Not aggregable; c) Registered before 
1 January 1987. 
The distinction between rights on inputs and rights on outputs is also of 
importance for the rights issuing institution (e.g. the Government). This be-
comes clear in case of decommissioning schemes: the target will be the remov-
ing of input rights to diminish the pressure on the stocks, while output rights 
will remain untouched (the TAC remains the same). In the Dutch situation this 
meant that those who were granted for a decommissioning premium had to 
send in their engine power licence and could hold their ITQs; in fact these out-
put rights were sold to skipper-owners who remained in business. 
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Objective 
Issued by 
Right t o 
Allocated to 
Period 
Transferable 
Enforcement 
ITQ sole/plaice 
allocation sole/ 
plaice TAC 
Ministry 
land a max. quanti ty 
sole/plaice annually 
owners of vessels 
historic, landings 
sole/plaice 
indef in. a) 
yes b) 
Groups 
Gen.Inspect. 
Service/Justice 
Entit lement cod/whit ing 
ful l year 
allocation cod/ 
wh i t ing TAC 
Ministry 
land a max. quant i ty 
cod/whit ing monthly 
owners of vessels 
historic, landings 
cod/whit ing 
indef in. a) 
yes b) 
Groups 
Gen.Inspect. 
Service/Justice 
seasonal 
allocation cod/ 
whi t ing TAC 
Ministry 
land a max. quanti ty 
cod/whiting monthly 
in lim. period 
owners of vessels 
historic, landings 
cod/whit ing 
indefin. a; 
yes b) 
Groups 
Gen.Inspect. 
Service/Justice 
Figure 5.9 Characteristics of property rights referring to outputs in Dutch fisheries; situation 
in 1993 
a) In fact the right (document) has been allocated annually to a hmited group of skipper-
owners, having a document by 31 December of previous year; 2) bpproval by ministry needed 
5.4.4 Changes in the situation relating to property rights in the period 1993-
1996 
In 1994 the regulation regarding cod/whiting entitlements has been 
changed. These documents has been transformed into individual transferable 
quota, with the same characteristics as the sole/plaice ITQs. Total Dutch TAC for 
cod and whit ing has been broken down between the four categories, men-
t ioned in section 5.3.1: 'R'-documents, 'K'-documents, seasonal and by-catch 
quantities. 
The individual cod/whiting quota, allocated to the right holders from 1st 
January 1994, are as follows: 'R'-documents 96,000/38,310 kg, 'K'-documents 
126,330/64,080 kg and seasonal documents 28,320/11,200 kg. The by-catch 
quantities were not allocated individually, but remained the right to land a 
certain quantity monthly (55 boxes of cod and 50 boxes of whiting). 
These individual quota are transferable with some constraints: 
the quota should be sold as a whole, to one or more other vessel-owners; 
both a quantity of cod and of whiting should be sold in case of selling to 
those vessel-owners which are not yet in possession of roundfish quota. 
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It became allowed in 1996 to sell cod/whiting ITQs in parts, in the same 
way as applies for flatfish ITQs (since 1994). In 1996 the herring and mackerel 
permits were also transfered into ITQs, wi th the same conditions as for the 
other ITQ-species. Hence, ITQs are allocated from this year for all the Dutch 
quota species. 
5.5 Property rights and legal framework in the United Kingdom 
5.5.1 Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy in the United Kingdom 
The initial members of the EC devised a policy towards fisheries which 
reflected their specific concerns and the general spirit of the Treaty of Rome in 
opening up markets to competitive forces. Thus the basic policy implies equal 
access in the waters controlled by the Community. The accession negotiations 
with Denmark, Norway, the Republic of Ireland and the UK, culminating in the 
entry of all except Norway in 1973, put a different focus on fishing. The UK 
sought to extend its territorial limits out to 50 miles and reserve the fisheries 
for its own industry; the outcome was somewhat more limited, exclusion of 
other countries from the territorial sea (out to 12 miles) apart from those hav-
ing certain historic rights in the 6 to 12 mile band. 
Subsequent developments saw British and other Member States' limits 
extend to 200 miles or median lines in 1977 and the CFP had to alter consider-
ably. Its implementation led to considerable changes within the UK fishing 
industry as it responded to the new policies. The CFP had and has a range of 
aims and consequently the various measures cover conservation, control, indus-
trial structure, markets and trade. Such aspects as external political influences 
as well as environmental, social and economic ones all affect the measures, 
especially those concerned with securing access to fishing in waters belonging 
to Third Countries. 
Implementation of the CFP had a considerable impact on the structure of 
the UK industry. The importance of distant water fisheries and significant de-
pendence on imports of fish had been critical in shaping both the national 
policy and the UK industry. The fleet had a substantial capacity that fished for 
cod around Iceland, Norway and elsewhere with large vessels and gear well 
suited to operating there. The traditional centre of the industry was in Hull and 
Grimsby, with the main consumer markets and the related processing and dis-
tr ibuting facilities (including those for imports) being within easy access. 
While little happened to the location of the main markets or the facilities 
serving them, the changes to the fleet in terms of location and structure were 
great. The new limits took away access in distant waters and created new op-
portunities around the UK, particularly towards the north and west and for 
pelagic stocks such as mackerel. The added sea areas were mainly around Scot-
land and suited different methods or smaller vessels. The UKs share of the TACs 
reflected some compensation for the losses in Iceland and elsewhere but the 
extra amounts neither made up much of the loss nor occurred in stocks readily 
used by the old distant water fleet. (The latter did, however, initially exploit 
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the pelagic stocks such as mackerel previously fished largely by Eastern Euro-
pean vessels. This helped to establish the track record that resulted in the UK 
being allocated much of the TAC for Western mackerel.) The balance on the 
catching side shifted in favour of the inshore fleet and pelagic vessels thereby 
suiting the Scottish industry. The latter's familiarity wi th the sea areas con-
cerned, the appropriate technology and the relevant infrastructure was greater 
while nearness to the grounds made for more economical working. 
In addition the structural measures of the CFP re-inforced the changes 
wi th the decommissioning grants taking out the larger but obsolete distant 
water vessels in England while the grants for modernisation and building 
helped to expand the Scottish fleet. The approach to encouraging structural 
change and to developing a restricted licensing system under the first MAGP 
(1984 to 1986) was fairly relaxed, wi th only vessels over 10m needing licences 
and licences given to all existing vessels. (Until then freely available licences had 
been used solely for conservation purposes identifying who could fish when, 
where and with what gear; they had no structural purpose and their main con-
tribution was in closing fisheries when quotas became exhausted.) The UK Gov-
ernment believed that fleet structure was for the industry to decide and as-
sumed that competitive behaviour would produce efficiency. Added opportuni-
ties were expected to allow for some expansion (as also happened in the US 
and Canada through moving to 200 mile limits) but natural wastage (through 
the scrapping of older vessels) was expected to keep the fleet from over-expan-
sion. 
Conservation 
The CFP was building on a familiar system of stock assessment by ICES 
leading to calculations of TACs and their sharing by the members of NEAFC. 
Similarly other measures relating to closed areas or seasons and to type of gear 
or size of mesh also derived from earlier NEAFC work. The expectation was that 
restrictions on catches in line with scientific and other advice would secure the 
future of the stocks and the industry depending on them. Knowledge of how 
much fish was available was expected to encourage appropriate levels of in-
vestment and effort. 
The development of the fisheries and the fleets exploiting them did not 
follow the hoped for lines of enough natural wastage and prudent investment 
to keep a reasonable balance between opportunity and capacity; open access 
and encouraging markets signals led to imbalance. Over-investment led to ex-
cess pressure on the stocks in all the grounds around the UK and resulted in 
very low TACs for the cod and haddock on which the industry depends for a 
significant part of its revenue. The situation in 1993 and 1994 suggested that 
fishing effort needed to be reduced by nearly a third to safeguard these stocks. 
Structural matters 
The measures introduced by EC Regulations 2908/83 and 4028/86 led in 
the UK to considerable modernisation of the fleet. The removal of many of the 
distant water vessels under the decommissioning scheme derived from 2908/83 
resulted in a drop in tonnage and power which suggested that the initial and 
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subsequent MAGPs might be met. This proved untrue as the co-incidence of 
better markets and good fishing in the mid-80s led to what proved to be an 
excess of confidence in the industry. Emergence from the recession of the early 
80s coupled with the availability of large EC and UK investment grants as well 
as easy credit led to considerable investment; this was mainly in expanding the 
inshore fleet but some investment went into larger vessels capable of ranging 
further. As licences were transferable between vessels (or else not needed for 
vessels under 10m), there was an upward drift in tonnage and power in the 
larger vessels and an increase in numbers, tonnage and power among the 
smaller ones. It may also have been the case that decommissioning funds 
flowed back into new investment. For example owners having more than one 
vessel could decommission a vessel and use the money to upgrade their other 
vessel or vessels. 
Due to the earlier over-expansion, the situation in 1993 was of a fleet 
needing to be cut by a f i f th before the end of 1996 to meet its targets under 
Table 5.2 UK Fleet by segment and M AGP targets 
Segment 
Pelagic t rawl 
Beam t rawl 
Demersal t rawl 
Nephrops t rawl 
Seiners 
Netters 
Liners, etc. 
Shellfish mobi le 
Shellfish f ixed 
Distant water 
Mixed (non 
Trawler) <10 m. 
Non-quota/non-
active >10 m. 
TOTAL 
(objective as 
at 31.12.96) 
No. 
88 
200 
1,105 
648 
274 
273 
106 
169 
137 
17 
7,538 
892 
11,411 
As at 1.1.92 
GRT 
25,178 
23,062 
54,724 
18,140 
17,232 
5,859 
6,262 
6,007 
2,636 
10,987 
24,438 
20,208 
214,733 
kW 
80,858 
107,542 
278,466 
100,142 
89,728 
35,073 
23,430 
34,735 
18,397 
23,829 
304,630 
132,102 
1,228,922 
Proposed 
Reduction 
(%) 
GRT and 
kW 
0 
15 
20 
15 
20 
0 
0 
20 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Objective (31.12.96) 
GRT 
22,633 
17,621 
39,354 
13,860 
12,392 
10,896 
4,320 
2,370 
9,876 
21,968 
18,165 
193,027 
173,455 
kW 
72,060 
81,465 
198,533 
75,859 
63,972 
52,137 
24,757 
16,395 
21,236 
271,484 
117,728 
1,095,206 
995,627 
Note: 'Liners, etc.' are grouped with 'Netters' for 1996. 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics, MAFF. 
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the latest MAGP. This excess capacity was fairly general affecting the main sec-
tors of demersal trawl, beam trawl, nephrops trawl and seining; only the pe-
lagic sector with its very restrictive licensing and the static gear sector wi th its 
effective selectivity appeared not to need significant reductions. The figures are 
shown in table 5.1 in some detail. 
Marketing 
The CFP includes a variety of measures aimed at improving the market for 
fish. Arrangements for minimum landing sizes probably owe as much to con-
cerns about conservation as they do to demand considerations but they, like 
the aid for investment in processing and related facilities, helped to strengthen 
prices. Perhaps the most important impact on the UK related to the develop-
ment of Producer Organisations (POs). While some of the impetus to set them 
up was to enable the fishermen to get compensation for withdrawn fish, the 
subsequent benefits went wider. POs helped to run quotas, develop demand 
and avoid gluts by bringing demand and supply into line. 
Control and enforcement 
While enforcement is a matter for national agencies, the CFP provides for 
the control framework in such matters as recording catches in log books and 
checking that the national agencies exert the necessary discipline to secure 
compliance with the various regulations. 
5.5.2 Limitations for the industry resulting from UK fishery policy 
As with other Member States the UK industry is subject to some influ-
ences stemming from past history, some derived from the CFP and some which 
reflect the current structure of the UK industry and its political environment. 
The UK has traditionally favoured open access in the widest sense because 
of its sea-going and trading interests. Thus its policies were for the most part 
in line with the 17th century Dutch lawyer Grotius (Mare Liberum 1609). He 
favoured a narrow territorial sea with the rest being international waters free 
to all, as opposed to the views of the contemporary English and Scottish law-
yers Seiden (Mare Clausum 1635) and Welwod (An Abridgement of all Sea-
Lawes 1613). Their preferences for a wider exclusive area and less open sea 
found favour in the UK for a brief time but were superseded as the UK devel-
oped its overseas trade in the 18th century. 
There was little change in the UK approach until the 70s. With a distant 
water fleet standing to lose its basic resource at Iceland and elsewhere the UK 
did not support the emerging consensus in favour of 200 mile limits at the UN 
Law of the Sea Conference. Like Germany, the UK took the dispute with Ice-
land to the International Court of Justice at The Hague but the 1974 judge-
ment indicated that the coastal state was entitled to extend its jurisdiction and 
had preferential rights there. Thus the UK had to acquiesce eventually in the 
loss of access there. Subsequently the UK extended its limits to 200 miles 
through the Fishery Limits Act 1976. 
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The move to 200 miles fol lowed a similar change by Peru and Chile as 
early as 1947 and by Iceland in a more graduated fashion thereafter. In a way 
this more restrictive approach not only accorded with 17th century legal think-
ing in England and Scotland but also with some earlier practices. These mainly 
related to the feudal system whereby the Crown owns the foreshore and sea-
bed out to the territorial limits (originally three miles but now twelve as cur-
rently defined in the Territorial Sea Act 1987). Over the years gifts or other 
transfers from the Crown put an end to open access in a few shell fisheries and 
in limited areas controlled by harbour or other authorities, wi th the recent 
developments in fish farming adding to the exclusive areas. These exclusions 
only apply to a very small proportion of the UK coastline, apart from areas like 
Shetland with its salmon farms. Fresh waters and tidal rivers are not normally 
open to access except for navigation. 
Other interference with the traditional public right to fish in the sea did 
exist but tended to relate to conservation matters. The measures might be bans 
on certain activities in certain areas and they might derive from local by-laws 
or national legislation, possibly reflecting wider concerns such as those of 
NEAFC, concerned to protect spawning or nursery grounds. These restrictions 
did not, however, cut across the general freedom to go fishing in the sea. 
Major influences of CFP 
While the past history explains some of the current situation as far as 
rights are concerned, the major influences in the development of fishing rights 
have been the CFP and the existing industry. Many of the resources which the 
UK industry exploits are held jointly with other Member States and third coun-
tries; exceptionally these resources may belong exclusively to third countries 
such as Canada or Norway and Russia. Thus the basic regulations fall within the 
area of competence of the EU Council and Commission. The fixing of total al-
lowable catches, the arrangements wi th third countries and the devising of 
suitable structural, marketing, conservation and control measures rest there. 
National policy in these areas is mainly the process of giving effect to EU policy 
decisions. There will be national measures but these stem from legislative pro-
cedures in the main, with relatively few divergences from the CFP beyond some 
tougher approaches in areas of especial concern. 
The important aspects of UK industry structure relate to the ability of 
much of the fleet to change method or target species and of the processing 
and distribution industries to cope with differing inputs and market demands. 
The political attitudes reflect some conflict between the desire on the one 
hand for control to conserve stocks, communities and employment and the 
desire on the other hand to let market forces and competition shape the fleet 
structure in terms of vessels and fishermen. The latter inclination has been per-
haps stronger in the last decade than before and it explains the developments 
of the 80s and early 90s. Planning the structure of the fleet was felt to be inap-
propriate and restrictive licensing started by covering only certain sectors 
where the stocks were under heavy pressure. The system had, however, to be 
extended to all vessels as the competitive race to fish grew in the sectors ini-
tially not under pressure and thus left as open access. 
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The measures affecting access to fisheries are mainly derived from legisla-
tion relating to conservation and particularly to the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 
1967. This provided for various licencing schemes used to regulate fishing activ-
ity, with licences specifying the conditions applying to permitted activities and 
wi th their revocation effectively closing the fisheries when the quotas were 
exhausted. Other barriers to entry exist in regulations concerning the registra-
t ion of fishing vessels (the Merchant Shipping Act 1988), the necessary vessel 
safety certificates and the required qualifications for those in charge of fishing 
vessels. 
National quota management 
After the TACs have been set for the EU and the national quotas allo-
cated having regard both to relative stability and The Hague Preference, the 
UK totals for each species have to be assigned to the various sectors; subse-
quently their uptake has to be monitored so that closures take place when the 
national quotas are exhausted. 
Currently the UK approach varies by species and sector wi th the licences 
giving access to the fisheries reflecting this. The main species of economic inter-
est to the UK and under quota are cod, haddock, monks, plaice, whit ing, sole, 
nephrops, mackerel and herring. The quotas for these species and others so 
controlled relate to specific areas such as the North Sea (ICES Area IV) or West 
of Scotland (ICES Area VI) and are managed as discrete stocks. In addition there 
are other stocks not under quota such as crabs, lobsters and scallops which are 
of considerable significance. There are as a result well over one hundred differ-
ent types of licence. With multi-species fisheries and a mobile fleet able to 
change method and area of activity, many vessels hold more than one licence 
allowing them to fish in different areas and on different stocks. The sequence 
of starting the licence system with vessels over 10m fishing the stocks under 
most pressure and progressively extending the system resulted in five main 
classes: 
a. Vessels over 10m fishing stocks under quota and initially identified as 
under severe pressure (Pressure stock licences). 
b. Vessels over 10m fishing other stocks under quota and subsequently de-
fined as under pressure (Limited pressure stock licences). 
c. Vessels over 10m fishing stocks under quota but not regarded as under 
pressure (Non-pressure stock licences). 
d. Vessels over 10m fishing stocks not under quota (Miscellaneous species 
licences). 
e. Vessels 10m and under fishing any stocks (General fishing licences). 
It should be noted that quite apart from the sub-division of these five 
groups to cater for areas such as the North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea, 
there are sub-divisions by method to cover beam trawlers in the demersal sec-
tor as well as pursers and freezer trawlers in the pelagic. 
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POs manage qouta 
A large part of each quota goes to the POs who then manage them on 
behalf of their members. POs may set a monthly allocation for each vessel, ei-
ther on a uniform basis or in relation to their size or past history. Discipline may 
be enforced by fines or losses of rights where allocations are exceeded or other 
conditions disregarded. It may be, however, that the overall allocations for a 
particular species are sufficiently great in some individual year to allow periods 
of unlimited catching. Equally failure to take enough early in the year may 
encourage POs to have a spell of 'free fishing' so as to avoid failing to take 
their allocation and losing out on track record. Such unconstrained catching 
may have unwanted side effects in marketing terms if excess landings lead to 
low prices and significant withdrawals wi th little by way of compensation. 
Other parts of the quota are managed on an individual basis by firms or 
persons entitled to participate in such fisheries as that for the Western mack-
erel. Apart from management by POs, firms and individuals, the Government 
may deal with some allocations directly, setting the amounts to be taken within 
certain periods and by certain vessels. Table 5.3 gives the division of the various 
quotas among the recipients. 
Table 5.3 Allocations of quotas to POs in 1993 
North Sea Cod Haddock Saithe Whi t ing Sole 
SFO 
Aberdeen 
NESFO 
Shetland 
Fife 
Ang/Scot 
YAFPO 
Grimsby 
Fleetwood 
FPO 
NIFPO 
ANIFPO 
Cornish 
S West 
ALLPO 
Non PO 
10m 
Total 
10,879 
4,259 
5,636 
2,207 
301 
4,441 
2,121 
4,873 
1,291 
97 
10 
4 
36,119 
5,570 
1,531 
27,327 
11,735 
14,727 
5,041 
1,845 
7,562 
1,109 
7 
758 
218 
6 
5 
70,340 
7,222 
58 
1,995 
1,021 
595 
162 
2,193 
2 
1 
5,969 
2,071 
20 
14,030 
3,724 
7,648 
2,222 
332 
3,042 
377 
67 
2 
11 
31,455 
3,324 
131 
179 
288 
225 
692 
540 
138 
43,220 77,620 8,060 34,910 1,370 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics, MAFF. 
With the exception of the allocations to individual firms or persons, as in 
the pelagic sector, the entitlements are not vested individually. The other allo-
cations are to groups. It should also be recalled that the fish still belong to no-
one until they are taken in a legal fashion and they are still potentially open 
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to the fishing industry as a whole until the quota or TAC is exhausted. Failure 
by a particular sector to take its share of quota can lead to some re-allocation 
to others eligible to take part in the fishery. Access to the various sectors of the 
fishing industry is more convincingly exclusive as only appropriately licensed 
vessels may participate, as with beam trawlers in the North Sea. Even there the 
free for all problem may be partly present because open access still exists 
though only for the members of the privileged group. 
National capacity management 
The UK measures for managing capacity have been and probably still are 
very inadequate. In the early stages of establishing the licensing system the 
decision was made to include only those species currently under pressure. Spe-
cies like plaice were not under pressure and were not included despite the fact 
that they were under TAC and quota regulations. However, as all existing ves-
sels catching cod and haddock were entitled to a licence, as were those taking 
such a by-catch in their prawn fisheries and those wi th no current activity but 
proof of past activity, no real restrictions on pressure stock licences arose at the 
initial stage. Furthermore, as transfers were allowed so that replacement ves-
sels could enter the fleet, licences migrated to higher powered vessels. Finally 
the decommissioning scheme was not confined to vessels with pressure stock 
licences and applied to all vessels such as those pursuing shell fish with no pres-
sure stock licence. Thus while licences still attached to decommissioned vessels 
were surrendered, nothing could prevent the transfer of licences followed by 
the decommissioning of unlicensed vessels; in consequence many of the licen-
ces associated with decommissioned vessels managed to move to active ones. 
The first UK MAGP received criticisms from the Commission because li-
censing did not extend to vessels of 10m and under. This criticism was well 
founded and the gap proved significant. When the licensing system started to 
become more effective for larger vessels wi th no additional licences available, 
no dormant ones to re-activate and no increase allowed in capacity in terms of 
tonnage and power, investment went into rule beaters and the sector with 
vessels of 10m and under increased substantially. This loophole has been filled 
by the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1992 and all fishing vessels must now be 
licensed; thus expansion is no longer possible in terms of numbers, tonnage or 
power in kW. Only in sophistication in fish finding and other technology is 
there still a source of improved catching ability. 
After a stop has been put to the upward drift in capacity, the need then 
arises to effect some reduction so as to achieve effective conservation and in-
creased profitability as well as meeting the peculiar needs of the MAGP. The 
national measures in this area now deal with the need to take out more capac-
ity (originally 110% but now 120%) than is introduced when a replacement 
vessel comes into the fleet or re-engining with more power takes place. The 
other two factors tending to decrease capacity are decommissioning grants and 
attrition. Decommissioning was introduced again in 1992/93 and has taken out 
a limited amount of capacity. As the basis was competitive tendering with low 
bid winning, the removed capacity tends to be older and less effective but at 
least the scrapping of the vessels (the only accepted form of disposal) prevents 
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any possibility of their return while the surrender of the attached licences pre-
vents their migration to more efficient replacements. 
After roughly one third of the £25m allocated for decommissioning had 
been spent in the first of the three years concerned, the Government delayed 
the next stages due to problems in getting other parts of their effort control 
programme brought into effect. The scheme was subsequently re-activated, 
without the element of effort control proposed (days-at-sea) and extended for 
an additional two years. Attr i t ion naturally continues as older boats become 
ineffective, do not generate enough funds for re-investment and are removed 
without their owners replacing them. The relevant licences will be available for 
transfer, though they are unlikely to be for pressure stocks, and, apart from 
that, all the measures now in place take out capacity and associated licences. 
Whether the reductions will suffice for MAGP purposes wil l depend on the 
degree of modernisation that takes place. Having to take out 120% of the ca-
pacity introduced is of little consequence if few new vessels come into the fleet, 
but much more significant if confidence and low interest rates lead to substan-
tial new building to repair the neglect of recent years. If such developments 
occur they will cut the fleet but may result in efficiency gains due to the new 
capacity being more appropriate and effective. 
National effort management 
Limits on days-at-sea are to be expected due to natural conditions as well 
as the sea-keeping qualities of the vessels concerned. In addition the exhaus-
t ion of quota before the end of the year is an inevitable consequence of the 
excess catching power available to the industry. Where the fisheries are man-
aged on a monthly or some other periodic basis, laying up during the year is 
common. Additional laying up may help relieve temporary and transient pres-
sure on stocks and the UK legislation giving effect to 2908/83 provided for this. 
The conditions were, however, not attractive to the industry; aid was only paid 
at a low rate, a lengthy minimum period was stipulated and it naturally applied 
only to those days in excess of normal days in port. Similar UK provisions were 
not included when giving effect to 4028/86. 
The problems over the North Sea and West Coast cod and haddock fisher-
ies in the 90s did, however, lead to the introduction of such a technical mea-
sure. In 1991 such vessels had to be tied up for 8 days each month and in 1992 
for 8 days each month or 135 days in total, as alternatives on each occasion to 
using larger mesh sizes (deemed to have the same effect on conservation). No 
compensation was given for whatever earnings might have been lost as no 
appropriate provision was made in the regulations; in any event the conditions 
for the laying up payments of 2908/83 and 4028/86 (a lengthy tie-up period in 
addition to normal days in port) would not have been met. 
The proposed introduction of individual allocations of days-at-sea is cov-
ered by the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1992. The provisional allocations (in 
half-days to increase flexibility in use) reflected the previous activity of the ves-
sels concerned; they ranged from the minimum of 160 to a maximum of 674 
half days with the average being 275. Analysis of the provisional Scottish data 
showed sharp differences between regions and vessel types within Scotland 
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and an apparently higher average than for the other constituent parts of the 
UK as a whole. These various differences reflected the different levels of activ-
ity normally encountered but were perceived as arbitrary and unfair. Thus, 
despite the existence of an appeals procedure (and 84% of vessel owners ap-
pealed against the provisional allocations), the proposals were resisted by fish-
ermen. This resistance gave rise to litigation which led not to a decision by the 
appropriate court in the UK but by a reference to the EG. While the latter 
eventually ruled on the matter in favour of the UK Government, it seems un-
likely that effort control wil l be introduced in the proposed form in the near 
future. 
Other measures creating property rights 
Regulations under shipping legislation (Merchant Shipping Act, 1988) 
cover aspects such as the registration of a fishing vessel thereby entitl ing it, 
subject to normal rules, to fish against UK quotas. It is an offence to fish for 
profit unless the vessel is registered. Provisions in this legislation, aimed at re-
stricting registration to vessels wi th 75% British crews and ownership, were 
found to be incompetent by the ECJ, being contrary to the free movement of 
capital and labour as well as the rights of establishment, deriving from the 
Treaty of Rome and the UK Treaty of Accession. Thus the property right created 
may be vested in persons or firms outside the UK. The EG ruled, however, that 
the vessels must be managed from the UK to qualify as being established there; 
the qualifying criteria were that either 50% of landings were made in the UK 
or 8 trips ended there each year. As noted earlier, such vessels may not be oper-
ated without meeting the necessary safety regulations (specified equipment as 
well as sea worthiness) and crewing qualifications. These too must be regarded 
as pre-requisites to exercising rights. 
Property rights also arise in coastal fisheries. Historically the Crown owned 
the foreshore and seabed of the territorial waters (now out to 12 miles). Under 
the Crown Estate Act 1961, the Crown Estate Commissioners look after the 
Crown Estate on behalf of the nation, including such activities as leasing coastal 
areas for fish or shell fish farming. These leases and earlier gifts to individuals 
and local authorities have created, for set periods or in perpetuity, entitlements 
to harvest the relevant production, whether farmed or natural as in certain 
oyster and mussel beds. 
5.5.3 Property rights in the UK fishing industry 
The existing property rights vary considerably between the sectors and it 
is worth considering them individually. It should be stressed that all licences are 
subject to Ministerial discretion and that all regulations creating rights are 
open to change with the passage of time or under political pressures. The most 
important of Scott's list of six characteristics of property rights, quality of title, 
is thus the one under most question. Ownership remains uncertain and open 
to challenge over time. The aspect of duration is also uncertain as the licenses 
are issued on an annual basis with only an expectation of continuity rather 
than a guarantee of it. A change in legislation or administrative practice may 
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see the rights amended or extinguished. Similarly the other attributes of trans-
ferability, flexibility, divisibility and exclusivity are all only what the enabling 
legislation and current interpretation allow. 
Pursers and freezer trawlers in mackerel and herring fisheries 
This small sector paradoxically benefited from the problems besetting the 
pelagic fisheries in the 70s, culminating in the 1977 ban on fishing for herring 
in the North Sea. It thus had a very restrictive licensing system imposed in 1980 
not allowing any additional pursers (vessels using purse seines) or freezer trawl-
ers into the fleet. Subsequent improvements in the mackerel and herring fish-
eries led to considerable pressures for admission to the exclusive group. This 
was resisted apart from a decision by Ministers to licence five additional vessels 
in the mid-80s. Despite the precedent of that dilution, there has been no fur-
ther undermining of the rights created. 
The current situation is that for all practical purposes the licensed vessels 
have an individual vessel quota. The two main POs involved, the Scottish Fisher-
men's Organisation and the Shetland Fish Producers' Organisation manage 
their allocations while individual firms and persons look after theirs. Any prob-
lems over transferability or divisibility of the quotas can be resolved within the 
POs. This is necessary since allocations depend on catches in the previous two 
years. Individual firms or persons are allowed to get up to 70% of their alloca-
tion taken by another vessel so that they too can maintain their track records. 
Beam trawlers 
Again this sector has benefited from concerns about conservation and the 
threats posed by a very efficient system of catching flatfish. Very t ight licensing 
has restricted the number of beam trawlers, initially in the South West and 
English Channel (Area VII) but subsequently also in the North Sea (Area IV). As 
with the pelagic sector, pressures for admission to the sector have developed 
and resulted in the addition of two vessels in the South West under the provi-
sions for Ministerial discretion. Reaction from the sector was unfavourable and 
there has been no subsequent dilution. 
Management of the amounts allocated to the firms and POs involved 
allows a certain amount of flexibility and transferability but does not approach 
the virtually individual quotas found in the pelagic sector. 
Demersal trawlers and seiners 
These vessels form the most important sector in terms of economic impor-
tance. They land most of the demersal species, apart from sole and plaice 
where the beam trawlers are more significant. This sector is mobile not only in 
terms of grounds worked and species caught but also in method used. In conse-
quence they tend either to hold a variety of licences over the year or have a 
very wide entitlement to enter a number of different fisheries. 
The rights in this sector are to participate in a number of fisheries but the 
allocations are not to individuals but to POs or for those outside PO member-
ship by the Government setting the allocation for individuals in that group. 
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Furthermore, the amounts are not secure against alteration as track records 
determine allocations. 
Nephrops trawlers 
This sector, though economically important, exploits a stock that is under 
quota but not thought to be under excess pressure. The vessels involved are 
mainly older and smaller with only a non-pressure stock licence in many cases. 
Their rights in demersal fisheries are usually limited to the by-catch provision 
and further restricted in many cases to Areas VI and VII due to historical activ-
ity. (Some vessels do, however, hold full pressure stock licences and may switch 
from nephrops to demersal species from time to time.) To the extent that the 
state of the stocks is correctly defined as not being under pressure, the limita-
tion on entry probably confers only protection against future developments if 
technology, stocks or markets improve sufficiently to generate a demand for 
additional licences. 
Static gear 
Again this sector is characterised by smaller and older vessels, frequently 
catching species not under quota though often very valuable such as lobsters. 
Thus the licences tend to be less flexible and confer only limited rights as in 
Miscellaneous species or Non-pressure stock licences. 
Vessels under 10 metres 
This sector expanded considerably when left un-constrained under the 
earlier versions of the licensing system. While many of the species pursued are 
not covered by quotas, significant landings of species under quota, such as cod, 
are made. The system of allocation of species under quota is handled by the 
Fisheries Ministries on a monthly or other basis. The rights conferred are thus 
both very limited and subject to arbitrary change. 
Objective 
Issued by 
Right conferred 
Allocated to 
Period 
Transferable 
Enforcement 
Vessel Registration 
Allow entry to fishing 
industry 
Department of Trans-
port 
Introduce vessel 
Vessel owners 
5 years 
Re-registered when 
sold 
Department of Trans-
port 
Fishing Licence 
Limit access, catch 
taken and effort de-
ployed 
Fisheries Ministries 
Catch fish as specified 
as to species, area, 
method and amount 
Vessel owners 
Annual or less 
With vessel when sold 
Fisheries Ministries 
Approval of Replacement 
Reduce capacity 
Fisheries Ministries 
Introduce replacement 
vessel of lower capa-
city 
Vessel owners 
Limited and related to 
time to build or acquire 
Only if with original 
vessel 
Fisheries Ministries 
Figure 5.10 Property rights in the UK fisheries 
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Figure 5.10 shows the general position over property rights in the UK. 
(There is also a helpful table labelled appendix III in the paper given by Hatcher 
and Cunningham at the 1994 EAFE Conference showing the relationships be-
tween the various stocks and types of licence for the main part of the UK fleet.) 
Institutional environment 
Figure 5.11 below shows the environment in which the fishing industry 
operates. There are systems for detailed consultations with the industry before 
enacting legislation. Equally there are formal and informal arrangements to 
discuss and negotiate wi th the industry any policy initiatives either proposed 
or under consideration. Such discussions naturally go wider than representa-
tives of the fishermen and Fisheries Ministries. Scientists and other professionals 
wil l be involved in stock assessments and technical measures, such as mesh 
sizes, while merchants, processors and retailers will be involved in consultations 
considering aspects of demand and distribution (including imports). Equally 
control and structural measures may widen the range of consultations to in-
clude other policing services and other ministries, such as transport and indus-
tries, such as boat building. 
EC Ministries Local Author i t ies 
Sea Fisheries 
Comittees 
Intervent ion 
Board 
P.O.s 
Fishing enterprises 
Professional 
Organisations 
Fisheries Insp. Law Courts Tax Author i t ies 
Figure 5.11 Institutional environment for fishermen 
5.5.4 Changes expected in the UK situation relating to property rights 
The immediate future is not expected to bring many changes. Three areas 
bearing on rights were identified in the 1993 report from the Agriculture Com-
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mittee of the House of Commons on The Effects of Conservation Measures on 
the UK Sea Fishing Industry' and the Government's reply to it. These related to 
days at sea, ITQs and licence charges. On the first the Committee tended to side 
with the industry in its resistance to the introduction of effort control through 
limits on days-at-sea. In response, the Government remains of the opinion that 
such effort control is essential and looked to its possible introduction subject 
to a favourable response from the ECJ (subsequently received). This would add 
a property right as the intention is that days-at-sea should be freely transfer-
able. This might necessitate the use of a standard unit in terms of capacity and 
days, such as VCU Days where VCU stands for Vessel Capacity Units and VCU = 
length x breadth in metres + 0.45 x power in kW. 
As to ITQs, the report recommended their introduction backed up by en-
hanced technical measures such as increases in mesh sizes and landing sizes to 
avoid problems of discarding and remove the need for high grading. The Gov-
ernment's response was guardedly negative, noting the opposition of the in-
dustry and adding its own concerns about the costs and complexities of en-
forcement in multi-species fisheries wi th a large heterogeneous fleet. There 
were also the political problems over initial allocations and subsequent owner-
ship patterns. The report's observation on the possibility of charging for licen-
ces met an even more careful response from the Government. The latter noted 
that it had taken powers under the Finance (No.2) Act 1987 to charge more 
than the administrative costs of issuing licences by also allowing the costs of 
the associated enforcement to be recovered in the licence fees. The Govern-
ment did, however, indicate that it had no present plans to do so. 
Other developments which may occur over time relate more to structural 
considerations. The system of allowing replacement only when 20% more ca-
pacity is withdrawn than is introduced may be subject to change. The indica-
tions are that this approach to re-structuring has proved more acceptable to 
the industry than expected and thus the possibility exists that the Government 
may increase the amount of additional capacity needed. (The Spanish approach 
in the 80s was of two for one i.e. 200% taken out for 100% introduced.) In 
addition the POs are now allowed to buy up track records of fish caught and 
the associated capacity in VCUs. The current approach by one PO is to acquire 
quota but not share it out to the individual vessels on a permanent basis, keep-
ing the additional entitlement 'ring fenced' as belonging to the group as a 
whole. (The additional capacity is made available for any replacement vessels 
brought in by members of the PO.) 
The communal approach has commanded the apparent public support of 
the industry for some time and accords with the belief that fish are for the 
communities that make up the industry and not to be expropriated by individu-
als. This may, however, not appeal to firms and individuals who may press to 
get individual enhancement of entitlement. In any event to the extent that 
decommissioning takes out vessels and other reductions occur, rights will be 
strengthened and their value underlined, especially if as with the pelagic sector 
in the 80s, stocks improve. Perceptions may accordingly alter and the un-
doubted resistance by the fishermen to any form of ITQs may diminish. 
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Effort control might have been expected when the EG reached its favour-
able conclusions or when the arrangements were made to control effort fol-
lowing access by Spain and Portugal to certain previously restricted areas (the 
'Irish Box'). Such a development has not yet happened. Whether and how ef-
fort control would be introduced thus remains unclear. The previous allocations 
of days-at-sea are now out of date and would need to be changed. The system 
of initial distribution, even fol lowing satisfactory resolution of the appeals, 
remains contentious; as before it would probably relate to past history of activ-
ity while arrangements for transferability would have to take account of the 
size in capacity units. The precise nature of the rights conferred is perhaps less 
important than the fact that the necessary restrictions will prove of value to the 
owner. What may impede progress is the development through the buying and 
selling of track records of a possible alternative route to effective effort con-
trol ; this process has naturally created vested interests with assets to lose if a 
different property right comes into being. 
5.6 Property rights in other countries 
5.6.1 Property rights in Iceland 
Before 1976 there was open access to the Icelandic fisheries. In 1976 the 
extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles was implemented. A manage-
ment system designed mainly for protection of juvenile fish was in force at that 
time and is still in force. 
In 7976 the first individual vessel quotas were introduced in the herring 
fishery and gradually this system has developed to become a complete uniform 
system of transferable vessels quotas in all the fisheries in 1990. In 1979 the 
individual quotas in the herring fishery were made transferable. Individual 
quotas were implemented in the capelin fishery in 1980 and made transferable 
in 1986. In the most important fishery, the demersal fishery, individual quotas 
were introduced in 1984, transferable from 1988. 
The objective of the ITQ-system 1) was to improve the economic efficiency 
of the fisheries. The fishing industry is Iceland's most important industry. The 
industry's total contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) including the 
indirect effects is about 35-45%. Fish products are Iceland's most important 
exports. Any fishery policy has far-reaching implications for the macro-economy 
and an efficient policy seems therefore more necessary than in f.ex. EU, where 
the fishing sectors macro-economy role is very small. 
The management units are shares in the TAC for every species for which 
there is a TAC. The shares are allocated on a permanent basis, i.e. the time pe-
riod of duration of the ITQs is indefinite. The TAC-shares are completely trans-
ferable, however, some restrictions remain on transfers of annual quotas. Such 
1) This draws on Arnason, R. 1993 'Iceland's ITQ System' Marine Resource Econo-
mics Vol 8(3). 
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transfers between regions is for example subject to certain conditions. Another 
restriction is that, if a vessel did not harvest 25% of its annual quota for 2 years 
in a row, it would loose its permanent share. 
The Ministry of Fisheries is responsible for the regulation and the enforce-
ment of the system. There is a levy on right - about 0,2% of the catch value -
to cover the cost of monitoring and enforcing the regulations. In the period of 
introduction (1976-1990) there was no capacity regulation (i.e. a decommission-
ing scheme), however, in a period (1985-1990) effort quota options were in 
force as well, which have had ill-advised effect on the development of fishing 
effort. Two other exemptions from the ITQ system are present in the demersal 
fishery. Longline fishing during the period November to February is not under 
quota restrictions. Second, vessels under 10 GRT could fish freely at the outset 
of the system in 1984. From 1990 vessels under 6 GRT could elect to stay outside 
the ITQ system. Then they must use hook and line and they are regulated by 
a limited number of fishing days. 
There is also restricted access. Every vessel must hold a valid fishing li-
cense. Replacement of vessel is only allowed if fishing power is not extended. 
The licenses are not transferable. ITQs are closely linked to fishing vessels. Only 
those who own fishing vessels with a valid fishing license can hold quotas. 
The Icelandic ITQ-system, which includes allocation of quotas on a perma-
nent basis, a high degree of transferability and exclusivity should according to 
the theory increase the efficiency in the fisheries. This has also in general been 
the effect of the system. However, in the demersal fisheries the gain in efficien-
cy has been less, because of forces outside the individual quota system (the 
effort quota and exemptions of vessel under 10 GRT). Only since 1990 the Ice-
landic ITQ system has been a close shop. 
Changes in the system came into force on January 1, 1996 according to 
a new legislation passing the Icelandic Parliament in July 1994 1). The regula-
tion will only allow a vessel to catch twice its allocated quota equivalent of cod. 
This will limit the possibilities for many vessels with small quota allocations and 
it is expected that the legislation will result in a reduction of the fleet. It is also 
expected that the demand for permanent quotas will increase in the future 
and that the trend for quotas to collect in the hands of a few financially strong 
companies wil l be encouraged. Also in 1994 the harvest requirement that a 
fishing vessel should harvest at 25% of its annual quota for 2 years otherwise 
it could loose its permanent share was doubled to 50%. The purpose of these 
restrictions on transferability is to discourage speculative quota holdings. 
1) Eurofish Report, August 18, 1994. 
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5.6.2 Property rights in Norway 
In 1972 the Government was given the authority to introduce limited 
entry 1). Before 1972 the fisheries were in principle not regulated. After intro-
duction of the extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles more national 
regulation was necessary. The Norwegian regulation started with licence limita-
tion, continued with total quotas and quotas for a group of vessels. The current 
regulation is still based on this approach, however, it has been extended with 
individual vessel quotas. 
The regulation is based on ecology principles, and has as the main objec-
tives to increase economic efficiency and maintain the settlement and employ-
ment in outlying districts. These objectives are somewhat conflicting and it 
probably one of reasons why Norway still has a relatively centralised fishery 
policy. The fishing possibilities are distributed to various fleets and regions. For 
example vessel quotas have been used as a means of income distribution within 
a group of vessels. 
For stocks that are shared (in the case of Norway mainly wi th EU, Sweden 
and Russia) the countries seek to coordinate the management, i.e. the conser-
vation. Over 80% of the Norwegian catch comes from shared stocks. 
The total catch in the Norwegian fisheries was 2.6 million tonnes in 1992, 
where in 1990 the total catch was about 1.7 million tonnes. The first-hand 
value of the Norwegian catches was in 1992 approximately NKr. 5.8 bin. In the 
1980s the catch volume declined from a level about 2.5 million tonnes to 1.7 
million tonnes in 1990. This was mainly due to reduced catches of capelin and 
cod. The increase in the catch volume in the 90s is mainly caused by recovery 
of the cod and capelin stocks. 
In total 17,400 vessels were recorded as fishing vessels in 1990. The main 
part of the fleet consists of about 4,000 vessels. Another 4-5,000 vessels are 
used in part-time fishery. The fishing fleet consisted in 1990 of about 3,700 
vessels with length over 8m, which conducted year-round fishery. About 2,000 
of these full-time vessels is between 8 and 13m, which in the case of Norway 
is regarded as smaller vessels. The coastal fleet consists of vessels under 25m of 
which 4,600 vessels were full-time used in 1990. There are about 4,500 part-
time vessels in the coastal fleet as well. 
The number of registered fishermen was 27,518 in 1990, of which 20,475 
full-time fishers. 
About 80% of the Norwegian fishery in value is regulated today by some 
sort of licence limitation or vessel quotas. The aim of the regulation has been 
to prevent further expansion in the fishing effort. At the time of introduction 
of the regulation by limited entry, i.e., licences, in the different offshore fisher-
The section is based on 'Individual quota management systems in Norway' in 
'The Use of Individual Quotas in Fisheries Management', OECD, 1993, 'Norsk 
fiskerinaering: landeanlyse' by Bjorn Hersoug in 'Fiskerinaeringens hovedtrekk-
landeanalyser', Nord 1992:30 and 'Regional Enterprise Share Quota Mangement 
System' byTorbjorn Trondsen and Jostein Angell in Proceedings of the IV Annual 
Conference of EAFE 1992. 
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ies, several resource and capacity problems were already present. There are 
different offshore vessels licences depending on the gear type, e.g., purse 
seine, cod trawl and shrimp trawl. The vessels participate in different fisheries. 
For example the purse seiners may participate in the capelin, the blue whit ing, 
the herring and mackerel fishery. To participate in the different fisheries an 
additional licence is normally required and in many cases the licenses specify an 
individual yearly quota. 
It is mainly the coastal fleet which uses a variety of gears i.e. hook-and-
line, gillnet, longline, Danish seine and shrimp trawl that have not been regu-
lated by these measures. These fleets, in general, have been regulated by vessel 
group quotas. An exception is the cod fishery, which, however, is the most im-
portant fishery for the coastal fleet, where a vessel quota system has been in-
troduced in 1990. The allocation of these quotas is based on length of the ves-
sel and the level of actvity of the vessel in the 1987-1989 period. This system 
was introduced as a response to a crises in the cod fishery and supposed to be 
temporary. However, the system is now permanent, even now if the cod stock 
has recovered since 1990. 
In short, most of Norwegian fishing today is regulated through licences 
and/or individual quotas. 
According to the regulation the licences are not transferable. In practice 
the licence follows the vessel, when the vessel is sold, which all things equal 
leads to a higher sales price. This has, however, not caused a major reduction 
in the fleet. Also vessel quotas, which have been introduced parallel to licences, 
are not transferable, and it has therefore not resulted in any major adjustment 
of the fleet. The main instrument regarding adjustment of the fleet has been 
scrapping programmes. 
The fishery policy in the future is planned to contain extensions and im-
provements of the existing system, i.e. an ITQ-system is not actual. For example 
it is planned to stimulate fleet adjustment by permitting merging of licences 
from several vessels, and withdrawal of the remaining vessel permanently from 
the fleet. In that case, the vessel quota attached to the licence can be kept for 
a certain period. 
5.6.3 Property rights in Canada 
Canada has probably had the longest record of all the nations seeking by 
detailed regulation to foster and control a large modern industry. Two back-
ground reports reveal the consistent interest of policy makers and the thor-
oughness of the investigations into the fishing industry. The first is Turning The 
Tide, A New Policy For Canada's Pacific Fisheries, also know as the Pearse Com-
mission Report as the relevant Commissioner was Peter H. Pearse. The second 
is Navigating Troubled Waters, A New Policy for the Atlantic Fisheries, also 
known as the Kirby Report as the chairman of the relevant Task Force was Mi-
chael J.L Kirby. Both were published in 1982. The legislation for conservation 
and other wider aspects rests with the federal Government while its laws on 
property are matters for the provincial Government. Its processes in creating 
rights in terms of access to fisheries through exclusive licensing and through 
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allocation of quantities to be caught have had to deal wi th a very wide range 
of stocks, fleet structures and dependent communities. Their experience thus 
indicates the various problems and solutions which have been tried. Some indi-
cation of the preeminence of the Canadian experience is given by the list of 
individual quota programmes in the 1992 National ITQ Study Report prepared 
for the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; out of 37 pro-
gramme's listed, 18 are Canadian. 
While Canadian experience in creating property rights in fisheries takes 
in everything from licensing vessels and methods to allocating quota shares to 
communities or individuals, the significant interest at present is in individual 
quotas. A brief description of some of these is given below. It draws heavily on 
the 1989 report by Ben Muse and Kurt Schelle of the Alaska Commercial Fisher-
ies Entry Commission. 
Year Adopted 
Atlantic Fisheries 
- offshore lobster 
- snow crab 
- offshore groundfish 
- gulf of St Lawrence fisheries 
- scotia-Fundy inshore fisheries 
herring 
- offshore scallop 
northern shrimp 
- offshore surf clam 
offshore tuna 
midshore groundfish 
Pacific Fisheries 
- abalone 
herring 
- black cod 
- geoduck clam 
- halibut 
Freshwater Fisheries 
Lake Winnipeg 
- Lake Erie 
1977 
1979 
1982 
1989,1991 
1991 
1983 
1986 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1988 
1979 
1980 
1990 
1989 
1990 
1972 
1986 
Figure 5.12 Individual quota programmes in Canada 
5.6.3.1 Bay of Fundy Herring 1976-1981 
The problem arose from the expansion of the fishery in the 60s due to a 
good market for processing for meal. Vessel numbers rose from 20 to 107 be-
tween 1963 and 1968. Fish stocks collapsed and with them the boom so that 
the fleet shrank to some 50 vessels by 1975. These were not doing well. 
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The aim was to solve the problem by improving markets and conservation 
by setting up a co-operative, selling at sea to Polish vessels and having individ-
ual quotas subject to weekly catch limits. The fishery was already subject to 
limited entry licencing. 
The programme was set up by the Federal Government, starting in 1976 
and covering only vessels purse seining for herring in the Bay of Fundy. Only 
those vessels active in the fishery in 1975 were eligible. 
The system of allocation changed over the period with the initial main 
emphasis on historical performance giving way, after a combined approach of 
history and vessel size, to one based on equal shares. 
The shares were temporary and only lasted for one season. While there 
was no trade in the quotas as such, there were provisions for those who fished 
cooperatively to pool their weekly allowances. This may have allowed an infor-
mal leasing system which, like the administrative re-allocation of uncaught 
quota, possible looked after the needs of those who had taken large catches 
historically and still needed them to stay profitable. 
Enforcement proved inadequate and difficult despite the limited number 
of vessels. Bulk discharge from vessels to tankers and by them to processors led 
to a lack of monitoring of the quantities. In addition, discharge could take 
place at a large number of locations. Prosecutions failed when cases were 
brought, either for technical reasons of official estimates not proving that 
underreporting had taken place or for legal ones with the courts finding the 
powers of the basic legislation inadequate. 
The rights were conveyed to the individuals without charge and there 
was no subsequent levy related to their exercise. 
The benefits of the programme were uncertain. Prices rose but this may 
have reflected improved export markets. It can be argued that the strength of 
the cooperative in dealing with processors and foreign buyers may have helped 
on prices. Decommissioning did not occur and what seems clear is the failure 
in conservation due to misreporting and a consequent failure to respect the 
TACs. 
5.6.3.2 Bay of Fundy and Gulf of St. Lawrence Herring 1983 onwards 
The problem, though it grew out of the failure of the earlier scheme, was 
seen in slightly different terms. The difficulty was seen as too many vessels pur-
suing too few opportunities. The underlying problem, however, remained that 
of over capacity and failures in conservation. 
The aim was to use a system of transferable individual quotas to encour-
age the creation of an appropriate fleet structure by reducing the number of 
vessels, so that pressures on income and stocks could be alleviated. 
The programme was set up by the federal government, starting in 1983 
and covering vessels purse seining for herring in the Bay of Fundy, the Atlantic 
coast of Nova Scotia and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Eligibility was confined to 
those vessels that had fished in one year during the period 1980 to 1983. 
The allocations were made to three sectors. Sixteen vessels based on the 
Gulf of St Lawrence each had 6.25% of the total allowable catch for that area. 
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Of the 49 vessels based on the Bay of Fundy, those also participating in the 
winter fishery off the Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia received 2.7% of the rele-
vant TAC wi th those fishing only in the Bay of Fundy getting 1.6%. 
The shares were allocated for ten years and were fully transferable, sub-
ject to certain conditions. The latter included no sales of quota to processors by 
fishermen. Processors could only buy from other processors and there was an 
upper limit of 4% of the total quota for vessels in the Bay of Fundy. Quota 
shares had to be sold in total though they might be subdivided and acquired 
by several other fishermen. Sale of quota wi th the vessel licence to a new en-
trant left the structure the same but disposal of the quota share without the 
vessel licence saw the latter expire in the fol lowing year. This resulted in one 
less vessel in the fleet. Formal leasing was not allowed but the arrangements 
for pooling between vessels let an informal system occur. 
Enforcement still proved difficult and misreporting continued. Despite 
added resources successful prosecutions proved elusive. Effective conservation 
did not occur but improvement in the stocks in relation to demand made this 
less significant. 
As before there was no charge made by the authorities for the licences 
and allocations. 
The structural impacts were noticeable wi th the Bay of Fundy fleet de-
creasing from 49 to 40 vessels as a result of the programme. The effect in the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence fleet was a fall from 16 to 14 vessels, with other influences 
taking out a further 3 vessels. It is understood that the programme continues 
after its initial ten year period. 
5.6.3.3 Atlantic offshore groundfish 1982 onwards 
Despite limited entry licensing in this sector, 1981 saw considerable prob-
lems develop due to excess capacity causing the quotas to be taken very quickly 
wi th ill effects for processing employment and product quality. 
The aim of the programme was to allocate to the companies involved 
appropriate shares of the TACs so that they could plan both their catching and 
processing activities more effectively. 
The programme was set up by the federal Government after consultation 
with the companies. The 1982 approach of involving only the 4 largest compa-
nies was dropped in favour of one with all the companies participating in 1984. 
The system of allocation to the companies took place after the shares in 
the TACs for the inshore fleet and foreign operators were deducted. The allo-
cations were the percentage shares of each stock based on past levels of 
catches with provisions for sharing pro rata in any declines and for making 
adjustments if TACs increased substantially. The latter approach was intended 
to deal with a perceived unfairness if the stocks recovered or improved differ-
entially; companies depending on stocks which had not improved would have 
been disadvantaged otherwise. Efficiency might also have suffered with chance 
increases in landings falling to companies wi thout adequate processing facili-
ties. 
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The shares were initially limited in duration to a five year period from 
1984 but subsequently continued and the arrangements for transfer were re-
stricted to exchanges within a particular year. No provisions existed for perma-
nent transfers. 
Enforcement poses few problems in this sector, mainly because of the 
limited number of vessels and associated processing facilities. It is thus easier 
to monitor fishing activity (done by independent inspectors on the vessels) and 
production levels on shore. No court cases have occurred. 
The rights in this programme are subject to an annual charge related to 
the level of catches. 
The benefits of the programme occurred mainly on the processing and 
marketing sides. There was some reduction in effort but little evidence of sub-
stantial rationalisation of the fleet. It did, however, decline from 123 active 
vessels in 1982 to 98 in 1987. Economic benefits stemmed from catching in line 
with market demand and extending the season which allowed rationalisation 
in plant and employment as well as improving the quality of the product. 
5.6.3.4 Newfoundland inshore cod 1984 onwards 
The problem here was of excessive capacity leading to a very concen-
trated season which in turn posed problems for catchers, employment in pro-
cessing and quality of product. Progressively more of the cod were taken in the 
winter fishery off the south west of Newfoundland, increasing the risks to fish-
ermen and removing the opportunities for those in more northerly fishing 
communities. 
The aim of the programme was to allocate individual quotas to the 108 
vessels licensed to be in this sector. The expectation was that such a move 
would stabilise the fishery, extend the season, improve profits, reduce safety 
problems and avoid gluts. 
The programme was set up by the Federal Government in 1984 for three 
years initially but extended thereafter. 
The system of allocation was originally left to the fishermen in four 
groups defined by home port and reliance on the shrimp fishery. Subsequently 
their preference for uniform allocations in each specific size group resulted in 
a similar approach being adopted throughout the fleet wi th four size groups 
recognised. 
The individual quotas are issued on an annual basis, reflecting the 
changes in the relevant TACs. They are not transferable except in association 
with the licensed vessels. These sales are restricted to local fishermen or opera-
tors so as to maintain regional employment apparently. Leasing is only permit-
ted where a vessel has been lost and not yet replaced. 
Enforcement runs into problems in some respects because illegal landings 
and mis-reporting of catches are possible and difficult to detect. The rights do 
not have charges attaching to them. 
The impacts of the programme have been mainly in the areas sought. 
Safety is thought to have improved and the fishermen are pleased with the 
ability to fish in relation to market indications. The lengthening of the season 
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has brought benefits on the employment and processing side. The effects on 
the fleet structure have been minimal, wi th only a few vessels leaving the in-
dustry. 
5.6.4 Property rights in the United States 
5.6.4.1 General characteristics 
Like Canada the United States obtained considerable new resources when 
the limits went out to 200 miles; their enjoyment of the improvement in reve-
nue was almost as short lived as that of Canada. Their investment and effort 
expanded to take the fish no longer caught by foreign fleets. At first the ex-
pansion left space for joint ventures with some of the displaced foreign vessels 
but eventually such ventures were superseded by those conducted by US ves-
sels. In time the expected problems of open access showed in excess capacity 
and depleted stocks. The various programmes to deal wi th the current situa-
t ion, like those of the past, concentrate more on technical measures and lim-
ited entry licensing than on individual quotas. The latter are mainly found in 
freshwater fisheries, with only a couple of West Coast roe herring fisheries and 
one clam fishery on the coast providing examples from sea fisheries. 
US legislation is focused on conservation wi th perhaps less emphasis on 
the economic aspects. This may well reflect a different perception and legal 
tradit ion. For example, anti-trust legislation was used to break up what was 
seen as restraint of competition when the fishermen tried to organise the Gulf 
of Mexico shrimp fishery on a coordinated basis. With the complication of fed-
eral and state responsibilities in regulation, as well as the massive recreational 
interest, the different legislative approach is inevitable. The Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act 1976 leaves the ownership of harvesting 
rights vested in the nation, except where allocated under a current programme 
but only for the duration of that programme. It is thus not the obvious vehicle 
for creating durable and transferable property rights, a point reinforced by the 
interpretation that it does not allow for selling either licences or quotas. Such 
values as may accrue to the owners of rights to operate in restricted fisheries 
are undeniable but their persistence is not secured. Attempts in the 80s to pri-
vatize the huge stock of federally owned land encountered such resistance as 
to leave it in public hands and this attitude may underlay the approach on fish-
eries. Bromley provides useful background on this in his in his 1991 book, Envi-
ronment and Economy. 
The list in figure 5.13 (from the previously mentioned National ITQ Study 
Report) indicates that most of the relevant US programmes are in freshwater 
fisheries. 
The US experience is mainly in freshwater fisheries but these provide fur-
ther examples of the varying aims, operational methods and achievements of 
any individual quota system. The example chosen is the longest standing one. 
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Year Adopted 
Wisconsin: Lake Superior lake trout 
San Francisco Bay herring sac roe 
Wisconsin: Yellow perch 
Wisconsin: Chub 
Wisconsin: Menominees 
Wisconsin: Whitefish 
Yaquina Bay, Oregon herring sac roe 
Mid-Atlantic surf clams and ocean quahogs 
1971 
1982 
1983 
1983 
1989 
1989 
1989 
1990 
Figure 5.13 Individual quota programmes in the USA 
5.6.4.2 Wisconsin: lake Superior lake trout 
The previous history of this fishery was of several depressed stocks which 
did not recover sufficiently for a commercial fishery until 1971. 
The aim was to build on the limited entry licensing programme intro-
duced for other stocks in 1968. The intention was to sustain the fishery but also 
to cut back on the numbers involved. 
The programme was set up by the state (Wisconsin) Government and the 
initial allocation was to the 32 persons who held licences to fish for the various 
species available. 
The basis for allocation was equal shares for all the licence holders. The 
allocations are given to those eligible but the number has been reduced over 
the years by initially not permitting transfers and by tightening the conditions 
relating to investment and effort. Transfers are allowed now but they only take 
place through a departing licence holder handing over his licence and quota 
share to his replacement. There are no provisions for subdividing quotas, for 
holding additional quota share or for anyone holding more than one licence 
and associated quota. Leasing is, however, permitted and provides some scope 
for transfers but the owner must remain active in some other fishery in Lake 
Superior to retain his licence. 
fnforcementhas posed problems wi th overfishing and under reporting 
threatening conservation. A satisfactory prosecution, involving a heavy input 
of time and expenditure, has, however, improved matters. The rights are sub-
ject to a charge. 
The benefits appear to relate to improved marketing and catching eco-
nomic. The cut from 32 to 21 fishermen arose because of attrition and inability 
to transfer licences on any basis during the initial stages of the programme. 
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5.6.5 Property rights in New Zealand 
5.6.5.1 Implementation 
A management system using Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) was 
introduced into New Zealand Fisheries 1) on 1 October 1986 2). The fishery for 
each species was divided into a number of fish stocks. In 1989 there were 769 
fish stocks in the system. Each fish stock is composed of one or more Quota 
Management Areas (QMAs). Most of the species caught are taken in trawl fish-
eries which are multi-species fisheries. 
Quotas were allocated on the basis of individual catch histories. Fisher-
men could chose their best two years out of the years 1982-1984 to form the 
basis for provisional maximum and guaranteed minimum ITQs for each species. 
Fishermen were given the opportunity to sell part of their provisional 
ITQs to the Government on a competitive secret tender basis. Later in 1986 
TACs of certain species were increased and were offered to the industry by 
competitive tender. 
Fishermen were given the right to appeal to a Quota Appeal Authority 
(QAA). The decisions of this QAA were reviewable by the courts. Where the 
QAA increases an individual quota the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
(MAF) increased the TAC. 
Allocation on the basis of catch history has led to races to create catch 
history where it was known that a particular fishery was to be put on ITQ in the 
near future. 
The Government allowed deepwater quota holders to catch their quota 
by chartering foreign owned vessels and operating them under NZ fishery reg-
istration. 
To resolve by-catch problems the fol lowing mechanisms were built into 
the management system: 
allowance for fishers to over-catch their ITQ by up to 10% in a given fish-
ing year or carry over up to 10% of their ITQ to the next fishing year; 
trading of ITQ; 
fishing on behalf of another ITQ holder; 
surrender of the port price value of over caught fish to the crown; 
exchange of uncaught ITQ for over-caught ITQ (the catch/quota trade-off 
mechanism). 
1) The information in this section stems for a large part from the article 'Manage-
ment of Multi-species Fisheries in New Zealand by Individual Transferable 
Quotas', by John H. Annala, Keving J. Sullivan and Arthur Hore, ICES 1989 MSM 
Symposium/No 41. 
2) ITQs had been introduced in New Zealand fisheries in 1982. 
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5.6.5.2 Property rights 
Quotas are freely transferable between New Zealand residents or compa-
nies wi th less than a 20% foreign ownership. However, the Government has 
imposed limits on ITQ ownership. No individual or company may possess more 
than 35% of TAC in the case of deepwater species and 20% of TAC in the case 
of inshore species. 
Initially a specified tonnage of the TAC was allocated to quota holders. 
Fisheries legislation obliged the Government to compensate ITQ holders who 
take a reduction in their holding. Changes of TACs were brought about by the 
Government buying and selling quota. Later on, however. New Zealand has 
moved to a proportional quota system. Therefore, New Zealand ITQs can be 
stated as 'the right to harvest a specified percentage of the Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) from a stock in a given Quota Management Area (QMA)'. 
The legislation bringing in the ITQ-system confirms that ITQs are issued 
to quota holders in perpetuity. A representative of the New Zealand fishery 
industry (Robins, 1988) states that ownership in perpetuity enabled his com-
pany to plan, almost to the day, its fishing operations and to offer its customers 
reliable year round deliveries. He also stated that his company is under no pres-
sure to overcapitalise. 
New Zealand quota holders have to pay resource rentals to the Govern-
ment. These rentals are paid on quotas held and not on fish caught. Govern-
ment and fishing industry agree that these rentals are used to finance the man-
agement of the fishery. 
Falloon (1993) reports a rapid change in the structure of quota ownership 
shortly after the introduction of the ITQ system. An interesting development 
was the selling of quota to processors in exchange for ongoing contracts to 
supply fish. Processors pooled these quota and in doing so were able to even 
out fluctuations in catches. Falloon concludes that quota probably resulted in 
closer integration of fishing and processing operations. 
A development that was connected with the creation of property rights 
in the fishery was the claiming of fishing rights by the aboriginal people of 
New Zealand. Falloon expects that these claims probably never would have 
been developed without the advent of these property rights. 
5.6.5.3 Effectiveness of the system 
The main problems experienced within the new system were by-catch 
problems. Annala (1989) states that these problems were due to the fact that 
TACs had not been set in proportion of pre-ITQ landing level and because of 
natural variations in stock size. 
For example in 1986-87 TAC over-runs ranged from 1.7% to 80.5%. The 
major causes for TAC over-runs were 10% ITQ over-runs, surrenders to the 
crown and catch/quota trade-offs. A total of 122 tons of quota was traded in 
exchange for landed catch. 
The possibility of surrendering over caught fish to the crown was intro-
duced to prevent dumping of fish. It may, however, also result in ITQ over-runs. 
85 
The mechanism of trading off under-caught ITQs for over-caught ITQs 
brings flexibility into the system. A disadvantage of this mechanism is that it 
may lead to TAC over-runs where large amounts of undercaught quota for 
species for which TACs are set too high can be traded-off for overcatch of an-
other species. 
5.6.6 Property rights in Australia 
In 1984 ITQs were introduced in the southern bluefin tuna fishery 1). 
Since that time ITQs have been introduced in several other Australian fisheries. 
The objectives of these ITQ schemes are to prevent fish stocks from depletion 
and to improve the economic performance of the fleets. 
ITQs were preferred above other management schemes, mainly due to 
bad experiences (overcapitalization) wi th input controls. Moreover, bio-eco-
nomic analysis by modelling before the introduction had shown a higher net 
present value of profits under an ITQ-system compared with alternatives. 
The ITQs are allocated by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
as a fixed percentage of the Total Allowable Catch. This percentage has been 
partly based on catch history (by 75%) and investment in the fishery (by 25%). 
The eligibility of the fishermen to receive quota was based on their depend-
ence on and financial commitment to the fishery. 
The ITQs are fully transferable. In the southern bluefin tuna and south 
east fisheries there are no restrictions on the maximum size of the individual 
quota holdings. However, in the south east fishery there are restrictions on 
who can own quota. 
In Australia all Commonwealth fisheries offences are heard within the 
court's criminal jurisdiction. It is anticipated that special investigators, auditors 
and accountants will be used since the focus of ITQ enforcement is likely to be 
in the area of 'paper fraud'. 
The Australian Government has applied a cost recovery policy to the fish-
ing industry since 1984. Under this policy fishermen are now required to pay 
90% of the 'attributable' costs incurred in managing fisheries. The levy payable 
by each fisherman is determined by the quantity and type of fishing rights 
held. 
Adjustments of the fleets occurred as a result of quota transfers not from 
a decommissioning scheme. 
Main source for this section: Geen G. et al., (1993) 'Australian experience with 
individual transferable quota systems', OECD Documents 'The use of individual 
quotas in fisheries management', Paris, 1993. 
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5.6.7 Property rights in Japan 
5.6.7.1 Coastal areas 
In Japan common fishery rights have been established, fora long time, 
in the coastal areas 1). These rights are granted to fishery cooperatives and 
they refer to the zone within several kilometres from the shoreline. 
For this fishery-right-based fishery in the coastal area the regulations con-
cern fishing seasons, fish species, fishing methods etc. 
Though these fishery rights are considered as property rights trade in 
those rights is forbidden, but inheriting the right is allowed. 
The prefectural governor allocates the rights for the coastal area to appli-
cants, after consultations of the Fishery Coordination Committee. Fishery Coop-
eratives are given a priority to receive the licences, which are allocated for dif-
ferent periods: ten years for the fisheries based on common fishery rights 
(about 5,000 licences) five years for the demarcated fishery right (refers to 
aquaculture) and also five years for the set-net fishery. These licences of the 
Fishery Cooperatives are a kind of common property. 
5.6.7.2 Governor licensed fishery 
The area offshore of the fishing grounds for fishery-right-based fishery 
is regulated by the governor-licensed fishery. The prefectural governor issues 
these licences for a period of three years to Fishery Cooperatives 2). Fisheries 
involved are gillnet, longline, small-scale purse-seine, pot fishery etc. This 
governor-licenced fishery applies for some 160,000 vessels. Beside this fishery 
the 'special type of governor-licensed fishery' is distinguished wi th a number 
of about 30,000 licences. This fishery contains vessels operating in areas of dif-
ferent prefectures, making it necessary for the central Government to establish 
the upper limit of licences to be issued by the governor. Fisheries involved in 
this respect are medium-scale purse-seine fishery and small-scale trawl fishery. 
The prefectural governor determines fishery adjustment regulations, 
which need authorization from the Central Government. These regulations 
contain prohibitions for fishing in certain areas, close periods, limitation of 
prohibition of certain fishing gears or methods, limitations regarding fishing 
vessels and minimum fish-size regulations. 
Fishery Cooperatives, as a licensee of the fishery right, conduct far reach-
ing fishery management in the case of the governor-licensed fishery. They may 
impose sanctions such as fines against violators of the regulations. 
1) This section draws heavily on the contribution paper for the Ad Hoc Expert 
Group on Fisheries of the OECD Committee for Fisheries, included in the 
'Synthesis report for the study on the economic aspects of the management of 
marine living resources', Paris, 1996 (forthcoming). 
2) It is not clear if these licences are also allocated to individuals. 
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5.6.7.3 Ministry licensed fisheries 
Fisheries based on intergovernmental arrangements and/or fisheries tar-
geted at stocks migrating in the offshore area are licensed by the Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The licence period is five years or one year 
in this respect. 
This licence scheme of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
applying for some 4,200 vessels, is based on the Fisheries Law. The regulations 
contain the total number of vessels by vessel size, fishing area and fishing gear 
control. 
5.6.7.4 Institutions 
Institutions at three levels are involved in Japanese fisheries management: 
(1) the Fishery Coordination Committee at regional level, consisting of repre-
sentatives of elected fishermen, scientists and members representing the public 
interest. The Joint Regional Fishery Coordination Committee (2) can be estab-
lished when adjustment ranging over several regions is necessary and (3) on the 
national level the Central Fishery Coordination Council considers matters wi th 
respect to the Minister licensed fishery and the implementation of regulations 
based on the Fisheries Law. This council is composed of fishermen and scien-
tists. 
5.6.7.5 Problems in practice 
The OECD contribution paper mentions four outstanding issues in Japa-
nese fisheries management: 
in the case of self-imposed fishery management by fishermen, there is a 
possibility that fishery management well suited to the stock status cannot 
be guaranteed because too much emphasis may be given to adjustment 
among the various fisheries concerned; 
there is a possibility that exclusive profits may arise to licences because of 
the limited entry. Implementation of management measures will be diffi-
cult if there is strong resistance from the fishermen concerned; 
in fishery management issues exceeding the competence of individual 
fishery cooperatives difficulties are involved in achieving consensus 
among those fishery cooperatives; 
promotion of voluntary operation regulations to ensure stock increase 
requires financial assistance from the central and prefectural Govern-
ments as it involves temporary income loss for fishermen. 
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ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROPERY RIGHTS IN 
FISHING 
6.1 Economic aspects of property rights in fishing in Denmark 
6.1.1 Introduction 
From 1984 to 1992 the total value of the Danish landings has been rela-
tively stable measured in current prices and gently decreasing measured in 
fixed prices given the low inflation rate in the period, see figure 6.1. The total 
landings have also been relatively stable, but the composition of species in the 
landings has changed during the period. There was a fall in the landings of the 
high valued species used for human consumption, e.g. cod in the Baltic and 
North Sea, while the share of lower valued species (e.g. herring) has increased. 
Since the total value of the landings has been stable in the period the changed 
composition of species in the landings has been offset by increasing prices of 
the high valued species until 1991. In figure 6.1 the fall in prices in 1992 and 
1993 is quit clear. The landings from the fisheries after industrial species fluctu-
ate from year to year, but the overall trend during the period indicates a fall 
in the total value of the landings measured in fixed prices. 
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Figure 6.1 The value of landings by Danish fishermen. Current prices 
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Before 1984 the Danish fishery experienced increasing landings measures 
in both quantity and value from year to year. The transition from the situation 
before 1984, where the value of the landings was increasing, to the current 
situation, where the growth in quantity and value of the landings is very lim-
ited and in several years even decreasing, has created a situation, where the 
resources in general and the main species for human consumption in particular 
have become more scarce. 
In the last part of the period (1987-1991) the Danish fleet should reduce 
to a given size in 1991, according to the MAGP. A new MAGP is in force for the 
period 1992-1996, where the size of the fleets in 1996 has to meet the objec-
tives set up in the programme. At the end of the first programme in 1991 the 
Danish fleet was reduced more than required by the MAGP. The reasons for 
this are probably the scarce resource situation, which has induced a bad eco-
nomic development in the fleet and this combined with the decommissioning 
scheme has lead to the overshooting of the objective. However, it should be 
mentioned that the size of the fleet continue to increase until 1987, which indi-
cates a general overcapacity. The decommissioning scheme is still in force in 
Denmark. 
The 'success' of the decommissioning scheme and the MAGP is also due 
to the fact that the overall access to the Danish fishery has been restricted since 
1987, see chapter 5. To insert a vessel a permission (or licence) is needed from 
the Ministry of Fishery. This permission is according to the regulation depend-
ent on (and it is nowadays, since 1987) whether corresponding capacity leaves 
the fishery. Further it is not allowed without permission from the Ministry to 
extend the capacity of existing vessels in certain ways. 
The introduction of limited access is the main new regulation initiative in 
response to the resource scarcity. There has also been a need for extending the 
use of some of the existing regulation measures, i.e. permissions and rations, 
because the allocation issue becomes more important when the pressure on 
the Danish quotas increases. For example as a reaction to the declining cod 
quota in the Baltic Sea, it was introduced that vessels longer than 12m needed 
a permit from the Ministry to enter this fishery. The use of rations has only 
been to set (i.e. cut) the allowed catch quantity per time-period so the Danish 
quota could last the whole fishing season. In general, permissions and rations 
have been used with the intention to distribute the fishing possibilities, it has 
not been the purpose to control the fisheries by restricting the access. 
In Denmark the effect of the increasing herring stock and consequently 
the TAC for herring has been, that a system of individual quotas for herring 
was replaced in 1990 by a system where the vessels are assigned a maximum 
allowed catch within a certain time period depending on number of fishing 
days and length of vessel. All vessels with a herring licence can participate. This 
licence can be obtained if the vessel meets a given technological standard. The 
reason for the change in 1990 was that more vessels, given the increasing TAC 
of herring, could participate. As mentioned in chapter 5 the regulation has 
from 1994 swifted back to both individual quotas and rations. This was mainly 
because the committee advising the Ministry about the regulation was split 
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and the Ministry decided to implement a regulation which to some extent re-
flected the different views in the committee. 
The limitations that follows from the mentioned regulations may have 
created entitlements/rights for some fishermen and these rights can function 
as normal input of production. In the fol lowing sections these rights are de-
scribed from an economic point of view. If the rights have the same characteris-
tics as other goods (scarcity, exclusivity etc.) then the rights become valuable 
and can be subject for trade. 
In the next section the distribution of rights on each fleet segment will 
be discussed. In section 6.1.3 the markets for rights are investigated and in sec-
tion 6.1.4 the changes in the distribution of rights in the last decade are shown. 
6.1.2 Distribution of rights in 1993 
Before the description of the distribution of rights on each fleet segment, 
vessels licence and permissions are discussed, because both measures applies to 
the whole fleet. 
Vessels licence 
The rules of limited access give the fishermen with a licence to participate 
the right to the benefit stream from the resources. The value of the licence will 
thus in theory reflect the expectations of future rents in the fisheries. These 
expectations are based among other things on forecast of changes in economic 
parameters, e.g. prices, the development in the resource situation and in the 
management regime. The licence value and the (current) rent/profit could, 
therefore, differ if the expectations of the future development are different 
from the current situation. 
According to the literature it is uncertain whether the economic efficiency 
is increased by implementation of overall limited access to the (Danish) fisheries 
combined with control over the individual vessels possibilities regarding exten-
sion of capacity (Clark, 1985, p. 156). The reason is that the underlying incen-
tives leading to economic inefficiency still exists. The intuitive argument is that 
if the regulation of inputs is successful, i.e., creating positive profit, then the 
participants in the fishery have incentives to increase their capacity, because it 
brings the fishermen in a position to take a larger share of the total outcome 
of the fishery. 
Effort and capacity are multidimensional variables and it is not an easy 
task to control these. A unit of effort is produced by applying equipment of 
various types (vessels wi th different characteristics, engine, electronic equip-
ment, fishing gear and manpower). Input regulation can limit the use of cer-
tain inputs in production and can limit entry into the fishery. Limited entry may 
induce the fishermen to expand the fishing power of their vessels until the 
whole resource rent is dissipated, i.e. total costs equal to total revenue. Since 
managers find that limited entry does not create economic rent, restrictions 
upon input usage per vessel are often imposed. For example, given restrictions 
on vessel tonnage, fishermen reoptimize over the reduced set of input and 
they may fish longer hours and use more labour and equipment; they substi-
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tute inputs for the restricted input. Regulations can introduce further restric-
tions and the fishermen wil l again respond by increasing the use of non-re-
stricted input. The conclusion isthat if the inputs can be substituted, restrictions 
on one input will lead to an expansion of other inputs and will increase the 
fishing costs and lead to resource rent dissipation. 
The success of input restrictions seems to depend on whether fishermen 
can find substitutes for the restricted inputs or whether their creative skills are 
better than the manager's. Munro and Scott (1985) conclude 'that there are 
too many inputs for all to be controlled effectively. Hence opportunities for 
substitution are never entirely absent'. 
Others emphasise that either vessels in general have limited possibilities 
to change the input proportions because of the relative fixed design of a fish-
ing unit, or provided that the regulations are sufficiently comprehensive and 
enforceable and the number of licenses sufficiently limited, the incentives lead-
ing to economic inefficiency can be defeated without further regulations. 
Campbell and Lindner (1990) shows in a theoretical example that success 
with restricting a subset of inputs is more likely if: 
it is difficult to substitute non-restricted inputs for restricted input and/or; 
the restricted input's proportion of the total factor cost is high and/or; 
the economic pressure to exploit the stock is not too high. 
Empirical work shows that knowledge about the production technology 
offers information about the internal structure of effort and the fishermen's 
ability to dissipate rent (Dupont 1991). If e.g. the variable inputs (fuel, gear and 
labour) are complements to the controlled input, e.g. tonnage per vessel, regu-
lation of the tonnage will increase efficiency. Regulation based on control of 
inputs could, therefore, (partly) be successful. 
It is useful to discuss the effects in the short and long run separately. In 
the short run the combination of limited access and extensive control of the 
capacity of individual vessels will probably stabilize the economic efficiency. 
This does not reduce the overcapacity, but it can prevent further expansion, if 
the input-usage can be effective controlled. In the long run, however, it is very 
difficult to control the development of the capacity, because of increasing pos-
sibilities of substitution of inputs over time. Further the technological develop-
ment makes the control task a very problematic affair. Without any transfer-
ability of licenses it may be necessary to implement a vessel buy-back program-
me to cope with the overcapacity. 
Danish case more complicated 
The discussion is based on a single species approach. However, the Danish 
case is more complicated, because: 
the main part of the vessels perform multi-purpose (and multi-species) 
fishery; 
the entry and exit of the different fisheries and changes of gear are in 
general unregulated; 
the decision of limited access and permission to extend the capacity of 
single vessels can be changed by the Ministry, because the Law of fishery 
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gives the framework for the Ministry to implement more detailed regula-
t ion. As an example of this the regulation of the herring and mackerel 
fisheries was changed from individual quota to rations in 1990. 
It is difficult to predict the outcome of the Danish regulation in the short 
run in terms of overall economic efficiency. Because of the possibilities regard-
ing entry and exit of the different fisheries it can be argued that even in the 
short run the regulation will fail to increase the economic efficiency. High 
profit fisheries will attract more vessels and consequently erode potential gain 
in efficiency. Only in the least attractive fisheries where the economy just 
breaks even the efficiency will increase. Opposite, the regulation combined 
wi th the decommission scheme may increase the efficiency in the short run, 
because the programme has reduced the total capacity in terms of GRT and 
kW. Given the Danish share of the TACs the available quotas are divided 
among fewer fishermen, all things equal. But in the long run the capacity will 
probably tend towards the level, where the rents are depleted. However, the 
capacity development can slow down because of the higher cost of capital due 
to the requirement that corresponding capacity has to leave the fleet. Since the 
higher cost of capital are not covered by secure fishing possibilities because of 
the unrestricted entry and exit of fisheries, the investments most be based on 
the overall profitability in the fisheries in general and the least profitable fish-
eries in particular. 
Based on the literature and experience from other countries/fisheries the 
prediction whether the Danish regulation leads to increased economic effi-
ciency will be mainly negative. In the long run it can be expected that the ca-
pacity will tend towards a level where the rents are depleted. The capacity de-
velopment will be determined by the profitability in the least profitable fisher-
ies. 
However, the licence could still have a value even if the rents/profits are 
small or even zero/negative because the fishermen then have the option to 
operate. The licence is connected to a vessel with a given capacity and it is pos-
sible to substitute the vessel with another if the capacity is maintained. The 
licence value is, therefore, in this case determined of the alternative employ-
ment possibilities in other sectors in the economy. If these employment possibil-
ities are poor as normally assumed, because fishermen are typically without 
many or any skills and the fishing regions are often relatively isolated from the 
rest of the economy, then the licence represents an access ticket to the main 
industry for the people in these regions. 
However, for some fleet segments entry of vessels are not possible. In 
Denmark substitution of vessels is not allowed, if it increases the number of 
beam trawlers or purse seiners. Therefore, the licence value in these fleet seg-
ments could be higher than in other segments, which of course also depends 
on the regulation of the fisheries that these fleet segments participate in. 
The use of permissions is very limited, see chapter 5. In several cases the 
use of permissions have been only to force the fishermen to notify the ministry 
that they intend to participate and permissions are issued to all. This implies 
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that the size of the rations implicit determines who participates. This use of 
permissions allocates no entitlements to the vessels. 
Purse seiners 
The purse seiners that participate in the herring fishery need a licence. 
This licence is not a reel barrier because as mentioned the licence can be ob-
tained by meeting some technological standards. Nothing in the regulation in 
1993 1) restricts the number of participating vessels in neither the herring nor 
the mackerel fishery. The assignment of rations for a certain number of fishing 
days used in the herring and mackerel fishery gives the participants the right 
(or limit the possibilities, given the open access to the fisheries) to withdraw 
some of the current benefit stream from the resource. 
Trawlers 
For the trawlers that participate in the fisheries for species regulated by 
TACs the main right is rations and in a few cases permissions. Other parts of the 
regulation have the objective to protect the stocks and this creates only (if any) 
very poor property rights. 
The rations create a right of a relatively poor quality, because the rations 
do not lead to exclusivity. The vessels are only given the possibility to catch a 
given amount of fish within a certain period (e.g. 14 days). It is e.g. not allowed 
to transfer an eventual unutilized part of the ration to the next ration period. 
This limitation can create a right wi th a value, because unexploited parts of a 
ration can be sold, which, however, is illegal, to fishermen with catches beyond 
the ration. For multi-species fisheries with more than one species covered by 
rations unexploited parts of the rations can be subject for exchange between 
fishermen. 
The vessels involved in the sprat fishery in ICES Ilia can only get a permis-
sion to participate in the fishery if they have had permission in the previous 
years. This can create a right of some value. 
Danish seiners 
For this fleet segment the main regulation is on the by-catch species 
which are regulated by rations, and to the extent that this create any rights it 
is the only rights allocated to this segment. 
Gill-netters 
Also for this segment the main restriction is rations. 
1) However, from 1994/95 the regulation of the herring and mackerel fisheries is 
based on individual quotas (non-transferable) which are assigned to vessels with 
a catch record in these fisheries. 
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6.1.3 Market characteristics 
There are no explicit market for vessel licenses. The market exists together 
wi th the market for vessels and it is difficult to separate the two markets from 
each other. 
The supply side of the market for vessels consists of fishermen who want 
either to leave the fishery or to replace their vessels with others. The final deci-
sion whether to leave or to remain in the fishery depends of course of the ad-
vantages that can be obtained in the two situations, but it can be useful to 
separate them here. 
If a fisherman wants to leave the fishery there are two options. He can 
apply for a subsidy from the decommissioning scheme and, as a part of the 
conditions for getting the subsidy, he must sell the vessel either as a fishing 
vessel to a fleet outside the EU fleets or to other purpose than fishing, includ-
ing scrapping. The second option is to sell the vessel to another fisherman, that 
way the vessel remains in the Danish fishery wi th the licence. 
If the fisherman wants to replace his vessel with another one then the 
vessel can be sold as a fishing vessel to other fisheries than the Danish ones or 
used for other purposes, including scrapping. Here the licence is transferred to 
the new vessel. 
Decommissioning scheme sets price floor 
The supply of vessels is influenced by the decommissioning scheme. The 
scheme sets a minimum price in the market. The subsidy from the scheme is 
based on objective criteria such as GRT and insurance value. The scheme is ap-
plied in Denmark by dividing the yearly grant into sub-grants which are used 
for vessels belonging to given regions and fleet segments. If a vessel apply for 
a subsidy the approval will depend on whether other vessels seek from the 
same sub-grant. But the grants have been relatively big for several years, so 
almost every vessel that has applied will be approved, at least within a few 
years. Therefore, the effect on the market for vessels has been to set a price 
floor in the market. 
The demand side consists of buyers who want to achieve a vessel with a 
licence in order to participate in the Danish fishery, and of buyers on the inter-
national market for vessels. The Danish market is presumably a little part of the 
international market, i.e. the price is exogenous given. The decision of invest-
ment in a fishing licence depends highly on the expectations of the future situ-
ation in the fishery. Therefore, the total investment can be compared with an 
investment in a vessels and an option, whose value reflects the expectations of 
the future profit in the fishery. 
The offer from a potential buyer of a vessel with a licence must be higher 
than the subsidy from the decommissioning scheme plus the price obtained by 
selling the vessel to a fleet outside the EU fleets or by scrapping the vessel, if 
the seller wants to leave the fishery. The value of a licence (i.e. the option 
value) is positive and in this case higher than the subsidy from the decommis-
sioning scheme. 
95 
If the seller wants to continue in the fishery, i.e. keep the licence, then 
the price he can obtain for the vessel without a licence is the price in the inter-
national market. Larger offers for the vessel inclusive the licence means that 
the licence have a positive value, which is the difference between the market 
prices in the two cases. The final decision whether to stay in the fishery or to 
leave depends on the relationship between the fisherman's expectations to the 
future earnings from the fishery and the licence value. 
The licence value depends on several factors. The main factors are: 
volume of catch and type of technology used; 
quality of the right, including the possibilities of new entrants; 
the availability of loans and/or credit. 
There are no record of the trade with vessels, which contains information 
about prices etc. Therefore, the market is not transparent and the price forma-
tion is to a certain extent unclear. 
Information from the participants in the market suggests that the decom-
missioning scheme in general sets the market price. Only in few cases the ves-
sels are traded at a higher price. 
Especially purse seiners and beam trawlers must be expected to be and 
have been traded at prices higher than the minimum price, because of the rela-
tively good quota situation in their main fisheries (at least in 1993-95) and the 
closed access of new vessels into these fleet segments. 
For trawlers that can participate in many different fisheries which always 
will lead to overcapacity in the most attractive fisheries, and where the quota 
situation is relatively poor in the main fisheries, the licence value have been 
small (smaller than the subsidy from the decommissioning scheme). The trade 
happens at the minimum price. 
The participants in the market besides the buyers and the sellers are 
bankers, brokers, lawyers and accountants. The roles played by each of these 
groups are at least in the Danish case quite obvious and the roles will not be 
commented further here. 
6.1.4 Changes in the distribution of rights 
In table 6.1 is shown the number of vessels by gear and GRT classes in 
1987 and 1993. The period is of interest, because since 1987 there has been 
limited access to the fishery. 
The number of trawlers and Danish seiners fell in the period relatively 
more than the total number of vessels. For trawlers the fall was in particular 
within the GRT groups between 20 and 150 GRT, while for Danish seiners the 
fall is concentrated inside the GRT groups between 10 and 50 GRT. 
The fall in Danish seiners can not be explained by the quota situation. The 
quota of plaice, the main species in the catch, has been relatively good in the 
period. Instead the explanation is the decommissioning scheme. The scheme 
was in these years directed towards old vessels (and fishermen) as the main part 
of the Danish seiners were. 
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The fall in trawlers can to a larger extent be explained by the quota situa-
tion. The vessel groups between 20 and 150 GRT are in general dependent on 
the main human consumption species cod. In the period the cod fishery in both 
the Baltic and the North Sea has been poor. The alternative fisheries are for the 
larger vessels in the group industrial fisheries, which over the period has experi-
enced an overall fall in catches. For the smaller vessels in the group the alterna-
tives have been other human consumption species. The decommissioning 
scheme has also played a role, because the smaller vessels were rather old. 
For the others groups, purse seiners/multi-purpose vessels and gill-netters 
etc., the number of vessels has been either increasing or almost unchanged. In 
the group of purse seiners/multi-purpose vessels the increase is due to multi-
purpose vessels. However, this increase reflects only that a number of existing 
vessels can use different gear technology (e.g. trawl/net) and, therefore, these 
vessels have changed vessel category. The reason for the unchanged number 
of purse seiners (vessels larger than 150 GRT) is the relatively good quota situa-
t ion regarding herring and mackerel. For the gill-netters the reason for the 
rather small decline in the number of vessels can be found in the elaboration 
of the regulation, where in several cases the vessels wi th length less than 12m 
are excepted and in other cases the allocated rations consider the smaller ves-
sels. Another factor is that some of the target species of gill-netters are not 
regulated very hard, such as plaice and turbot. 
6.1.5 Conclusions 
On a small scale property rights in the form of limited access have been 
introduced into the Danish fishery. However, this entitlement is weak and has 
not up to now influenced the development of the fleet significantly. 
However, in the future, regulation based on creating of rights are going 
to become more used. This prognosis is founded on two observations. First the 
actual trials with regulation based on assignment of fishing days and INTQ indi-
cate that application of this type of regulation will increase in the future. The 
implementation in 1994 of INTQ in the herring and mackerel fishery, which also 
is in force in 1995, shows that rights based regulation are not only an experi-
mental arrangement. Second when the main stocks for the Danish fishery re-
cover then the fishermen will learn that their vessel licence is valuable. The 
tradition in Denmark has been to have free access to the sector and also to 
each individual fishery. This implies that when (hopefully) the stocks recover 
the tight regulation should be relaxed in order to fol lowing the tradition. But 
if the present fishermen then experience that their vessel licence becomes 
worthless, the fishermen will probably argue in favour of keeping the vessel 
licence system. 
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6.2 Economic aspects of property rights in fishing in the Netherlands 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The distribution of the Dutch property rights will be shown in this chapter 
on the basis of the fol lowing aspects: 
fleet segment; 
HP-group; 
region; 
percentage share of the individual transferable quota per enterprise in 
total national sole and plaice quotas. 
6.2.2 Distribution of rights in 1993 and 1994 
Fishing rights with respect to fleet segment 
The Dutch property rights were distributed in 1993 over some 470 active 
vessels of the cutter fleet and 13 trawlers of the distant water fishery. Table 6.2 
shows the part of each fleet segment in the cutter fishery 1) in these property 
rights. 
Table 6.2 Distribution of licences and ITQs by segment of Dutch cutter fleet, situation Janu-
ary 1st. 1993 
Fleet segment 
Flatfish sector 
Roundfish sector 
Multi-purpose vessels 
Shrimp vessels 
Total 
Nr. of 
vessels 
212 
52 
79 
126 
469 
Total of 
licensed HP 
406,700 
24,600 
28,100 
16,700 
476,700 
Total of flatfish ITQs a) 
sole 
(tonnes) 
19,880 
102 
1,209 
39 
21,230 
plaice 
(tonnes) 
62,780 
424 
4,624 
82 
67,910 
a) ITQ: Individual Transferable Quota. 
Source: Fishing rights registration of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
The importance of the main sector of the cutter fleet, the flatfish sector 
(the beam trawlers), proves from the part of the total licensed HP, owned by 
this sector: 85%, whereas the other three fleet segments own 5-6 and 4% re-
spectively. 
The flatfish sector became even more important in the past five years, 
measured by fishing effort. This effort, expressed as HP-times days-at-sea, of 
1) Fleet segment defined in this respect as 70% of potential earnings at minimum 
from concerning fishery, based upon fishing rights. 
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the beam trawlers was 89% of the total effort in 1993. An increase compared 
with 1988 when this percentage was 84%. Especially the effort of the roundfish 
sector has declined during the past five years as a result of lower cod quotas 
and decommissioning of vessels. 
The distribution of the other major fishing rights is explained in table 6.3. 
Roundfish entitlements refer to catching rights for cod and whit ing 1). The 
1993 cod quota of 11,675 tonnes was mainly distributed amongst the vessel 
owners by this kind of entitlements, which gave the right to land a certain 
quantity of cod and whit ing weekly or monthly. A small number of roundfish 
entitlements have been bought by beam trawlers of the flatfish sector, because 
of their substantial by-catch of cod and whit ing. 
The 1993 herring quota allocated to the cutter fisheries (22,400 tonnes) 
was distributed individually by 'documents', giving the right to land a certain 
quantity annually. A small number of beam trawlers is involved in this fishery 
during a part of the year. There is no TAC for shrimp but entrance to this fish-
ery needs an entitlement, which is owned by owners of shrimp vessels and 
multi-purpose vessels. The latter ones are mainly 300 HP vessels, involved in 
flatfish, roundfish and shrimp fisheries. 
Table 6.3 Distribution of entitlements by segment of Dutch cutter fleet, situation January 
1st. 1993 
Fleet segment 
Flatfish sector 
Roundfish sector 
Multi-purpose vessels 
Shrimp vessels 
fu l l 
1 
42 
21 
Number of ent i t lements 
roundfish 
seasonal 
10 
7 
24 
herring 
9 
3 
5 
shrimp 
1 
5 
50 
121 
Source: Fishing rights registration of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
A quite separate sector is the distant water fishery, which consisted of 
thirteen vessels by January 1st. 1993 owned by four companies. The HP-licences 
of these vessels totalled 73,800 HP. These freezer trawlers ranged in HP from 
3,200-10,400. The companies owned also herring- and mackerel permits. 
It can be added in this respect that Dutch vessel owners participate to 
some extent in fishing rights in other countries, namely the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Belgium. 
The regulations for these and the other fishing rights are explained in 
section 5.3. 
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Property rights as to HP-group 
Table 6.4 shows the distribution of flatfish ITQs by HP-group. The 
sole/plaice ITQs were attached to 382 vessels in 1994. In the smallest size group, 
up to 260 HP, some 40 vessels had rather big ITQs. In fact, these documents 
were 'parked' on those vessels which were in fact not active in the flatfish fish-
eries. The main reason for this is to avoid loss of documents which are not allo-
cated to a vessel during a time period of two years. 
The major part of the flatfish ITQs (nearly 80% for sole and 75% for 
plaice) are allocated to vessels equipped with an engine power of more than 
1,500, which form 30% of total entitled vessels. 
The cod/whiting entitlements are mainly allocated (84% of total national 
quota) to the vessels ranging from 300-1,100 HP, as table 6.5 shows. 
Table 6.4 Distribution of flatfish ITQs by HP-group of Dutch cutter fleet, situation 1 January 
1994 
HP-group Nr. of vessels 
67 
99 
25 
33 
86 
72 
Total of flatfish ITQs 
sole 
(tonnes) 
318 
1,855 
342 
2,162 
8,656 
8,708 
plaice 
(tonnes) 
1,014 
6,194 
1,348 
7,310 
25,306 
24,811 
- 260 
261- 300 
301-1100 
1101-1500 
1501-2000 
>2000 
Total 382 22,042 65,982 
Source: Fishing rights registration of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
Table 6.5 Distribution of cod and whiting permits by HP-group of Dutch cutter fleet, situa-
tion 1 January 1994 
HP-group Number of permits Total of roundfish ITQs 
full year 
5 
26 
30 
3 
1 
1 
season 
5 
40 
1 
6 
cod 
(tonnes) 
622 
3,780 
3,090 
458 
96 
96 
whiting 
(tonnes) 
248 
1,573 
1,315 
182 
38 
38 
- 260 
261- 300 
301-1100 
1101-1500 
1501-2000 
>2000 
Total 66 52 8,142 3,428 
Source: Fishing rights registration of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
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Regional distribution of property rights 
The regional distribution of property rights by 1 January 1994 is shown 
in appendix 2. Vessels from Urk have the biggest part (36%) of the flatfish ITQs, 
followed by Den Helder and Goedereede. Together fishermen from these three 
ports own nearly 80% of the national quotas of sole and plaice whereas their 
part of the fleet amounted to 48%. 
Urk is also the main port of ownership of cod/whiting entitlements 
whereas Wieringen and Umuiden take the second and third place. Fishermen 
of these three ports together own some 64% of the national cod and whit ing 
quotas. 
Distribution with respect to size of the ITQ 
The size of the ITQ per right holder is mostly between 0.005 and 0.5% of 
total Dutch sole and plaice quota as table 6.6 shows. On average, the size of an 
ITQ in 1994 amounted to 76,250 kg sole and 228,300 kg of plaice. 
Table 6.6 Distribution of ITQ holders as to the percentage share in total allocated flatfish 
quotas (1994) 
Share in total flatfish quotas Percentage of right holders a) 
0 
0.005 ('mini' ITQ) 
0.005-0.5 
0.5 -1.0 
1.0 -1.5 
1.5 -2.5 
ITQ sole 
31.7 
11.8 
39.4 
11.6 
3.1 
2.4 
ITQ plaice 
31.7 
11.8 
39.5 
11.6 
4.5 
0.9 
100.0 100.0 
a) Holders of ITQs and other fishing rights owning one or more vessels in the Dutch cutter fish-
eries by 1 January 1994. Holders are synonym with enterprises (total of 423) in this respect. 
Source: Fishing rights registration of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
6.2.3 Market characteristics 
Market structure 
The market for fishing rights has developed gradually in the Netherlands 
since 1976. In this year documents were handed out to vessel-owners specifying 
the number of kg sole and plaice the document holder was entitled to catch. 
All the subsequent limiting measures from the Dutch Government have re-
sulted in more or less tradable fishing rights. The industry has created possibili-
ties to trade even when this trade was not allowed officially. Roundfish entitle-
ments were sold for instance together with the vessel and the buyer could sell 
the vessel alone to acquire the desired entitlement. 
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Transferability of rights was officially allowed in 1985 for sole and plaice 
ITQs and in 1994 the roundfish entitlements were transformed into fully trans-
ferable individual quotas. 
A limiting measure from Government means that a certain group of fish-
ermen is created which is entitled to operate within these limitations and those 
outside this group are excluded. This creates at the same time a scarcity for 
these entitlements and, therefore, a value is attached to the concerning docu-
ments. Those who need (extra) rights are able to find those vessel-owners who 
want to sell their rights, a price is agreed and a market is established. This has 
been favoured by the relative small number of vessel-owners (some 700) in the 
cutter fisheries knowing each other rather well and having good communica-
t ion facilities i.e. on board of the vessels. Thus information about quantities 
and prices circulates rather quickly, which is an important condition for a mar-
ket process. 
Nevertheless, the market is not very transparent especially for outsiders. 
A part of the market process is visible in the Dutch fishing magazine 'Visserij-
nieuws', which is shown in table 6.7. These offers and demands are far from 
complete, but the tables give a good overview of tradable fishing rights in the 
Netherlands in 1992 and 1993. 
Table 6.7 Offers and demands of fishing rights in advertisements in 1992 and 1993 
Engine Shrimp EU file ITQ sole/ Entitl. cod/ 
power permits registr. plaice whiting 
licence 
Year 1992 
Number of offers 
Number of demands 
Year 1993 
Number of offers 
Number of demands 
12 
2 
13 
7 
2 
-
6 
5 
10 
-
13 
2 
31 
14 
13 
1 
9 
6 
9 
5 
Source: Visserijnieuws 1992 and 1993. 
Table 6.8 Offers and demands of licences and Individual Transferable Quota, quantities con-
cerned 
Engine power ITQ sole/plaice 
licence (HP) (tonnes) 
Offers, total quantity in 1992 8,070 264/1790 
Offers, total quantity in 1993 9,050 525/1480 
Source: Visserijnieuws 1992 and 1993. 
The following persons/institutions play a role in the market for property 
rights: 
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vessel-owners, who want to buy property rights. Demand may come from 
vessel-owners who have ordered a new (bigger) vessel and, therefore, 
have a shortage in licensed HP and sole/plaice quotas. In cases a smaller 
vessel is bought a demand may arise to a shrimp permit, a EU vessel file 
registration for the coastal zone and an entitlement for cod/whiting fish-
ery; 
vessel-owners, who want to sell property rights, all their available rights 
or part of them. These offers may be induced by replacement by a smaller 
vessel, by specialization to one fishery (e.g. selling of flatfish ITQs by 
cod/whiting fishermen) and by decommissioning. In the latter case all 
property rights can be sold except the HP-licence; this document has to 
be sent in to the ministry as a condition to receive the decommissioning 
payment. Only then a real decline in HP capacity occurs; 
ship-brokers, who may bring offer and demand together, sometimes by 
advertising in 'Visserijnieuws'; 
shipyards, who may act as an intermediate between sellers and buyers. 
Yards may also own property rights for sale to those who order a new 
boat; 
PO, as an intermediate between sellers and buyers, not only for their 
members. This refers especially to transactions of flatfish ITQs. These are 
hampered by the rule that an ITQ should be sold as a whole document 
whereas buying of parts of ITQs is allowed. A PO may buy an ITQ and sell 
it in smaller quantities to its members, thus facilitating the transactions. 
A PO does not own ITQs usually, in fact they act as a broker; 
Banks, having a good insight in the needs of their clients may also facili-
tate and finance transactions (of ITQs). Moreover, when financing a vessel 
it is usually agreed that sale of the property right by the vessel-owner 
requires approvement of the bank; 
accountancy firms, which may incidentally act as an intermediate be-
tween sellers and buyers; 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, which has 
to approve and registrate the transactions of the property rights in fish-
ing. 
Ownership of property rights is concentrated on the vessel-owners. Inter-
mediary organisations may own rights but this will be only temporary. In the 
Dutch fishery sector processing companies do not own fishing rights, like in 
other individual quota schemes may be the case. Furthermore, there are no 
observations of buying of Dutch property rights by foreigners. 
Parallel to this market for buying and selling of property rights, a lease 
market has developed. Especially, lease of sole- and plaice ITQs became impor-
tant in recent years. 
These lease contracts only refer to the relevant quota year. 
Prices of property rights 
Information about prices of property rights is only available incidentally, 
because of the lack of transparency of the market. 
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Prices in table 6.9 are only indicative, based upon LEI-DLO costs and earn-
ings investigations and talks wi th representatives of the industry. 
Up to 1987 prices of flatfish ITQs remained rather low; in fact, only a price 
was paid for sole in this period and the plaice quantity was given free in addi-
t ion to the sole quantity. When prices rose in 1987/1988 the quantity of plaice 
was paid separately at a maximum level of some NLG 12/kg. In 1994 this price 
had dropped til l some NLG 5-6/kg. 
Table 6.9 Price indications of property rights 
year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
a) Plaice was traded more and more seperately, at higher prices: NLG 8-10 in 1995 and NLG 10-
12 per kg in 1996. 
Source: LEI-DLO costs and earnings studies. 
Rather high prices were also paid for other entitlements: cod/whiting 
documents NLG 500,000-700,000 in 1993 and herring permits some NLG 
600,000-900,000. Furthermore, HP- licences were priced at NLG 100-300 in 1993 
and subsequent years. 
Prices of flatfish ITQs increased sharply in 1987/1988. This reflects the fact 
that control measures became very stringent in 1988. In this year systematic 
control of landings was implemented, carried out by some hundred inspectors. 
In 1993/1994 these prices of sole and plaice quotas dropped, due to the high 
level of the national sole quota and diminished catches of plaice. These catches 
were low in many cases compared with the available plaice quota so that there 
was no need, generally spoken, to buy plaice quota. 
Summarising, wi th respect to price developments of Dutch ITQs the fol-
lowing major influencing factors can be distinguished: 
enforcement of quotas. A major improvement of this enforcement in 
1988 caused a sharp price increase; 
105 
Flatfish ITQ 
sole/plaice 
(NLG/kg) 
13.50 
10-15 
70-85 
100-120 
100-120 
100-120 
130-150 
130-150 
70-95 
65-90 
• a) 
• a) 
sole only 
(NLG/kg) 
13.50 
10-15 
70-80 
70-80 
70-80 
90-95 
90-95 
55-75 
50-70 
60-80 
75-85 
profitability of the fishery. A better profitability in 1991 also caused 
higher quota prices. Formerly, investments in fishing vessels used to in-
crease sharply in such a situation but in 1991 investments in vessels were 
replaced by investments in flatfish ITQs to a certain extent; 
catchability of the fish related to the quota level. In 1993/1994 the na-
tional plaice quota was rather high in view of the catch possibilities for 
this species. This contributed to a downward price development for the 
plaice quotas. In 1995 the opposite occurred as a consequence of the 
major decrease in the plaice TAC. This caused a substantial increase in the 
price of plaice rights. 
Trade in flatfish ITQs 
Trade in fishing rights is not registered separately by the ministry of Agri-
culture, Nature management and Fisheries. By analysing the annual changes 
in the allocated sole and plaice quantities in the files of fishing rights an esti-
mation of this trade has been made. Table 6.10 contains a rather rough esti-
mate of this trade 1). It seems to be a minimum estimate because the offers of 
flatfish ITQs in table 6.8 suggest higher traded quantities. But these latter 
quantities may be too high because of repeated advertising. 
The volume of the trade in ITQs shows the same pattern for sole and 
plaice: relatively high traded quantities in 1988 and 1991 and less trade in 1992. 
Trade in 1988 was induced by much stronger enforcement in this year. A num-
ber of skipper-owners adjusted their individual quotas to their vessel capacity 
to escape from penalties imposed on poaching. The increase in trade in 1990 
and 1991 could be explained by the improvements of the net profit in these 
years. As has been stated before, in former years skipper-owners used to invest 
in new vessels in years of high profitability. In these two years these invest-
ments were limited because of the HP-licences so that the investments were 
more directed into the rights. It is assumable that in 1992 and subsequent years 
trade in ITQs will take place on a lower scale because the ITQs are, from that 
year, better adjusted to the vessel capacity (apart from quota changes). It has 
to be emphasized that the major part of the transfers concerns buying of a part 
of the ITQ from those who have leaved the industry e.g. by decommissioning 
their vessel. In fact, the decommissioning scheme, in force in the period 1987-
1994, has stimulated the trade in ITQs. In this period some 120 vessels were 
decommissioned and the owners sold their available ITQs to the remaining 
skipper-owners. It must be added that in general, no big ITQs were attached 
to the decommissioned vessels. 
In view of the prices of flatfish ITQs in table 6.9 it will be clear that total 
of investments in ITQs had high values in the period 1988-1992. Investments in 
1990 and 1991 were highest, amounting to NLG 91 million and 115 million 
respectively. This means that in both these years investments in ITQs exceeded 
1) Rough because changes in ITQs resulting from trade can not be seperated 
sharply from other changes in ITQ levels e.g. enterprises owning more vessels are 
allowed to shift parts of their ITQ from one vessel to another. 
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the investments in vessels and equipment; the latter investments amounted to 
NLG 64 million and NLG 31 million for the cutter fishery as a whole in 1990 and 
1991. 
The volume of trade in ITQs in the period 1988-1992 means that some 
18% of the 1988 national sole and plaice quotas changed of ownership in 
these five years. 
A disadvantage of this trade in ITQs is that money leaves the industry 
together wi th those skipper-owners who sell their vessel wi th the rights. The 
remaining enterprises are able (on average) to land a some what higher quan-
tity at much higher costs. In the long run enterprises have to be taken over by 
the next generation. In the Netherlands there are (fiscal) allowances for trans-
fers within the family. Nevertheless, next generations of skipper-owners will 
have to produce at higher costs, due to the necessity of acquiring the rights of 
their fathers and other family members participating in the value of the rights. 
Against this disadvantage of higher costs there is the advantage of pro-
tection of the right holders, the closed shop situation, which could result in a 
'rent' for them. 
Table 6.10 Trade in sole and plaice ITQs 
Traded quant i ty (tonnes) 
- sole 
- plaice 
Trade in % of national quota 
- sole 
- plaice 
1988 
489 
4,745 
4.8 
5.9 
1989 
335 
3,898 
3.5 
4.1 
1990 
827 
3,895 
4.6 
4.4 
1991 
818 
3,730 
4.2 
4.4 
1992 
188 
616 
0.9 
0.8 
Source: Fishing rights registration of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
6.2.4 Changes in the distribution of ITQs 
Trade in ITQs has changed the distribution of the rights as table 6.11 
shows with respect to the part of each HP-group in the national quotas. The 
share of the medium size cutters (300-1,500 HP) has fallen dramatically in the 
period from some 40% in 1988 to 12% in the national sole and plaice quotas 
in 1994. This reflects the changes in the cutter fleet in this period, because the 
number of this medium size vessels dropped from 216 in 1988 to 72 in 1994 to 
an important extent as a result of the decommissioning scheme. As has been 
stated earlier, the ITQs of the decommissioned cutters were bought by owners 
of remaining vessels thus increasing the relative importance of the share of 
bigger and smaller (261-300 HP) beam trawlers. It has to be added that the 
decommissioned vessels were fishing mainly on roundfish (cod and whiting). 
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sole 
1.0 
4.7 
10.5 
28.0 
28.4 
27.4 
plaice 
0.8 
6.5 
12.2 
28.2 
27.0 
25.3 
sole 
1.5 
8.4 
1.6 
9.8 
39.3 
39.4 
plaice 
1.5 
9.4 
2.0 
11.1 
38.4 
37.6 
Table 6.11 Percentage distribution of flatfish individual quotas in 1988 and 1994 
HP-group 1988 1994 
- 260 
261- 300 
301-1100 
1101-1500 
1501-2000 
>2000 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Fishing rights registration of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
The question arises to which extent the decommissioning and trade in 
ITQs have increased the average flatfish ITQ of the remaining vessels. Table 
6.12 shows this increase of the average sole and plaice ITQ by HP-group in the 
period 1988-1994. These quantities are quite comparable because the general 
change in the national quota of sole and plaice has been removed i.e. the 
quantities of 1988 has been adjusted to the 1994 national quota level. Thus, 
the changes are a result of trade. 
The remaining medium size cutters ranging from 301-1,100 HP show a 
sharp decrease of the average ITQ due to selling and more specialisation on the 
cod/whiting fishery. 
7ab/e 6.12 Average flatfish ITQ per vessel by HP-group in 1988 and 1994 (tonnes) 
HP-group 1988 a) 1994 
- 260 
261- 300 
301-1100 
1101-1500 
1501-2000 
>2000 
a) The 1988 ITQs are adjusted to the 1994 level of national quotas by multiplying the sole ITQs 
by 2.46 and the plaice quantities by 1.03 
Source: Fishing rights registration of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
In terms of potential earnings from the flatfish ITQs (average quantity 
times price of sole and plaice) especially the smaller cutters (261-300 HP) and 
the biggest ones (>2,000 HP) show a substantial increase (64% and 30% respec-
tively). This increase is the result of buying of ITQs, shift of ITQs within a com-
108 
sole 
1.56 
8.14 
20.40 
60.59 
97.98 
91.64 
plaice 
3.70 
34.01 
70.56 
182.73 
277.91 
252.52 
sole 
2.65 
14.96 
9.78 
58.44 
103.05 
117.68 
plaice 
8.45 
49.95 
38.51 
197.51 
301.26 
335.28 
15.0 
50.0 
103.1 
301.3 
14.1 
36.2 
96.9 
217.9 
11.1 
24.6 
76.2 
148.3 
pany from smaller to bigger vessels and replacing a vessel by a smaller one; the 
latter development may partly explain the increase of the average ITQ of the 
261-300 HP-vessels. 
6.2.5 ITQ per vessel in 1995 and 1996 
The Dutch part of the plaice TAC was dramatically lowered in 1995 and 
1996 (by 28% and 32% respectively). Furthermore, the sole quota came at a 
26% lower vessel in 1996 compared wi th 1994. The consequences for the two 
main size groups, 261-300 and 1501-2,000, are shown in table 6.13. 
Table 6.13 Estimates of average flatfish ITQs per vessel in 1995 and 1996 (tonnes) a) 
HP-group 1994 1995 1996 
261-300 
- sole 
- plaice 
1501-2000 
- sole 
- plaice 
a) Estimates since trade of ITQs in these years is not included. 
These major decreases of ITQ levels were partly compensated by increase 
of the sole and plaice prices in 1995 and 1996. An adequate management of 
the quota by the co-management groups in both years caused these price im-
provements to an important extent. 
Chapter 10 explores which part of the fleet may run into financial trou-
bles because of quota shortages. 
6.2.6 Summary and conclusions 
Flatfish ITQs are the most important type of property rights in the Nether-
lands. They distribute the TAC of sole and plaice amongst some 380 vessels 
(1994). The biggest part of the ITQs (85% of the total 1994 sole and plaice quo-
tas) is hold by the owners of the beam trawlers. From the viewpoint of vessel 
size the main part (75-80% in 1994) of the ITQs is attached to the vessels ex-
ceeding 1,500 HP. 
Urk is the most important port for these vessels, followed by Den Helder/ 
Texel and Goedereede in the southern part of the country. Together, fishermen 
of these three ports own nearly 80% of the national quotas of sole and plaice. 
In spite of this concentration wi th respect to vessel size and region, the 
flatfish ITQs are rather widespread; there were some 290 holders (enterprises) 
of the documents in 1994 and most of them (58%) own 0.5% or less of the 
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national sole and plaice quotas. This size of the ITQ means an annual catch of 
110 tonnes of sole and 330 tonnes of plaice on the basis of the 1994 quotas. 
The Dutch cod and whit ing TACs, 11,500 and 5,000 tonnes in 1993 and 
1994, were distributed by entitlements amongst some 120 vessels of the 
roundfish sector. These vessels were entitled to land a certain quantity of cod 
and whiting weekly or monthly. These quantities were transformed into ITQs 
for cod/whiting in 1995. This has led to selling of these ITQs to owners of beam 
trawlers who use to land high quantities of cod and sole as a by-catch. The 
regional distribution of cod/whiting entitlements shows high proportions for 
Urk (23%), Wieringen (23%) and Umuiden/Katwijk (18% of the national cod 
quota). 
All kinds of fishing rights are traded in the Netherlands. Advertisements 
in the fishing magazine 'Visserijnieuws' show offers and demands for 
sole/plaice ITQs, entitlements and in 1995 ITQs for cod/whiting, shrimp permits, 
herring documents, engine power licences and EU vessel file registrations. In-
vestments in rights are important, considering the high prices that are usually 
paid. The price of a sole/plaice ITQ was at maximum in 1991/1992 (NLG 130-
150/kg of sole) and decreased to a level of NLG 65-90 in 1994. Factors that in-
fluenced this ITQ price in the period 1988-1994 were: the degree of enforce-
ment, the profitability level and the catchability of sole and plaice in relation-
ship wi th the quota level. 
The volume of trade in ITQs in the period 1988-1992 means that some 
18% of the national sole and plaice quotas changed of ownership. The 'close 
shop' situation, i.e. the HP ceiling in the cutter fisheries, results in a shift from 
investments in vessels towards investments in fishing rights. 
In years of good profitability, 1990 and 1991, investments in ITQs (NLG 91 
and 115 million) exceeded those in new vessels (NLG 64 and 31 million). In fact, 
property rights were a production factor that was most scarce in these years. 
Major decreases of the TAC for sole and plaice in 1995 and 1996 resulted 
in a 25% lower sole and a 50% lower plaice ITQ in 1996 compared with 1994. 
Price increases and cost savings (caused by decrease of fishing effort) have 
partly compensated the quota lowerings. 
6.3 Economic aspects of property rights in fishing in the UK 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 covered the legal basis for property rights in fishing and indi-
cated what this implied in practical terms for the UK industry and the various 
identifiable sectors. It also sketched in lightly what the economic implications 
of these rights might be. These economic interests need more detailed consid-
eration and this is provided in the sections below. It may, however, be helpful 
to provide some general background on the economic dimension. 
The usual idea of competition implies freedom for individuals to enter or 
leave an industry; this means open access in securing or disposing of resources 
and in seeking markets for them as well as the resultant product. Normally such 
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an approach ensures economic efficiency but depends on the action of an indi-
vidual being insufficient to affect the whole market. Such lack of disturbance 
(due to 'externalities') does not apply in fisheries for the reasons adduced in 
chapter 5. The other qualities which transform things into goods and services 
clearly apply to fishing rights; they are scarce, they have alternative values in 
different uses and they can be transferred. In short, where rights have been 
created and enforced, they provide an essential factor in production. 
Limited access to a potentially profitable business, whether in fishing or 
not, means that a price must be paid for entry. (Other regulated UK industries 
like those which provide gambling, alcohol or taxicabs show similar characteris-
tics as do certain jobs like head waiters.) The form of price will depend on the 
political process. If settled by an untrammelled market, the price will be posi-
tive and reflect the conditions of supply and demand; these in their turn will 
be determined by technology and the prices of other inputs as well as the 
quantities and prices offish and competing products offered to the consumers. 
If not set by normal market processes, the price will reflect the administrative 
arrangements. There may be no money price where central management con-
trols the issue, re-issue and revocation of access rights; the only reckoning or 
'price' might be the political cost of losing power if the results were unfair. This 
would occur only where fishermen's dissatisfaction recruited support from the 
rest of the electorate. 
The following more detailed description covers the main aspects of eco-
nomic structure and performance. The structural aspects include the distribu-
t ion of rights indicating the economic scale of the businesses making up the 
industry and the processes whereby this distribution changes. It links to the 
sectoral description in chapter 5. The performance really relates to the market 
or transfer mechanism which allow the rights to move to those most able to 
use them. There is, however, a structural dimension here in that the perfor-
mance of the market will depend on the people and institutions involved. Law-
yers, accountants and brokers, as well as their clients (the fishermen and fishing 
companies) figure prominently in addition to Government departments, POs 
and financial services. It should, however, be emphasised that the market is 
somewhat unlike other markets; it is not as transparent as an auction or other 
channel for open sales in quantity would be. The few deals that are struck are 
private and 'one-off' so that the usual information underpinning the market 
is absent or deficient. 
6.3.2 Distribution of rights 
In the UK there are two significant features in fishing rights. The first is 
the entitlement to operate a vessel. This process of registration as a fishing 
vessel with the Department of Transport is a prerequisite and is freely available 
for any eligible vessel. (There may be occasional problems over the registration 
process as it is assumed that eligible applicants will already have access to some 
form of licence.) It, like other prerequisites such as acquiring the necessary 
qualifications for personnel and safety certificates for vessels, does not really 
serve as a substantial barrier to entry. The real barriers are those relating to the 
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species that may be caught. Such entitlements to take species under quota de-
rive from historical catching records; these relate to what happened under the 
owner in past years or under a previous owner on registering a transfer of a 
licensed vessel or to what a vessel being replaced actually had achieved before 
such a change occurred. The different types of restrictive licences came into 
existence in the way noted in chapter 5 as a progressively increasing number 
of species and fleet sectors came under pressure; depending on their type, they 
allow access to the quotas either on an allocated or sharing basis. As might be 
expected the predominance of the larger vessels, historically in the catches 
under open access and currently under restricted access, is very marked with 
vessels over 10m catching 95% of the total quantity landed. The proportion of 
value of the catch landed by the smaller vessels is slightly greater but this does 
not alter the fact that medium and large vessels account for most of the land-
ings though numbering only a third of the total of vessels. This reflects the 
catching power or capacity of the larger vessels, as is seen subsequently in table 
6.17 giving the distribution of vessels by VCU and length groups. 
6.3.3 Market characteristics and performance 
It is necessary initially to consider the roles played by the various people 
involved in the market for licences and the processes informing their actions. 
The outline indicated below shows that all the parties involved in buying and 
selling vessels figure in the list though their relative importance may change. 
In particular, specialist brokers or middlemen appear to have a larger part to 
play in transferring licences. 
a. Sellers-fishermen, firms and other owners. The licence is issued to a 
named person in respect of a named vessel but ownership of the licence 
or licences effectively rests with the people who own the vessel. This may 
be an individual fisherman or a fishing company but more frequently 
involves shares held by fishermen, fishing companies and others, such as 
relatives of the fishermen. Borrowings by fishermen from banks and insti-
tutions like the Ship Finance Mortgage Company affect the net worth 
and may be crucial in deciding whether or not to sell a boat but such 
sources of credit do not have a direct interest in the licence. 
b. Buyers-as above 
c. Transport and fisheries departments. The former registers the current 
ownership of the vessel and deals with any subsequent changes while the 
latter performs a similar task in relation to the entitlement to licences. 
d. Lawyers. They have to perform their normal professional role in dealing 
formally wi th the legal aspects of transfer of ownership of vessels so as 
to secure all implicit rights, including the entitlements to appropriate 
licences. These entitlements are given out annually and are thus less cer-
tain than other rights of ownership. 
e. Bankers. They too have to perform their usual roles in assessing credit 
worthiness and providing loans, for normal operation as well as when 
vessels are transferred. Licences can not be used as security due to their 
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short term and uncertain nature, though their existence affects assess-
ments and leads to special arrangements to prevent their unauthorised 
disposal. 
f. Accountants. Their customary processes of formally recording the finan-
cial structure and performance of the business tend not to include such 
uncertain elements as the value of licences, though aware of their essen-
tial significance. The exceptions arise when the costs of acquiring a li-
censed vessel naturally reflect the value of the associated licence. 
g. Fish salesmen or vessel agents. They have a central role in vessels' business 
activities in marketing the fish and in handling the proceeds, as well as 
providing short term credit. These activities, as well as their investment 
in many boats, make them critical in certain aspects of dealing with licen-
ces. 
h. Boat builders. Their interest stems from the need to ensure that where 
any order for a replacement vessel will depend on additional licences to 
cover any increase in vessel size or power, those additional licences are in 
hand. 
I. Specialist brokers or middlemen. The difficulty in matching the demand 
and supply for licences, as well as coping wi th what is not an ordinary 
open market situation, has created the need for such dealers. 
j . Producers' organisations. Their interest in securing adequate quotas for 
their membership means that POs get involved in the market for vessels 
and their associated entitlements. In some cases the POs will sell on or 
scrap the vessels and use the acquired track records to provide a reserve 
for the members but not necessarily allocated to them individually on a 
permanent basis. The capacity units of the scrapped vessels may also be 
used to allow the entry of slightly larger replacement vessels. 
As the industry's original concerns were to allow new blood and new 
technology into the industry without interfering significantly wi th the fishing 
community's rights of open access, the initial administrative processes allowed 
licences only to move in association with the appropriate vessels. No separate 
movement of licences was envisaged and the intention was to avoid the cre-
ation of any value in the licences. The latter could not be achieved and the 
value of being allowed into the industry, therefore, was capitalised in the sale 
price of licensed vessels with something like a market evolving as licences were 
moved to replacement vessels. 
The market in licences is both unofficial and informal, wi th little clear 
evidence of its characteristics or effects. The transactions resemble the market 
in housing in a particular location in that individual bargains may not be very 
numerous; they thus reflect the peculiar circumstances of the contracting par-
ties and of the economy at a particular point in t ime. A further complication 
arises from the fact that, though the prices may be given in relation to capacity, 
two further elements come into play. The first is the track record in terms of 
species and quantity of fish caught while the second relates to the effort in 
terms of days at sea. The latter is significant because of the likelihood of future 
policies controlling effort directly. It takes little thought to realise that the ab-
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sence of a system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), uncertainties about 
future Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and the threat of individual limits on 
days-at-sea leads to other property rights being compounded in the value ex-
pressed in conventional prices per unit of vessel capacity (VCU). (There may also 
be different planning perspectives as an existing business needing to expand 
is likely to value marginal VCUs higher than a new entrant paying the average 
value for VCUs embodied in an existing second-hand vessel.) It should be 
stressed that the capacity unit combines the vessel's physical size and its engine 
power to give an abstract number serving as a proxy for its ability to catch fish. 
This should be kept in mind when considering the figures given below. 
Previous estimates suggested that the cost of a licence was initially quite 
low apart from those for pelagic pursers or freezer trawlers and for beamers. 
Ordinary pressure stock licences for demersal vessels were thought to be worth 
around £10,000 to £20,000 in the mid-80s as against perhaps £0.5m for the 
large pelagic vessels and £0.25m for the beamers. As the licensing system tight-
ened up in the other sectors so did the prices increase there. The 1993 esti-
mates given in table 6.14 show that the various sectors and types of licence 
(other than pelagic and beaming) record different values. 
Table 6.14 Price of full pressure stock licence in 1993 
Price per VCU a) 
Demersal vessels 
- over 17m £90 to £130 
- 17m and under £75 to £85 
Limited Licence (10m and under) 
- larger vessels £25 to £35 
- smaller vessels £50 to £75 
Nephrops Licence £40 
Miscellaneous Species Licence £25 to £30 
a) Vessel Capacity Unit. 
Source: Sea Fisheries Inspectorate, DAFS. 
It is understood that the above figures will be adjusted upwards by the 
equivalent of a broker's commission of the order of 20% for someone buying 
a licence through a middleman. Apart from that the main interest in the table 
centres on the graduation of prices reflecting the value in use of the licence. 
The largest vessels with full licences tend to generate the most income, while 
the sectors whose catches are limited to nephrops or miscellaneous species, 
typically with older vessels, are less productive. For a demersal trawler around 
25m (which would usually have something like 450 VCUs) the licence would 
have cost approximately £40,000 to £60,000 in 1993, with maybe a further 
£10,000 to the broker. Clearly the variation mentioned is mainly explained by 
the track record in the fish caught but perhaps with some reflection of the level 
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of effort. It may be, however, that days-at-sea and quantity caught will be posi-
tively and highly correlated, at least within sectors; clearly the difference be-
tween short high yielding seasonal pelagic fisheries and more year-round de-
mersal activity would invalidate such an association in any comparison across 
all vessels. The interesting anomaly in the higher priced VCUs for smaller vessels 
in the 10m and under group indicates the very strong demand for less expen-
sive boats wi th lower capacity. This probably reflects the pressure from new 
entrants with limited capital, as well as the high cost and limited opportunities 
of the larger 'rule beaters', just below the 10m mark. 
Factors affecting the value of rights 
The value of the various licences is determined by several factors - value 
of catch, security of the entitlement, profitability of the relevant technology, 
availability of capital and pressure for entry to the industry (reflecting employ-
ment opportunities elsewhere and general economic conditions). Thus the pe-
lagic vessels have the most highly valued licences due to the good and stable 
(sometimes even growing) mackerel and herring quotas as well as the very 
efficient technology involved. This situation applied from the start and the 
growth in value over the last decade is nothing like the increase in licence 
prices in the demersal and shellfish sectors. Similarly beam trawlers have had 
the benefit of efficient technology and reasonably stable quotas of highly 
priced flat fish species over the years and their highly valued licences have not 
increased in price at the same rate as the initially undervalued other demersal 
licences. One element creating variability in the value of licences is track record 
and combining the quota allocations partly given in table 5.3 with the numbers 
of vessels in membership shows the wide scatter of average entitlement. The 
memberships in 1993 numbered from under 20 to over 500 while those outside 
the POs were nearly 2,000. North sea average quotas of cod for individual POs 
go as high as nearly 60 tonnes and as low as zero, though the latter may reflect 
POs concentrating on other grounds and species to some extent to offset this. 
Similar reservations apply to the averages for sole being as high as 6 tonnes 
and as low as zero. While it did not prove possible to get the actual value of 
landings to set against the numbers in table 6.15 below, a rough estimate of 
the value of catches under quota shows the different levels of activity in the 
sectors. 
Table 6.15 Number of vessels over 10m in PO membership in 1993 
SFO 533 Grimsby 101 
Aberdeen 71 Fleetwood 48 
NESFO 112 FPO 48 
Shetland 54 NIFPO 221 
Fife 19 ANIFPO 63 
Anglo/Scot 181 Cornish 151 
YAFPO 47 Southwest 135 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics, MAFF. 
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The average value per vessel for most of the main species, other than 
pelagic, under quota (sole, cod, haddock, saithe, whit ing, monks and nephrops) 
apparently ranges from something over £50,000 for some POs to three times 
that amount for others. When consideration is given to the variation in vessel 
performance within each PO, it becomes clearer that some licences wil l be 
worth much more than others. 
Developments in the period 1994-1996 
The developments since 1993 have tended to focus the attention more 
on the track records of the vessel with VCUs taking an important second place. 
There is less attention paid to days-at-sea due either to a lack of belief in their 
introduction or a recognition that track records wil l remain central to future 
policy. Whatever the reason the 1996 estimates of licence values are usually 
given in prices per tonne of fish. With few fisheries yielding only one species, 
the prices reflect various combinations of cod, haddock, whiting, monks, saithe 
and other species. The indications are of prices rising from around £500 at the 
beginning of the year to around £600 at the end of 1996. These figures suggest 
that while the licences for pelagic and beam trawl vessels may have risen about 
four fold since the mid 80s, those for the main demersal sector have risen ten-
fold. The typical range of licence values is now of the order of £100,000 to 
£200,000 per vessel. The importance attached to the VCUs depends on whether 
or not they are needed to meet the penalties on bringing in a replacement 
vessel. 
There is no clear evidence to allow an examination of the various pro-
cesses underlying price formation in this market. As in any other private mar-
ket, the deals will be struck on the basis of haggling and agreement wi th a 
binding contract completed and the transfer registered with the appropriate 
departments. The obvious assumptions that the offer price will depend on cal-
culations about the expected evolution of quotas, markets and technology, as 
well as current costs of operation and value of current entitlements, appear 
unproven in the absence of detailed surveys. The research indication that under 
conditions of uncertainty fishermen discount future expected earnings heavily 
seems confirmed in the relatively low value attached to a demersal or shellfish 
licence. The value may, however, be more strongly influenced by the degree 
of confidence about the security of title and doubts about future availability 
of stocks and markets. In this respect, the longer existence and more restrictive 
conditions of pelagic licensing, allied to effective conservation and competitive 
marketing, may explain the very high values there. The likelihood of revised 
legislative or administrative arrangements destroying current levels of entitle-
ment seems small while the remedy of a judicial review (to secure existing 
rights in the face of proposed change) is available and has been used success-
fully in the past in this sector. It is noticeable that the Government in its propos-
als (August 1994) to simplify licensing procedures did not propose any such 
severe dilution of existing rights. The eventual outcome of the consultations in 
November 1994 confirmed this initial impression by deciding that even a very 
limited upgrading of certain licences would not take place. 
116 
The role of the financial sector in the fishing industry is reflected in the 
activities of bankers and others in funding investment. The existence of the 
necessary licences is taken by them as a pre-requisite in allowing loans or over-
draft facilities but the values of the licences are not regarded as part of the 
capital structure by them or the accountants and consequently by the tax au-
thorities. (This disregard applies to figures in the balance sheet as opposed to 
liability for capital taxation on disposal where the value of the licence will en-
hance that of the vessel if sold.) The bankers are guided in this respect by the 
fact that the licences are issued on an annual basis to the operators of the ves-
sels and may not be assigned to the banks as security against loans. For all prac-
tical purposes the only clear manifestation of the value of licences occurs on 
the occasion of their transfer with the associated vessels. Then any profit would 
show up in the accountants' figures and attract the attention of the tax author-
ities. 
What is even less clear is what lies behind the acquisition of licences. On 
some occasions this is straightforward. New entrants need them to get started; 
boat builders need them to sell vessels of increased power or size; individual 
fishermen, fishing firms and producers' organisations need them to make their 
scale of business and operating technology appropriate and efficient. Against 
this was the evidence initially of a significant number of 'hip pocket' licences 
(those which exist but are currently un-attached to operating vessels). These 
suggested that there might be an element of speculative activity, a worrying 
feature to some fishermen who fear concentration of economic activity under-
mining remote fishing communities. The indications from North America do 
not provide a consistent picture. In some cases concentration has ensued, while 
in others it has not. The economic benefits of transferable fishing rights may 
not be realised by reducing the number of operators as individuals search for 
economies of scale but rather by marrying catching operations to the needs of 
the markets so that loss-making gluts and poor quality are avoided and em-
ployment becomes more secure rather than less plentiful. 
It is difficult to describe the market fully. The various groups involved and 
functions discharged are recognisable but the number of transfers and price 
levels can only be estimated very roughly. The changes in numbers of fishing 
vessels can not estimated accurately due to the existence of different statistical 
series from fisheries departments on the one hand and the Department of 
Transport's Vessel Register on the other. The age structure of the fleet and the 
introduction of new and second-hand replacements suggest nonetheless that 
over the years, transfers may be of the order of several hundred vessels. 
6.3.4 Changes in the distribution 1983 to 1993 
The statistics for the period of the first UK MAGP (table 6.16) show the 
initial transformation in the distribution of rights. It should be stressed that the 
numbers in both 1983 and 1986 related to active fishing vessels and are much 
smaller than the current numbers on the fishing vessel register which includes 
the inactive as well as the active. In particular the number of small vessels was 
under-stated. The initial licensing scheme did not call for the inclusion of ves-
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sels under 40 feet (later under 10m) and there was no incentive to show activity 
to be allowed to go fishing in the future. The obligation to show activity ap-
plied to some extent to the bigger vessels. Even wi th these vessels, the avail-
ability of licences more than covered all vessels. 
Table 6.16 Active UK fishing vessels by length groups 
End 1983 
no. GRT 
End 1986 
no. GRT 
Under 40 feet 
40 to 80 feet 
80 to 110 feet 
Over 110 feet 
4,806 
1,976 
124 
106 
27,592 
81,103 
19,634 
49,855 
6,158 
1,656 
120 
90 
30,533 
72,650 
18,364 
26,856 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics, MAFF. 
The distant water vessels all held or were eligible to hold pressure stock 
licences. The lack of appropriate opportunities for economic operation led to 
their departure and that of some of the associated companies. At the end of 
1983 there were 230 larger vessels accounting for over 69,000 out of a total of 
some 178,000 tonnes. By the end of 1986, though the number declined by only 
some twenty vessels, their share of the tonnage was down to 45,000 out of 
148,000. The balance of the fleet and the share of rights thus moved in favour 
of the inshore fleet. Subsequently the development of the fleet resulted in the 
current MAGP number by sector, given in chapter 5. While there has been an 
increase in the size and power of vessels wi th some reduction in the number 
of smaller sized vessels among those over 10m, the changes have been more 
gradual than that evoked by the loss of distant water opportunities and the 
subsequent decommissioning of 1984 to 1986. Table 6.17 gives the numbers of 
vessels by length and VCU groups. 
Table 6.17 
VCU group 
Number of vessels by length and VCU size group in 
Length (metres) 
Under 8 
8-10 
10-15 
15-21 
21-33 
Over 33 
Total 
-50 
4,920 
732 
21 
0 
0 
0 
5,673 
50-100 
320 
1,717 
695 
1 
0 
0 
2,733 
100-150 
15 
388 
422 
109 
0 
0 
934 
150-250 
7 
73 
153 
582 
33 
0 
848 
7994 
250-500 
0 
0 
4 
209 
455 
1 
669 
500-
0 
0 
0 
0 
69 
146 
215 
Total 
5,262 
2,910 
1,295 
901 
557 
147 
11,072 
Source: Seafish analysis of data from UK Fisheries Departments. 
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It is clear from the table that over five thousand of the vessels on the 
1994 register account for only a trivial amount of capacity. It also indicates that 
the VCU measurement is an imperfect proxy for actual catching performance 
as vessels over 10m account for significantly more of the catch than they do of 
the VCUs. 
The outcome of the 1994 consultations on changing the licensing system 
indicated that the Government's intentions were to simplify the procedures 
rather than dilute the restrictive nature of licencing. The extension of the ar-
rangements in 1993 to the previously unlicensed smaller vessels (those 10m and 
under) removed the last gap in the system. The recognition of the dangers to 
economic objectives as well as those in conservation from having any degree 
of open access now seems to have arrived. While controversy still continues 
about how access will be rationed, a trend towards more rational economic 
behaviour seems likely. Individual transferable quotas do not appear accept-
able to the industry at present but the situation may change as individual fish-
ermen, fishing firms and producers' organisations use the current system to 
make their operations more profitable and their communities more secure. 
(The pelagic sector have virtually arrived at a system of individual quotas which 
can be transferred to a large extent. Something similar also applies in the very 
small distant water sector.) 
Reducing the number of licences and the size of the fleet happens in two 
ways; the Government does this through the decommissioning scheme while 
the industry does so through the statutory reductions in capacity when replace-
ment vessels are introduced. This naturally leads to further diminutions in ac-
cess. An industry with fewer vessels (with their operators more certain of their 
share of quotas) seems the certain outcome. If this allows the producers' or-
ganisations to improve their performance in marketing, rationalisation may 
carry fewer unwelcome social implications. The type of employment may 
change with more activity in the processing sector but loss of jobs and capital 
invested seems less likely. The Shetlands provide an example of this kind of 
flexible approach with concentration and reduction on the sea-going side be-
ing offset by acquisition of added quotas and expansion in fish farming and 
processing. 
Lack of transparency in the market 
The lack of transparency in the market in licences suggests that some 
evolution is both necessary and likely. The Government's consultation docu-
ment mentions the need to make the transfer mechanism less cumbersome. 
This may lead to some simplifying of the paperwork but is unlikely to lead to 
say an open system of auctioning alienated licences. What is likely to develop, 
whether formally or informally is a clearer way of dealing with each of the 
property rights of economic significance. Size and power are relevant dimen-
sions to new entrants to the industry who must acquire a vessel and a licence 
to go fishing. They are even more important to those already operating who 
wish to change or upgrade their vessels and the boat builders seeking to supply 
them. The completely different component of track records in terms of quota 
entitlements (and to some extent the relative allowable effort in days-at-sea) 
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is currently the dominant element in the prices paid for units of fish, wi th that 
for capacity not separately identified. Time will no doubt see some refining of 
the ways in which the two values are assessed with the attraction of some form 
of transferable units of power and of quota becoming more obvious. It may be 
that some rule of thumb wil l lead to a system combining the value attaching 
to the capacity and a series of values attaching to the amounts of each species 
that the vessel licence allows to be landed. 
Currently the main economic barriers to entry rest on the basic cost of the 
vessel, gear and operating capital. The indications of the value of a licence, 
which after all seems likely in some form or other to outlast the associated ves-
sel, do not suggest its cost to a new entrant to the main demersal and shellfish 
sectors will prove a major deterrent. If, however, reductions in capacity and 
improvements in conservation make a licence into 'a licence to print money' 
which tends to be the view in some quarters of the pelagic and beamer licen-
ces, things would change. A demersal vessel around 25m probably costs around 
£1 m, which makes the cost of a licence of lesser consequence as say an addition 
of 15%. If this rose to the proportions found in the pelagic or beaming sectors 
of perhaps an additional 50%, the economic barrier to entry would be signifi-
cant. 
6.3.5 Conclusions 
The economic dimensions of fishing rights embodied in restrictive licens-
ing are considerable. They form a significant barrier to entry in some sectors 
and may be expected to affect increasing numbers of sectors in this way in the 
future. While they may not dictate the evolution of the industry, as technical, 
social and political influences wil l also play their parts, fishing rights wil l have 
a substantial role. What is clear is the fact that rights which can be transferred 
and aggregated do allow more profitable enterprises to evolve. The knowl-
edge of the scale of entitlement leads to better matching of vessel investment 
to fishing operations, often by reducing overall capacity and to improvement 
of marketing processes. Certain forms of industrial organisations such as POs 
and companies appear well suited to cope with developments and likely to 
grow in power. Again much will depend on the extent to which political and 
social pressures legitimise individual fishing rights. This balance impinges on 
wider economic considerations as the cost of enforcement, if very heavy due 
to a lack of political support in the relevant communities, may well erode the 
gains in rationalisation. 
Other aspects which need considered include the apparent excess of par-
ties involved in the market and the lack of detailed information on its opera-
t ion. It seems to need fewer middlemen and more transparency. Additional 
information about the market would also throw light on what goals acquirers 
have. Evidence from fisheries elsewhere, as with ITQs in New Zealand, and in 
various sectors of agriculture throughout the world, suggests that speculative 
interest can occasionally develop wastefully leading to excessive transactions 
and extra marketing costs. What is undeniable is the added cost caused by 
licences having a value. They become yet another factor of production needing 
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their share of the product which they gain only at the expense of the return to 
other factors due to the higher costs incurred in production. It seems less likely 
that better returns from the market due to better t iming, selection and presen-
tat ion of product wil l effectively transfer the costs to the consumer. 
6.4 Economic aspects of property rights in other countries 
6.4.1 Economic aspects of property rights in Iceland 
The evolution of the management system in Iceland shows an interesting 
development. Until the extension of the fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles in 
1976 the Icelandic fisheries were international and had an open access. The 
initial management measures taken in 1976 in the demersal fisheries, which 
count for 75-80% of the total catch value, were inadequate and didn't change 
the open access nature of the fishery. The development in the Icelandic fisher-
ies followed the path predicted for these kind of fisheries, wi th excessive capi-
tal compared to the reproductive capacity of the fish stocks Hence, the eco-
nomic results were bad. As a consequence in 1984 an system of individual ves-
sels quotas was introduced. In 1985 vessels were allowed to opt for effort re-
strictions instead of catch quotas. However, in 1990 a general ITQ system for all 
Icelandic fisheries was introduced, and the effort option was abolished. 
The evolution of the ITQ system in Island has been based on trial and 
error 1). Also the steps in the evolution of ITQs have been taken in response 
the crises in the fisheries. This feature seems to be common, only when interest 
groups are faced with reductions in catches or income, they are will ing to dis-
cuss changes in the management framework. However, in 1990 there were no 
such crises, but the industry has in the period before 1990 experienced the eco-
nomic benefits of the vessel quota system and therefore the industry supported 
the implementation of the general ITQ system. 
Economic and biological impact of ITQs 
In the herring fishery, where ITQs have been in force since 1976, the 
catches have increased threefold since 1987 and the effort has declined by 
20%, i.e. the efficiency is about 4 times higher than is was at the outset of the 
ITQ system. In 1993 there were 30 vessels in the fishery. The biomass of the 
summer-spawning herring stock has increase from 300,000 tonnes in 1984 to 
nearly 700,000 tonnes in 1993. 
In the capelin fishery, the mean catches have been roughly unchanged. 
Capelin is a short living species and the fishery is therefore very volatile. The 
total tonnage of the fleet has been reduced by about 25% from 1979 to 1993 
and the efficiency in the fishery has thus increased since the introduction of 
1) This section is more or less based on Arnason 1993 'The Icelandic Transferable 
Quota System: A Descriptive Account' Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 8, nr. 3. 
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ITQs. Given the nature of the capelin stock the biomass has not been signifi-
cantly affected by the ITQ system. 
In the demersal fishery the evidence is not so definite as in the herring 
and capelin fishery. The level of the catches seems to be unaffected by the ITQ 
system. However, since 1984 the catches of particular cod have persistently 
exceeded the TACs set by the Government, i.e., the political TAC. This TAC has 
furthermore been set over the recommended TACs, which in many cases sug-
gested a substantial reduction in catches. As a consequence of this short term 
policy the stock size of the importance species has declined considerably. 
The capital employed in the fishery has increased in the period from 1983 
to 1992, while the fishing effort have declined only slightly. However, the capi-
tal has only increased in the period 1985-1990, probably because the ITQ sys-
tem was supplemented by another system based on effort. Since 1990, when 
the effort option was abolished, the invested capital has declined. The develop-
ment of effort shows the same pattern. Evidence that the considerable re-
source rent is generated is shown from various indicators, e.g. quota prices. The 
annual lease price of e.g. cod has been rather high in the recent years, about 
80-90% of the landing price, which indicates a serious shortage of cod quota. 
A contributory cause has probably been that the trade in quota often takes 
place if it turns out that the catch is beyond the original quota and thus trade 
is necessary. The quota price is in this case more depending on the fine of 
catching over the quota than on the marginal return of extra quota and catch 
alone. 
Lessons to learn 
The lessons from the Icelandic ITQ system show that success of an ITQ 
system among other things will depend on permanency of the assignment of 
quotas, that the quotas are stipulated as shares in the TAC rather than fixed 
quantities, that the ITQ system is as complete as possible, that the market for 
quotas is working as perfect as possible and finally that distribution of the en-
tire rents to the initial receivers of the quotas may undermine the social sup-
port for ITQs. Only since 1990 the ITQ system in Iceland can be said to be a com-
plete system with only minor exemptions. The effects of these exemptions seem 
to have be quite serious in the demersal fishery. 
In Iceland two issues have been discuss recently. Firstly and most inten-
sively, the distribution of the rents from the fisheries, i.e. the equity aspect. The 
high quota prices are seen as an indicator of very valuable property rights and 
the critics argue that the shares should be reallocated or taxes should be im-
posed on quota holdings. Secondly the regional implications of the ITQ system 
have been discussed. By restricting the transferability of the quotas the re-
gional reallocation can be minimised. These issues deal with adjustments of the 
ITQ system and are not about fundamentals in the system. The ITQ system 
seems to have wide support in Iceland. The annual lease price of quotas is 
about 10-25% of the price of permanent quotas given a implicit rate of dis-
counting of 10-25%. This fairly high rate may indicate that the fishermen do 
not believe that the current system wil l continue in the long run. 
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6.4.2 Economic aspects of property rights in Norway 1) 
As mentioned in section 5.6.2 the regulation of the Norwegian fisheries 
is more or less based on licenses and/or individual vessel quotas. These rights 
are not transferable in themselves, but the rights can fol low the vessels when 
a vessel is traded. The value of licenses and quotas has therefore been capital-
ised in the value of the traded vessels. 
The present value of these rights is mainly influenced by two factors 1). 
The uncertainty about the regulation all things equal reduce the value of the 
licences/quotas compared to a situation where the duration of the licences/ 
individual quotas would be perpetual 2). The considerable subsidies to the sec-
tor have increased the value of the rights. In the present literature no value of 
the rights is given or estimated, but it is, however, believed that the economic 
rent in the fisheries is substantial and that in certain fisheries the value of the 
rights has been included in the price of second hand vessels. Flaaten et.al. 
(1995) investigate whether the profitability of purse seiners wich have received 
the license for free are higher than the profitability of purse seiners, has 
bought with a license. They conclude that the profitability was higher because 
the capital cost for vessels wi th a 'free' licence was lower, indicating higher 
capital cost of vessels wi th a purchased license. 
As mentioned in section 5.6.2, the reduction in capacity has been realized 
mainly through a scrapping programme. The policy was not consistent, because 
at the same time considerable subsidies were provided, in 1988 548 million NKr. 
(excluding investment support). The aim of the subsidies was to secure the 
profitability of the fleet. In 1992 the subsidies have declined to 425 million NKr. 
because of the improved profitability of the fleet and the Government had the 
objective to reduce this kind of support. The main part of the support (over 
50%) is given to social schemes, which covers a minimum weekly income for 
fishermen guaranteed in case the fishing fails. A part of the unemployment 
benefits to fishermen and vacation support is also financed by these schemes. 
The regional aspect of the regulation is relative important in Norway and 
there have been some changes in the 80s. In the period 1977-89 the fleet from 
the northern part of Norway reduced its share of the total Norwegian catches 
from 37% to 23%. The main reason was that the fleet from the western and 
southern part of Norway had better resource conditions. The biomass of cod 
stock in the Barents Sea was very low, which influences the fleet in the north 
more than the fleet from south. In 1990 quota limitations were introduced for 
the coastal fleet based on historical catch and nearly the whole fleet becomes 
regulated by licences and/or quotas. As a consequence, regions that had re-
1) The section is based on 'Individual quota management systems in Norway' in 
'The Use of Individual Quotas in Fisheries Management', OECD, 1993, 'Norsk 
fiskerinaering: landeanlyse' by Bjorn Hersoug in 'Fiskerinaeringens hovedtrekk-
landeanalyser', Nord 1992:30 and 'Regional Enterprise Share Quota Mangement 
System' by Torbjorn Trondsen and Jostein Angell in Proceedings of the IV Annual 
Conference of EAFE 1992. 
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duced their fleet temporarily, due to low catch rates, also lost the future legal 
rights to the resources. 
The biological effects of the regulation seem to have been quite success-
ful, especially since the late 1980'ties, despite the inefficient regulation and 
overcapacity of the fleet. One can speculate whether this is due to regularly 
consultants between the Ministry and the fishermen's representatives which 
can provide a high degree of legitimacy for management decisions (Hannesson, 
1996). 
6.4.3 Economic aspects of property rights in North America 
The different institutional structures in Canada and the United States 
reflect the different political frameworks which have evolved in those societies. 
(For example, unfettered capitalism in the US led to excessive use of market 
power by monopolies and oligopolies; this necessitated such legislation as the 
Sherman Act 1890 which outlawed certain anti-competitive actions. The Clay-
ton and the Federal Trade Commission Acts are also relevant in this area of 
regulating business behaviour. Equally both the United States and Canada tend 
to regard certain natural resources, whether in national parks or in fisheries as 
belonging to the nation rather than individuals.) These in turn have deter-
mined the economic environment within which the fishing industrial structure 
has developed and the degree to which social objectives may obscure or inhibit 
the working of economic forces. The experience there, as in Western Europe, 
is of adjustment to policy measures and to their economic impacts as technol-
ogy changes and political pressures develop. With much greater sea areas and 
fishery resources, as well as politically significant but remote communities de-
pendent on fisheries (in places like Newfoundland or Alaska), the working out 
of the economic influences is in some ways clearer than in Western Europe and 
provides useful insights into the adjustment process needed to reconcile techni-
cal progress and social goals. 
Restricted licensing creates an economic good. Thus economic forces will, 
if allowed to do so, tend to move licences, like other resources, to their best 
users to manage in best combinations with other resources to produce the 
most appropriate outputs. As with other essential inputs, a shortage of or high 
prices for licences leads to the employment of economic substitutes. Depending 
on the restrictions in force, these may include use of additional technical in-
puts, such as horsepower, or of labour by multiple crewing. The restrictions on 
transfers will also determine whether the market in licences operates freely and 
the resultant industrial structure reflects the appropriate range of f irm sizes 
and the optimal levels of employment and investment. The examples given 
below show both the occasions where political pressures have led to waste and 
where improved policy measures have allowed greater efficiency. 
While the main interest is in economic efficiency at the firm and industry 
level, there are economic concerns at the national level as well. Property rights 
are created politically in appropriate legislation but secured only by legal pro-
cesses, legitimised by the support of the community and enforced by Govern-
ment or other agencies. Lack of support, high costs of the legal process and 
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intrinsic problems in policing can lead to costly and ineffective efforts to secure 
conservation and a prosperous industry. Some US studies have suggested that 
costs of conservation, administration and enforcement may exceed the profit 
of the sector involved. As the sting operation to detect illegal landings from 
the Wisconsin Lake Superior trout fishery involved the States of Wisconsin, Illi-
nois, Michigan and Indiana as well as the federal authorities in setting up a 
f i rm in Chicago, the costs were understandably high on that occasion. With 
only 21 eligible fishermen and an overall quota of around 15,000 fish the bene-
fits looked to be relatively small. 
6.4.3.1 Canada 
The Bay ofFundy herring fishery 
This fishery provides an interesting sequence of profit in the 60s leading 
to overcapacity followed by a limited licensing scheme which did not solve the 
various problems identified. Setting up a marketing co-operative and having 
annual individual vessel quotas and weekly catch rates did little for conserva-
t ion (due to illegal landings and consequent mis-reporting) or for rationalis-
ation of the fleet. Some improvement in bargaining power vis a vis the proces-
sors and foreign (state) buyers may have led to firmer prices but this is uncer-
tain, as is the possibility that having an apparently definite share may have led 
to some cost savings and product improvements. A market in licences did not 
develop as no real system of transferability was allowed for, other than the 
informal one providing for vessels pooling their individual quotas; the rele-
vance of market-type transfers was further eroded by the process of adminis-
trative re-allocation of any quotas which were not being fully used. In effect 
with the property right lacking real exclusivity, permanence and enforceability, 
rational economic behaviour largely remained a competitive race to fish with 
capital stuffing and disregard for conservation being the natural outcome. 
The wider programme which began in 1983, covering the Gulf of St. Law-
rence as well (16 vessels there in addition to 49 in the Bay of Fundy fleet), 
added transferable quotas to the vessel licensing scheme wi th the aim of re-
structuring the fleet. Furthermore, these individual quota shares were fixed 
and of ten year duration as opposed to the previous variable ones lasting only 
a year. Again the ability of economic forces to work directly on the structure 
and performance of the industry was constrained by the political and social 
objectives and environments. Transfers were subject to considerable restric-
tions. No vessel operating in the Bay of Fundy could accumulate more than 4% 
of the TAC which implied at least 25 vessels after 10 years compared with 49 
at the outset. Furthermore, while fishermen could buy quota share from other 
fishermen and processors, the latter could only buy from other processors. This 
may have been to avoid excessive concentration but it put rigidities into the 
market for quota share, as did the obligation to sell all, as opposed to part, of 
the quota and the absence of provision for leasing. Pooling arrangements, as 
before, allowed an informal system of leasing. Again the inflexibilities seem 
aimed at avoiding fluctuations in individual quotas causing added enforcement 
problems as well as creating the chance for speculation. The swift initial depar-
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ture of 5 Fundy vessel and one from the Gulf suggested confidence that a valu-
able property right had been created. Subsequently the rate slowed down and 
only 4 more Fundy vessels went and one other from the Gulf. This diminution 
in fleet size will undoubtedly have reduced the economic waste associated with 
excess capacity. The reduced costs of harvesting were thought to have im-
proved profit but not to the extent initially envisaged. This failure to achieve 
the expected re-structuring stemmed from the difficulties in enforcement 
which persisted. The possibility of making illegal landings meant that buying 
additional quota became less attractive than under-reporting. It is likely that 
the smaller fleet, wi th its secure individual allocations, has taken its catch more 
effectively in terms of lower operating costs and more appropriate t iming for 
higher priced marketing and processing outlets. This may have made for better 
conservation but probably this arose as much from strengthening stocks allied 
to weakening demand. 
Atlantic offshore groundfish fishery 
The offshore fleet is defined as the fleet of vessels over 100 feet and it 
shares its grounds with vessels from the mid-water and inshore fleets to a cer-
tain extent. What distinguishes this sector is the predominance of two large 
firms owning fleets of trawlers delivering to their shore based processing 
plants. Limited entry licensing and Canada's post-1977 acquisition of added 
fishing opportunities did not prevent this sector showing all the problems of 
open access fisheries. Economic inefficiencies showed up on land and at sea. 
The race to catch fish led to early closures and idle capacity while the com-
pressed catching season led to overloaded processing facilities and inevitably 
poorer quality output. The economic waste on shore also extended to unem-
ployment and idle plant when the closures cut off the supply of raw material. 
The Government introduced enterprise allocations which gave roughly half of 
the TACs to the company sector and allocated the individual shares to the com-
panies on the basis of past catching records. While the allocations were neither 
permanent nor transferable they had a considerable economic impact, partly 
because of the dominance of the two main firms. The allocations resulted in 
changes on the harvesting side with catching being geared to the needs of the 
market. This in turn extended the season and allowed a reduction in vessel 
numbers of some 20% with associated lower operating costs. On shore the 
impacts were if anything greater since planned harvesting meant extended 
effective employment of the labour and plant as well as better quality product. 
There were no provisions for transferring shares wi th the exception of ex-
changes between firms within the year. Thus no market in quota shares could 
develop. The decision to prevent such a market reflected political and social 
consideration (in particular a desire to maintain regional balance in employ-
ment) as did subsequent pressure by the rest of the fleet (mid-water and in-
shore vessels) for similar allocations and failing that a greater share of the over-
all TACs. Enforcement problems prevented extension of the system to the more 
numerous smaller vessels but political considerations resulted in a declining 
share to the company sector, which if anything means an increase in the waste 
associated with open access. 
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Newfoundland inshore cod fishery 
Developments in otter trawling in this fishery had led to considerable 
over-capacity and unbalanced exploitation of the allowable catch. Limited en-
try licensing had not been sufficiently restrictive and had to accommodate po-
litical pressures by allowing a substantial influx of additional vessels. Economic 
waste was apparent in the rush to fish which increased the costs and decreased 
the value of the catch by glutting the market. Further dislocation appeared in 
the concentration of activity on the winter fishery off the south west of New-
foundland; this meant under-employed fishermen and processing facilities in 
the northern areas and inadequate capacity in the south. The move to individ-
ual quotas for vessels allowed some re-dress of certain economic problems but 
not others due to political and social considerations. Quotas and vessel licence 
went wi th the vessel and transferability was limited to moving them from one 
fisherman to another or from a boat to its replacement. Leasing was only possi-
ble where a vessel was lost or unable to go to sea. The rigidity may have been 
intended to keep the regional balance intact and to minimise enforcement 
problems but the absence of ability to aggregate quota prevented significant 
re-structuring and impeded cost cutting. It is, however, clear that the program-
me did have considerable economic benefits. Labour in catching and processing 
as well as the related capital was more effectively used. Gluts and the need to 
incur extra costs in hauling fish from the over-stretched processing facilities in 
the south west was avoided. Better quality produce as well as lower cost and 
safer catching operations resulted as the season was extended. As the only 
effects on structure were those stemming from departures where replacement 
did not occur, there was only a very slight decline in the number of vessels. 
6.4.3.2 United States 
Wisconsin: Lake Superior lake trout 
The aims of the measures used to regulate this fishery were initially to 
revive the severely depressed stocks and to sustain it by cutting back on the 
number of licence holders. Thus in the early stages, the emphasis was on not 
permitting transfers and tightening the conditions of investment and effort. 
Subsequently the transfer of licence and quota is allowed but only to a replace-
ment fisherman. Aggregation or sub-division is not permitted and leasing is 
only accepted under very restrictive rules. Thus economic improvement has 
been noticeable only in reduced operating costs and improved marketing re-
turns. Enforcement has posed problems which appear to have been improved 
by considerable expenditure; over-fishing and mis-reporting do, however, occur 
and undermine both the economic and conservation benefits. 
6.4.5 Economic characteristics of property rights in New Zealand 
As has been said in section 5.6.5, an ITQ system was implemented in the 
New Zealand fisheries in 1986. Since the introduction of the system some 80% 
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of quota has changed hands in permanent trades of quotas (Clark, 1992) 1). 
This has lead to some concentration of quota ownership (Falloon, 1993). In 
June 1987, the three largest consortiums owned 43% of the quota by tonnage, 
whereas in March 1992 they owned 50%. However, in specific fisheries (e.g. 
abalone) ownership of quota has become more widespread. 
Total production of the New Zealand fisheries remained rather stable 
after the introduction of the ITQ scheme (table 6.18). The total number of ves-
sels increased from 2,331 in 1986 up to 3,216 in 1991; the majority of this fleet 
(79% in 1986 and 7 1 % in 1990/91) consists of small vessels (up to 12m). The 
number of bigger vessels (more than 33m) increased from 2.7% in 1986 up to 
8.9% 1990/91. The publications of Clark and Falloon do not give insight in the 
background of these developments. 
An interesting feature of the NZ ITQ system is a Quota Trading Exchange 
(QTE) that was in operation during the first two years of scheme. However, this 
proved to be unnecessary when the quotas became concentrated in fewer 
hands. Another reason of abolition of the QTE has been that quota holders 
had the opinion that the system revealed too much information to the Govern-
ment in view of implementing resource rentals based on market prices. 
Market prices of quotas are not included in the publications of Clark and 
Falloon. Falloon does mention the level of the lease price: 1 1 % of the fully 
capitalised valuation of the quotas (NZ$ 1.32 bin). The rate of capitalization of 
1 1 % is close to the required return on capital for fishing businesses in New 
Zealand. 
An important lesson from the New Zealand ITQ case is that there are 
many factors influencing and affecting the price of the quota (Clark, 1992 
p. 522). The unpredictability and lack of correlation with any economic criteria 
makes the quota price unusable as an indicator in a fishery. 
There has been much discussion about the security character of ITQs for 
loans. The NZ Government has decided to implement a registration system for 
quota ownership that guaranteed a clear title to quota. Therefore, lenders are 
reluctant to provide loans on the basis of the value of the quota alone. The 
industry prefers a quota registration system, operated by the fisheries manage-
ment administering authority, so that quotas may serve as a security for loans. 
The issue of resource rentals has probably been the one that has caused 
the greatest conflict between the industry and the NZ Government. The Gov-
ernment has the opinion that rents are created by the implementation of the 
ITQ system and that these rents should accrue to the Government. On the other 
hand, the industry argues that wi th the move to proportional quotas all the 
risks of TAC changes have been transferred to the industry and therefore all of 
any rent should accrue to the industry. Moreover, any rents that may have ex-
1) Sources of information about the New Zealand fishing industry in this section 
are: 'New Zealand's Individual Transferable Quota System for Fisheries Mana-
gement', by Ian Clark, in International Perspectives of Fisheries Management, 
Tokyo, 1992 and the second source is 'Individual Transferable Quotas, The New 
Zealand Case' by Roger Falloon in The Use of Individual Quotas in Fisheries 
Management, OECD, 1993. 
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isted have been capitalised into the value of quota and have been captured in 
the transfer by sale o f tha t quota. Nevertheless, resource rental have been in-
troduced and they accounted for around 15% of the estimated annual value 
of the fishery in 1992. 
The tendering of new rights has been very successful. Deepwater quota 
was tendered to the highest bidders during 1987 and 1988 to raise about NZ$ 
100 million. The move to a proportional quota system means that extra quota 
can no longer be tendered; it must be allocated on a pro-rata basis. 
The costs of management have increased somewhat since the implemen-
tation of the ITQ system. Staff has increased by about 10%, mainly in the area 
of administration of the paper-flows; enforcement staff has remained relatively 
constant, though there has been a move to the use of investigating accoun-
tants. 
Table 6.18 Production and employment in the Fishing Industry of New Zealand 
1984 1987 1989 1990 
Production (1,000 MT) 430 485 458 450 
Value of production ($NZ mln) 541 812 900 950 
Employment 8,000 10,000 12,000 15,000 
Source: 'New Zealand's Individual Transferable Quota System for Fisheries Management'; 
Ian Clark in International Perspectives on Fisheries Management; Tokyo, 1992. 
6.4.6 Economic characteristics of property rights in Australia 
Two different types of individual property rights were introduced in Aus-
tralia in 1984: An ITQ program for the Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) and input 
rights ('Class A' and 'Class B' units) were allocated to fishermen in the Northern 
Prawn Fishery (NPF). 
The SBT ITQ program started in October 1984 1). The TAC for this tuna 
species was fixed at 14,500 tonnes for the first year of the program, which 
meant a decrease by 30% compared with the preceding year. This TAC was 
lowered further and amounted to 11,500 tonnes in 1987. Initial allocations of 
ITQs were insufficient for a number of fishermen to allow a viable exploitation 
in the tuna fishery. Therefore, many fishermen chose to sell their small quota 
holdings and left the fishery. This resulted in an adjustment of the fleet, 
whereby the number of ITQ holders diminished from 136 in 1984 to 63 in 1987. 
The speed of this fleet adjustment was facilitated by the compensation pay-
ments for ITQs sold by those who left the industry. 
Information about the results of the Australian fishing rights has been derived 
f rom: 'Applied Fisheries Management Plans', David Wesney, in 'Rights Based 
Fishing', 1989 and from the Australian contribution to the OECD study on 
management techniques, 1994. 
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A shift in the proportion of individual to company operations holding 
quotas, from 74%: 26% in 1984 to 55%: 45% in 1987 shows a concentration of 
ownership amongst bigger enterprises. The larger operators in South Australia 
have purchased quota from fishermen in Western Australia and New South 
Wales. This concentration tendency lead to the situation that in 1992-93 over 
62% of the total southern bluefin tuna quota was held by 5% of the quota 
holders. 
The value of the quota reflects the increase in catch value: the per tonne 
quota value has increased from the initial level of about $ 1,000 to over $ 5,000 
in 1987. The increase in catch value could be realised by exporting more tuna 
to Japan, for the high-priced sashimi market. 
Despite the reductions in catches the industry remained profitable, wi th 
the cost of catching a tonne of tuna falling by 25% and a resource rent of $6-
$7 million being earned in 1986-87 (Geen and Nayar, 1989). Gains have also 
been made from improved fishing techniques encouraged by the introduction 
of ITQs. For example, long line fishing methods were more used to catch more 
valuable tuna for the Japanese sashimi market. 
For the Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF) a management plan regulating the 
inputs of the fishery was implemented in 1984. The reason for this plan was a 
more economic one i.e. improvement of the profitability of the vessels by re-
ducing the pressure on the stocks. Moreover, this fleet was more scattered over 
a vast area so that an ITQ system would be more costly and difficult to control 
compared with input controls. A voluntary adjustment scheme (VAS) aimed to 
reduce the capacity by some 40% up to 1993. Due to this scheme, the boat 
capacity decreased by 13% in the period 1985-1988 which suggests that the 
progress towards achieving a 40% reduction in fishing capacity in 1993 was 
well on target. 
Fishermen paid a levy to support the VAS, which meant an annual 
amount of $18,000 for an average-sized trawler. The capacity of the boats is 
expressed in 'Class A' units which are tradable. In 1989 market prices of these 
units ranged from $450 to $650 which meant a value of $220,000 for a trawler 
of average capacity. At the start of the scheme the units were priced at $120, 
hence an increase in value of some 400% occurred in four years. 
The south east fishery, a multi-species fishery, is the third Australian fish-
ery were fishing rights were introduced (in 1985). Transferable endorsements 
were issued to fishermen for one or more of three management zones. This 
kind of input control did not succeed because of the continuing increase in 
effort, in spite of adaptations of the input regulations. In 1992 the TAC for 
sixteen species (orange roughly, blue grenadier, gemfish etc.) was 31,680 
tonnes, of which some 29,000 tonnes was allocated to two types of trawl fisher-
ies (Danish seine and otter trawl). The vessels in each sector were allocated a 
portion of the respective number of quota units available to each sector. So, 
there has been a move from input rights to an ITQ scheme in the south east 
fishery. 
A lack of an effective market for quota occurred in this fishery which was 
ascertained to dissatisfaction with the initial allocations of quota. This absence 
of quota trade has made the adjustment of the fishery much slower compared 
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with the southern bluefin tuna fishery. This adjustment process has also been 
hampered by the limitations in other fisheries (a move to other fisheries was 
not allowed) and bad employment prospects in coastal communities. 
Profitability improved for the south east fishery as a whole, after the im-
plementation of the ITQ system. This was mainly due to the increase of the 
return on capital of one sector, the offshore boats, in 1991-92 (42% return to 
capital in that year). Amalgamation of ITQs by operators who owned more 
than one vessel and an increase of prices for orange roughly mainly explain this 
increase in the average return on capital. 
Evaluation of the Australian property rights 
The quota-based system of SBT enabled an immediate and substantial 
reduction in the TAC from a 21,000 tonnes national quota in 1983-84 to 14,500 
tonnes in the following year and further to 11,500 tonnes. The number of 
quota holders was reduced by 54% between 1984 and 1987 due to selling of 
ITQs from those who left the industry. 
The average size of the fish landed has increased and the value of the 
catch has increased significantly due to a rise in exports to Japan. 
The concluding comments of Wesney are somewhat preliminary but he 
states clearly that one of the major advantages of this ITQ system is its direct 
control on catch and incentives for a more efficient fishery. Government inter-
vention is minimal and in the case of SBT surveillance and enforcement have 
not been a major problem. 
The Australian contribution to the OECD study on management tech-
niques assesses the effectiveness of the SBT ITQ system in terms of: 1) gains in 
economic efficiency 2) the cost effectiveness of its implementation 3) the ability 
to meet the conservation objective of fisheries management and 4) income 
distribution effects that may occur. 
With respect to points one and four the conclusions are positive: there 
has been an improvement in economic efficiency, because the catching costs 
have decreased and fishing techniques have been improved and, regarding the 
fourth point, rationalisation has taken place because the ownership of quota 
is acquired by those that are the most efficient operators. 
Regarding point 2, cost effectiveness, the Australian study mentions that 
the costs of surveillance and compliance ($310,000 in 1991-92) were about 64% 
of the SBT fishery management budget. There have been some problems with 
monitoring and enforcing the program so that dumping of fish, caught in ex-
cess of the quota, may have occurred. It is not sure whether the conservation 
objective (point 3) has been met because the southern bluefin tuna stock re-
sponses only slowly to changes in fishing mortality. 
In the end the OECD study concludes that in the medium to longer term 
a system of ITQs in the southern bluefin tuna fishery is thought to have a num-
ber of advantages over other management systems. 
The other management plan, the one for the NPF fishery, is more com-
plex and involves considerable Government intervention. Moreover, constraints 
such as gear restrictions, seasonal closures etc. impose additional costs on indi-
vidual fishermen. Subjective information from fishermen about profitability of 
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their operations ('good' in 1987) suggest that substantial resource rents have 
been accruing to the industry, in spite of costs of the VAS and management 
fees. According to the OECD study, positive results of the NPF plan are that 
most of the potential capacity (i.e. units that were not assigned to boats) has 
now been removed from the fishery, as well as some operational boats. 
Wesney states in his previously mentioned article that there are signs that the 
managements measures for the NPF fishery had desirable effects because of 
the decrease in boat capacity by 13% in the period 1985-1988. 
Both plans, the SBT ITQ scheme and the NPF input management plan, 
have the capability of being quickly amended in response to changing circum-
stances in the fishery. 
The effectiveness of the ITQ scheme in the south east fishery is not very 
clear. The economic performance of the trawlers improved after the introduc-
tion of the ITQs in 1992, but there were also other factors that have influenced 
this improvement. The cost effectiveness of the ITQ implementation has been 
doubtful, due to inadequately defined user rights and the problems that are 
caused by implementing ITQs in a multi-species fishery. Moreover, there is a 
multiple jurisdiction in that apart from the Commonwealth Government four 
other states have jurisdiction about the fishing grounds. This situation creates 
enforcement problems. 
Whether ITQs in the south east fishery are successful in meeting the con-
servation objective is too early to assess, according to the previously mentioned 
study for the OECD. Estimation of the TAC is difficult for some species due to 
lack of information about the stock structure for a number of species such as 
orange roughly. 
Income distribution effects, the fourth measure for effectiveness in the 
OECD study, differed widely from those in the southern bluefin tuna fishery. 
The lack of an effective market for quota, due to restrictions and dissatisfaction 
with initial quota allocations, resulted in a slow rate of adjustment of the fleet. 
The Australian contribution to the OECD study on management tech-
niques gives also an overview of key management problems and issues. One of 
the points is that there has been a trend towards increased industry involve-
ment in the management of the Australian fisheries. Especially in South Austra-
lia, where Integrated Management Committees operate which are composed 
of representatives from all areas, including commercial and recreative fishers, 
scientists and fishery managers. Another point is that there has been some 
questions regarding the appropperiateness of the Australian Fisheries Manage-
ment Authority's objective of maximising economic efficiency in the exploita-
t ion of the fisheries resources. It has been argued that it is only the task of 
AFMA to get sustainability in the fishery by setting biological reference points 
whereas the industry should strive for economic efficiency in his own way. 
6.4.7 Economic characteristics of property rights in Japan 
In Japan the property rights for fishing can be distinguished between 
fishing rights for coastal areas, prefectural fishing licences and licences issued 
by the ministry, as has been described in section 5.6.7. 
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The fishing rights for the coastal zone, managed by the Fishery Coopera-
tive Associations (FCAs), have a validity of five or ten years. Generally spoken, 
the rights are granted to the FCAs. Fishermen who want to fish in the coastal 
zone should be a member of an FCA. It is a system of community based fisheries 
management by highly cohesive units of fishermen. The rights of the FCAs are 
property rights but they can not be sold or leased. 
Products from the coastal zone such as urchins, shellfish, spiny lobsters, 
abalones, clams and marine algeas have a relatively high value. The exclusive 
common rights system allows fishermen to stabilize and maximize harvest of 
these valuable species. Thus in many cases fisheries conducted under the exclu-
sive common rights tend to be among the most profitable operations engaged 
in by coastal fishermen 1). The owners of the coastal fishing rights have a very 
strong position, because the rights are inalienable and are guaranteed under 
both the Fisheries Law and as livelihood rights under Japanese Civil Law. Fur-
thermore, a party applying for a permit to reclaim a particular sea area must 
first obtain permission of the owners of fishing rights existing in that area. This 
has lead to very high compensation payments, demanded by FCAs, for loss of 
rights due to coastal development projects. 
Table 6.19 Economic structure ofJapai 
Number of fishing 
establishments 
Number of fishing boats 
Number of fishermen 
Production (1,000 MT) 
total 
175,444 
277,949 
370,300 
10,843 
nese Marine Fisheries, 1991 
Coastal Fishery 
capture 
128,903 
253,149 
300,300 
1,992 
aquacult. 
36,951 
22,235 
70,000 
1,273 
Offshore 
fishery 
9,298 
2,565 
6,081 
Distant 
water 
fishery 
212 
1,496 
Source: 'Development of a Community-Based Fishery Management System in Japan', Tadashi 
Yamamoto in Marine Resource Economics, Spring 1995. 
The fishing licenses granted by the prefecture and the ministry restrict the 
number of fishing units for offshore fisheries. Fishing effort is controlled by the 
number of licenses issued, limitation on vessel size and gear and through the 
opening and closing of seasons and areas. Fishing licenses are normally valid 
for five years with possible renewal. The licence is transferable under certain 
conditions (Yamamoto, 1995). 
1) 'The Japanese Coastal Fisheries Management System Based on Exclusive Fishing 
Rights', Kevin Short, International Perspectives on Fisheries Management, Tokyo 
1991. 
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Tanaka (1993) 1) states that, as a result of transfers, the price of a fishery 
right (e.g. per ton) will be generated for each type of fishery, whereby financial 
institutions accept these valuable rights as a collateral. From the viewpoint of 
business management licence-based fishery in Japan has many problems such 
as deterioration of profitability because of excessive investment, adverse effect 
of excessive exploitation arising out of efficient fishery methods, emphasis on 
large volume catch because of competitive catch and scanty attention given to 
enhancing added value of the catch. 
The available literature does not provide information about markets of 
fishing rights, prices and effects on the structure of the industry. 
1) 'Comparative Study of Fishery Management Systems in Japan and New Zealand', 
Katsunory Tanaka in 'the Use of Individual Quotas in Fisheries Management', 
OECD 1993. 
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7. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICULTURE 
7.1 The EU milk quota system 
The situation before implementation of milk quotas in 1984 was domi-
nated of a level of production resulting in considerable level of the inventories 
and increasing expenses for the support of the prices. This was a consequence 
of the conducted price policy. By keeping a price guarantee larger than the 
market clearing price, adjustment of supply and demand has been prevented. 
The overproduction of milk has been a reality since the early 70s. In the late 70s 
and early 80s the imbalance between supply and demand deteriorated (in 1979 
the overproduction was 11 %). In 1977 a co-responsibility levy was introduced 
corresponding to 1,5% of the indicative price. In 1982 it was introduced that 
production over a given level would lead to a corresponding reduction in 
prices, measured in percentage. All these measures didn't have any great effect 
on the milk production, e.g. the overproduction in 1983 was 25%. It can there-
fore be concluded that in this period, given the price policy, the overproduction 
was permanent and structural determined. 
In summer 1983 the overproduction had reached a level which would 
have meant a reduction in prices at 12% in 1984/85. The quota system was then 
introduced in order to avoid the reduction in price, which the Council evalu-
ated would give the farmers too serious income problems. 
The quota system was supplemented by a two-price system. A guaranteed 
minimum price is given for the production within the quota. Production be-
yond the quota is imposed with a levy, which since 1990/91 has been 115% of 
the price. Before 1986 the levy was either 75% or 100% depending on the 
choice of quota-system, while in 1986-1990/91 the levy percentage was 100%. 
There were two ways in 1984/85 in which the quota-system could been 
introduced on the national level: either a system where each farmer pays the 
levy for production beyond his(hers) assigned quantity/quota (formula A), or 
a system where each dairy/buyer of milk pays the levy for production beyond 
the assigned quantity/quota (formula B). 
The total quota in EU was determined from the total production in EU in 
1981 added by 1 % and some minor quantities as reserve of EU. The total quota 
was distributed to each Member State based on their share of the production 
in 1981. Compared to the total EU production in 1983 the total production in 
1984/85 was 3,9% lower. 
The production was still significant over the consumption and the quotas 
were, therefore, currently reduced, however, slightly, in the 80s by cessation 
and suspension schemes. Since 1989/90 the total quota has been almost stable. 
The level of overproduction was in 1990 15%, a quite significant overproduc-
t ion. 
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In 1986 the rules for the Member States payment of the levy changed 
such that the rules now are (nearly) independent of choice of formula, which 
means that only production beyond the national quota is subject to the levy. 
However, it was still possible to impose a levy of 75% on the overproduction 
of each farmer (in force in Holland and Germany). The extra money in these 
countries from individual overrun of quota have mainly been used to finance 
purchase of quota. 
The duration of the EU milk quota system was first decided to be 5 years, 
then the period was extended 3 years, then 1 year. The system was extended 
in 1993 another seven years to 2000. So de jure the duration has been relatively 
uncertain. But given the capitalization of the milk quota in the prices, changes 
of the system have become very difficult. Therefore, the duration of the system 
is probably not de facto enclosed wi th a great deal of uncertainty. 
7.2 Property rights in the Danish agriculture 
7.2.1 The Danish implementation of the milk quota system 
Denmark chose in 1984 formula B and wi th the purpose to utilize the 
national quota as much as possible only one milk collecting agency was estab-
lished. The agency buys the milk from the farmers and sells it to the dairies. The 
superlevy applies, therefore, only to production beyond the national quota. For 
the individual farmer the implication is that the levy system is only applied to 
the extent the national quota is exceeded. If the national quota is exceeded, 
the levy is charged on those farmers who exceeded their quota most. 
The central agency is also responsible for reallocation of quotas between 
farmers. Only the agency can reallocate quotas either directly through the dif-
ferent schemes or indirectly by approving sale and lease of quotas. The activi-
ties of the agency are financed by selling the milk to the dairies at a higher 
price than the purchase price. 
The quota follows in principle the farm, and the quotas are, therefore, 
only transferable along wi th land in cases of sale, inheritance or tenancy. Be-
sides a certain amount of land has to fol low the each sold quota unit, the 
quota can only be transferred to other farmers within a distance of 10 km. 
These requirements have effectively limited the direct transferability of quotas 
between farmers. The transfer of quotas has to be approved by the agency. 
The Danish farmers were assigned at the outset in 1984/85 a quota 6,7% 
lower than their production in 1983. Because the national quota was only re-
duced by 5.6%, a reserve was created, from which quota could be distributed 
to 'special cases', including new investments. The natural inflow to the national 
reserve come from ordinary cessation, where farmers ceasing milk production 
of their own wil l , i.e. wi thout any compensation. 
In order to increase the amount of quotas for redistributing several 
schemes have been applied in Denmark, especially wi th the purpose to help 
farmers out of the sector. The main schemes have been the EU cessation 
scheme and the Danish buy and sale scheme. 
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The EU cessation scheme was first applied in Denmark in 1986-1988. By 
opting a lower rate of compensation (12.4 DKK per 100 kg milk in seven years) 
than intended by the Commission (about 51 DKK per 100 kg milk in seven 
years) Denmark was able to release extra quotas. Out of a total amount of 608 
million kg only 146 million kg were transferred to EU. The EU cessation scheme 
has also been in force in 1991/92 and 1993/94, where 277 and 10,1 million kg 
were purchased, respectively. Of the 277 million kg were 107,8 million kg re-
verted to EU (suspension), while the rest were reallocated in Denmark. All 10,1 
million kg from the scheme in 1993/94 enter the national reserve for 1994/95. 
The Danish buy and sale scheme has been applied since 1989/90. The aim 
of the scheme was to make the reallocation of quota more flexible by helping 
less productive farmers to leave the sector. This promotes also the structure 
development. The price of quota was in 1989/90 political determined to a no-
taxable amount of 0,86 DKK per kg. Later the price has been increased to 1,25 
DKK per kg, the same amount as in the EU cessation scheme. In the quota years 
1989/90, 1990/91 and 1991/92 a total amount of 137,4 million kg was brought 
via the scheme. In 1992/93 and 1993/94 the purchased amount was 62,8 million 
kg and 66,1 million kg, respectively. 
The purchased and the released quotas have been reallocated via other 
schemes to other producers on basis of applications (this applies to new as well 
as existing producers) or as general allocation, either free of charge or subject 
to a price. In the first 8 years with the quota system 1545,7 million kg have 
been reallocated via the central agency or more than one third of the present 
national quota. 
7.2.2 Effects of milk rights on the Danish agricultural industry 
When trying to assess the effects of the quota system it is very important 
to consider the choice of reference situation, e.g. the situation the develop-
ment is compared to. The reference situation could be the situation just before 
the quota system was implemented or a situation which is forecasted based on 
the assumption that the management system in 1984 was continued or a situa-
tion simulated based on the assumption that another management system was 
introduced in 1984. 
The last two possibilities are more or less speculative, but, however, the 
most relevant. One way to overcome the speculative element to some extent 
could be to compare the development in a given period (e.g. 3-5 years) before 
the quota system with the development in a period of the same length after 
implementation of the quota system. However, the most common method is 
to use the situation in 1) as the reference situation. On the other hand if it is 
an analysis of whether the political objective with the quota system have been 
achieved, the relevant reference situation may be the situation in 1984, i.e. 1). 
We will here describe the present situation in relation to the situation in 
1984, but we wil l also refer to a rapport from 1988 (Langfrits and Walter-
Jorgensen, 1988), in which the changes in the sector just before and after im-
plementation of the quota system are compared. 
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4,913 
4,884 
4,882 
4,603 
4,514 
4,550 
4,546 
4,434 
4,457 
4,465 
4,932 
4,882 
4,882 
4,580 
4,458 
4,515 
4,513 
4,419 
4,420 
4,454 
4,454 
-0.39% 
0.04% 
-0.01 % 
0.59% 
1.25% 
0.80% 
0.75% 
0.35% 
0.03% 
0.24% 
Production and quotation 
The development in the Danish production of milk and quota is shown 
in table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Production and the Danish national quota 
Production Quota Difference 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
Source: Milk Committee of the Danish dairy industry. 
The Danish quota has decreased in the period by 9,7%, so compared to 
the production in 1983 the quota is 15.4% lower. The utilization of the na-
tional quota has been, as intended, about 100% and also the amount paid as 
superlevy has been relatively small, indicating mainly that it has been possible 
for the agency to equalize overproduction from some of farmers with under-
production from other farmers. Compared to other countries the enforcement 
and control of the system has functioned well in Denmark, e.g. Denmark has 
not be asked to pay extra amount as levy. 
Effects on the structure 
As expected the number of herds and the number of cows have de-
creased considerable since the introduction of the quota system, see table 7.2. 
In 1984/85 there were 32,679 farmers, while in 1994/95 the number of farmers 
is 15348, i.e. the number of farmers has more than halved in the period. The 
number of cows decreased in the same period by 28%. The average size of 
quota per herd/farmer has increased in period by 90.8%. The output per cow 
has in the period increased by 21,2% and the number of cows per herd has 
increased by 50%, see again table 7.2. 
This development is also reflected in the number of farmers grouped by 
size of quota. Small scale farmers, i.e. farmers with quota less than 100,000 kg, 
constituted in 1985/86 about 40% (12,000) of the total number of farmers and 
had about 14% of the total quota, while in 1991/92 they constituted only 
about 20% (3,750) of number of farmers and had about 6% of the total quota. 
Large scale farmers, i.e. farmers with quota over 300,000 kg, constituted in 
1985/86 about 12% (3,650) of the total number of farmers and had about 3 1 % 
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Table 7.2 Indicators of the structure development (indices in blanket) 
1984/85 1994/95 
Number of farmers 
Average quota per farmers 
Output per cow 
Number of cows per herd 
Number of cows 
32,679 
(100) 
152,000 kg 
(100) 
5,559 kg 
(100) 
29,0 
(100) 
951,000 
(100) 
15,348 
(47.0) 
290,000 kg 
(190.8) 
6,737 kg 
(121.2) 
43,5 
(150.0) 
685,000 
(72.0) 
Source: Milk Committee of the Danish dairy industry. 
of the total quota, while in 1991/92 they constituted about 24% (4,750) of the 
number of farmers and had about 46% of the total quota. 
In the first years wi th the quota system occurred the adjustment to the 
quota mainly through reduction in the number of cows (about 5% per year), 
while the size of the herds stagnated, which implies a reduction in number of 
herbs equal to the reduction in the number of cows, i.e. 5% per year. Later, 
due to the different schemes, there have been an increase in the number of 
cows per herd. As the size of the herds increased the farming tends to be more 
specialized, so the number of farms with herds of both pigs and cows has de-
creased. In the whole period the output per cow has increased 2-3% per year. 
In the first years the milk production fell by about 2% per year. 
In the years just before the implementation of quota system the number 
of cows was declining about 1 % per year and the number of herds by about 
5% per year. The average size of herds increased consequently by about 4% 
per year. Given the current increase in output per cow the total milk produc-
tion was increasing in this period by 0.5-1 % per year. 
7ab/e 7.3 Changes in the size of herbs before and after implementation of the quota system 
Size of herb Larger Un- Smaller 
changed 
Exit Newcom-
bers a) 
Share of all herbs in percent 
1983 (compared to 1981) 
1985 (compared to 1983) 
8.3 
3.9 
69.6 
71.4 
5.2 
10.1 
16.9 
14.7 
5.0 
4.7 
a) In percent of all the herbs in 1983 and 1985, respectively. 
Source: Langfrits and Walter-Jorgensen (1988). 
The quota system seems in the first years to have slowed down the speed 
of adjustment in the sector. The structure of the sector have been more stable 
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in the period. Both the number of herds that increased in size and the number 
of newcomers were decreasing in the period after the quota system compared 
to the period before the quota system. The number of herds that decreased in 
size was more than doubled. This development in the first years after the im-
plementation of the quota system is very different from the development later, 
as reflected in the table 7.3. One explanation could be that the first period 
after a new regulation system, the reaction is more or less expectant and the 
farmers have mainly adjusted their individual production to the system. An 
explanation for the later increased speed of adjustment in the sector may be 
the different schemes that have been applied. 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the implementation of the quota 
system did not change the structure of the farming sector, in fact compared to 
the period just before the quota system, the speed of adjustments in the struc-
ture decreased. 
For the dairy industry the stagnated production did not course large 
problems, because the industry had begun the adjustment in the structure in 
the years before the quota system. The Danish production of milk only in-
creased by about 0.5% per year in the period just before the quota system. 
Reallocation of quotas 
As mentioned more than one third of the national quota has been reallo-
cated in the first 8 years of the system, i.e. until 1991/92. 
About half of the reallocation is due to the EU cessation scheme and the 
Danish buy and sale scheme. The released quantity from the EU cessation 
scheme in 1986-88 was for free assigned to the remaining farmers, partly by 
10,537 kg to each farmer and partly by limitation in each farmers reduction of 
quota due to the quota system. The released quantity from the buy and sale 
scheme was mainly sold by political determined criteria. The released quantity 
from the EU cessation scheme in 1991/92 was assigned for free to about 85% 
of the farmers. The assignment was based on a equal percentage of each farm-
ers quota. 
Over 2/3 of the farmers that left the sector due to these schemes were 
elder than 55 years and over 7/8 of the farmers had a quota lower than 
200,000 kg. Age, sickness and environmental requirements were the main rea-
sons for leaving the sector. 
About 20% of the reallocation happens through direct buy and inheri-
tance. This relatively minor importance in redistribution of quotas might to 
some extent be explained by crowding out effects of the different schemes. For 
instance the level of transferred quota fell from 80.6 million kg in 1989/90 to 
24.6 million kg in 1990/91 probably due to the buy and sale scheme. Another 
explanation may be the special rule (in force 1989-92) requiring 33% of the 
transferred quota to be handed over to the agency in case of addition of quo-
tas. 
The rest of the reallocation, about 30%, has happened through ordinary 
leaving. 
The agency have been allocating some of the released quotas (quotas 
which were not allocated general to all the farmers) to producers on basis of 
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applications. It has not been possible to meet all the applicants. Only, on aver-
age, about 2/3 of the applicants were approved in the 80'ties, while in the 90s 
only 1/3 have been approved. The selection of applicants has been based on 
priority rules set by the Ministry of Agriculture. The critical rules have been the 
age of the applicants. Before 1989 a maximum limit of 27 years have been ap-
plied in case of establishment, while after 1989 a minimum limit of 26 years 
have also been in force. For example in 1991/92 the maximal age of new estab-
lished farmers was 29 years and 3 month. 
In the period 1984/85 to 1991/92 576.3 million kg of quotas were reallo-
cated in case of establishment and extensions, where additional quotas were 
needed. The reallocated quotas were free of charge. 
Because of increasing problems of getting quotas available to establish-
ment, only a part of the applied quantity has been free of charge since 1992/ 
93. In 1992/93 it was 55% and in 1993/94 25%. The remaining quantity should 
be brought via the buy and sales scheme. 
Economic performance 
The reduction in number of farmers have mainly been in the group of 
small farmers (quota <150,000 kg), over 3/4 of the reduction occurred within 
this group. These farmers have a low economic return to production. An eco-
nomic investigation have shown that there are economics of scale up to herd 
sizes of 100-150 cows. 
It has been possible the keep the production for the remaining farmers 
on the same level or even on a higher level compared with the level of produc-
tion in 1983. The individual quota has been reduced in the period, but during 
the quota year it is possible due to current updating of the production of each 
farmer to assign so-called 'free quantity' to each farmer as a percentage of the 
quota of each farmer. Therefore, the economic results of the individual farmers 
are not as in some of other EU countries charged with lower output. 
Since the implementation of the quota system the prices of milk products 
have in periods increased perceptibly, which have improved on average the 
income of the Danish dairy farmers. This has put extra pressure on the quota 
system and a considerable increase in number of direct sale of quotas (which 
have to be approved by the agency) have taken place the last years. In 1993/94 
quotas of 89.4 million kg were transferred, against only 36.6 million kg in 
1991/92. It has also increased the tendency to capitalization of the quotas. In 
the Danish buy and sale scheme the price at present is 1.6 DKK/kg. In case of 
permanent sale of quotas between farmers the price between 2 and 3 DKK, 
while the leasing price is 0.4-0.6 DKK per year. These prices are considerable 
lower than prices in other EU countries, which mainly is due to the limited 
transferability of quotas. In Denmark the milk quotas are not, in general, a part 
of the mortgage on real property, it has been clarified after a decision of Court 
in 1992. However, the prices of farms with quota are considerable higher than 
prices on farms without quotas and the quotas are often used as security for 
loans. This means that de facto the quotas have been capitalized. The invest-
ment in quotas can not be subject to depreciation and the trade of quotas are, 
therefore, not subject to any taxes. 
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7.3 Property rights in the Dutch agriculture 
7.3.1 The Dutch implementation of the milk quota system 
The milk quota is a right of an individual farmer to deliver a certain 
amount of milk levy-free, but a member state is due to pay a levy to the com-
munity if the total guaranteed quantity for the member state is exceeded. 
There are two levels at which differences between allowed and real deliveries 
are balanced. The first level is between milk factories and the second level is 
between farmers who deliver milk to the same factory. However, the Member 
States are due to collect the levy from farmers who deliver more milk than their 
quota. 
The trade organization of dairy produce in Rijswijk has been charged 
with the execution of the regulation of the superlevy. They have to fix the 
amount of the superlevy and to collect it. This institution also records the 
changes of the ownership and the size of the quota. 
The way the regulation of the superlevy has been executed in the Nether-
lands can be seen as a successful policy in a sense that the goal of reducing the 
milk supply has been realised. The milk production was not much more than 
the milk quota (table 7.4). The amounts of superlevy are mainly caused by ex-
ceeding of the fat content and by quantities of not allocated milk. Main causes 
for this success are the strong organization of dairy production in the Nether-
lands (the trade organization) and the fact that almost all the milk of the farm-
ers is delivered to milk factories. 
Table 7.4 Milk production and milk quota in the Netherlands 
Measure 1984 1987 1990 1993 
National quota a) 1000 ton 
Milk production b) 1000 ton 
Superlevy million NLG 
Milk price change compared 
with previous year 0.7 0.9 -10.0 -1.0 
a) National quota of the amount of levy-free milk; 1984 = 1984/85 etc; b) Computed national 
production, from 1986 corrected for fat content. 
Source: Commodity Board for Dairy Produce. 
Transferability rules 
Milk quotas can only be transferred permanently when they are connec-
ted with land. The maximum amount is 20,000 kg per hectare except for trans-
actions of complete dairy farms including the complete milk quota of that 
farm. Since 1989, many transfers of milk quota take place by means of a ten-
ancy construction. The buyer buys the milk quota and rents the connected land 
for one year (or more if he wants). After the tenancy period the buyer remains 
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12,174 
12,195 
79.3 
11,404 
11,398 
101.0 
11,111 
11,212 
81.8 
10,983 
11,030 
22.3 
the owner of the milk rights and the seller remains the owner of the land. In 
this way, land and milk are formally connected but actually disconnected. This 
moves the price of milk quota in an upwards direction because less or even no 
investment is needed in land; only for the tenancy period the tenancy has to 
be paid. 
A lessor can lease his total milk quota or a part of it to one or more les-
sees. The smallest allowed amount is 10,000 kg per transaction. The lessee can 
lease from one or more lessors up till a total amount of 75,000 kg. The lease 
period is one year. As a consequence, if lessor and lessee want to continue the 
lease for more years they nevertheless have to sign a new lease contract for 
every year they want to go on. 
7.3.2 Effects of milk rights on the Dutch agricultural industry 
Structure of the sector 
The number of farms with milk cows decreased from 60,233 in 1984 to 
43,039 in 1992. The national milk quota during the same period has been de-
creased by almost 10% (table 7.5). 
Table 7.5 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Development of the Dutch dairy 
National 
milk quota 
* mln kg 
12,174 
12,158 
12,177 
11,404 
10,954 
11,104 
11,111 
10,874 
10,994 
Number 
of farms 
w i th cows 
60,233 
57,995 
55,122 
52,802 
50,247 
48,826 
46,977 
45,037 
43,039 
' sector in the period 
Average milk-
quota per farm 
* 1000 kg 
202 
210 
221 
216 
218 
227 
237 
241 
255 
1989-1992 
Average 
number 
of cows 
42 
41 
42 
40 
39 
39 
40 
41 
41 
Mi lk-prod. 
per cow per 
farm (kg) 
4,776 
5,136 
5,322 
5,430 
5,558 
5,803 
5,916 
5,871 
6,193 
Source: Central Statistical Office; Commodity Board for Dairy Produce. 
The average milk quota per farm increased til l 255,000 kg per farm in 
1992.The increase of the average milk production per cow made that the aver-
age number of cows stayed constant around 40 cows per farm. Krijger (1990) 
states that the competition strength of Dutch dairy sector got worse after in-
troduction of the milk quotation. In the Netherlands, he states, the enlarge-
ment of dairy farms is less than in other (important) EU Member States. For the 
short term this is compensated by an increase of the milk production per cow, 
but in the long term there will be a limit to this growth. The Government has 
not been active in buying quota and reallocate it and also there were more 
limitations to quota transfers than in especially the United Kingdom. Also van 
Bruchem (1991) states that especially farms with 30 till 70 milk cows did not 
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succeed to compensate their quota cuts by buying or leasing quota. The conclu-
sion is that the enlargement of the scale of milk production has been dimin-
ished by the introduction of the milk quotation. It is not clear whether or not 
this consequence is wanted by the Dutch Government. They may also have 
other targets than production of milk at a price as low as possible. An impor-
tant aim of EU agricultural policy from the beginning has been to ensure a fair 
standard of living for dairy farmers. 
The question can be asked whether the Dutch choice in 1984 for a free 
market system has been the best choice for milk quota transfer. Administrative 
redistribution of the milk quota from stopping dairy farmers (combined with 
buying-ups, but that is not absolutely necessary) in France and Denmark re-
sulted in more enlargement of dairy farms with no or little money value for the 
milk quota. 
The price that will be paid for one kg of milk quota mainly depends on 
the margin between the returns of one more kg of milk production and the 
costs to produce that one more kg of milk. This nearly always means that dairy 
farmers, when buying or leasing milk quota from others, don't take into ac-
count fixed costs. The amounts bought or leased are relatively small compared 
with the quota they already own so changes in labour, land, cow-housing and 
machinery are not necessary (moreover there is the 'disconnection' of land and 
quota). Many of these fixed assets are not fully utilized because of the reduc-
tions of the milk quota and an increase in the milk production per cow. 
Of course the margin between returns and variable costs is much higher 
than the margin between returns and total costs. In the last four or five years 
this margin reached levels of ƒ 0,50 till ƒ 0,60 per kg of milk (in individual cases 
sometimes around ƒ 0,70). The price for leasing one kg of milk fluctuated be-
tween ƒ 0,40 and ƒ 0,50 per kg. 
In the case of buying milk quota price calculation is more complex. You 
have to pay now for buying but the returns will come during a number of years 
vas long as the milk quota system exists). Calculations must be made with net 
present values under influences of the interest level and the duration of the 
milk quota system. Another complicating factor is the depreciation of the 
bought milk quota allowed by tax regulation. In 1995 and 1996 the deprecia-
tion period in tax regulation was eight years. The fiscal advantages of these 
depreciations are also part of the net present value calculation. A tax level of 
60%, an interest level of 7%, a duration of the milk quota system of ten years 
and returns minus variable costs of ƒ 0,55 per kg of milk per year result in a 
price of ƒ 4,50. This was the current level 1993 and 1994. Lower margins occu-
red in later years and this has decreased the price to levels under ƒ 4,00 per kg. 
Reasons for the high prices for milk quota in the Netherlands, compared 
with other countries in the EU are: 
no free trade of milk quota but an administrative redistribution of milk 
quota from farmers who stop or diminish milk production (France, Den-
mark); 
this administrative redistribution often has been combined wi th large 
buying-ups of milk quota by the Government (France, Germany); 
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creaming off and administrative redistribution of the parts that are 
creamed off; smaller, less financially strong farms are benefitted which 
decreases the price (Belgium); 
strong land/milk quota connection (Germany); 
lower margins (UK); 
smaller increase in milk production per cow which causes less unutilized 
production capacity (UK); 
more rather equally profitable alternatives within agriculture for milk 
production (UK, Denmark); 
more favourable fiscal aspects concerning the purchase of milk quota in 
the Netherlands than in any other EU country. 
The free market for milk quota is rather successful in the UK. Important 
reasons are the smaller margins in milk production and more rather equal al-
ternatives within agriculture than in the Netherlands. In the UK the price for 
one kg of milk quota is about one third of the price in the Netherlands which 
causes smaller capital needs for purchase of milk quota in the UK. 
Adjustments, taken by the dairy farmers under influence of the milk quota 
system 
Especially the big reductions of the milk quota in 1984, 1987 and 1988 
pressed the Dutch dairy farmers to reduce their milk production strongly. Near-
ly all dairy farmers carried out a strong selection under their dairy cows and 
sold the dairy cows with the lowest milk production. The number of dairy cows 
per farm and per hectare decreased. Other consequences were decreases in the 
purchase of concentrates (less cows, heifers and calves) per farm (not per cow 
because the cows with the highest productions remained on the farms). Instead 
of a shortage of roughage, many farms got a surplus of roughage. This caused 
lower levels in the use of nitrogen fertilizer to prevent from a surplus of rough-
age. Also the number of beef cattle and sheep increased. 
Markets for tradable property rights (e.g. milk quota) 
Table 7.6 shows the division of dairy farms in classes of milk quota per 
dairy farm at the beginning of the (quota)year (=basic quota). Also the distribu-
t ion of the total Dutch milk quota and the amounts sold, bought and leased 
are given as percentages. 
Fifty percent of the dairy farms with milk quota has less then 200,000 kg 
of milk quota. These farms own less than one quarter of the total amount in 
the Netherlands (10,874,000 tonnes in 1991). The smaller dairy farms sell more 
milk quota than they buy and they lease more to other dairy farms than they 
lease from. The dairy farms with the biggest milk quota are not much involved 
in leasing; also sale and purchase are rather in equilibrium on these farms. The 
4% biggest dairy farms own 12% of the Dutch milk quota. 
The dairy farms with milk quota between 200,000 and 600,000 kg are the 
most active traders in milk quota, especially in leasing from other, in majority 
small, dairy farms. Many small dairy farmers use to stop the milk production 
but still continue their farm with, in most cases, a form of extensive beef cattle 
145 
Table 7.6 Distribution of the number of dairy farms, basic quota, lease and trade in milk 
quotas as to size of the bask quota, period 1988-1991 
Basic quota 
per fa rm 
in 1,000 kg 
0-100 
100-200 
200-300 
300-400 
400-500 
500-600 
600-700 
700 and more 
dairy farms 
23 
27 
21 
14 
7 
4 
2 
2 
100 
basic quota 
6 
17 
22 
21 
14 
8 
5 
7 
100 
Percentage 
purchase 
11 
22 
22 
18 
11 
6 
3 
7 
100 
of to ta l 
sale 
3 
13 
27 
23 
14 
9 
4 
7 
100 
leased f rom 
35 
38 
13 
7 
2 
2 
1 
2 
100 
leased to 
5 
22 
28 
22 
11 
6 
3 
3 
100 
Source: Commodity Board for Dairy Produce. 
farming. Their income mainly consists of the lease payments or the interest on 
money, obtained from the sale of milk quota. 
Table 7.7 shows the basic quota and the change in 1,000 tonnes by sale/ 
purchase and leasing for the year 1991. The trends are the same as in table 7.6. 
Table 7.7 Basic quotas and change by sale/purchase and leasing in 1991 in 1,000 tonnes 
Basis quota in 1,000 kg per farm Total basic Change quotas 
0-100 
100-200 
200-300 
300-400 
400-500 
500-600 
600-700 
700 and more 
Total 
652 
1,849 
2,392 
2,284 
1,522 
870 
544 
761 
-54 
-43 
+30 
+30 
+18 
+13 
+ 5 
+ 1 
10,874 
Source: Commodity Board for Dairy Produce. 
Production cost of milk 
The production cost of milk have been almost on the same level during 
the period 1983-1993 (figure 7.1). The number of milk cows per hectare de-
creased by 25-30% during this period. This caused a decrease in the price of 
roughage and the amount of roughage the farmer had to buy. 
The price of concentrated feed also decreased, but less than the price of 
roughage. The fixed cost per kg milk increased a lot in the last years. 
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Table 7.8 Cost price per 100 kg milk of the average dairy farm a) 
Bookkeeping year 
Direct variable cost 
Labour and contractors 
Land, buildings and machinery 
Quota cost 
Other nonspecific cost 
Total cost 
Other output 
Cost price milk 
Milk price 
1983/84 
40.49 
30.03 
21.14 
0 
9.45 
101.1 
14.61 
86.49 
76.11 
1986/87 
33.23 
30.65 
24.10 
0.32 
8.73 
97.03 
12.60 
84.43 
76.50 
1989/90 
26.61 
32.53 
29.46 
2.78 
9.97 
101.34 
19.83 
81.50 
82.72 
1992/93 
25.03 
38.20 
30.31 
6.19 
10.28 
110.00 
17.10 
92.90 
79.26 
a) Dairy farms bigger than 157 standard size units. 
Source: Farm accountancy data network of LEI-DLO. 
NLG 
120 r 
100 -
80 -
60 
40 
20 
1983/84 1992/93 
Variable cost 
year 
EvsXH fixed cost Quota cost 
Figure 7.1 Cost price per 100 kg milk of the average dairy farm 
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Total fixed cost increased by ƒ 24.36 per 100 kg milk, of which ƒ 8.17 for 
labour and contractors - ƒ 9.17 for land, buildings and machinery - ƒ 0.83 for 
non specific cost and ƒ 6.19 for quota cost (table 7.8). So 25% of the increase 
of total fixed cost is caused by the quota cost. This amount contains the cost of 
depreciation as well as the cost of leasing quota. There is a danger that the 
fixed cost will increase in the future caused by the value of quota that will be 
transferred (whether between farmers or even within a family. The conclusion 
is that up to 1989/90 an increase of the fixed cost, of which quota cost became 
a important part was compensated by a decrease of direct cost. In 1995 fixed 
cost still increased and the direct cost remained constant. 
Effects of milk quota on individual farm holdings 
1. Fiscal aspects of purchase and sale 
In the Dutch fiscal system milk quota are seen as an asset. It is necessary 
for running a dairy farm. The purchased quota, so not the allocated 
quota by the Government in 1983, will have a value till the quota-system 
will be ended, so depreciation is possible. As a consequence, from a fiscal 
point of view the quota is rather seen in the same way as 'goodwill ' . 
The purchase price is the basis to determine the value of bought quota. 
Before 1-1-1994 it was possible to take a depreciation period of four or 
five years (in 1983 it was supposed that the milk quota system would end 
in 1992). From the beginning of 1994 farmers can depreciate the pur-
chased quota within 8 years, also on a linear basis (yearly 12,5%) with a 
rest-value of zero. When the new fiscal system is favourable for the far-
mer he can also choose the new system for investments in quota before 
1-1-1994. The Farm Accountancy Data Network of the Agricultural Eco-
nomics Research Institute (LEI-DLO) maintains a depreciation period of 15 
years for bought quota for purposes of income calculation. 
Besides this, paid superlevy is seen as cost for income tax; the levy system 
works prohibitive so that this cost deduction seldom occurs. For the prop-
erty-tax, milk quota are valued on the same basis as for the income tax. 
2. Transfer to next generation of farmers 
Tax regulation allows transfer of milk quota to the next generation with-
out any value for the milk quota (Venema et al., 1994). This is only possi-
ble in combination with complete transfer of the dairy farm and only in 
parents/children transactions. The consequence of this method is that all 
fiscal claims are put on the shoulders of the successor (e.g. to pay income 
tax over the hidden reserves, when quota is sold. In the absence of par-
ents/children transactions the seller has to pay tax over the difference 
between the value on the balance sheet (in most cases zero) and the sale 
value of the milk quota. On the other hand the buyers of milk quota can 
reduce their tax income by depreciation of the milk quota. 
A take-over in which the value of the milk quota is included results in a 
lot higher need for capital. On an average dairy farm, the market value 
of quota is almost 1 million NLG. For instance: the market value of the 
other assets on a dairy farm is about 1.5 million NLG. The take-over of 
quota will led to a growing appeal on non-family capital. Rising interest 
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and redemptions must be generated by the yearly cash flow. The margins 
for financing a take-over are getting smaller. Rising environmental costs, 
lesser growing capabilities and a decreasing role of the Government put 
extra pressure on the future cash flows. A take-over of a dairy farm by 
non-family members is nowadays almost impossible. 
The fiscal system has had an influence on the demand of quota. The de-
preciation has decreased the good incomes of many dairy farmers during 
the period 1989-1995. So lesser income-tax has been paid. 
Depreciation on quota (costs) has a negative effect on the savings. Be-
cause the annual cash f low of a farm consists of savings and deprecia-
tions, the effect of an investment in quota on the cashflow remains lim-
ited. The cash flow is the financial basis for paying interest and redemp-
tions over the borrowed capital. When an investment in quota is financed 
with loans, this will lead to lesser capacity for financing other invest-
ments. The share of investments in land and breeding livestock on the 
dairy farms has decreased since the end of the eighties. 
Effects on policy 
In view of low prices for beef cattle and sheep (which will decrease fur-
ther in future) dairy farmers now (1995) are looking for possibilities to sell heif-
ers of a high breeding quality. This is rather successful because of a high export 
demand. Possible future environmental rules and laws make farmers to look 
forward for a more extensive way of dairy farming. Thus, breeding remains fo-
cused on a high milk production per cow. The fixed or nearly fixed milk produc-
t ion per hectare, because of the milk quota system, combined with this increase 
in milk production per cow have been a good help to achieve levels resulting 
from the future environmental rules and laws. Possibly the number of rearing 
dairy cattle will then be minimized. A side effect of the quotation of milk has 
been a decrease of the stocking rate. Trade liberalisation tends to decrease 
milk prices so there remains pressure to decrease the cost price. 
When milk production is free, a reduction of the milk price for the dairy 
farmer of around 30% seems to be needed to reach equilibrium between de-
mand and supply of milk. Assumptions for this are: 
a price elasticity (short-term) in the demand of milk of -0,3; 
a price elasticity (short-term) in the supply of milk of 0,5; 
an unutilized milk production capacity of 25%. 
A 30% lower price of milk increases the demand with 9%. The supply of 
milk firstly increases with 25% but the lower price decreases this 25% to 10%, 
nearly equal to the 9% increase in demand. Such a decrease in the price of milk 
is absolutely unacceptable in the whole EU but also in regions favourable for 
milk production as Wales, England, Ireland, Bretagne, the Netherlands and 
Denmark. The 10% increase in production is also not favourable in the Nether-
lands when looking at environmental constraints. 
Manunza (1993) discusses three alternative policies: A basic scenario, 'free 
trade', and a proposal of a study group 'better dairy produce policy'. This pro-
posal includes: 
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no free trade of milk quota; 
redistribution of production; 
reduction of milk production to a level closer to EU consumption; 
continuation of current price support. 
The model outcomes show a higher income for the farmers in case of the 
last alternative and also especially in the first years a slower decrease of the 
number of farmers than in the free trade scenario. It must be added that ex-
penses of EU as a consequence of the proposal will be highest of the three 
alternatives. But expenses for unemployed farmers are not taken into account 
in the free trade scenario. The expenses for the basic scenario don't contain the 
extra needed expenses to carry out the new ways of income support. The con-
sumer pays in the scenario 'better dairy produce' the highest price. Environ-
mental effects, obvious most favourable in the scenario 'better dairy produce', 
because of a lower stocking rate, are not taken into account in the comparison 
of the EU budget consequences of the proposals. 
Problems of the milk quota transfer system as carried out in the Nether-
lands are the high capital need for the purchase of milk quota ('money leaves 
agriculture') and the increase of the cost price of milk caused by the milk quota 
transfers. This can weaken the competition position of the Dutch dairy farmers. 
Administrative redistribution (France, Denmark) causes less or even no costs for 
dairy farmers to obtain more milk quota while the quota increase is more than 
in the Netherlands. 
Theoretically a free market should cause allocation of transferable milk 
quota to the most efficient dairy farms so the choice for a free market system 
is understandable. In practice the solvability rate (because of the high capital 
need) and the fact that an important part of the costs only is calculated (not 
paid out) disturb this allocation assumption. Many dairy farmers are not acting 
rationally in economical terms which is one of the conditions for a real free 
market. 
Still the duration of the milk quota system is uncertain. At the moment 
(1995) it wil l be continued til l the year 2000. Claims because of a huge loss of 
value when the milk quota system would be ended, are not expected. For the 
main part of the milk quota nothing has been paid because the owners of to-
day got it by the allocation of 1984 or out of parents/children transactions, with 
no value as mentioned before. In future, a greater part will have been paid but 
the interesting fiscal depreciation possibilities are compensation for this. Thus, 
claims will be small or none. Moreover, the farmers themselves expect a limited 
period of the quota system, because the pay-out period of the quota invest-
ments is seven years, as has been stated earlier. 
Juridical characteristics of a milk quota 
Property rights such as a milk quota represent a bundle of rights that 
have different characteristics. Section 5.1 of this report describes the six charac-
teristics of property rights which Antony Scott has shown in a star. The follow-
ing part evaluates the milk quota in view of these characteristics. 
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Flexibility: The flexibility of the milk quota is high in the sense that the 
owner is free to deliver the milk quantity whenever he wants and the 
quota can be leased out or sold without major restrictions. 
Exclusivity: Farmers who have a right to deliver a certain amount of milk 
free of superlevy to the milk factory have a very exclusive right. Others 
are strongly excluded. 
Quality of the title: The high price of milk quota taken into account, it is 
clear that the quality of the tit le is high. This high price is related to the 
high price of the milk itself. 
Transferability: In practice there are more possibilities of quota transfer 
than formal. Especially the tenancy construction has disconnected the for-
mal relation between quota and agricultural land. 
Divisibility: The divisibility of milk quota is high. Also amounts of less than 
20,000 kg are involved in transactions. 
Duration: The duration of the milk quotation system is certain ti l l the 
year 2000 and uncertain after that year. So, the duration is certain till 
next relevant decision. 
7.4 Property rights in UK agriculture 
7.4.1 The UK implementation of the milk quota system 
In the UK milk provided the most sophisticated demonstration of supply 
management because product differentiation and market demand allowed the 
boards to behave like discriminating monopolies. The market was complicated 
by milk products such as butter and cheese coming from abroad, especially the 
Commonwealth, at low world prices. Supplies of liquid milk for direct human 
consumption were in effect kept down to the level where high prices were 
maintained. The system was of course much more complex in that there were 
Government guaranteed producer prices, seasonal prices set by the boards, 
milk distributors margins and control over retail prices for much of the period. 
Less valuable uses in making cheese, butter and milk powder in particular were 
employed to dispose of the rest of the milk. Such price differentials were much 
less noticeable in New Zealand and Ireland where manufacturing milk was the 
main disposal; that for human consumption could only retain a premium re-
flecting the added costs of meeting additional public health standards and of 
distribution. On sugar the United States went even further with quotas allo-
cated not just between domestic producers of beet and of cane but also be-
tween various foreign suppliers to its market. 
The work on milk quotas by Burrell and others in the publication edited 
by her, 'Milk Quotas in the EC' (1989), provides a useful review of the situation 
and its economic implications. As indicated earlier the milk industry in the UK 
was dominated by the various milk marketing boards over the past f i fty years. 
They were in effect the sole buyers of raw milk from farmers (producer retailers 
did exist but only had a very small share of production and markets) and sup-
plied the distributors who looked after retail sales of liquid milk in its various 
151 
forms. The boards also competed with other dairy processors in the production 
of cream, cheese, yoghurt, butter and milk powder. The moves towards quotas 
for producers and ending the monopoly powers of the boards, as EU policy 
evolved, caused considerable changes in the UK dairy industry. 
The paper by Kirke in the volume edited by Burrell looks at 'The Influence 
of Milk Supply Quotas on Dairy Farm Performance in Northern Ireland'. Of par-
ticular interest is the confirmation of expected results from earlier modelling 
work, in that incomes were maintained. Less production and higher milk prices, 
allied to reduced costs were responsible for both the modelled and actual out-
come. As might be expected the longer term trend towards fewer and bigger 
herds achieving higher yields was modified. Departures were delayed as it was 
clear that quotas would have a future value. Some small part of the adjustment 
came from those who had delayed departure finally leaving the industry and 
selling off their quotas; the purchasers thereby reduced their need to cut pro-
duction or defer expansion. In general, however, the management approach 
to cutting production in line with overall quotas took two lines. The first was 
to reduce feeding levels wi th beneficial effects on total costs and the second 
was to cull cows. Initially this led to a decline in yields and herd size. The subse-
quent developments saw the return to an upward trend in both, as quota 
moved with acreage either on a permanent or leased basis. The figures in table 
Table 7.9 Distribution of UK dairy cows and herds by herd size 
1973 1983 1993 
Dairy Cows in Herds of 
1- 10 cows 
10- 29 
30- 49 
50- 69 
70- 99 
100-199 
200 and over 
Total 
(Percent) 
Number of Herds having 
1- 10 cows 
10- 29 
30- 49 
50- 69 
70- 99 
100-199 
200 and over 
Total 
(Percent) 
Source: UK Agricultural Departments. 
152 
82,209 
585,761 
763,438 
652,430 
623,782 
536,472 
192,182 
3,436,274 
(100.00) 
19,127 
31,278 
19,899 
11,201 
7,674 
4,198 
672 
94,049 
(100.00) 
22,579 
226,422 
472,492 
555,662 
740,092 
974,589 
335,722 
3,327,558 
(96.84) 
6,778 
11,454 
12,146 
9,489 
8,962 
7,579 
1,189 
57,597 
(61.24) 
12,695 
142,015 
356,206 
417,439 
598,081 
881,206 
257,618 
2,665,260 
(77.56) 
3,230 
7,126 
9,084 
7.109 
7,231 
6,765 
937 
41,482 
(44.11) 
7.9 show the longer term developments in UK structure. As expected, the ra-
tionalisation in terms of reduced number of farms with larger herd sizes pro-
ceeded in much the same way in both decades. This contrasts wi th the sharp 
decline in the total number of cows only occurring during the second decade 
as quotas started to influence events. 
The UK approach of allocating individual quotas but managing the quota 
regime on a national basis through the board areas (or their equivalents) soft-
ened the impact of over-production on individual producers; those responsible 
for over quota supplies were spared the full impact of the levy as their sur-
pluses were partly or fully offset by under supply by others. Thus the costs and 
benefits of an approach of penalising individuals for their over-production (the 
alternative provided under the rules) were not realised. As quota limits became 
t ighter and dairy farm management improved in attempts to hit individual 
targets, the partial indemnifying of over quota producers by under production 
elsewhere effectively declined with the penalties now more directly affecting 
those responsible. 
7.4.2 Effects of property rights on UK agriculture 
The evolution from near overall matching of quota to recent over supply 
may only reflect the normal variations in milk production stemming from 
weather and other ephemeral conditions. Whether the future wil l bring fur-
ther overshoots is uncertain. Be that as it may, undiluted application of levies 
on those directly causing the surplus resulted in a strengthening of the market 
for quotas. Clearly the rights in question are more certain and durable than 
before, while the degree of rigidity in the transfer process declined as fewer 
obstacles were placed in the way of sales or leases. Those remaining reflect the 
need to secure supplies under special circumstances, as in the island communi-
ties off Scotland. Thus the current market is estimated to involve 1,200m litres 
leased at around 11 p per litre and over 300m litres sold at around 60p per litre. 
The expanded value and turnover in traded quotas have resulted in a reduction 
in the brokers' charges which now are around 4% for leasing and 2% for sales. 
These, however, amount to around f10m with the cost of leasing quota 
around £130m and the expenditure on purchases nearly f 200m. 
These figures should be compared with UK milk output of around 
14,000m litres worth over £3,000m. Apparently over 8% of total quota is leased 
and some 2% sold. The commission paid is an added cost which reduces either 
the profit or the return to other factors of production. Equally the market price 
of quota indicates a total value of some £8,000m for the industry. At the farm 
level this suggests an additional charge for newcomers, compared wi th pre-
quota days, of some £300,000 for acquiring a fifty cow herd producing 500,000 
litres. This represents a considerable barrier to entry. It may, however, be that 
market prices reflect marginal purchases where overheads are already met and 
additional quota justifies a high price. Furthermore, the value of land without 
quota will have fallen to some extent to reflect its more restricted use (other 
grazing livestock such as beef cattle or sheep yield lower returns and are sub-
ject forms of quotas as well), thereby offsetting the additional cost to some 
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extent. If, however, the value is correct for all farms, this would imply, given a 
target investment return of 10%, a need for £800m in added revenue or reduc-
tions in returns to other factors. 
The difference between the lease price and sale price appears to show a 
considerable amount of discounting of the value of the asset. The ratio of pri-
ces suggests a discount of around 20%. It may be even higher for many acquir-
ers if the value of 60p averages the value in two different markets - a higher 
level for those wishing to cover marginal increases in production or marginal 
overshoots and a lower level for normal entries or expansion. Leasing avoids 
the paying of levy and allows a margin between cost and return of perhaps 12p 
per litre towards variable costs such as feed. Purchases at 60p against a milk 
price of around 23p would imply looking for a return of 10% if the profit mar-
gin is 6p per litre. Even the latter looks high against normal returns to land 
which may be half that. The discrepancy will be even greater if the normal as 
opposed to the marginal market trades below 60p. This may indicate uncer-
tainty about the durability of quota rights. 
What is perhaps less surprising in the material edited by Burrell is evi-
dence on structural changes in dairying. There is a continuing migration of 
quotas away from farms with better ways of using their land to those whose 
qualities do not allow alternatives. The trend towards concentration in the 
west of Great Britain where soil and rainfall make cows and grass the obvious 
system is matched in Northern Ireland by a move from the less productive 
rougher grazings of the west to the better grassland of the east. The develop-
ments on the eastern side of the UK where crops are potentially profitable al-
ternatives or the set aside aspects are relevant, is equally unsurprising. The pa-
per by Smith explores 'Land Use Changes and the Effect on Other Enterprises' 
for England and Wales while that by Hollingham, 'The NIEMP Quota Effect 
Research Project' touches among other things on regional relocation of dairy-
ing. 
Burrell's own paper on The Microeconomics of Quota Transfer' looks at 
the developments possible under completely transferable quotas. She conclu-
des that the system can be made self sustaining using an arrangement to divert 
part of the individual quotas to be sold to cover the costs of running a quota 
programme. Such an arrangement in effect levies part of the quotas to gener-
ate the income needed to sustain the system. She also concludes that unre-
stricted transferability leads to overall efficiency. 
7.4.3 Conclusions 
It is perhaps worth emphasising the difference between fishing quota 
licences and agricultural quotas like milk. It will be clear that fishing rights such 
as licences or ITQs really relate to safeguarding the raw material of the fishing 
industry - in effect securing an essential input to combine with labour and capi-
tal in producing an output. The quota system is not really a supply restriction 
on production to avoid market collapse or the costs of surplus disposal al-
though there may be occasions on which fish output is withdrawn for market-
ing reasons. It is, therefore, essential to keep in mind the distinction of fish in 
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the sea being an input or raw material and fish in the market being the output 
or what the industry produces. It is the input that is covered by fishing quotas 
and the objective is to secure or conserve the essential resource exploited. Out-
put restriction on the pattern of farm quotas may be an objective subsequently 
if fish propagation and cultivation (or changes on the demand side) lead to 
over supply. It is not a current aim in fisheries policy. 
The lessons to be learned from quotas in the agricultural sector relate 
mainly to the mechanisms for transferring entitlements and the resulting ef-
fects on structure and other economic aspects. The only really close parallels to 
the situation in fisheries occur in common grazing and water rights. These re-
late to inputs and the resources there can also be damaged by open access 
leading to excessive exploitation and degradation. Furthermore, individual acti-
vity to improve the resource does not bring commensurate benefit to the indi-
vidual concerned but rather to all the exploiters. The solutions where the rights 
are common or vested in some larger organisation such as the state, frequently 
do not rely on the open market but on some socially legitimised distribution 
depending on value systems rather than market prices. 
What is clear about agricultural quotas is that they, like licences in fishing, 
acquire a value wherever they occur. This may be expressed positively with 
people in the US paying a substantial premium for land with a tobacco alloca-
tion or negatively as in the UK wi th people having to pay penalty charges for 
excess plantings of potatoes or sugar beet. They thus lead to higher cost struc-
tures due to the added factor or input needing its return: where the ensuing 
market price does not meet the higher costs resulting, this involves taking part 
of the return earned previously by other factors. 
7.5 Property rights in Agriculture and Fisheries: some similarities and 
differences 
7.5.1 General remarks 
In the agricultural and fisheries sector of the EU the production capacity 
is too big, in agriculture with respect to the consumers' demand and in fisheries 
wi th respect to the available fish stocks. Since 1984 national (levy free) milk 
quotas and national fish quotas have been agreed by the Council of Ministers 
and implemented by the Commission of the EU to solve these problems of 
overcapacity. In the fol lowing part similarities and differences between milk-
and fish quotas 1) wil l be described from the viewpoint of fisheries manage-
ment, the industry and the individual firms. This could lead too a sharper view 
on the characteristics of fish quotas and there could be lessons for the fishery 
sector from the situation in agriculture. 
1) Milk quotas are not the only kind of property right in agriculture, but they are 
most important ones and best comparable with fish quotas. 
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7.5.2 Similarities between milk quotas and fish quotas 
Viewpoint of management 
1. There is one common European policy wi th respect to agriculture (CAP) 
and one for the fishery sector (CFP) but the national regulations resulting 
f rom these common policies differ, both in agriculture and in fisheries. 
The Dutch and UK dairy farmers e.g. own milk quotas which are transfer-
able as a contrast to the non-transferable quota of the Danish farmers, 
allocated by a central agency. In fact these quotas follow the farm. In the 
fishery sector some countries have introduced individual transferable fish 
quotas (the Netherlands and the UK to some extent) and others (Den-
mark) not. 
2. The quotas have been more or less allocated on the basis of historical per-
formance, on national and on f irm level (as far as they are applied), both 
in agriculture and in fisheries. Annual differences in national and individ-
ual quotas are in line with the total allowable milk production and total 
allowable catches per fish species. 
3. In the agricultural and fisheries sector cessation- or decommissioning 
schemes have been implemented by the EU and by the national Govern-
ments to diminish the tension between quotas and capacity. This has 
resulted in larger quotas for those firms which remained in the industry, 
either by reallocating quotas (e.g. the central Danish agency for milk 
production) or buying of quotas (e.g. Dutch individual flatfish quotas). 
4. In the Netherlands and the UK regulations for transferability and lease 
of quotas have been implemented in the dairy sector and in (parts) of the 
fishing industry. Thus, enterprises are more flexible in adjusting their 
quota to the available capacity. In some cases (in the UK) this transferabil-
ity is limited to protect communities for social reasons; this has resulted 
in restrictions being placed on transfer of milk quotas away from such 
regions (e.g. from certain Scottish islands) and in the fishing industry 
some POs retain track records for its group fishing quota rather than indi-
vidual vessels. 
The industry 
5. Quotation has contributed to structural changes in the agricultural and 
fishing industry. The number of enterprises has diminished and an impor-
tant production increase of individual firms has taken place, especially in 
the Danish dairy sector. It has to be emphasized that more factors have 
influenced this concentration tendency, i.e. the above mentioned cessa-
tion/decommissioning schemes and also technical improvements which 
always tend to increase the scale of production in agriculture and in fish-
eries as well. Quotation may have stimulated the implementation of tech-
nological improvements because this enables cost minimizing. The aver-
age production increase per farm has been remarkable big in the Danish 
dairy sector were the average milk quota per farm more than doubled in 
the period 1984/85-1994/95. In the Dutch dairy sector the quota increase 
per farm amounted to 40% on average (1984-1992) and in the Dutch 
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beam trawl sector the average flatfish quota increased by 34% in the 
period 1984-1994 (apart from the general quota changes). This compari-
son may be interesting because individual transferable quota systems (in 
the two latter cases) have resulted in lower increases of production per 
f i rm than in the case of reallocating the individual quotas for free (the 
Danish milk quotation system). 
6. Prices of individual milk- and fish quotas increased importantly in the 
Dutch and UK dairy- and fishing industry since the implementation of 
transferability. The majority of transfers consisted of additional buying 
to adjust the quota to the available capacity. Prices could be high because 
only the marginal costs had to be matched against the extra revenue. 
Individual firms 
7. An increase in production costs has occurred for enterprises which had to 
acquire quotas such as in the Dutch and UK dairy and fishery sector. The 
initial allocation of quotas has resulted in substantial profits for firms 
which have received these quotas for free, but in future transfer of rights 
will permanently lead to higher costs in cases individual milk- or fish quo-
tas are applied. On the other hand the value of other input factors (land 
and vessels without quotas) depressed when a new, scarce production 
factor like a quota has been introduced. The higher costs connected with 
quotas consist of interest costs and also costs of depreciation in cases that 
abrogation of the quota system is to be expected. It is interesting in this 
respect that the Danish system of milk quotation, by reallocating the quo-
tas for free via a central agency, did not result in higher production costs 
for individual farmers. However, these Danish milk quotas are not allo-
cated for free now so that also the Danish farmers are confronted with 
an increase of milk production costs due to costs of acquiring quotas. 
8. Protection by quotation favours the profitability of individual dairy farms 
and fishing enterprises. The milk price is higher compared with a situa-
tion of no production limitations and in the fishing industry fish quotas 
should result in higher fish stocks in the long run. Both, in the dairy and 
fishing sector quotation creates a rent for individual enterprises. Cost in-
creases mentioned in point 7 make clear that owners of farms and fishing 
enterprises have to pay for this rent. 
9. Quotation causes problems in that transferring the enterprise to the next 
generation may be very difficult in the dairy and fishing sector. Invest-
ments will be too high when young farmers and fishermen have to pay 
the full market price of the milk- and fish quotas. A low market price in 
these cases may lead to taxation of grants. For the Dutch agricultural 
sector solutions have been made in this respect by introducing special fis-
cal allowances for quota transactions within the family and thanks to 
efforts of fiscal specialists and representatives of fishermen these allow-
ances now also apply for the Dutch fishing sector. As a result of this, the 
vessel owner is able to sell his enterprise to his son whereby the valuable 
fishing rights are transferred against the balance value (which can be 
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zero). In Denmark the central agency for milk quotation has met this 
problem by creating reserves of milk quotas on behalf of young farmers. 
7.5.3 Differences between milk quotas and fish quotas 
There are important differences between the milk- and fish quotation 
which mean that regulations and solutions of problems for the milk sector may 
not be applicable for the fishing sector. 
Viewpoint of management 
1. Milk quotation meant to have a limited duration: initially five years, but 
in 1993 the system was extended for another seven years to 2000. There 
are no such limits in duration for fish quotas and, though the Common 
Fisheries Policy may be revised in 2002, it is to be expected that the 
'closed shop' situation will remain. This may lead to different develop-
ments in rents and values of milk- and fish quotas on firm level and to the 
need to depreciate on milk quotas. However, in view of the investments 
in individual milk quotas, abrogation of the milk quota system is ques-
tionable because this will probably meet heavy resistance of farmers and 
their representatives. 
2. The nature of milk quotation (i.e. to prevent over-supply on the market) 
differs from the reasons for fish quotation which means that alternative 
strategies and policies have different effects. For instance, added effort 
leads to surplus supplies in farming but reduced supplies in fishing in the 
longer run. Lower prices in farming would lead to a more efficient indus-
try whereas such an approach would not have the same effect in fishing. 
3. Milk production is a well controllable production process, whilst manage-
ment of fish stocks meets far more uncertainties. This may explain why 
the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy with respect to the milk 
production are met rather well in the past ten years (e.g. milk production 
in Denmark and the Netherlands decreased by nearly 10% in this period) 
and why the results of the Common Fisheries Policy are not so clear. An-
other effect of this difference in controllability is that the milk production 
shows only minor annual changes (1.5% at maximum) in total and on 
firm level, whilst annual changes in fish quotas amounted to up to 85%. 
4. Costs of control and enforcement will be less for milk quotation because 
the marketing process lead to bottlenecks which allow easier and less 
costly monitoring of compliance. The peculiar properties of fishing, wi th 
small scale operations and ease of landing abroad make for unusual diffi-
culties in enforcement. 
The industry 
5. Milk quotation has another shape (superlevy and quantity of levy-free 
milk) than fish quotation and this may have consequences for the behav-
iour of individual producers. In particular, dairy farmers have the security 
that they can produce their annual quantity of levy-free milk whereas 
fishermen do not have a similar security in cases of individual quotation. 
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They meet the risk that their colleagues over-fish their individual quantity 
so that the fishery has to be closed, whilst some fishermen have a part of 
their individual quota left. This means that the competition amongst 
fishermen remains to some extent and it needs additional management 
measures to remove the race for fish. 
6. There seems to be less effort and also fewer possibilities to acquire pro-
duction rights for individual enterprises abroad in farming than in fish-
ing. However, the principle of relative stability between countries will 
remain a major guideline for the CAP and for the CFP as well. 
Individual firms 
7. Points 3 and 5 also have different consequences for management on firm 
level. Dairy farmers will not have much difficulties in keeping their actual 
milk production on their quota level, whilst fishermen may have big diffi-
culties in matching the catches with their quota, due to the unpredictabil-
ity of catches. The insecurity with respect to the right to land the quota 
quantity, mentioned in point 5, may hamper a rational business manage-
ment for fishing enterprises. Fishermen may feel that they are compelled 
to participate in a race for fish, whereas dairy farmers have more oppor-
tunities to minimise cost, given the quota level. 
7.5.4 Conclusions 
Considering lessons to be drawn from the farming industry, the exclusiv-
ity, divisibility, transferability and flexibility attainable in farming quotas could 
be an example for the fishery sector, especially in Denmark and the UK. Fur-
thermore, an organisation like the Danish central agency for milk quotation 
seems to be an option which is worth considering (also in Denmark and the 
UK), because of low quota costs for individual producers and the possibility to 
create chances for new entrants. The Dutch fish ITQ-system seems to have a 
more or less definite shape now which means that a kind of central agency to 
reallocate quotas is not suitable. However, the problems for new entrants are 
not solved in the Dutch fishing industry, except for a limited group of family 
members of the vessel/quota owner. 
The special fiscal allowances for the Dutch agricultural sector, to facilitate 
transfer of the enterprise to the next generation, could be an example for the 
fishery sector in other countries were similar problems may occur. 
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8. STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
8.1 Structural implications of property rights in the Danish fishing 
industry 
8.1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the effects of property rights, i.e. the regulation, on the 
structure of the Danish fishing fleet are described and analyzed. The main fo-
cus is put on the changes in fleet segments of different size groups with respect 
to regions and type of gear. 
As shown in chapters 5 and 6 the Danish fisheries are in principle open 
access fisheries, where the resource removals are regulated by quotas, and/or 
rations for a given time period (fishery related measures), while the access to 
the sector as a whole is regulated by vessels license and authorization of com-
mercial fishermen (fishing sector related measures). The fishery related mea-
sures regulate indirectly the access to the resource. This kind of regulation with 
allocation of the resource (for Denmark the available resources for the most 
important species are determined as a fix share of the TACs for EU) amongst 
different fleet segments is more or less political determined. The regulation 
directly allocates the resource to the fishermen (or group of fishermen). 
A condition for the necessity to allocate directly the resource is overcapac-
ity of the fleet. Direct allocation of resource amongst different fleet segments 
also requires that these segments can be distinguished. 
Acceptance of the allocation mechanism of the fishermen is also impor-
tant, because the process creates winners and losers. The losers might even be 
bankruptcy and squeezed out. An open process can here be central, because 
it can ensure compliance. It is also central that the outcome is perceived as eq-
uitable and fair. A central element in the Danish regulation has been open 
access to the different fisheries. Hereby everyone can participate in the differ-
ent fisheries. By the use of rations available for a limited period the allowable 
catch is directly allocated to the participating fishermen. This allocation system 
seems to be perceived by the Danish fishermen as a fair system. 
Another element in the allocative process is the objective of the regula-
t ion. In the Danish case the objective is to ensure a better exploitation of the 
resources compared to the outcome of a free fishery. A better exploitation is 
defined in relation to 
the conservation of the resources; 
efficient, including seasonal good, exploitation; 
the relation between the resource and the capacity; 
economic and employment consideration in general and in different re-
gions. 
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These objectives or considerations include both efficiency and social fac-
tors as well as resource conservation in the allocative process. In any actual allo-
cation the final outcome is based on a mixture or compromise of these objec-
tives. 
In the Danish fisheries there have since the late 1980s been a substantial 
overcapacity. The Danish regulation of the fisheries and the capacity has cre-
ated winners and losers. In this chapter we will investigate for the period 1985-
1992 which fleet segments that have the largest reduction in capacity. In Chap-
ter 10 we will compare the results wi th the outcome of a regime based on 
more well defined ITQs for the main species in the North Sea and Skagerrak. 
8.1.2 Structural changes in the fishing industry 
In this section the development in the structure of the fleet is investigated 
for the period 1986-1992. In the next section some explanation for the develop-
ment will be given, stressing the importance of the regulation. 
The overall development in the total fleet is given in figure 8.1. While the 
number of fleets have been decreasing in the period by 687 (21%), the total 
GRT and total kW have declined by 29859 (22%) and 112601 (20%) respec-
tively. 
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Figure 8.1 Development in the Danish fleet, 1986-1992 
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Because of lack of better indicators the number of vessels and the GRT-
measure are used in the following as proxy for capacity. The reduction in GRT 
for each relevant fleet segment is calculated and compared with the mean 
reduction in total GRT. Hereby fleet segments wi th relatively larger reduction 
in GRT than on average are identified. Having identified these fleet segments 
we will look at the regulation, the catches and stocks, and the decommission-
ing scheme with the purpose to f ind some of the factors that can explain the 
development in the fleet segments. 
As trawlers, Danish seiners and gill-netters are the main gear-types, the 
description is concentrated on these. In 1992 the number 1) and total GRT for 
these three gear-types were about 1,025 and 75,000 GRT for trawlers, 210 and 
8,000 GRT for Danish seine and 1,250 and 17,000 GRT for gill-netters. While the 
total GRT of gill-netters have declined by 10%, the total GRT of trawlers and 
Danish seiners have decreased by 26% and 28% respectively, more than the 
fleet average in the period (22%). 
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Figure 8.2 Development in total GRT of different trawler fleet segments 
Within the trawlers the largest reduction in total GRT has been within the 
middle size-groups, i.e. 20-100 GRT, but also the groups <20 GRT and 100-150 
GRT have declined more than the average for trawlers and the whole fleet, see 
figure 8.2. The group 150-250 GRT has declined about the average for both the 
trawlers and the whole fleet. For the group >250 GRT the total GRT has been 
almost unchanged in the period. 
1) Over 5 GRT. 
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Danish seiners and gill-netters 
The main size-group in the Danish seine fleet is 20-50 GRT and the devel-
opment for this group follows the overall trend for the Danish seine fleet, i.e. 
a decrease in total GRT at 28%. The total GRT for the group < 20 GRT has de-
clined by 40%, see figure 8.3. 
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Figure 8.3 Development in total GRT of different Danish seine and gill-net fleet segments 
For the gill-netters the reduction in total GRT in the main group <20 GRT 
has been 5% (i.e. less than on average for gill-netters, 10%), while for the 
groups 20-50 and 50-100 GRT the reduction have been about 15%, which is 
more than on average for the gill-netters, but less than on average for the 
whole fleet (22%), see figure 8.3. 
The conclusion is that the relatively largest reductions in the fleet, i.e. 
over the fleet average, have been within the trawlers less than 150 GRT and 
the Danish seiners less than 50 GRT. 
Regional development 
The distribution of the fleet in different regions is shown in figure 8.4. 
West and North Jutland are the regions, which in terms of total GRT count 
most, about 75% of the total fleet GRT belongs to these regions. Bornholm is 
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the region wi th the smallest fleet in terms of GRT, but as this region is more 
dependant on fishery than the other regions, the fishery is more important 
from a regional economic point of view. 
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Figure 8.4 Total GRT by regions 
Bornholm and North Jutland have experienced the largest reduction in 
total GRT 33% and 25% respectively, while total GRT in West Jutland and in 
'the rest of Denmark' have declined by 17% and 2 1 % respectively. The region 
'the rest of Denmark' consists of fleets from ports located out to the inner Dan-
ish waters. 
For Bomholm trawlers and gill-netters are the main gear-types and it has 
been within the trawlers the fall in the fleet has taken place. The group 100-
150 GRT has almost disappeared from the fleet, 17 vessels in 1986 and 1 left in 
1992. The two other large vessel-groups, <20 GRT and 20-60 GRT, for the fleet 
of Bornholm have declined by 26% and 36% measured in total GRT, respec-
tively, see table 8.1. The group 20-60 GRT consists mainly of trawlers, while the 
group < 20 GRT consists of both gill-netters and trawlers. Since the fall in num-
ber of Gill-netters have only been 14%, the fall in the fleet is due to the fall 
within the trawlers. 
The fleet of North Jutland consists of mainly trawlers, purse seiners, gill-
netters and to a small extent of Danish seiners. The number of purse seiners are 
small 11, but the total GRT of the purse seiner fleet make up over 20% of the 
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total GRT of the fleet of North Jutland. The purse seiner fleet has remained 
constant in the period. The decline has first of all been within the vessel-groups 
less than 150 GRT, particularly within the groups 20-60 GRT and 100-150 GRT 
the fall have in total GRT been large, over 40%. These vessel-groups consist 
mainly of trawlers. 
For West Jutland the fleet consists of trawlers, Danish seiners and gill-
netters. The decline in the fleet has taken place within the trawlers and Danish 
seiners. The largest fall in total GRT have been within the groups 20-60 GRT 
and 60-100 GRT, 44% and 27%, respectively, which is over the average for both 
the region and the whole country. The groups 100-150 GRT and >150 GRT have 
declined about 12%, while the group 5-20 GRT in fact has increased by 9% in 
total GRT in the period. Both trawlers and Danish seiners are located in the 
group 20-60 GRT, while the large decline within the group 60-100 GRT is only 
due to decline in number of trawlers. The number of gill-netters, which mainly 
are small vessels, increased in the period by 9%, corresponding to the increase 
in total GRT for the small vessel-group 5-20 GRT. 
The fleet in the region 'the rest of Denmark' consists of gill-netters and 
trawlers with over 75% of total GRT located in the group of small vessels 5-20 
GRT. There are no vessels over 150 GRT. The fall in this fleet has take place first 
of all within the trawlers (31%), but also the group of gill-netters has de-
creased(16%). 
Table 8.1 Total GRT by fleet size and regions (1 January 1987 and 1993) 
GRT 
5-20 
20-60 
60-100 
100-150 
>150 
Total 
West Jutland 
1987 
3,351 
14,534 
5,144 
6,163 
31,122 
60,314 
1993 
3,633 
10,580 
2,856 
5,386 
27,501 
49,956 
D 
(%) 
8 
-27 
-44 
-13 
-12 
-17 
North Jutland 
1987 
7,101 
7,886 
3,815 
9,734 
16,849 
45,385 
1993 
5,746 
4,435 
2,803 
5,774 
15,184 
33,942 
D 
(%) 
-19 
-44 
-27 
-41 
-10 
25 
Bornholm 
1987 
3,284 
2,568 
339 
2,267 
4,920 
13,438 
1993 
2,095 
1,391 
306 
132 
5,112 
9,036 
D 
(%) 
-36 
-46 
-23 
-94 
4 
-33 
Rest of Denmark 
1987 1993 
13,653 10,916 
2,194 
780 
1,259 
0 
1,791 
572 
945 
0 
17,886 14,224 
D 
(%) 
-20 
-18 
-27 
-25 
-
-20 
8.1.3 Explanations for the structural changes 
In this section the principal elements explaining the changes in the fleet 
structure described in the last section are found. The analysis is concentrated 
on the vessels-groups which have experienced the largest decline, i.e. trawlers 
less than 150 GRT and Danish seiners less than 50 GRT. 
The crucial problem is to determine the different fisheries the vessels par-
ticipate in and to add these fisheries together to sensible fishery patterns. The 
fishery patterns form the basis of the balance sheet of the vessels and the calcu-
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lation of the profit. There are no information of the fishery patterns, but there 
are information of different typical fisheries the vessels-groups can and nor-
mally do participate in. Based on this information the overall economic devel-
opment in each fishery is described in the period. Hereafter the overall change 
in the fleet structure should be explainable. 
Table 8.2 Main fisheries for selected fleet segments 
GRT size group 
Fisheries 
Cod Baltic Sea 
Mixed he a) North Sea 
Lobster Kattegat/Skagerrak 
Sandell North Sea 
Prawn Skagerrak 
Prawn North Sea 
Sprat Kattegat/Skagerrak 
Sprat North Sea 
Plaice North Sea 
<20 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
+ 
20-40 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Trawl 
40-60 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
+ 
60-100 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
100-150 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Danish 
seine 
(+) 
+ 
a) he is an abbreviation for human consumption. 
Typical fisheries for trawlers between 100-150 GRT have in the period 
been: Sprat in the North Sea, Sandell in the North Sea, Shrimp and lobster in 
the North Sea and Skagerrak, Cod in the Baltic and mixed human consumption 
in the North Sea and Skagerrak. 
For trawlers between 60-100 GRT the main fisheries in period have been: 
Sprat in Skagerrak and Kattegat, Sandell in the North Sea, Shrimp and lobster 
in the North Sea and Skagerrak, Cod in the Baltic and mixed human consump-
tion in the North Sea and Skagerrak. 
Typical fisheries for trawlers between 40-60 GRT have in period been: 
Sprat in Skagerrak and Kattegat, Sandell in the North Sea, Shrimp in Skagerrak, 
lobster in Skagerrak and Kattegat, Cod in the Baltic and mixed human con-
sumption in the North Sea and Skagerrak. 
Typical fisheries for trawlers between 20-40 GRT have in period been: 
Sprat in Skagerrak and Kattegat, Sandell in the North Sea, Shrimp in Skagerrak, 
lobster in Skagerrak and Kattegat, Cod in the Baltic and mixed human con-
sumption in the North Sea and Skagerrak. 
Typical fisheries for trawlers less than 20 GRT have in period been: Sprat 
in Skagerrak and Kattegat, Shrimp in Skagerrak, lobster in Skagerrak and Kat-
tegat, Cod in the Baltic and mixed human consumption in the North Sea and 
Skagerrak. 
The Danish seiners participate in the mixed human consumption fishery 
in the North Sea and the Skagerrak, where the target species is plaice and im-
portant by-catch species are cod, haddock, saithe. 
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Cod fishery in the Baltic 
In the 1980s vessels from all the trawler-groups less than 150 GRT partici-
pated in the cod fishery in the Baltic. The Danish catches were in 1983-1986 
about 100,000 to 120,000 tonnes per year, and since late in the 1970s the 
catches have been over 75,000 per year on average. But since 1983 the catches 
have declined every year and in 1993 the catches reach the bottom so far, 
about 10,000 tonnes. The decline in catches was in 1989 to 1991 to a certain 
extend offset by increasing prices, however, from 1986 to 1989 the price was 
stable. Since 1991 the price has been declining. The total revenue in this fishery 
has declined in the period by 40-50%. 
Cod fishery in the North Sea 
Also the Danish catches of cod in the North Sea have been declining, from 
a level about 45-50,000 tonnes in 1983-1985 to a level about 35,000 in 1986-
1988 and since then the catches have declining every year. From 1991 the 
catches have been about 35-40% of the catch level in 1983, i.e. less than 20,000 
tonnes pr. year. The total revenue in this fishery has declined 20-30% in the 
period. 
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Figure 8.5 Catch and price/cost index for the cod fishery 1) 
1) The price/cost index is formed by dividing a price index of the relevant species 
by an index of the cost. 
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Sandelt in the North Sea 
The Danish catches have fluctuated within 600,000 and 900,000 tonnes 
since 1985, wi th catches about 600,000 tonnes in 1987, 1990 and 1993. The 
prices fluctuate, wi th a tendency to a minor fall in the trend. In the years wi th 
low catches the price has been low too, indicating that the price of meal and 
oil is a world market price and that low prices make the fishery unprofitable for 
a part of the fleet. Since 1990 the price has been about 70% of the level in 
1983. The revenue in this fishery is in the years wi th both low prices and 
catches, e.g. 1987, 1990 and 1993, lesser than the level in 1983, and in the years 
wi th high catches larger than the level in 1983. 
No regulation is carried out for this fishery, however, in the Norwegian 
zone a TAC is set. 
Prawn in the North Sea 
Apart from a windfall high catch level in 1987 the Danish catches have 
been falling in the period from a level about 4,500 tons before 1987 to 2,000 
tonnes since 1990, wi th the lowest catch in 1991 (750 tons). The prices have 
been stable until 1993, fluctuate within 20% of the 1993-price and since 1986 
over the 1983-price. In 1993 the prices declined about 30%. In the Norwegian 
zone a TAC is set and regulation by ration per time period is carried out if nec-
essary. Overall revenue in this fishery is 40-50% of the revenue in 1983. 
Prawn in Skagerrak 
The catches have since 1985 been between 2,200 and 4,500 tonnes with 
high catches (3,500-4,500) in 1985-87 and 1991-92. In 1988-90 and 1993 the 
catches have been about 2,500 tonnes. The revenue has in the period fluctu-
ated together wi th the catches given the relatively stable prices, expect for 
1993, where the prices fall 30%. Since 1985-87 the revenue has been 60%-90% 
of the level in 1985-87. 
If the Danish quota is exploited by more than 70% before a certain date, 
then ration pr. tr ip is imposed. 
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Figure 8.6 Catches and price/cost index in the prawn fishery 
Lobster in Skagerrak and Kattegat 
The catches have been stable until 1991 on a level about 3,000 tonnes, 
but in 1992 and 1993 the catches fall to a level about 2,000 tonnes. 
The prices increased relatively fast between 1983 and 1987 from about 
42 DKK/kg to about 65 DKK/kg (60%). Until 1992 the price was between 60 and 
70 DKK/kg, but in 1993 the price fell by 30%. 
Because of relatively high prices the earnings from this species/fishery 
have been over the level in 1983. In the period 1987-1991 over 30% higher 
earnings, but in 1992 and 1993 the earnings have been lower than in 1983. 
There are no quota regulation carried out for this species, but the fishery 
is limited by the regulation of the by-catches of cod and sole. 
Sprat in Skagerrak and Kattegat 
Catches 1986-1989 between 50,000 and 60,000 tonnes, while catches 
1990-1993 between 35,000 and 30,000 tonnes. 
The level of the earnings from this fishery in 1990-1993 were only about 
half the earnings 1986-1989. 
169 
In this fishery there are vessel-restrictions, only vessels less than a given 
length are allowed to participate. The fishery is regulated by rations, specifying 
maximum catch pr. week. In order to increase the length of the season monthly 
or quarterly Danish quotas are specified. The fishery close, if the quota is 
upfished before the end of the month. 
Sprat in the North Sea 
The catches from this species have been very fluctuating. From the very 
high catch levels in 1983-84 (over 100,000 tonnes) the catch fall to 42,000 in 
1985 and grew in the following period to 80,000 in 1988. In 1989 and 1990 the 
catches were between 40,000 and 45,000 tonnes. In 1992 the catches were the 
lowest in the period about 30,000 tonnes, but then in 1993 the catches in-
creased to about 77,000 tonnes. 
These fluctuation seems to indicate that this fishery has been some kind 
of 'fishery of last resort'. If the other fisheries turns out to been bad, then the 
sprat fishery in the North Sea is always a possibility. The reason for the very 
dramatic fall in catches from 1983 to 1985 is the sprat-box along the west coast 
of Jutland. 
The vessels participating are given a ration pr. trip. The maximum catch 
depends on the length of the vessel. Also here is the Danish quota divide into 
time periods, here 3 periods. 
The prices for sprat are the industrial prices, e.g. the same as for sandeel. 
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Figure 8.7 Catch and price/cost index in the sprat fishery 
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Plaice in the North Sea 
This fishery which has important bycatches of especially cod, haddock and 
saithe is mainly conducted by Danish seiners, small trawlers and gill-netters. 
From 1983 to 1990 the annual Danish catches of plaice were fluctuating be-
tween 20,000 and 30,000 tonnes, but since 1990 the annual catches have de-
clined every year and the catch in 1993 -15,500 tonnes - was the lowest in the 
considered period. 
The prices have been relatively stable. The fluctuations have been be-
tween 20% of the level in 1983, expect for a peak in 1991, with very high prices 
(an increase of almost 50% in 1 year). In 1993 the prices increased, where the 
prices of cod declined. Before 1993 the overall revenue in this fishery was over 
the 1983-level, but in 1993 the total revenue was about 90% of the 1983-level. 
There have not been any effective quota regulation of the plaice. A TAC 
is determined every year, but no Danish regulation has been necessary to se-
cure landings less than the Danish quota. 
Conclusions 
For trawlers less than 40 GRT the decline in the mixed fishery after species 
for human consumption in the North Sea and Skagerrak (mainly cod) and in 
the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea had had the most important influence on the 
earnings in this fleet segment, since cod and other species for human consump-
tion account for a share in revenue about 68% in 1987 and 66% in 1992, see 
table 8.3. The total revenue for the whole fleet segment declined in this period 
by 21 %. The only important substitutions between species has been towards 
a higher share of industrial species, from a share about 5% in 1987 to about 
15% in 1992 and a lower share of lobster and prawn (from 26% to 19%). 
The total revenue for trawlers between 40 and 100 GRT fell from 1987 to 
1992 by 21.4%. The share of cod fell substantial (from 4 1 % to 23%) and the 
share of human consumption species fell from 70% to 52%, while the share of 
industrial species increased from 9% to 3 1 % . The share of lobster and prawn 
Table 8.3 Revenue shares of species for selected fleet segments, 1987 and 1992 (percent) 
Cod 
Other cod fish 
Plaice 
Other f lat fish 
Lobster/prawn 
Industrial 
Herring 
Other he a) spec. 
Trawlers 
<40 GRT 
1987 
35.4 
2.8 
9.2 
10.2 
26.6 
5.1 
2.7 
8.0 
1992 
34.3 
3.9 
6.5 
12.6 
19.2 
14.6 
4.2 
4.6 
Trawlers 40-
100 GRT 
1987 
40.9 
10.3 
7.8 
4.7 
21.3 
9.0 
0.9 
5.2 
1992 
22.7 
8.5 
5.5 
7.2 
17.5 
31.0 
1.9 
8.3 
Trawlers 
>100GRT 
1987 
26.1 
6.3 
0.7 
1.2 
14.7 
38.9 
5.9 
6.3 
1992 
5.3 
5.0 
4.0 
2.2 
8.5 
53.4 
13.1 
8.5 
Danish 
1987 
40.4 
4.9 
44.1 
8.4 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
2.0 
seiners 
1992 
5.3 
7.4 
45.6 
12.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4.3 
a) he is an abbreviation for human consumption. 
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is unchanged. This fleet segment has also substituted towards industrial species, 
but at the expenses of cod and other species for human consumption. 
The share of cod fell from 26% to 5% for trawlers larger than 100 GRT, 
but disprite this the total revenue increased in the period by 18%. This is mainly 
due to higher shares of industrial species (from 39% to 53%) and of herring 
(from 6% to 13%). To a minor extent the share of f lat fish species has in-
creased, from 2% to 6%. This group of vessels are, however, heterogeneous. 
The vessels less than 150 GRT are more depending on the cod fishery than 
larger vessels. The largest fall in this fleet segment had exactly taken place 
within vessels between 100 and 150 GRT. 
For Danish seiners the effect of decreasing cod fishery (from a share of 
40% in 1987 to 30% in 1992) has been subsitution towards other species, i.e. 
the share of other cod fish and flat fish has increased. However, since the total 
revenue has fallen by 24% the increased share of other species than cod had 
not been enough to compensate for the decreasing cod fishery. 
8.1.4 The regulation 
Two main points can be extracted from table 8.4. The first point regards 
the development of the regulation in the main Danish fishery, the cod fishery. 
From almost no regulation in the first part of the 1980'ties, the regulation has 
since 1986 gradually evolved to be more detailed and tightened as the stocks 
and consequently the TAC deteriorated. The second point is that the regulation 
through different rations to separate length-groups implicit determines the 
distribution of the fishing possibilities or fishing rights. 
Examples of other fisheries regulated by rations depending on vessel 
length are the sole and herring fishery, while the haddock and saithe fisheries 
are regulated by general rations. 
The rations in the cod fishery in both the North Sea and the Baltic have 
vrom 1987 to 1991 been more than halved and from 1991 to 1993 the rations 
were halved again. 
The regulation by rations in both the cod fishery in the Baltic and the 
North Sea also indicates that as the regulation gets tightened over the years 
the rations have been changed from more general and identical rations for 
several length-groups to different rations for separate length-groups. The ex-
ception is the cod fishery in the Baltic, where in 1993 the rations were very low 
and only two different rations were set. It is easy to see that these rations dis-
criminate in favour of the shortest length-group. 
Vessels from the length-group < 12m consist mainly of vessels less than 
11 GRT. The main part of these vessels belongs to the group of gill-netters, only 
a very small part is trawlers. The main part of the gill-netters has a length be-
tween 6m and 9m. It is not possible on the existing economic data to assess 
quantitative whether the rations in general have discriminated in favour of the 
shortest length-group. But the development in the fleet structure indicates that 
the regulation in fact to a certain extent has favour the shortest length-group. 
Studies have shown that the catch capacity of vessels with length between 12m 
and 16m and vessels with length between 16m and 22m are four and five times 
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the catchcapacity of vessels with length between 6m and 9m. Only the rations 
in 1993 for the cod fishery in the North Sea seems to reflect this relationship. 
The other rations have on the contrary favour the shortest length-group. 
Cod Baltic Sea 
Cod North Sea 
Sprat Skagerak/ 
Kattegat 
Sprat North Sea 
1987 
Rations per 2 weeks 
depending on vessel 
length. 
12-22m: 28 tonnes 
22-26m: 32 tonnes 
>26m: 34 tonnes 
From May rations per 
week independent of 
vessel length. 
(5 tonnes) 
Monthly rations: 
20 tonnes 
August: 15 tonnes 
Stop from November 
Max 30 tonnes per 
trip 
1991 
Rations per month 
depending on vessel 
length. 
<12m: 20 tonnes 
12-16m: 28 tonnes 
16-22m: 34 tonnes 
>22m: 40 tonnes 
Monthly rations 
depending on 
vessel length 
<12m: 7 tonnes 
12-16: 10 tonnes 
16-22: 11.5 tonnes 
>22m: 13 tonnes 
Rations reduced 
over year 
Max 75 tonnes 
per trip 
Rations per trip 
depending on 
vessel length 
1993 
Weekly rations depen-
ding on vessel length 
<12m: 2>h tonnes 
>12m: 3V4 tonnes 
Quarterly rations depen-
ding on vessel length 
<9m: 41/2 tonnes 
9-12m: 9 tonnes 
12-16m: 17 tonnes 
16-22m: 19 tonnes 
>22m: 21 Vi tonnes 
Rations reduced overthe 
year and fishery closed 
from November 
Max 50 tonnes per trip 
License depending on 
fishery in 1991/1992 
Rations per trip 
depending on 
vessel length 
Figure 8.8 Examples of regulation of selected fisheries 
8.1.5 The decommissioning scheme 1) 
In the period 1987-1992 the reduction in the fleet by the decommission-
ing scheme was about 30,000 GRT which closely corresponds to the change in 
the fleet. 
The decommissioning scheme was managed, so it was possible for a large 
number of vessels to qualify for subsidies. The target vessels have in general 
been older vessels fishing for protected species, but also trawlers fishing for 
1) This section is based on Frost et.al. (1995) 'An Appraisal of the Effects of the 
Decommissioning Scheme in the Case of Denmark and the Netherlands'. 
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reduction purpose were given a high priority in 1988 (and 1993). In 1991, for 
example, the vessels in the cod fishery in the Baltic were given a very high pri-
ority. Two vessel categories have, in particular, been subject to decommission-
ing, the Danish seiners and the trawlers. The decommissioning grant was asso-
ciated wi th the size of the vessel in GRT and not the debt. Only vessels wi th a 
low debt relative to the size of the vessels were therefore able to benefit from 
the system. Mainly older vessels will fulf i l this and the reduction has mainly 
been within the oldest part of the fleet. This is the reason for the large reduc-
t ion in the Danish seiners, which typically did not perform particular bad in 
economic terms, but were old. Many of the trawlers did on the contrary beside 
being old perform economic bad with high debt rates and were in many cases 
forced to use the system of the creditors implying a loss for the owner and 
some of the creditors. 
8.1.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter the effects of the fishery policy on the structure of the 
fleet have been described and analyzed. The changes in the fleet have in the 
considered period been dramatic, with a reduction in the total GRT of the fleet 
of over 20%. This reduction have mainly been explained by two factors. First 
of all the outcome from a large part of the traditional main fisheries deterio-
rated during the period. Secondly the decommissioning scheme was imple-
mented in the period and the scheme had contributed to the substantial reduc-
t ion. 
The regulation becomes in response to the aggravated resource situation 
more tight, e.g. rations, but the overall principle with open access to the differ-
ent fisheries was maintained. Therefore the reduction is mainly within groups 
who were either favoured of the decommissioning scheme or had a bad eco-
nomic situation and could not survived in the game of 'race for the fish'. 
The reduction in the Danish seiners is not due to a poor economic devel-
opment in the main fishery, e.g. plaice, of this fleet. Instead this fleet which 
consists on average of old vessels wi th a relatively small debt was reduced by 
the decommissioning scheme. 
The middle size trawlers, e.g. the group 60-100 GRT and 100-150 GRT 
were reduced because of a poor economic development in their main fisheries. 
The reduction was not equal distributed through the country. In Bornholm and 
North Jutland the group 100-150 GRT declined more than in the other regions, 
because the vessels in this group were very dependent on the cod fishery in the 
Baltic. In West Jutland the group 60-100 GRT were reduced more than in the 
other regions, because the economic outcome from mainly the sandell and the 
mixed human consumption fishery in the North Sea declined. The group 20-60 
GRT has in all regions expect 'rest of Denmark' been cut back over the overall 
average. The reason is the poor economic outcome from the cod fishery in the 
Baltic and the North Sea. 
It is an open question whether the Danish regulation has lead to the re-
quired or wanted structure. The regulation carried out for the human con-
sumption fishery seems to have favoured the smallest vessel size on the ex-
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penses of the larger vessels. The purpose of the decommissioning scheme seems 
to have been to take out older vessels fishing for protected species. However, 
the decommissioning scheme has in the recent years give more attention to 
reduction in the younger part of the fleet. In chapter 10 a situation with more 
well defined rights is analyzed and compared to findings of this chapter. 
8.2 Structural implications of property rights in the Dutch fishing 
industry 
8.2.1 Introduction 
Section 8.2.2 describes changes in the structure of the Dutch cutter fishery 
wi th respect to the fol lowing structure components: 
The scope of the industry represented by the number of enterprises and 
vessels. 
The fleet structure. 
The level of employment. 
The fisheries the vessels are involved in. 
The external organisation of the enterprises. 
The internal structure of the enterprises. 
The causes of these changes in the structure of the sector are explained 
in section 8.2.3, whereas 8.2.4 describes the role that property rights have 
played in the whole of these explaining factors. 
Section 8.2.5 focuses on a major structural change i.e. flatfish ITQs and 
considers if there has been a concentration tendency with respect to the ITQ 
ownership. 
8.2.2 Changes in the structure of the Dutch cutter fishery 
To describe the changes in the structure of the Dutch cutter fishery the 
development of the industry will be considered for the period 1983-1995, thus 
from the start of the CFP. 
Scope of the industry 
The number of enterprises decreased substantially (by 26%) in this period 
(table 8.4), mainly as a result of decommissioning. 
A small, but increasing part of the cutter enterprises (16% in 1995) owns 
more than on vessel (mostly two). These 'multi-vessel' enterprises generally ex-
ploit bigger vessels so that their part in the capacity of the fleet, expressed in 
terms of HP, is far more important (some 50% in 1995). A substantial part of 
these bigger enterprises has also decreased the number of vessels in order to 
get higher flatfish ITQs per vessel. This is indicated by their constant part (50%) 
in the total HP of the fleet in the period 1988-1995, whereas their share in the 
number of enterprises increased from 13.5% to 16%. 
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The average number of vessels per enterprise remained rather constant 
(1.2) in the period 1983-1995. 
The scope of the industry declined importantly in terms of number of 
vessels: from 594 in 1983 to 457 at the end of 1995. 
Table 8.4 Number of enterprises in the Dutch cutter fisheries, situation by December 31st 
1983 1988 1993 1995 
Total number of enterprises 511 500 396 377 
Of which owning more vessels a) 57 67 64 59 
Number of vessels 594 603 474 457 
a) Mostly two. 
Source: 'Fisheries in Figures', LEI-DLO; Registry of fishing vessels. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Management and Fisheries. 
Fleet structure 
Table 8.5 shows that the composition of the cutter fleet as to size group 
changed dramatically in the period 1983-1995: the number of medium size ves-
sels (301-1,500 HP) decreased from 295 to only 43, whereas the number of big-
ger vessels (> 1,500 HP) more than doubled in this period (from 81 to 171). 
The size category up to 300 HP increased in number, which means a major 
extent in the total number of vessels (from 37% in 183 to 53% in 1995). 
As a result of the developments, the fleet structure in 1995 is character-
ised by a domination of two size groups: 300 HP and above 1,500 HP, which 
together account for 52% of the total number of vessels. In fact, there is a con-
centration tendency into two HP levels i.e. 300 and 2,000 HP, both resulting 
Trom HP maximums: 300 for the coastal zone and 2000 for beam trawlers. 
Table 8.5 Number of vessels in the cutter fisheries by HP-group, situation 31 December 
HP-group 1983 1988 1993 1995 
- 260 
261- 300 
301-1100 
1101-1500 
1501-2000 
>2000 
594 603 474 457 
Source: 'Fisheries in Figures', LEI-DLO. 
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The fleet reduction occurred in the same way in the two main regions, 
'North' (fishing ports north of Scheveningen, like Urk, Den Helder and Texel) 
and 'South' (Goedereede/Stellendam and Vlissingen as main ports). Hence, the 
distribution North-South remained about 76%-24% during the period 1983-
1995. 
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Figure 8.9 Development of total HP and of HP per size-group of the Dutch cutter fisheries in 
the period 1983-1995 
The fleet reduction is hardly reflected in the total HP of the cutter fleet 
(figure 8.9), resulting in a fleet capacity in 1995 somewhat below (2%) the level 
in 1983, when the CFP started. In view of the decreased number of vessels this 
means an increase of the average HP per vessel from 840 in 1983 up to 1,070 
HP in 1995. 
Compared with the highest HP level of 598,000 HP at the end of 1988, 
this total was 18% lower at the end of 1995. 
Figure 8.9 also shows the dramatic changes in the HP composition of the 
cutter fleet in the period 1983-1995. The part of the mid-size vessels (301-
1,500 HP) decreased from 58% to 9%, whereas this share of the bigger ones 
(>1,500 HP) increased from 32 to 78%. 
Employment 
A number of 2,100 fishermen was employed on the cutters by the end of 
1995. This is a 23% lower level compared with 1983. This employment had the 
about the same development as the number of vessels, which means that the 
average crew stabilized at 4.6 members (figure 8.10). 
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Figure 8.10 Number of crew members and vessels in the Dutch cutter fishery 
Different fisheries 
The kind of fishery of the vessels i.e. the gears used, are another aspect 
of the industry's structure. In this respect, the beam trawl sub-sector became 
far more important since 1983. This can be expressed by the increase in share 
(from 77% to 89%) of the total fishing effort of the cutter fleet, measured by 
'HP-days' (totalling 90.6 million in 1995). On the other hand, the share of the 
otter trawl and pair fishery decreased from 19% to 3.5% in this period, mainly 
as a result of decommissioning. 
External organisation 
The formation of 'Management Groups', closely connected to the POs, in 
1993 means an important change in the external organisation of the enter-
prises. In 1995 eight of these groups carried out a kind of co-management of 
the flatfish and cod/whiting quotas by monitoring the landings, and acting as 
an intermediate fortrade and lease of ITQs. Each of these groups is responsible 
for fishing within the totals of the individual quotas of their members 1). 
Structure of enterprises 
The internal structure of most enterprises has changed, in particular since 
1988: 
1. Apart from the vessel, the fishing rights are now an important (intangi-
ble) asset. When the rights e.g. flatfish ITQs have been bought the value 
1) The OECD Issue paper 'Experiences in Dutch co-management of marine resour-
ces', 1996 forthcoming, contains detailed information about these groups. 
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of them appears on the balance sheet, with in most cases a corresponding 
rise of the amounts of debts. The rights that have been allocated for free 
represent an important hidden financial reserve for most enterprises in 
the cutter sector. Should these rights, i.e. the flatfish ITQs, be valued 
against the market price the value would equal the price of a newbuild 
vessel. This means an ITQ value of some NLG 7.5-8 million on average for 
a cutter equipped with an engine exceeding 1,500 HP. 
2. The policy of the vessel owners has changed more or less in that they are 
more managers of quotas than hunters for fish. This may lead to decisions 
to stop fishing for a certain week and save the individual quota for peri-
ods with better fish price expectations 1). 
3. A number of vessel owners decided to take over a foreign company with 
all the fishing rights, to 'reflag' one or more vessels, resulting in an en-
largement of the economic opportunities. Hence, the ownership of for-
eign daughter companies has changed the internal structure of some 
Dutch cutter enterprises. 
4. High prices of fishing rights (ITQs) have become a barrier for new en-
trants. Sons of vessel owners, who used to start a firm for their own, re-
main more frequently in their father's firm so that the number of (poten-
tial) owners in an enterprise tends to increase. 
8.2.3 Causes of changes in the structure of the cutter sector 
The structural changes in the cutter sector are caused by a chain of several 
factors which are described below, more or less fol lowing this chain. It has to 
be kept in mind that there are no simple cause-effect relationships. Causes may 
be effects from other points of view. 
Common Fisheries Policy 
The establishment of the CFP in 1983 is the first and main influencing 
factor, through the implementation of TACs in the framework of the conserva-
t ion policy and the through the introduction of MAGPs resulting from the 
structural policy. The CFP has led to several national measures which have 
caused major changes in the structure of the cutter fishery. 
TAC limitations 
The national quota levels for sole (before 1990), plaice, cod and whiting 
caused a big disproportion between the capacity of many cutters and their 
fishing rights. A study of LEI-DLO in 1988 2) pointed out that 70,000-100,000 
1) This appeared clearly during a number of interviews with vessel owners in the 
period November 1995-October 1996. More information has been included in 
'Strategic responses of Dutch fishermen to limiting measures and property 
rights', Sevilla 1996. 
2) Pavel Salz et al. 'Prospects for the Dutch flatfish and roundf ish sector in the short 
and long run', LEI-DLO report nr 5.79, August 1988. 
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HP of the operating fleet would come into liquidity problems in the next 2-4 
years, due to this disproportion. 
The parts of the EU TACs allocated to the Netherlands forced the Govern-
ment to implement a number of measures, such as distribution of them 
through ITQs, decommissioning and heavy enforcement. 
HP-licence system 
To fulfill the obligations resulting from the first MAGP the Dutch ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature management and Fisheries implemented in 1984 a 
licence scheme which led to a HP ceiling for the cutter fleet, as has been de-
scribed in chapter 5. The total HP of the active fleet could increase until 1988, 
due to orders for newbuildings which were in the pipeline when the licence 
scheme came into force in 1984. The stabilisation of this total HP in the period 
1991-1995 (figure 8.9) demonstrates the effectiveness of the licence scheme, 
since it prevented an expansion after the profitable years 1991/1992. 
Decommissioning scheme 
The first scheme started in 1988 and this was fol lowed by subsequent 
programs so that decommissioning grants could be obtained nearly throughout 
the whole period 1988-1995. 
Quota limitations for cod and whiting have forced most of the owners of 
otter- and pair trawlers to apply for decommissioning. This has been the main 
cause of the decline of the cutter fleet after 1988, more in particular of the dra-
matic decrease of the number of mid-size vessels. Totally 124,000 HP of 133 
vessels 1) was withdrawn from the fleet in the period 1988-1994. The majority 
of the decommissioned vessels (100) belonged to the medium size group (301-
1,500 HP). 
Heavy enforcement 
The major intensification of enforcement in 1988, which meant systematic 
control of landings, carried out by some hundred inspectors, made the overca-
pacity of the fleet visible and sensible. This contributed importantly to the ef-
fectiveness of the decommissioning schemes. 
Limitations for the coastal zone 
A maximum number of vessels is entitled to fish within the 12-mile limit. 
This is a EU measure (Regulation nr. 55/87) whereby the concerning vessels are 
registered in two separate files. These entitlements have been the main cause 
of the relative increase of the vessels up to 300 HP, mentioned in section 8.2.2. 
1) Hans Frost et al. 'An Appraisal of the Effects of the Decommissioning Scheme in 
the Case of Denmark and the Netherlands', draft final report to the Commission 
of the EU, April 1995. 
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High prices of property rights 
Heavy enforcement led to a sharp rise of prices of flatfish ITQs in 1988. 
The rather good profitability of the cutters in 1991 and 1992 kept these prices 
on a high level and even resulted in new price increases. The decommissioning 
process contributed importantly to the trade in ITQs in the period 1988-1995, 
as has been pointed out in chapter 6. This enabled those who remained in the 
industry to adjust the rights to the available capacity of the vessel by buying 
additional ITQs. This process of price increases and trade in ITQs has been re-
sponsible for, or has contributed to: 
the changes in the structure of the enterprises mentioned in section 8.2.2; 
withdrawals from the fleet, apart from decommissioning. Table 8.6 shows 
the importance of this contribution to the fleet reduction; 
concentration of rights amongst the owners of the bigger beam trawlers, 
which has contributed to the dominating part of these vessels in the total 
HP of the fleet. 
the absence of a high level of newbuildings in the nineties after profit-
able years. Investments in ITQs exceeded those in vessels in some years. 
This will also have consequences for the near future since the investments 
in ITQs have absorbed more or less the depreciation funds and this wil l 
hamper future newbuildings. 
Fiscal investment allowances 
A special Law for investment stimulation (for all industries) was intro-
duced in 1978. This allowed a deduction of a certain percentage (12 at mini-
mum) of the investment amount from the fiscal income. In fact, it meant a di-
minishing of the income or corporate Tax amount and this has stimulated new-
buildings of fishing vessels in the period 1979-1988. This has contributed to the 
increase of total HP and to the larger part of this total of the >1,500 HPbeam-
ers, shown in figure 8.9. 
Economic performances 
A good profitability level in the years 1985-1987 and 1991/1992 induced 
newbuildings of vessels, in combination (in the first period) wi th the invest-
ment allowances mentioned before. The existence of a second hand market for 
vessels abroad enabled the investors in new vessels to get rid of their 'old' one 
at a rather high price and to transfer the HP licence from the vessel sold to the 
new one. In case of expansion additional HP could be bought from those who 
withdraw their vessel from the Dutch fleet, apart from decommissioning. How-
ever, this mechanism stopped nearly completely in the early nineties, mainly 
due to the tightening of the licence schemes in the UK. This caused a major fall 
in the demand for second hand vessels. 
Table 8.6 summarises the different factors that have caused an important 
decline in the number of cutters. 
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Table 8.6 Causes of the reduction of the cutter fleet in the period 1988-1994 
Number of vessels 
Cutter fleet by December 31 st 1987 611 
Period 1988-1994: 
Newbuildings 92 
Second-hand bought abroad 15 
Decommissioned 133 
Withdrawn from the Dutch fleet a) 121 
Cutter fleet by December 31 st 1994 464 
a) Mainly sold to other EU countries or 'reflagged', whereas the decommissioned vessels have 
been sold to Third countries, if they were not scrapped. 
Source: 'Fisheries in Figures', LEI-DLO. 
Policy of decentralisation 
The management and enforcement of the national quotas became a very 
heavy burden for the ministry of Agriculture, Nature management and Fisher-
ies and also for the judicature in the early nineties. Moreover, the relationship 
with the industry was disturbed at that time. In this situation plans for co-man-
agement of the quotas by the industry were made and this resulted in the es-
tablishment of the eight Management Groups in the beginning of 1993 men-
tioned in 8.2.2 under 'external organisation'. 
8.2.4 Effects of property rights on the structure of the cutter fishery 
It is difficult to assess the separate effect of property rights 1) on the 
structure of the cutter sector. There are a lot of explaining factors (section 
8.2.3) and the establishment of property rights are a part of them. In fact limi-
tations and property rights are two sides of the same coin: Measures may cre-
ate limitations on the one hand but rights on the other hand, depending on 
the viewpoint one takes. The rights' aspect may be more on the foreground for 
the vessel-owner in that he has a right to a benefit stream. In this respect, the 
property rights have added a complete new element to the structure of the 
Dutch cutter fishery i.e. the distribution of flat- and roundfish ITQs. The prop-
erty rights have become a quite new, separate production factor for vessel-
owners. 
Focusing on the rights' aspect of the limiting measures the following role 
of the property rights in the whole of explaining factors (summarised in section 
8.2.3) comes into sight: 
The fleet reduction by decommissioning and by withdrawals due to other 
reasons has been stimulated by the existence of valuable rights, i.e. ITQs. 
Vessel-owners could sell these rights and leave the fishery under more or 
1) Defined as (briefly stated) a right to a benefit stream, see chapter 5 for the ful l 
def ini t ion. 
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less favourable conditions, mainly depending on the amounts of their 
debts and tax payments; 
The HP rights have prevented a fleet expansion in the nineties. Individual 
vessel owners could expand their fishing capacity but only if they ac-
quired additional rights from another owner, who had to resign or to 
reduce his capacity. 
Renewal of the remaining fleet is hampered due to high investments in 
(flatfish) ITQs, which may have absorbed the depreciation for newbuil-
dings; 
Entitlements for the coastal zone and high-priced ITQs have been explic-
itly mentioned in section 8.2.3 as separate explaining factors with respect 
to expansion of the capacity in the coastal zone and to changes in the 
internal structure of enterprises. 
8.2.5 Concentration of ITQ ownership 
Property rights i.e. ITQs have become a new aspect of the structure of the 
cutter fishery as has been stated in 8.2.4. Much attention has been paid to con-
centration of ITQ ownership in the fisheries economics literature. The OECD 
report on individual quotas 1) contains some statements on concentration of 
rights: 
Per Mickwitz et al., describe proposals for ITQs in the Finnish salmon fish-
ery and they state that 'The possibility that the quotas would be in the 
hands of only a few is an issue that has been discussed a great deal'; 
Roger Falloon states about the situation in New Zealand that 'There has 
been some concentration of quota ownership'; 
G. Geen et. al. remark about the southern bluefin tuna fishery: '...a rela-
tively small number of South Australian corporate operators gained the 
vast majority of the quota'; 
Stephen Cunningham summarises the different country contributions and 
concludes: 'However, taking a political economy perspective, IQS may 
lead to problems since the incentive would probably towards monopoli-
zation of fishing rights'; 
Gfsli Palsson and Agnar Helgason conclude, after an analysis of the Icelan-
dic ITQ distribution 2) that 'fishing rights have been increasingly concen-
trated in the hands of the biggest companies'. 
Thus, the concentration issue is important enough to devote a separate 
section on possible concentration of ITQ ownership amongst a limited number 
of bigger enterprises in the Dutch cutter sector. Therefore, the distribution of 
1) 'The use of individual quotas in fisheries management', OECD Documents, Paris 
1993. 
2) 'Property rights and practical knowledge: The Icelandic quota system', in: 
'Fisheries Management in crisis', edited by Kevin Crean and David Symes, Fishing 
News Books, 1996. 
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individual sole and plaice quota as to the size of the ITQ is considered. This size 
is expressed as a percentage of the total national sole and plaice quotas. Table 
8.7 shows this distribution for the sole ITQs. The level ranges from the 'mini' 
ITQs, representing 0.005% of the total sole quota (an annual landing of 1.18 
tonnes of sole on the basis of the 1994 quota) to 1.5-2.5% (354-590 tonnes) for 
the biggest ITQs. 
Table 8.7 Distribution of ITQ holders as to size of the ITQ, expressed as percentage share in 
total allocated Dutch sole quotas in 1988, 1994 and 1997 
Share of ITQ in total sole quota Percentage of ITQ holders 
0.005 ('mini' ITQ) 
0.005-0.5 
0.5 -1.0 
1.0 -1.5 
1.5 -2.5 
>2.5 
1988 
(n=387) 
20.2 
65.4 
9.8 
3.9 
0.8 
0.0 
1994 
(n=289) 
17.3 
57.7 
17.0 
4.5 
3.5 
0.0 
1997 
(n=276) 
14.9 
59.7 
17.8 
3.6 
3.6 
0.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries; LEI-DLO. 
Table 8.7 shows that some concentration of sole ITQs occurred in the pe-
riod 1988-1994. Holders of bigger sole ITQs, owning 1 % or more of the na-
tional sole quota, had a higher share in the total number of ITQ holders in 1994 
(8%) compared with 1988 (4.7%). On the other hand, the percentage of hold-
ers owning smaller ITQs (up to 0.5%) decreased since 1988. The ownership dis-
tribution with respect to the plaice ITQs shows the same development, though 
holders of the biggest plaice ITQs (1.5-2.5%) were somewhat less in number 
compared wi th the sole ITQs. 
Table 8.7 also contains the ITQ distribution as to size for the 1997 alloca-
tions. This shows that the concentration tendency did not continue clearly in 
the period 1994-1997. The number of holders of the smallest ITQs decreased 
on the one hand, but on the other hand, also the number of bigger (category 
>1 %) ITQ holders decreased somewhat. The underlying factor seems to be less 
trade in ITQs, since the number of holders remained rather constant in the 
periode 1994-1997. 
The total number of flatfish ITQ holders decreased importantly (by 25%) 
in the period 1988-1994, due to the selling of sole/plaice ITQs in combination 
with decommissioning, stopping the enterprise for other reasons, or only stop-
ping wi th beam trawling. 
The share in the total Dutch sole/plaice quotas of the holders of the 20% 
biggest ITQs is another measure for the level of concentration. In 1994 this 
group owned nearly 60% of total Dutch sole quota and 56% of the plaice 
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quota. This share of the holders of the biggest ITQs was somewhat lower in 
1997: 58% and 56% respectively. Nearly all of these ITQ holders are companies 
owning more than one vessel. Table 8.8 gives the shares of these companies in 
fleet number, engine capacity and flatfish rights. The ITQ concentration proves 
from their increased share in the total Dutch sole/plaice quotas, mostly for sole: 
from 43% in 1988 to 62% in 1993. These figures show also that the concentra-
t ion tendency did not continue clearly in the period 1994-1997. 
Table 8.8 Share of enterprises owning more than one vessel, in fleet and fishing rights (per-
centages) 
1988 1993 1997 
Share of enterprises owning more than one vessel, in: 
Total number of vessels 
Total engine power of the cutter fleet 
Total Dutch sole quota 
Total Dutch plaice quota 
24 
48 
43 
38 
25 
50 
62 
44 
28 
49 
53 
51 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries; LEI-DLO. 
Perc. total sole quota 100 r v/y 
80 
40 
20 
1988 1994 
year 
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Urk Den Helder/ EXXXiH Goeree + V//A Other ports 
Texel adj. ports 
Figure 8.11 Regional distribution of sole ITQs 
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It can also be questioned if there is a concentration tendency with respect 
to the regional distribution of ITQs. Figure 8.11 shows the development in this 
respect in the period 1988-1997. The share of the main port, Urk, decreased 
from 36.6-32%, whereas Den Helder/Texel increased their share in the national 
sole quota (from 19.9-24.5%). This is probably explained by the relatively high 
number of 'multi-vessel' enterprises in these latter ports. There was not a major 
concentration of flatfish ITQs 1) towards a limited number of regions in the 
period 1988-1997, since the other nineteen ports kept their share rather con-
stant. 
ITQ ownership in other countries 
ITQs became concentrated in fewer hands in Iceland, concluded Pàlsson 
et al., (1996). They found that the 'giants', owning more than 1 %of the total 
quota, increased their share in the total quota to 47.2% in 1994. These holders 
of big ITQs have a share of only 3% in the total number of ITQ holders. 
Table 8.9 shows that this concentration level is much higher than in the 
Dutch situation. 
Table 8.9 Concentration of ITQ ownership in the Netherlands and Iceland (1994) (percentage) 
The Netherlands Iceland 
(sole quota) (cod équivalants) 
Share of 3% biggest ITQ holders 
in total quota 17.4 47.2 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries; LEI-DLO; Pàlsson et al., 
(1996). 
It has to be noted that the ownership structure differs in both countries. 
Processing companies are most important amongst the 'giants' of the owners 
in Iceland, where in the Dutch cutter fishery ownership is limited to the har-
vesting sector. 
Also in New Zeeland ITQs are more concentrated than in the Dutch situa-
t ion. Falloon (1993) mentions a part of 50% of the total quotas for the three 
largest consortiums in 1992. 
8.2.6 Concluding remarks 
Finally, it can be concluded that the trade in flatfish ITQs in the period 
1988-1997 did not lead to a major concentration of ITQ ownership amongst a 
small number of big companies. Some concentration of ITQs occurred, how-
1) Plaice ITQs are closely connected to the sole ITQs and they show the same 
development wi th respect to the (regional) distribution. 
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ever, and the following circumstances are relevant for a better understanding 
of this process: 
Decommissioning has induced the trade in ITQs, as has been mentioned 
before and such a process always tends towards concentration of vessels 
amongst bigger enterprises; 
The major intensification of enforcement in 1988 forced the remaining 
enterprises to adjust the fishing rights to the available capacity of the 
vessel. This process is reflected in table 8.5 which points out that for the 
'multi-vessel' enterprises, the share of the flatfish ITQs was below their 
share in the HP capacity in 1988, whereas these shares came more to-
gether in 1997. So, this means rather an adjustment process than an ex-
pansion of these enterprises by buying additional ITQs; 
A concentration process should not be ascertained to the existence of 
ITQs alone. Already before the flatfish ITQs became effective some con-
centration took place in the cutter fishery: the 'multi-vessel' enterprises 
increased their share in the total HP of the fleet from 30% in 1983 to 
nearly 50% in 1988, apart from trade in ITQs; 
A further concentration of ITQs amongst the bigger enterprises wil l be 
hampered through the high prices of ITQs. The amount of debts of the 
'multi-vessel' enterprises increased on average from NLG 4.25 million up 
to NLG 4.4 million in the period 1988-1994 (Fisheries in Figures, 1994) and 
the liquidity situation did not allow (on average) for an increase of finan-
cial obligations resulting from new investments. It has to be kept in mind 
that these bigger enterprises in the cutter fishery are real family enter-
prises which limits the financial possibilities to aggregate property rights; 
The level of concentration of property rights is somewhat higher when 
foreign fishing rights are taken into account. An unknown number of 
(mainly bigger) enterprises has acquired fishing rights in the UK, Belgium 
and Germany, as has been stated before. Thehigh price of rights in the 
years 1996/1997 in the Netherlands makes it assumable that this phenom-
enon of quota hopping will continue in future, whereby the high transac-
t ion costs may cause important barriers. 
ITQs were in the Netherlands less concentrated amongst bigger enter-
prises compared with the situation in Iceland and New Zealand. 
8.3 Structural implications of property rights in the UK fishing indus-
try 
8.3.1 Introduction 
The processes of concentration and specialisation are common to most 
industries. Fishing in the UK is no exception. Most improvements in technology 
and markets tend to increase output per person; they thus reduce the need for 
as many people and as many firms as in the past. There may also be aspects 
peculiar to fisheries which strengthen the trend; these include the stagnant or 
declining resource base, the comparative attractions of other proteins and the 
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deterrent effects of a very arduous working environment. More general factors 
such as the effects of education and the availability of well paid employment 
elsewhere also influence developments. 
Some of the manifestations of structural change have been covered in 
chapter 6; the significant features are increasing power and reducing numbers 
in the main inshore fleet. This followed a period when two substantial changes 
occurred; the existing and increasingly obsolete distant water fleet was effec-
tively de-commissioned wi th a decline in tonnage and power, both in total and 
on average. In contrast subsequent profitability and access to capital saw an 
increase in numbers and power of the inshore fleet (usually regarded as vessels 
of 40 feet and over, roughly 12,2m, though the current dividing line for many 
purposes is 10m) until licensing became more restrictive. Table 8.10 provides 
the information with the dividing line at 40 feet as the statistics were not then 
presented in metric terms. 
Table 8.10 Number and Tonnage of Active Fishing Vessels in the UK 
Number 
total under 40ft 40ft and over 
Tonnage 
40ft and over 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1988 
7,067 
6,895 
6,797 
7,584 
8,166 
8,132 
4,732 
4,512 
4,485 
5,433 
6,305 
6,128 
2,335 
2,383 
2,312 
2,151 
1,861 
2,004 
206,057 
179,557 
159,714 
130,380 
116,556 
145,377 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics MAFF. 
The contradictory increase in the number of smaller vessels during this 
period and subsequently reflects the lack of restrictions over entry to this sector 
until very recently. The capital needed for such vessels was not much of a bar-
rier and this enabled fishermen to get started in the industry. This aspect of en-
try is also reflected in the nature of much of the employment concerned being 
part-time or casual. Open access to the fisheries and the system of regulating 
the quotas may have encouraged the race to fish and to invest in vessels. Even 
here the growth in power has been a feature but wi th licensing and limits on 
replacement now in place, declining numbers seem inevitable in the future. 
Indeed they are apparent in the 1995 figures, where the increase in numbers 
and tonnage between 1990 and 1993 has been succeeded by a marked decline. 
Table 8.11 resents the relevant data. 
The 90s saw an increase in the average power of small vessels; it amoun-
ted to over 20% in the first five years of the decade. This increase for individual 
vessels was accompanied by an increase in the sector's share of the total power 
of the UK fleet from around 23% to roughly 26%. The 1995 figures are slightly 
down from the peak levels for share and absolute total in 1993. 
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Table 8.11 Fishing Vessels 10 metres and under in the UK 
1991 1992 1993 
Number of vessels 7,121 7,376 7,666 
Tonnage 23,326 24,622 25,363 
1994 
7,195 
23,956 
1995 
6,320 
21,411 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics MAFF. 
8.3.2 Structural changes in the UK fishing industry 
Two aspects seem especially interesting in the structural developments in 
the UK. The first is the regional re-distribution of activity. This f lowed partly 
from the loss of grounds in distant waters and partly from growth in the sec-
tors initially left free to expand. This showed in the change in the value and 
volume of landings in the different parts of the UK. England and Wales moved 
from its historic dominance (with two thirds to three quarters of the total value 
in the 50s and 60s) to second place as the post 1977 conditions favoured the 
Scottish industry. The extension to 200 miles resulted in expanded grounds 
around Scotland where the local industry had the type of vessels and experi-
ence to exploit the new opportunities. Even now after the necessary adjust-
ments to the fleet structure in England and Wales, landings into Scotland ac-
counted in 1995 for 56% of the value with England and Wales at 39% and 
Northern Ireland at 4%. The impact locally was considerable wi th regions like 
the North West of England, Fleetwood in particular with its deep sea trawlers, 
declining substantially while others such as the North East of Scotland and 
Shetland expanded. The latter development was helped by the expanding 
Table 8.12 Fishing Vessels over 10 metres in certain UK Ports 
Fleetwood 
Grimsby 
Milford Haven 
Newlyn 
England and Wales 
Peterhead 
Shetland 
Scotland 
UK total 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics MAFF. 
Numbe 
1993 
109 
234 
132 
214 
1,563 
97 
68 
1,314 
3,442 
r 
1995 
83 
183 
128 
198 
1,332 
116 
82 
1,195 
2,855 
Engine 
1993 
18,694 
84,442 
38,845 
54,258 
357,172 
56,965 
32,187 
406,126 
882,750 
power (HP) 
1995 
13,914 
72,386 
44,852 
58,667 
328,843 
70,551 
36,583 
384,958 
800,658 
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mackerel fishery of the late 70s. Special features such as Spanish and Dutch 
investment in UK vessels complicate the interpretation of developments in pla-
ces like Milford Haven and East Anglia. (There may be increased numbers of 
certain types of vessel while the overall numbers decline due to sharper de-
creases in other types.) Table 8.12 shows the current position. 
The second and more relevant aspect in this context is the impact of re-
strictive licensing on the profitability of the sectors. This in turn determines 
whether funds will be available not just for new vessels but also for investment 
in licences leading to some increase in concentration. The obvious example is 
the pelagic sector where limited entry and high earnings allowed modernisa-
tion. The purse seine vessels (roughly 50 in number) which dominated this sec-
tor in the 80s generated high profits and their licences were then worth 
around £0.5m each. The balance in the fleet has altered in the mid-90s with 
large pelagic trawlers replacing some of the pursers. This recent change is not 
fully reflected in table 8.13 which gives some data about costs and earnings by 
pelagic vessels in 1993. While the sample is not random it is large enough 
(18 vessels) to indicate what some vessels were capable of earning and the de-
gree to which differing cost structures influenced profits. Poor performance 
seems to be linked to the quality of the vessel and the combined cash f low of 
crew share and profit amounts to only around 13% of the vessel value and 
25% of the earnings. Top performance also reflects the quality of the vessel 
and the comparable figures are 19% and 48%. What is surprising is the ratio 
between earnings and insured value with the poorer performers showing 
higher turnover per £ invested (over 50% compared with under 40% for the 
top performers). 
Table 8.13 Financial results for pelagic vessels (£ per vessel 1993) 
Average 
Upper quartile 
Lower quartile 
Total earnings 
821,188 
1,131,715 
699,221 
Profit *) 
104,046 
14,451 
-24,928 
Crew share 
239,658 
332,989 
199,498 
Insured value 
1,841,667 
2,912,500 
1,293,750 
*) Profit before deducting interest and depreciation. 
Source: SeaFish Costs and Earnings Survey. 
While there is no change in the main location of the vessels in North East 
Scotland and Shetland, technology and markets have changed. Three larger 
vessels capable of trawling and of presenting a better quality of product had 
already entered the sector by 1996 with three more due to arrive in the near 
future; they replace existing capacity but they ensure the removal of additional 
capacity to accommodate the increase in size and power of the vessels. While 
the developments reflect both the improvements in pelagic prices and vessel 
design, they have undoubtedly been facilitated by the relatively secure rights 
in the fisheries. The outcome has been both a reduction in the number of ves-
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sels involved and a sharp rise in the licence value now thought to be worth 
more than £2m. Whether the assumption of secure rights, possibly based on 
the tighter and longer established licensing system, justifies this value or the 
investment of around £50m in the six new vessels, must remain open to ques-
t ion. 
Events in the pelagic sector do not necessarily carry through to the much 
more important demersal and shellfish ones. Demersal landings accounted in 
1995 for over 60% of total value as against over 25% for shellfish and just over 
10% for pelagic species. Table 8.14 provides some information on costs and 
earnings. The figures relate to 1994 for the beam trawlers and 1995 for the 
others. Again the sample can not be seen as random and exactly representative 
of the sector but the figures do provide a range of actually occurring results to 
inform the discussion. As with the results for pelagic vessels, the profit is before 
deducting charges for depreciation and interest. 
Table 8.14 Financial results for demersal and nephrops vessels (£ per vessel) 
Beam trawlers 
- medium 
- large 
Demersal trawlers 
- small 
- medium 
- large 
Demersal seiners 
- small 
- medium 
- large 
Nephrops trawlers 
- small 
- medium 
1994 For beam trawli 
total earnings 
327,232 
575,292 
190,975 
329,237 
467,640 
313,934 
464,239 
462,127 
273,988 
282,629 
profit 
19,077 
55,802 
33,640 
45,102 
58,411 
27,080 
62,772 
70,161 
57,100 
66,384 
ers and 1995 for others 
crew share 
85,274 
149,706 
60,973 
97,545 
142,075 
104,100 
145,142 
146,087 
86,436 
86,872 
insured value 
592,857 
1,427,273 
189,333 
421,375 
642,214 
276,250 
476,400 
607,300 
188,800 
368,600 
Source: SeaFish Costs and Earnings Survey. 
As wi th the pelagic vessels the range of results and the differences be-
tween the best 25% and the worst 25% are considerable. Table 8.15 provides 
a couple of examples. 
Quite a number of vessels in the demersal and shellfish sectors generate 
considerable cash flows in relation to the value both of the landings and the 
vessel. This feature perhaps partly explains why increases in value of licences 
have been observed in these sectors as well, and at a proportionately greater 
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7ab/e S. 75 Financial results for certain demersal vessels (£ per vessel) 
Medium trawlers 
- average 
- upper quartile 
- lower quartile 
Small seiners 
- average 
- upper quartile 
- lower quartile 
1994 For beam trawlers and 1995 for others 
total earnings 
329,237 
400,015 
247,551 
313,934 
400,138 
241,060 
profit 
45,102 
89,482 
5,126 
27,080 
67,988 
-13,052 
crew share 
97,545 
116,775 
81,087 
104,100 
133,230 
90,670 
insured value 
421,375 
488,000 
339,167 
276,250 
333,333 
218,333 
Source: SeaFish Costs and Earnings Survey. 
rate. However, the combination of decommissioning and the reduction in ca-
pacity imposed when replacement vessels enter the fleet provides most of the 
explanation for the increases. Decommissioning under the scheme introduced 
in 1993 removed some 4.5% of capacity at a cost of £16.6m in the first two 
years and 2% at £9.6m in the third. There are still two years of the programme 
to run and around £24m still available but the cost per unit of capacity re-
moved has risen and the amount to depart wil l probably be a further 4% at 
best. This does imply, however, that the quotas will be shared by fewer vessels 
(with fleet capacity reduced by 10% or more) and suggests higher returns for 
those remaining and upward pressure on licence prices. 
What is perhaps surprising is the heavier capital to earning ratio in the 
most exclusive sectors. Beam trawlers and pelagic vessels have ratios of 2:1 or 
worse while most of the others run at a level between 1:1 and 1.5:1 wi th the 
small vessels showing insured values below the value of earnings. A similar 
disparity arises with the value of licences where the ratio of earnings to licence 
price seems less favourable for the pelagic and beam trawl vessels. This sug-
gests that 'capital stuffing' or perhaps a willingness to 'buy jobs' for the future 
erodes the benefits conferred by securer and more exclusive rights. Alterna-
tively there may be certain underlying positive assumptions about the reliability 
of future TACs and prices for the species involved which make the main pelagic 
and flat fish sectors more willing to invest. A further possible explanation may 
lie in the historical situation where other demersal and shellfish stocks were 
initially under much less pressure (with no problems equivalent to those which 
led to the cessation of herring fishing in the North Sea). As a result licences 
(other than pelagic and beam trawl) were both more numerous and less diff i-
cult to acquire. This situation is, however, changing and the recent sharper in-
crease in licence values in these sectors may well lead to levels equivalent to 
those in the pelagic and beam trawl sectors. 
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Increasing strength of POs 
Another feature in the structure of the UK fishing fleet which is associ-
ated wi th property rights has been the increasing strength of the POs. 
While much of the initial impetus to form these organisations stemmed 
from concerns to recover compensation for withdrawn fish, subsequent devel-
opment has expanded their role in managing the fisheries. Table 8.16 records 
recent developments. In effect this reflects the ability of the POs to manage 
quotas in relation to the track records and current activity of their membership; 
they can smooth out supplies coping with vessels being laid up or taking a tem-
porary excess as well as providing the discipline needed to do so. In addition 
they can provide guidance on marketing (and on occasion markets) to improve 
earnings. The increasing proportions of the vessels in membership is reflected 
in the share of the important quotas managed by the POs. Table 5.3 in an ear-
lier chapter gave the relevant quantities for the North Sea (Area IV) for the 
main demersal species in 1993. It was clear then that only for sole did those not 
in PO membership have anything near 50% of the quotas. POs had over 80% 
for cod, over 70% for saithe and over 90% for haddock and whit ing. Since then 
the shares have increased and the 1995 figures for the North Sea show cod, 
haddock, saithe and whit ing over 90% and sole over 75%. The share of the 
most valuable shell fish quota, nephrops, is just over 80%. The indications for 
the future are of this trend continuing wi th the vessels outside the POs and 
those under 10m having insignificant shares. 
Table 8.16 Vessels over 10 metres by PO Membership (Percent of total) 
1994 1995 1996 
Scottish Fishermen's Organisation 
Cornish Fish Producers' Organisation 
Northern Ireland Fish Producers' Organisation 
Anglo Scottish Fish Producers' Organisation 
South Western Fish Producers' Organisation 
North East of Scotland Fishermens' Organisation 
Anglo Northern Irish Fish Producers' Organisation 
Grimsby Fish Producers' Organisation 
Aberdeen Fish Producers' Organisation 
Shetland Fish Producers' Organisation 
West of Scotland Fish Producers' Organisation 
Wales and West Coast Producers' Organisation 
The Fish Producers' Organisation Ltd. 
North Sea Fish Producers' Organisation 
Fife Fish Producers' Organisation 
Yorkshire & Anglia Fish Producers' Organisation 
Fleetwood Fish Producers' Organisation 
Lowestoft Fish Producers' Organisation 
Northern Fish Producers' Organisation 
Non-PO vessels 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics MAFF. 
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14.2 
4.5 
5.3 
4.6 
3.4 
3.5 
1.7 
2.6 
2.1 
1.6 
-
1.2 
1.3 
0.5 
1.7 
1.6 
1.3 
0.7 
-
49.2 
14.6 
5.4 
4.8 
4.9 
3.8 
4.0 
2.1 
2.7 
2.4 
2.0 
-
1.5 
1.4 
1.0 
1.0 
1.4 
1.0 
0.7 
-
45.3 
15.6 
5.5 
4.9 
4.7 
3.9 
3.8 
2.4 
2.4 
2.3 
2.1 
1.9 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
1.2 
1.1 
0.4 
0.4 
41.3 
While there have been some measures to secure a guaranteed quantity 
for those not in membership this has not stopped the f low of vessels and track 
records taking more of the entitlement to the POs. In some instances, the enti-
tlement to quota share has been retained by the PO and the vessels sold, lead-
ing to futher concentration on the catching side. Shetland is estimated to have 
improved its shares of both demersal and pelagic species in this way; demersal 
from something over 4% to nearer 7%, herring from 12% to 15% and mack-
erel f rom 18% to 24%. In addition, new POs have been set up to look after 
special interests, whether for the re-flagged vessels or for areas previously not 
adequately covered. There are for example POs looking after the interests of 
the Anglo-Spanish vessels (Wales and West Coast PO) and Anglo-Dutch ones 
(North Sea Fish PO) as well as one covering the West of Scotland and one incor-
porating Icelandic interests (Northern Fish PO). 
8.3.3 Structural implications of property rights 
The UK experience seems to indicate property rights having relatively 
little influence so far on structural developments. The relevant factors appear 
to be technical changes, profitability and decommissioning payments. The loss 
of distant waters and the extension of limits made much of the fleet of the 70s 
redundant and subsequent investment encouraged by Government and FEOGA 
funds changed both the structure and location of the fleet. The inshore sector 
grew and the location moved northwards in the UK. Decommissioning pay-
ments went initially to those vessels which had lost their grounds and could not 
work profitably under the new regime. Subsequently the departure of vessels, 
either under the renewed decommissioning scheme or where removed to allow 
replacements to enter the fleet, has continued the technical adjustment of the 
fleet. 
Where property rights do influence matters is in providing the security to 
justify the investment, though the UK form of rights may induce an excess of 
investment ('capital stuffing'). There may be a lack of confidence in the current 
situation which explains the over-investment wi th owners eager to improve 
their technology and quota share as insurance against harder times to come. 
This bids up the price of licences. The UK capacity is still well in excess of its 
MAGP targets and thus no investment aid is available for new vessel construc-
t ion. Fishermen and banks have to depend on the safeguards provided by 
entitlements under licences to ensure the cash f low to pay for the investment 
and related borrowings. Tables 8.13, 8.14 and 8.15 do not indicate exception-
ally high levels of cash f low on average, though the better performers (upper 
quartiles) clearly do reasonably well. As many of the licences are still in the ini-
tial hands and may have no formal value (beyond inflating the second hand 
value of licensed vessels when such vessels change hands) even the expected 
additional problems of succession may not arise to any great extent. Uncer-
tainty about the future existence of the licence rights in the same form, even 
without the impending review for 2002, limits the influences on structural de-
velopments. 
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One feature which does derive from UK property rights has been the re-
flagging of foreign vessels through their owners acquiring UK licences and 
registrations. The original incomers were mainly Spanish seeking to secure es-
tablished fisheries in Western waters only partly (if at all) exploited by British 
fishermen in the past, and their licences were mainly acquired at little or no 
cost; the more recent arrivals have been mainly from the Netherlands paying 
significant amounts to acquire entitlement to take sole and plaice. The relative 
costs of acquiring entitlements in the Netherlands and the UK have encouraged 
this, though the licences can not be regarded as being as secure as the Dutch 
ITQs (which look certain at least until 2002). The Icelandic interests connected 
with the vessels in the Northern Fish PO may be the next development in this 
particular phenomenon. 
8.3.4 Conclusions 
It is thus too early to detect significant impacts arising from property 
rights. It is reasonable to expect them in the future. The change in the value of 
a pelagic licence from £0.5m to £2m and similar or proportionately greater 
increases for various other licences will constrain investment decisions and erect 
barriers to entry. Whether they will also facilitate the adjustments to fleet 
structure wil l depend on the flexibility, transferability and divisibility of the 
rights. Whether their influence will displace that of technical developments in 
vessels, changes in fishing grounds or their productivity and alterations in mar-
ket preferences remains to be seen. A critical factor will be the extent to which 
trade in track records provides the necessary building blocks for marginal ad-
justments of varying size (as some ITQ systems allow). The Shetland PO has 
shown how the acquisition of track record and associated vessel licences can be 
used to effect structural change. Whether the Shetland approach to regional 
protection, introduction of new technology, fisheries management and inte-
grated marketing will be copied more widely depends on developing UK and 
EU policies. The most important PO in terms of vessels and quotas, the SFO, also 
has processing facilities but its membership is more diverse; it would have 
greater difficulty in reconciling the varied interests of its differing sectors in 
acquiring and allocating additional entitlements. 
The trade in licences may be regarded as easing change or stopping it. For 
some with capital, expansion becomes easier while for others it becomes har-
der, as for new entrants with limited resources. A further factor may be the ex-
pectations about growth in the value of licences. Owners may retain them on 
a speculative basis and cause a period of structural freeze as happened in the 
dairying sector when milk quotas were introduced. What is clear from the ex-
tent of re-flagging and purchase of entitlement to fish UK quotas is that rights 
will generally f low from those with poorer technology and funding to those 
with better, as has happened with Anglo-Dutch vessels. They may to a lesser ex-
tent f low to those whose opportunity costs are lowest; this would be where the 
resale value of the vessel is less than its value in use and lack of alternative em-
ployment puts a zero value on labour, as wi th some of the Anglo-Spanish ves-
sels. 
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EFFECTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AT 
ENTERPRISE LEVEL 
9.1 Danish fishing enterprises 
The analysis so far has concentrated on the effects of the Danish regula-
t ion. From a property right point of view poor entitlements have been created 
by this regulation. Since the fisheries related regulation is based on open access 
regulation, i.e. regulation of where, when and how much to catch and not 
limiting the number of participating fishermen, the effect of the sector related 
regulation, i.e. vessels and fishermen licences, on the profitability is assumed 
to be minor. There are two effects that contribute to this conclusion. Because 
the vessels are flexible they will still participate in the most profitable fisheries 
and these fisheries will therefore still be under pressure. Only the least profit-
able fisheries will benefit from the limited access, because of reduced fishing 
effort. Secondly over a longer period an eventual profit will be invested in fish-
ing capacity because of the 'race for the fish' element in the regulation. 
Therefore, the analysis so far points toward a break even economy of the 
vessels. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate this hypothesis based on 
cost and earning figures. The cost and earning figures are samples from vessels 
from the port of Thyboron at the west coast of Jutland, belonging to the re-
gion of West Jutland. 
9.1.1 Profitability of selected fleet segments 
The sample shown in table 9.1 is for the fleet segments of main interest, 
i.e. the fleet segments identified in chapters 6 and 8. It must be remarked that 
the information provided in table 9.1. is hardly representative, since it is only 
based on data from one port, but given the size of the fleet in that port the 
information can be considered as indicative for the development in the period. 
Two indicators can be formed from the figures in the table to show the 
profitability of the fleet, the operating return on capital and the ratio between 
profit and total earnings. The operating (or gross) return on capital is measured 
as profit (before interest and depreciation) as a percent of insurance value of 
the vessel and it is a measure of the return on investment. The ratio between 
profit and total earnings, the operating profit ratio, is an indicator for the op-
erational profitability. 
The operating return on capital fluctuates for trawler segments over the 
period 1987-1995 between -2.0 - 15.6% (average for the period: 8.0%), 7.5 -
12.6% (average 9.3%), 4.3 -14.4% (average 10.3%) and 3.4 -15.6% (average 
10.4%), respectively and for the Danish seiner segments 10.6 - 21.7% (average 
15.8%) and 8.5 -14 .1% (average 16.7%), respectively. A detailed evaluation of 
these return rates requires a determination of relevant interest and deprecia-
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tJon rates, but in order to obtain just a minimum return the sum of the rates 
must in all years be over 10% and rates over 15% will normally be required 1). 
Therefore, the trawler fleet segments are all in a range of returns where the 
economy at best just break even and in many years the result indicates a loss. 
For the Danish seiners the economic situation seems to be more positive, but 
the returns are not that high. 
Table 9. J Financial results of selected fleet segments from Thyboron. Per vessel. Current 
prices (1,000 DKK) 
Trawlers 0-50 GRT 
Total earnings 
Profit a) 
Crew share 
Insurance value 
Trawlers 50-120 CRT 
Total earnings 
Profit 
Crew share 
Insurance value 
Trawlers 120-200 GRT 
Total earnings 
Profit 
Crew share 
Insurance value 
Trawlers >200 GRT 
Total earnings 
Profit 
Crew share 
Insurance value 
Danish seiners 0-30 GRT 
Total earnings 
Profit 
Crew share 
Insurance value 
Danish seiners >30 GRT 
Total earnings 
Profit 
Crew share 
Insurance value 
1987 
1,312 
167 
517 
2,028 
1,812 
300 
172 
3,152 
2,950 
506 
864 
5,395 
7,164 
1,650 
2,062 
1988 
1,484 
38 
595 
2,168 
1,261 
291 
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3,496 
4,011 
847 
1,162 
5,875 
7,933 
1,965 
2,318 
12,966 12,581 
1,217 
211 
511 
1,017 
1,586 
276 
659 
2,004 
1,055 
138 
425 
1,136 
1,545 
244 
633 
2,116 
1989 
1,484 
-38 
728 
1,800 
1,409 
312 
266 
3,820 
4,011 
562 
1,324 
7,219 
7,633 
1,221 
2,319 
1990 
1,482 
163 
581 
2,212 
1,632 
252 
254 
3,369 
3,571 
339 
1,062 
7,923 
6,604 
532 
1,945 
1991 
2,284 
328 
977 
2,580 
1,801 
381 
305 
3,650 
5,075 
1,066 
1,589 
8,381 
9,197 
2,018 
2,702 
1992 
1,259 
134 
520 
2,151 
1,005 
317 
213 
3,493 
4,811 
870 
1,448 
8,527 
8,936 
2,063 
2,605 
1993 
1,363 
221 
537 
1,876 
1,185 
348 
217 
3,750 
4,270 
715 
1,256 
9,190 
7,175 
1,300 
2,005 
1994 
1,250 
264 
445 
1,686 
993 
571 
199 
4,438 
5,328 
1,131 
1,573 
9,185 
8,065 
1,735 
2,287 
1995 
1,250 
198 
472 
1,980 
1,167 
330 
205 
4,214 
5,753 
1,302 
1,716 
9,578 
9,241 
2,099 
2,608 
15,748 15,820 15,436 16,379 17,280 17,174 17,435 
1,277 
172 
548 
1,359 
1,606 
231 
693 
2,088 
1,293 
263 
526 
1,207 
1,693 
310 
700 
2,203 
a) Profit is defined before interest and depreciation. 
1,216 
226 
517 
1,277 
1,709 
299 
752 
2,345 
1,166 
236 
482 
1,288 
1,667 
308 
716 
2,411 
960 
152 
413 
1,228 
1,491 
241 
635 
2,559 
1,157 
227 
500 
1,345 
1,861 
341 
789 
2,636 
973 
131 
411 
1,239 
1,619 
211 
684 
2,479 
1) The rate of depreciation based on the insurance value of the vessel ('=' the value 
of capital) is for these vessels, which are old and therefore have a shorter expec-
ted lifetime left, relatively high 8-15%. 
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The operating profit ratio fluctuates also significantly in the period. How-
ever, the average for the period is between 10-15% for the trawler fleet seg-
ment 0-50 GRT, between 15-20% for the Danish seiner fleet segments and the 
trawler fleet segments 120-200 GRT and 200- GRT and between 20-25% for 
trawler fleet segment 50-120 GRT. Since fishery by trawl is capital intensive the 
operating profit ratio must be relatively high, i.e. over 15%. Only smaller trawl-
ers have on average a smaller operating profit ratio (11 %). The Danish seiners 
are not as capital intensive as the trawlers and a lower operating profit ratio 
is therefore acceptable. 
The low operating return on capital for the trawlers despite the relatively 
high operating profit ratio is as mentioned due to the capital intensity of the 
sector. The total earnings are well below the insured value and for the trawler 
fleet segment 50-120 GRT only 37% of the insurance value. So despite the rela-
tively high operating profit ratio the resulting operating return on capital is 
low. The other fleet segments have a ratio between 0.55 and 0.75. This could 
indicate overcapacity in the fleet. 
The development in the insurance value in the period shows that for the 
trawler fleet segments, 50-120 GRT, 120-200 GRT and 200- GRT the insurance 
value per vessel has increased more than expected 1) (the insurance value is 
measured in current prices). However, the insurance value for the segment 120-
200 GRT has increased by 75%, while the increase for the two other segments 
is about 34%. The insurance value of the other segments has more or less fol-
lowed the price development in the period except the trawler fleet segment 
0-50 GRT. For this segment the insurance value has been fluctuating in the pe-
riod (within a range of 25% of the insurance value in 1987) and is in 1995 at 
the same level as in 1987. These figures can, however, be biased, because the 
sample of vessels in each segment change from year to year and a change in 
insurance value can therefore be due to change in the sample of vessels. 
Since the total earnings per vessel only have increased beyond the in-
crease due to inflation for the trawler fleet segment 120-200 GRT the increase 
in insurance value for this segment can be explained by increasing possibilities 
for higher total earnings. For the segments 50-120 GRT the total earnings per 
vessel since 1991 has been at a level of 60% of the level in 1987-91 indicating 
serious problems for this segment, while for the segment 200- the total earn-
ings per vessel have increased, but the increase is lesser than the increase in 
insurance value. The material shows that the increase of total earnings per ves-
sel in the segments 120-200 GRT and 200- GRT has been within the industrial 
fisheries, while the earnings from the fisheries after human consumption have 
been relatively stable. 
1) Given a price development around 2-3% per year, the insurance value measured 
in current value must increase by 17-26% in order to maintain the level of capital 
measured in fixed prices. 
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9.1.2 Conclusion 
Information from interviews with accountants confirms the figures. Ves-
sels within the trawler fleet segments 120-200 GRT and 200- GRT have invested 
to increase the earnings from the industrial fisheries, mainly in the hold condi-
tions and in engines to increase the effectiveness, e.g. by a new gearing. These 
investments are in general not limited by the regulation of extension of capac-
ity. The investments will tend to improve both the quality of the landed fish 
and the cost structure of the vessels. 
According tö the accountants, the restrictions in the fisheries after human 
consumption species and the relative low prices of these species are some of 
the factors that in the medium-term will determine the return on capital of 
vessels depending on the human consumption fisheries. These factors will in 
many cases lead to the conclusion that larger investments in the human con-
sumption species fleet are not profitable. 
The restrictions on extensions of capacity, where extensions are only al-
lowed if equal capacity leaves the fleet, add ah extra cost to consider in the in-
vestment process. This extra investment cost can, in general, not be expected 
to be covered by the earnings from the fisheries, because the future fishing 
possibilities are not secure, i.e. no fishing rights are defined by the Danish fish-
ery related regulation. From this point of view the decommissioning scheme 
has also been a reel barrier for new investments, since the compensation paid 
sets up a minimum payment for capacity. 
9.2 Effects of property rights at enterprise level in the Dutch cutter 
fishery 
The effects of property rights on firm level is the subject of this chapter. 
Section 9.2.1 considers if substantial investments in Dutch flatfish quotas can 
be covered by future earnings from sole and plaice landings. The significance 
of the rights as intangible assets on the balance sheet is described in section 
9.2.2 and 9.2.3 gives estimates of the capitalised value of the flatfish ITQs. Valu-
able rights have consequences for the profit level, as is explained in 9.2.4 and 
finally, section 9.2.5 focuses on the consequences of the property rights for 
succession of ownership. 
9.2.1 Effects of quota investments on the profitability of fishing enterprises 
Investments in marginal quotas 
The Dutch market for ITQs mainly regards the transfer of small quantities 
sole, plaice, cod and whit ing. The transactions contain buying of additional 
quantities of these species by vessel-owners who intend to adjust their rights 
to the available capacity of the vessel, as has been explained in chapter 8. Sup-
pliers of ITQs use to split up their quantities in smaller parts so that high prices 
can be earned. Prices are expressed in NLG per kg of sole and plaice quota and 
amount to three or four times the auction price per kg of sole and plaice. Buy-
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ers are allowed to add these 'ITQ-parts' to their available ITQ and in this way 
they increase their 'permanent' share in the total quota, allocated to the Neth-
erlands. The acquired right remains for an indefinite number of years. Thus, 
additional earnings can be obtained that only need to cover the marginal (vari-
able) costs so that a high balance remains to cover the quota investment. 
Table 9.2 shows the effect on the cash-flow of an additional sole/plaice 
quota, bought by an owner of a 1,800 HP beam trawler. The majority of quota 
transfers in the period 1988-1994 referred to this type of beam trawlers. The 
table starts with the average costs and earnings of a 1501-2,000 HP beam trawl-
ers based upon the 1993 figures from the LEI-DLO sample of fishing enterprises 
accounts. The calculation 1) has been based upon the fol lowing assumptions: 
marginal quantity bought of 6,740 kg of sole and 15,200 kg of plaice 
(average quantities bought for this type of vessels); 
prices paid for this ITQ-part: sole quantity NLG 60 per kg and plaice quan-
tity NLG 7 per kg; 
these quantities and prices result in an investment of NLG 510,800 for 
sole and plaice together; 
auction price of sole NLG 13.12 per kg, plaice NLG 3.23 per kg (average 
auction prices in 1994); 
variable costs such as fuel increase proportionally wi th the landings. 
Table 9.2 shows an extra cash-flow of NLG 66,600 that is available for 
covering the investment costs of the quota. It seems a rather good investment, 
since the return is 13% before taxation. 
The quota situation was rather different in 1996 and 1997, in that the 
plaice quota was much (50-55%) lower compared with 1994. Furthermore, the 
sole ITQs were 25-40% lower in these two years. 
The effect of quota decreases is that the kg price of an ITQ tends to in-
crease. This means a longer pay-back period for purchased marginal ITQs, as-
suming that the gross margin (earnings-variable costs) remains constant. 
Table 9.2 Increase in cash-flow in 1994 as a result of buying of an additional ITQ by an 
owner of a beam trawler, 1501-2000 HP class (average figures in NLG) 
Year 1994, Year 1994, inclusive Additional quota 
original quota of additional quota alone 
Gross earnings 2,367,900 2,528,900 161,000 
Expenses, excl. of wages 1,186,500 1,238,300 51,800 
Wages (shares) incl. of 
skipper-owner 583,500 626,100 42,600 
Gross cash-flow 597,900 664,500 66,600 
Source: Fisheries accountancy data network of LEI-DLO. 
1) An important part of these calculations has been carried out by G.H. Beyert, for 
her final essay for the Business school in Alkmaar. 
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A separate remark has to be made about taxation of quotas for the In-
come or Company taxation. For fiscal purposes a depreciation period of eight 
years 1) is allowed for quota investments. This means a depreciation amount 
of NLG 510,800/5= NLG 102,160 in the case of the beam trawler in table 9.2. 
Thus, a fiscal loss (66,600 minus 102,160) results during the first five years after 
buying the ITQ. This loss might be even higher when an interest amount has 
to be paid for an additional loan. These losses can be compensated when prof-
its occur, thus reducing the future tax amount that has to be paid. This may 
explain the attractiveness of buying ITQs by Dutch vessel-owners in cases that 
high amounts of taxes have to be paid. 
Investments in full quotas 
The investment in a 'ful l ' flatfish quota is considered in table 9.3. The 
(theoretical) case is that a starting fishing enterprise has taken over a second 
handed beam trawler with the rights, i.e. a sole/plaice ITQ consisting of 103,050 
kg of sole and 310,250 kg of plaice (the average quota level for this type of 
beam trawlers in 1993 and 1994). This means an investment of NLG 8.3 million 
for the quota alone, on the basis of actual quota prices, and for the vessel NLG 
2.5 million. 
The resulting cash-flow in table 9.3 is too low to cover repayments and 
interest for a loan. Assuming that the bank would consider a loan of NLG 6.5 
million, to pay off in eight years (usual for second handed vessels) and 7.5% 
interest this would require an annual cash f low of at least NLG 1.1 million. 
The conclusion is that taking over a second handed vessel wi th all the 
rights will not lead to a profitable investment. Therefore, a financial institution 
will not be prepared to provide the finance for such an investment. 
This conclusion is based on average circumstances. The question can be 
posed if 'highliners' could meet such high cash-flow requirements. Highliners 
in this respect are the quota owners who take up their ITQ most efficiently. An 
analysis of the LEI-DLO costs and earnings database turns out that these opera-
tors have a 20% better gross margin (gross cash-flow as a percentage of the 
gross earnings). This would result in a gross cash-flow of NLG 1,025,000 in the 
example of table 9.2. Thus, it seems that even (potential) highliners cannot 
enter the fishery by buying a vessel with all the necessary rights. 
This example makes clear that very high barriers for new entrants in the 
Dutch cutter fisheries exist. The Dutch Government has contributed to a solu-
tion of this problem by implementing fiscal allowances, only for quota transac-
tions within the family. These are the same allowances as already existed for 
agriculture, i.e. transfers of milkquotas, as is pointed out more in detail in sec-
t ion 9.2.5. 
1) Fish quotas may be depreciated for fiscal purposes in eight years. This regards 
quota investments from April 1st 1994, but this period may also be applied to 
quotas purchased before this date. 
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Table 9.3 Estimated cash-flow in 1994 of a beam trawler, size group 1501-2000 HP, resulting 
from the investment in a second handed vessel and a full ITQ (amounts in NLG) 
Gross earnings a) 2,722,100 
Expenses, excl. of wages 1,153,500 
Wages (shares) incl. of skipper-owner 715,400 
Cash-flow 853,200 
a) This amount exceeds the one in table 9.2 since it is assumed that the ITQ is taken up fully, 
contrary to the average outcomes in 1994. 
Source: Fisheries accountancy data network of LEI-DLO. 
9.2.2 Effects of investments in property rights on the financial position of 
fishing enterprises 
This section deals with financial issues with respect to property rights, 
such as: 
financial conditions for investments in rights; 
the financing of (additional) quota investments; 
the value of the rights on balance sheets. 
9.2.2.1 Financial conditions for investments in rights 
High amounts were invested in property rights, i.e. flatfish ITQs in the 
period 1988-1995. Chapter 6 shows that in investments in these rights exceeded 
those in vessels in the years 1990 and 1991. It will be clear that financial institu-
tions has played a role in financing the investments in rights. The amounts 
were, generally spoken, too high for the individual buyers to provide the 
money from their own resources. Financing with debts has been usual and this 
posed, from the beginning, the question to the banks as to the nature of the 
rights (i.e. the flatfish ITQs). 
In case of financing the investments in rights, the vessel is taken into ac-
count in most cases. The actual debt situation of the enterprise is considered 
by the bank and additional finance for the investment in rights depends on the 
level of debts with respect to the vessel. A low level enables an additional loan 
for the buying of e.g. a flatfish ITQ. Since 1994 there is a tendency to consider 
flatfish ITQs as a kind of security, a collateral, for a loan. Banks have observed 
that, in case of bankruptcy of a fishing enterprise, the ITQs can generate a high 
proceed by public auctioning of the rights. This gives them a certain perception 
of security of the rights. 
When the rights are concerned in case of financing, banks always stipu-
late the condition that the rights should not be sold without the approval of 
the bank. In such cases, the bank informs the ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
management and Fisheries that the rights serve as a security for a loan. When 
a transfer of rights has to be registered by the ministry, it is checked if the nec-
essary approval from the bank is obtained. 
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The banks require different periods of repayment for loans. For new ves-
sels this period uses to be ten (mostly) up to fifteen years. Loans for second 
handed vessels have to be repaid in eight years and the same period was taken 
in 1994 for rights (i.e. ITQs), be it or not in combination with the vessel. The 
possible change in the Common Fishery Policy in 2002 leads to uncertainty in 
the perception of the banks. This leads to shortening of the repayment periods 
in case of financing the rights after 1994 so that no financial burdens on the 
rights will remain beyond 2002. 
9.2.2.2 The financing of quota investments 
The question is if the extra returns, generated by investments in ITQs, will 
be high enough to allow repayment of loans. This section only considers the 
flatfish ITQs, since they represent by far the most important issue regarding 
financing of fishing rights. 
The situation from section 9.2.1, a purchase of 6.7 tonnes of sole and 15.2 
tonnes of plaice quota, will be taken as an example again. Such an investment 
is based on the average quantities bought by owners of beam trawlers in 1993. 
Also in this case a 1800 HP beamer is considered and the average earnings and 
expenses are shown in table 9.3. 
Furthermore, the assumption is that the quota investment is financed 
with a loan of 60% of the investment amount, to pay off in eight years. 
Table 9.4 Estimation of the average net-cash flow in 1994 for an additional flatfish ITQ, 
bought by the owner of a beam trawler in the 1501-2000 HP class (amounts in 
NLG) 
Gross earnings 
Expenses, excl. of wages 
Wages (shares) incl. of 
skipper-owner 
Repayment+interest loan 
Total expenses 
Net cash-flow 
Year 1994, 
original quota 
2,367,900 
1,186,500 
583,500 
590,800 
2,360,800 
7,100 
Year 1994, inclusive 
of additional quota 
2,528,900 
1,238,300 
626,100 
642,100 
2,506,500 
22,400 
Additional quota 
alone 
161,000 
51,800 
42,600 
51,300 
145,700 
15,300 
Source: Fisheries accountancy data network of LEI-DLO. 
The net cash-flow in table 9.3 shows that, on average, the extra returns 
from the quota investment were high enough to pay the extra costs of fuel, 
wages etc. and to cover the additional financial burdens resulting from this 
quota investment. In fact, the extra return will be higher since the quota invest-
ment may save tax payments. The purchase of an ITQ allows an annual fiscal 
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depreciation (since 1994 12.5% of the investment amount) so that the fiscal 
profit can be reduced by the quota investment. This reduction of tax payments 
has been an extra incentive for skipper-owners to acquire flatfish ITQs. 
9.2.2.3 Property rights as an asset on the balance sheet 
Property rights that contain a right to fish for more years can be consid-
ered as an asset on the balance sheet of an enterprise, in particular when the 
rights have been purchased. These valuable rights meet the requirements for 
recognition as an intangible asset according to the International Accounting 
Standards Committe (IASC). Therefore, the requirements are: 1) 
it is probable that future economic benefits associated with the asset will 
f low to the enterprise; 
the cost or value of the asset to the enterprise can be measured reliably. 
The International Accounting Standard (IAS) 22 defines intangibles as: 
'identifiable, non-monetary assets without physical substence that are con-
trolled by an enterprise for use in the production or supply of goods or services, 
for rental to others, or for administrative purposes, and are expected to be 
used during more than one period'. 
The question is how to value these property rights on the balance sheet? 
There are some regulations by Law concerning the valuation and depreci-
ation of intangible assets in the Netherlands. The Civil Law, part 2, art. 365, 
distinguishes five categories of intangible assets. One of them is 'purchase costs 
regarding concessions, permits and rights of intellectual property'. Property 
rights in fishing belong to this category. The value of the intangibles should 
not exceed the purchase costs minus the applied depreciation, according to the 
Civil Law. Value against zero has a preference because of the high uncertainty 
of the intangibles. As a consequence, concessions and permits that have been 
allocated for free by Government should keep a value of zero (Krens, 1991) 2). 
The International Accounting Standard (IAS) 22 also gives guidelines for 
the valuation of intangibles. This regards in particular 'goodwil l ' and IAS 22, 
therefore, recommends the 'fair value' at the moment of taking over an enter-
prise. 
The requirement that costs have to be measured reliably means in fact 
that rights that have been allocated for free cannot be valued on the balance 
sheet. Exposure Draft E50 of the IASC allows an alternative valuation of intan-
gibles, but only for the ones that had already a value (Bak, 1996). 
Property rights have become a rather important intangible asset for a 
substantial number of Dutch fishing enterprises, due to the purchase of ITQs 
in the period 1988-1993 (table 9.5). It has to be kept in mind that, in accor-
1) Exposure draft E50, issued in June 1995. Quotation from the Dutch business 
magazine 'Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfsadministratie', September 
1996, article from Bak, G.G.M. 'Merken en uitgaven rechten in de jaarrekening'. 
2) F. Krens, 'Intangible fix assets', chapter 3 and 7, Deiwel, 1991. 
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dance wi th the rules described before, only purchased rights are included on 
these average balance sheets. Rights that have been allocated freely are not 
valued and mean in fact an important hidden reserve. 
The item 'intangible assets' in table 9.5 consists almost completely of the 
value of the rights, i.e. the purchase value minus the allowable fiscal deprecia-
t ion. Flatfish ITQs are the main component of this value, but purchased HP 
licences, codfish ITQs, shrimp- and herring permits may also be part of the in-
tangible assets. 
Enterprises owning more vessels show by far the highest amounts of 
rights (16% of total assets), reflecting the important part in the trade of fishing 
rights of these enterprises, as has been mentioned in chapter 6. 
The bookvalue of the 'intangible assets' in table 9.5 changes as a result 
of purchases on the one hand and fiscal depreciations on the other hand. This 
bookvalue decreased for the enterprises owning more vessels f rom NLG 1.58 
million by the end of 1991 to NLG 1.36 by December31st, 1993, indicating that 
investments in rights decreased since 1991. The other size groups show a more 
or less fluctuating pattern in this period. 
Table 9.5 Property rights as intangible assets on the balance sheets of enterprises in the 
Dutch cutter fisheries. Average amounts in NLG by 31 December 31st, 1993 
Intangible assets 
Vessel(s) a) 
Other assets 
Total of assets 
Total number of enterprises 
in the cutter fishery 
Enterprises owning one 
up to 300 HP 
57,400 
571,700 
180,200 
809,300 
213 
301-1100 HP 
17,500 
1,545,200 
179,500 
1,742,200 
26 
vessel 
>1100HP 
451,700 
2,523,900 
663,000 
3,638,600 
88 
Enterprises 
more vessels 
1,351,900 
5,545,800 
2,038,500 
8,936,200 
64 
a) Bookvalue, based upon the replacement value of the vessel. 
Source: Fisheries accountancy data network of LEI-DLO. 
9.2.3 The capitalised values of ITQs 
Section 9.2.1 concludes that investments in marginal ITQ quantities may 
result in a fiscal loss, taking into account a depreciation period of eight years. 
The question is how long the duration of the rights should be to cover the in-
vestment amount from the earnings. Table 9.6 shows the capitalised value (the 
present value) of the marginal flatfish ITQs for different duration periods. This 
value results from a discounted cash-flow analysis whereby the extra cash-flows 
generated by the investments in marginal quantities are discounted against an 
interest rate of 8% and 12%. The lower rate is an approach for the firms cost 
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of capital and the higher one takes into account a higher risk w i th respect to 
future quota developments. 
Table 9.6 Estimated capitalised values in 1994 of an additional sole/plaice ITQ for a beam 
trawler, size group 1501-2000, amounts in NLG 
Discount rate 
8% 12% 
476,400 
733,700 
828,100 
1,011,700 
412,300 
567,900 
618,600 
726,400 
Investment, 6.7 t. of sole and 15.2 t. of plaice 510,800 510,800 
Capitalised Value pay-out period: 
8 years, final ITQ value zero 
20 years, final ITQ value zero 
20 years, final ITQ value equal to investment amnt 
perpetual 
It is rather clear that the investment costs for the purchases in 1993 and 
1994 (NLG 510,800 on average) can not be covered before 2002, the year of a 
possible change in the Common Fisheries Policy. On the other hand, the pur-
chase of an additional ITQ would be a very profitable investment when the 
right would remain in perpetuity. In this case, an ITQ would have the same 
character as the land of a farmer. 
The following assumptions, based on average quantities and prices, has 
been used for this discounted cash-flow analysis: 
the owner of a beam trawler in the 1501-2,000 HP class bought in 1993 
an ITQ consisting of 6,700 kg of sole and 15,200 kg of plaice in addition 
to his existing flatfish ITQ (roughly 100 tonnes of sole and 300 tonnes of 
plaice); 
purchase price of these additional quantities is NLG 510,800 (sole and 
plaice together), which means a price per kg of NLG 75.90 on the basis of 
sole; 
the same annual gross cash-flow of NLG 66,600 (table 9.2) is generated 
by the extra purchased quantity of sole and plaice. This cash-flow has 
been adjusted for tax effects; 
the discount rate is basicly 8%. This is a rather low rate, adjusted to the 
usual (accepted) low renumeration for the owners' capital in the f i rm. 
The alternative of 12% takes into account a much higher risk for future 
quota developments. 
Table 9.7 shows the capitalised value of a 'ful l ' flatfish ITQ, consisting of 
103 tonnes of sole and 301 tonnes of plaice. In this case also the full costs of the 
vessel have been included. This means a difference with the marginal approach 
in table 9.6, where depreciation and interest of the vessel have been excluded. 
The value (investment amount) against market prices in 1994 of the ITQ is also 
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shown (about NLG 8.3 million). This shows the (theoretical) situation for a start-
ing fisherman who intends to invest in a beam trawler and considers to pur-
chase the necessary rights. The situation before taxes in table 9.7 will apply to 
him since the investment amount can be depreciated for tax purposes, which 
results in big losses in the first (may be eight) years. Tax payments will not be 
obliged for a rather long period, since fiscal losses can be 'carried forward'. It 
is clear that the NLG 8.3 million investment can not be covered by future earn-
ings since the capitalised value is far below the investment amount. Thus, it is 
impossible to start an enterprise for beam trawl fishery when the 1993/1994 
market prices for sole and plaice quantities have to be paid. This is the same 
situation as has been shown in table 9.3, where it proves that an investment in 
a second handed vessel and the necessary ITQ can not be financed. 
The situation 'after taxes' in table 9.7 applies to the owner of the fishing 
rights. He could consider if the future earnings of his flatfish ITQ will exceed 
the present value. If not, selling of the ITQ could be better than continuation 
of the enterprise. In this case, however, income tax has to be paid about the 
profit that wil l be realized by selling the ITQ. This fiscal profit can be the full 
proceed of 8.3 million when the rights have been allocated for free. A special 
tax rate of 45% applies for such a profit so that some NLG 4.5 million may re-
main after selling the ITQ and paying the obliged tax amount. This still exceeds 
the capitalized value of the future earnings so that the owner of the rights 
would be better off by selling the ITQ, (assuming that the vessel can be sold 
without a loss). 
The interest income from the net proceed of the sold ITQ could be some 
NLG 200-250,000 and this would exceed the missing income from fishing (NLG 
113,000 in 1993) substantially 1). 
Table 9.7 Estimated capitalised values by December 31st, 1994 of a full sole/plaice ITQ fora 
beam trawler, size group 1501-2000 (amounts in NLO) 
Discount rate Capitalised value 
Pay-out period: 
8 years 
20 years, final ITQ value zero 
20 years, final ITQ value equal 
to investment amount 
Perpetual 
before taxes 8% 
1,040,300 
1,771,600 
3,553,500 
2,461,700 
after taxes 8% 
494,400 
927,000 
2,451,400 
1,390,500 
after taxes 12% 
427,400 
717,300 
1,826,500 
998,100 
Note: The value against market price, after taxes, was approx. NLG 4.5 million in 1994. 
1) This income from fishing consists of profit + imputed labour share + interest on 
the owners' capital in the vessel. 
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From this example, it seems rather curious that no more vessel-owners 
stop fishing and sell their rights. But they usually have important considerations 
to continue the enterprise, such as: 
to keep the enterprise for the next generation; 
to remain fully involved in fishing, above living of his interest. 
The example in table 9.7 makes clear that fishermen are will ing to pay a 
high price to remain in the fishery sector. 
It must be emphasized that the estimated long term value is very arbi-
trary. It depends on the developments of the stocks, the conservation policy 
and other fisheries management measures. 
The assumptions for the values in table 9.7 have been: 
the flatfish ITQ contains 103 tonnes of sole and 310 tonnes of plaice (av-
erages in 1994); 
fish price and cost level of 1994; 
fish price and cost level of 1994 represent an 'average year' in the long 
run. The actual economic performances in this year were between 'good' 
and 'bad' years; 
the discount rate is basically 8% (5.6% after taxes). An alternative of 12% 
is shown to take into account a much higher risk of quota decreases. 
Duration of rights 
Calculating a present value reguires a time horizon beyond 2002, when 
the CFP be possibly reviewed. This lead to the question how long the duration 
of individual Dutch rights will be. 
At this moment (spring 1996) it is most likely that individual property 
rights will remain, in one way or another, after 2002. 
There is evidence that no essential changes will be implemented in 2002: 
EU Commissioner Bonino has stated that 'relative stability will protect the 
livelihoods of UK fishermen up to and beyond 2002' (during the exhibi-
t ion FISHING 96 in Aberdeen, March 1996); 
Alain Laurec, who heads the Conservation, Research and Monitoring Divi-
sion of the EU Fisheries Directorate, stated in April 1995 1) that entry (to 
the fishery) must be limited to get management on a sound footing and 
most fishermen now accept that 'the open entry idea is over'. Decisions 
about which fishermen should have fishing rights must remain in the 
hands of the member states, according to him; 
The Commission of the EU has formulated some guidelines for the CFP 
during the period 1993-2002 in the 'Mid-term Review of the Common 
Fisheries Policy' (December 1991) 2). The Commission states that this pe-
1) During the conference 'Fisheries in the Future: Sustainability or Extinction?', 
London, April 24, 1995. 
2) 'Report 1991 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the Common Fisheries Policy'. 
208 
riod must be considered as a preparation of the years after 2002 (page 
63). Under '8. Improvements of the Common Fisheries Policy' the Commis-
sion states: '...the Commission considers it necessary to strengthen and 
adapt the present instruments, wi th particular emphasis on the regula-
t ion of access to the resources. This is especially necessary in the run-up 
to 2003,...'. In this respect the Commission pledges for a licensing system, 
that would supplement, rather than replace the TAC and quota arrange-
ments. Under '8.2.2 Management of output' the Commission mentions 
as one of (nine) adjustments that could be considered: 'a study of the 
possibility of applying a system of individual quotas, with reference to the 
post-2002 situation.' 
The European Commission has called for cuts of up to 40% in fishing 
fleets for certain fish species in the period 1997-2002, as part of its fourth 
MAGP 1). These intended fleet reductions make it assumable that access 
to the fishery after 2002 will be limited to a specified group of right hold-
ers. This means probability of the continuation of individual property 
rights, i.e. 'rights to a benefit stream', in a sense defined by Bromley 
(chapter 5). 
9.2.4 Property rights and profit calculations 
Property rights have become an important production factor for fishing 
enterprises in the Netherlands, as has been made clear in section 9.2.3. Since 
they are in fact the most limiting production factor their value is high since 
1988. Trade in rights has resulted in important investments for a substantial 
number of enterprises in the period 1988-1995. The question in this respect is 
which consequences the rights have for profit calculations? 
To answer this question different kinds of profit calculations have to be 
distinguished. The next three sections discuss the way in which property rights 
in fishing should or can be treated for three types of profit calculations. 
9.2.4.1 Consequences of property rights for fiscal profits 
The Dutch Tax system contains a depreciation allowance for fish quotas, 
just as for the milk- and manure quotas of farm holdings. Investments in ITQs 
can be depreciated in eight years since 1994, according to Resolutions from the 
Income Tax Law. Before that year this period was five years. The reason for this 
depreciation is that Tax Authorities have accepted that investments in these 
fishing rights may become worthless in 2002, when the Common Fisheries Pol-
icy will be reviewed. The fiscal depreciation period for milk quotas is also eight 
years. 
The depreciation allowance for fish quotas has stimulated ITQ invest-
ments (section 9.2.1), since vessel-owners could reduce their tax obligations by 
these purchases. This tax reduction seems to make the ITQs cheaper for the 
1) World Fish report, June 6, 1996. 
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buyer. However, the advantage may be temporarily, since a capital gain tax has 
to be paid in case of selling the quota at a higher price compared with the 
bookvalue. This capital gain tax amounts to 45% of the realized gain, but can 
be transferred to the future, under certain conditions, when replacement of 
rights or the vessel is foreseen. In that case the profit resulting from selling the 
quota can be added to a replacement reserve, for a certain time. When the 
quota and/or the vessel are actually replaced this reserve should be deducted 
from a purchase price of the investment. This results in lower depreciations and 
higher tax amounts in future. 
The other consequence of ITQ investments for the level of the fiscal profit 
may be the interest costs that result from a loan to finance these purchases. 
In the example of the beamer in the 1501 -2000 HP class from table 9.2 the 
consequences of the ITQ purchase for the fiscal profit are as follow: 
Table 9.8 Estimated tax reduction from a purchase of a flatfish ITQ by an owner of a beam 
trawler, 1501-2000 HP (average figures in NLG) 
Gross earnings 
Expenses, excl. of wages 
Wages, excl. of skipper-owner 
Fiscal depreciation vessel 
Fiscal depreciation ITQ 
Interest 
Fiscal profit 
Income Tax amount 
Year 1994, 
original quota 
2,367,900 
1,186,500 
493,100 
218,200 
0 
142,300 
327,800 
141,800 
Year 1994, 
inclusive of 
additional quota 
2,528,900 
1,238,300 
529,600 
218,200 
63,800 
165,300 
313,700 
134,700 
Source: LEI-DLO fisheries accountancy data network. 
The NLG 510,800 quota investment causes an additional depreciation of 
NLG 63,900 and additional interest costs of (assumed) NLG 23,000. Though this 
investments adds NLG 161,000 to the gross earnings a net loss results from the 
fiscal point of view, also caused by higher expenses (fuel and labour). After all, 
the tax payment may be reduced by NLG 7,100 which results in an extra im-
provement of the cash-flow, apart from the contribution from the additional 
quota. 
ITQs that have been allocated for free have no consequences for the level 
of the annual fiscal profit, unless they are sold at a certain price. In that case 
the resulting profit is subject to the capital gain tax of 45%, unless replacement 
is foreseen. In that case transfer of tax payments to a future period can be ap-
plied, as mentioned above. 
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Apart from ITQs for flatfish and cod/whiting there are other types of 
rights in the Netherlands: HP licences, shrimp permits and permits for the 
coastal zone. The general fiscal rules for depreciation on purchased 'goodwill ' 
and permits will apply for these kinds of rights. These rules stipulate that it 
must be assumable that the value of the goodwill or permit decreases systemat-
ically during the period of use. A depreciation period of five years is most usual 
for these intangible assets. This is in accordance with the recommendation in 
the International Accountancy Standard IAS 22 to depreciate acquired goodwill 
in five years at maximum, unless a longer period (no more than twenty years) 
can be justified. 
A depreciation period of five years could also be applied for fishing licen-
ces and permits if a sustainable decrease of value is to be expected. In practice, 
the accountants of the fishermen seem to apply different depreciation periods 
for the fishing permits, whereas for the HP licences the general line is that they 
wil l keep their value so that no depreciation is applied on them. 
Finally, it has to be added that the rights not only result in extra costs (of 
depreciation) but on the other side determine, fully or partly, the gross earn-
ings and thus the level of the fiscal profit. 
9.2.4.2 Consequences of property rights for economic or commercial profits 
The accountant of the vessel owner presents a 'commercial' profit, apart 
from the fiscal one, in a number of cases. Such a profit (or loss) does not con-
tain influences of fiscal regulations that have nothing to do with the economic 
results of the enterprise. The intention of the commercial profit is to show an 
amount that can be distracted from the enterprise without threatening the 
continuity of it. This amount is the surplus above the reward of all production 
factors, including an imputed amount for the labour of the owner(s). 
As has been said in section 9.2.2.3 there are some regulations by Law con-
cerning the valuation and depreciation of intangible assets in the Netherlands. 
In spite of these guidelines depreciation on quota for a certain enterprise re-
mains very arbitrary from a business economics point of view. The depreciation 
period will depend on the period that the catch limitations will remain in force. 
Accountants of the fishermen seem to apply a precautionary principle in this 
respect by following the fiscal approach. This takes into account that the cur-
rent regulations will end in 2002, due to revision of the Common Fisheries Pol-
icy. As a consequence, the accountants seem to keep a depreciation period for 
fishing rights (i.e. ITQs) until this year. Thus, for example in 1994 a depreciation 
period of eight years will be mostly taken. In case of sale of rights a capital gain 
(or loss) will be shown, i.e. the difference between the proceed and the book-
value. 
Other rights than ITQs will also be depreciated according to the fiscal 
practice, which means for HP licences that a depreciation of zero will be ap-
plied in most cases. 
Rights that have been allocated for free are not shown under 'intangible 
assets' on the balance sheets of the fishermen's accountants and, as a conse-
quence, no (imputed) costs are incurred. The same applies for transfer of rights 
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within the family against zero-value, which has been accepted by the Treasury 
(under certain conditions). Section 9.2.5 pays more attention to these transfers 
from the viewpoint of succession. 
The calculation of the commercial net profit is shown in table 9.10 for a 
beam trawler in the 1501-2,000 HP class, as an example. This profit differs from 
the fiscal one because of the inclusion of an imputed labour amount for the 
skipper-owner and higher depreciation costs. The latter is caused by the re-
moval of situations such as deduction of capital gains from the purchase price 
of the vessel. 
Only for the purchased rights a depreciation amount has been included 
in table 9.10 (second column). Earnings from the purchased additional flatfish 
ITQ are too low (on an average basis) to cover this investment, when a depreci-
ation period of eight years is taken into account. 
Similar analyses for beam trawlers of other size groups have also pointed 
out that quota investments in 1993 and 1994 cannot be earned back in eight 
years, thus not before 2002 (Davidse, W.P. and Beyert, G., 1995). 
Table 9.9 The commercial profit of a beam trawler, 1501-2000 HP, before and after the in-
vestment in a flatfish ITQ (average figures in NLG) 
Gross earnings 
Expenses, excl. of wages 
Wages, incl. of skipper-owner 
Commercial depreciation 
Interest 
Commercial profit 
Year 1994, 
original 
quota 
2,367,900 
1,186,500 
583,500 
319,300 
142,300 
136,300 
Year 1994, in-
clusive of ad-
ditional quota 
2,528,900 
1,238,300 
626,100 
383,200 
165,300 
116,000 
Additional 
quota alone 
161,000 
51,800 
42,600 
63,900 
23,000 
-20,300 
9.2.4.3 How to deal with property rights in costs and earnings studies 
A special type of profit calculation occurs in costs and earnings studies. 
This concerns the methodology of costs and earnings calculation for a group 
of enterprises, farms or vessels. One of the purposes is to show the average 
costs, earnings, profit or loss and income per type of enterprise, farm or vessel. 
The Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN, or RICA in French) of the EU is an 
important survey in this respect and several more or less comparable studies 
have been undertaken 1) or are going on in the fishery sector. 
1) See 'Costs and earnings of fishing vessels in four EC countries', Davidse W.P. et 
al., 1993. Another example is the EU wide costs and earnings study in the fishe-
ries sector, carried out by Cooper & Lybrand, Quimper, 1996. 
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The most important aims of these types of profit calculations are: 
to give insight in the economic performance of certain types of farms and 
vessels; 
to assess the economic strength of farms and vessels and the possibilities 
for continuation of the enterprise; 
to identify the most profitable or efficient type of farm, vessel or activity 
(fishery); 
to assess the economic consequences of national or EU measures. 
A uniform methodology of profit calculation for a sample of enterprises 
is one of the main requirements of these costs and earnings studies. The result-
ing profit should be the amount that can be distracted from the enterprise 
wi thout threatening its continuity. Again, a profit that is a real surplus after 
taking into account 'normal' rewards for all the production factors. It must be 
added that 'income' (globally consisting of profit plus imputed labour costs of 
the family members) is a more important indicator for agricultural holdings, 
than for fishing enterprises. 
The question is how to deal with property rights, that are a separate in-
tangible asset, for profit calculations? 
Some solutions has been applied to include these rights in profit calcula-
tions in the framework of costs and earnings studies: 
purchased milk quotas are depreciated in 14 years in the Dutch FADN, 
carried out by the Dutch Agricultural Economic Research Institute (LEI-
DLO). An imputed interest is calculated on the basis of the bookvalue of 
the (purchased) milk quotas. Milk quotas that have been allocated for 
free are not taken into account; 
costs of milk quotas are not taken into account in other countries, partici-
pating in FADN, as far as known. In the United Kingdom the quotas ap-
pear on the balance sheet, without depreciation. 
Property rights are not taken into account yet in the Dutch annual costs 
and earnings investigations 1), nor in other, similar studies 2). It is somewhat 
unsatisfactory that high investments in rights don't affect the costs of the fish-
ing enterprises. Therefore, it is recommendable to treat fishing rights in accor-
dance with the guidelines for intangible assets included in Exposure Draft E50 
of the International Accountancy Standard IAS 22 (described in section 9.2.2.3). 
This E50 guideline contains a depreciation period for purchased intangible 
1) Results are published in the annual LEI-DLO publication 'Fisheries in Figures'. 
2) i.e. 'Costs and earnings of fishing vessels in the United Kingdom, 1992/1993' and 
'Uitkomsten van de Belgische Zeevisserij, 1994'. 
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assets of no more than five years, unless a longer period can be justified. How-
ever, this period should be shorter than twenty years 1). 
The foreseeable development of the Common Fisheries Policy, in particu-
lar the continuation of the closed shop situation for the fishery sector after 
2002 (section 9.2.3), makes a duration of individual rights of more than five 
years most probable. 
Two considerations are important for the fixation of the depreciation 
period for property rights in the Dutch situation: 
1. the general approach 2) is to depreciate intangible assets in a rather short 
period because of uncertainties in regulations etc. A kind of precaution-
ary principle is applied in this respect; 
2. a period of eight years is mostly applied (in 1994) to depreciate Dutch 
ITQs for commercial profit & loss accounts. This is in fact in accordance 
with the fiscal practice. 
This results in the conclusion that it is most preferable to depreciate the 
Dutch rights with respect to quota species, mainly the ITQs, also in eight years 
in the framework of costs and earnings studies. This period may also be applied 
to Dutch rights for non-quota species like shrimp permits. The consequence of 
this is that rights, purchased in 1995 and subsequent years will have a value 
beyond year 2002. The 'impairment test', mentioned in this section (in a foot-
note) can be applied to consider if this is correct. This test evaluates if the cur-
rent bookvalue can be covered by future earnings from the concerning fixed 
asset. 
This methodology of depreciation on property rights could also be ap-
plied to costs and earnings studies in other EU countries. The condition is that 
the rights should be identifiable and that they can be measured reliably. The 
choice of the depreciation period is arbitrary. In case of frequently changing 
regulations the period may be shorter than for the Dutch case. For instance, for 
British Pressure Stock Licences the period might be no longer than the IAS rec-
ommendation of five years. It is remarkable in this respect that in the USA pur-
chased ITQs should be amortized in fifteen years for Tax purposes, according 
to the rules for the 'section 197 intangibles' 3). 
Apart from depreciation costs interest costs result from purchased rights. 
Therefore, an imputed interest amount, based upon the bookvalue of the 
1) The Board of the International Accountancy Standard Committee (IASC) con-
siders the acceptance of a longer period than twenty years, under the condition 
that the remaining bookvalue will be subject annually to an 'impairment test', 
according to IASC Update of April 1996. Quoted from Bak G.G.M., MAB, Septem-
ber 1996; 'Merken en uitgavenrechten in de jaarrekening'. 
2) In the Dutch Civil Law and also in the International Accountancy Standards. 
3) USA Department of Treasury, Publication 535, Business Expenses, 1994, Section 
197 Intangibles: a.o.'License, permit, etc. granted by government'. 
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rights could be included. This means application of the same method as for the 
other fixed assets, e.g. the vessel 1). 
Table 9.11 shows the consequences of inclusion costs of rights (a pur-
chased ITQ) on the profitability. The assumption thereby is that the ITQ (an 
average quantity) has been bought in the beginning of 1993. The interest costs 
wi l l decrease in subsequent years, fol lowing the declining bookvalue of the 
right. 
Costs and earnings studies use to show average figures for certain size 
groups. Property rights will have been bought only for a part of the investi-
gated vessels so that the impact on the average net profit wil l be less, com-
pared with the example in table 9.11. 
Table 9.10 Impact of costs of a flatfish ITQ on the profitability of a beam trawler in the 1,501-
2,000 HP class (based upon average figures for 1993, in NLG) 
Gross earnings 
Costs excl. depr./interest 
Depreciation vessel a) 
Interest vessel 
Depreciation ITQ 
Interest ITQ 
Net profit 
neglect ITQs for 
profit calculations 
2,528,900 
1,864,400 
466,200 
206,300 
0 
0 
-8,000 
Method 
depreciation and interest 
of purchased ITQs 
2,528,900 
1,864,400 
466,200 
206,300 
63,900 
28,200 
-100,100 
a) Based upon the replacement value. 
Source: LEI-DLO fisheries accountancy data network. 
Finally, ITQs affect the profitability of fishing vessels through leasing and 
renting of the rights. This kind of transactions occurs frequently in the Dutch 
cutter fishery, facilitated by the co-management groups mentioned before. 
Some 70% of the cutters with engine power exceeding 1,100 HP had leased a 
flatfish rights in 1993. Bigger vessels use to have a balance of lease costs, 
whereas the smaller ones the receipts from rentals of ITQ rights dominate. The 
vessels of the size group 1,501-2,000 from table 9.11 showed on average the 
highest amount of lease costs in 1993, i.e. some NLG 46,000, which is about 2% 
of the gross earnings. 
1) According to the method described in 'Costs and earnings of fishing fleets in 
four EC countries', Davidse W.P. et al., 1993, chapter 7. 
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9.2.5 Property rights and succession of ownership 
Public companies use to exist apart from their owners. Their equity is di-
vided amongst a big number of shareholders, who retire and enter the owner-
ship by share transactions. Fishing enterprises use to be family enterprises 1) 
which means that changes in ownership have major consequences for the con-
ditions for continuation. Property rights in fishing use to complicate this chan-
ge in ownership since valuable rights are concerned. 
This section deals with the constraints that the property rights have in the 
Netherlands in case of transferring the enterprise or a part of the equity to 
successors, mostly to people within the family, i.e. the son(s). Regulations that 
intend to remove these constraints wil l be presented and considered. 
9.2.5.1 Financial problems connected wi th transfer of rights 
The major part of the problem concerns rights that have been allocated 
for free. The problems concentrate on the ITQs, the most valuable rights, which 
are subject to taxation when they are sold against market prices. Profits may 
be very high in these cases and they are subject to income taxation according 
to a special tariff of 45%. 
Selling the rights against market prices to e.g. the next generation, will 
also cause a finance problem in that the future earnings from the enterprise 
can not cover the high investments costs (as has been made clear in section 
9.2.1). 
Rights could be transferred at very low prices or even at a zero price in 
case of transactions within the family, to solve the above mentioned problems. 
However, this is a gift from fiscal viewpoint and, therefore, subject to 'grant 
taxation' that is based upon the difference between the market price and the 
actual price agreed between the family members. This kind of taxation has the 
same (progressive) tariff as succession duties and amounts to 20% or more for 
'gifts' that may result from low priced ITQ transactions. 
Transfer of the enterprise can also take place by inheritance. In that case 
succession duties have to be paid about the equity of the firm, the value of the 
rights included. 
9.2.5.2 Regulations and solutions to facilitate transfer of rights 
A general regulation in the Income Tax Law (article 17) facilitates the 
transfer of the enterprise within the family. This contains that transfer without 
paying an income tax on capital gains is allowed. Consequently, the hidden 
reserves (e.g. in rights) can be transferred 'smoothly' to the next generation of 
to other family members. This is possible in the fol lowing circumstances: 
1) A substantial number of enterprises in the Dutch cutter fishery have the form of 
a Private Limited Company, mainly for fiscal reasons, but they are in fact real 
family enterprises. 
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transfer to the spouse or partner of the owner. The condition thereby is 
that the spouse or partner is younger than 55 years; 
the owner is 55 years or older, or disabled and the enterprise will be 
transferred to a (foster) child, grandchild or to their spouse. 
A special decree has been implemented for agriculture to allow a tax free 
transfer of milk quotas within the family (Decree of the Finance Department 
December 14th, 1987). This means an extension of the application of the regu-
lation in art. 17 of the Income Tax, mentioned before. The Decree of December 
14th 1987 rules also that people who inherit parts of the assets of an agricul-
tural enterprise, e.g. a milk quota, can also obtain these properties free from 
income tax when the market price exceeds the transfer value, provided that 
the assets are used to continue the enterprise. These fiscal rules for milk quotas 
were applied to fish quotas by Decree of September 12th, 1988 1). 
A special tariff of 45% income tax about the gain on fish quota, realized 
by selling, has to be paid when the above rules are not applicable. 
Though these rules facilitate the transfers of rights within the family 
there are still some bottlenecks now (June 1996) that may threaten the contin-
uation of fishing enterprises when valuable rights are concerned. Transfers of 
fish quotas within the family may occur apart from the above mentioned circle 
of relatives. For example, the enterprise may be owned by two brothers and 
when one of them intends to retire big (fiscal) problems may rise with respect 
to the valuable flatfish ITQs. 
Extension of the circle of relatives is pledged for by the fiscal experts of 
the industry because of this bottleneck. Another request to the Finance Depart-
ment is the application of special allowances regarding grant- and succession 
duties that are in force for agriculture, i.e. milk quotas. The reason for this is 
that transfer of fish quotas against a low or zero price may result in payment 
of grant duties for the difference between the current market price and the 
lower agreed price. The special allowances for agriculture (Decree of October 
1992) prevent these grant- and succession duties by accepting lower transfer 
prices. A resolution in the Parliament in 1994 pledges for the application of 
these allowances also for the fishery sector, but so far (June 1996) this resolu-
tion has not been carried out. 
The regulations described above make clear that succession of ownership 
is a complicated matter when valuable rights are involved. This needs the ad-
vice of an expert to get solutions that meet the special circumstances of the 
enterprise. In particular when other relatives than the son(s) of the owner are 
involved an expert has to be consulted to apply the most suitable fiscal con-
structions. Some fiscal experts promote the change of the legal form of the 
enterprise into a private limited company where shares are traded in stead of 
the enterprise or parts (assets) of it. This may have the advantage that these 
1) Bakker, J.C. (1996), 'Bedrijfsopvolging in de visserij'; paper presented in Goeree 
(a major fishing port) during a seminar organized by Cooper & Lybrand and the 
local Fishermen's Association of the 'Nederlandse Vissers Bond'. 
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shares are valued against the earning capacity which means that fish quotas 
may be valued below the market price. But such a change of legal form of the 
enterprise may have fiscal disadvantages in other respect so that the balance 
might be negative in fiscal terms. 
The conclusion of this is that some special fiscal regulations have removed 
barriers for succession of ownership that result f rom valuable property rights. 
However, these rights may still complicate transfer of the enterprise to the next 
generation of fishermen which is sometimes indicated by structural adjust-
ments of the enterprise (change of legal form) on the basis of advices of fiscal 
and juridical experts. 
9.3 Effects of property rights at enterprise level in the UK 
9.3.1 Introduction 
There are a number of ways in which property rights affect the financial 
structure and performance of the business. The first and most obvious is the 
cost involved. This affects the capital position in terms of the source and costs 
of the investment. Equally it results in an annual charge affecting the level of 
profitability. The tables of costs and returns in Chapter 8 gave some idea of 
what may be involved. The profits indicated are really net cash flow as the costs 
of depreciation and interest repayments are not deducted. To get a truer pic-
ture of the economic situation, charges for the capital involved need to be in-
cluded. A charge of 10% of the insured value of the vessels and of the esti-
mated value of licences allows the calculation of something nearer the actual 
net profit or loss. It will not necessarily reflect the tax position; the latter impact 
wil l naturally also affect business decisions. 
9.3.2 Effects of property rights on costs and profits 
What is surprising about the results is the inability of the sectors wi th 
apparently the most secure rights (such as pelagic and beam trawl) to secure 
adequate earnings to cover all costs. This may indicate unrepresentative sam-
ples, either in terms of the vessels covered or the particular years included. The 
latter does not seem likely as other years show similar figures but even if the 
vessels are atypical, the results still show a considerable number of vessels expe-
riencing problems. They are not making enough to cover capital costs (either 
in terms of past investment or future replacement). The table below gives the 
data. 
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19,077 
55,802 
33,640 
45,102 
58,411 
27,080 
62,772 
70,161 
57,100 
66,384 
59,286 
142,727 
18,933 
42,137 
64,221 
27,625 
47,640 
60,730 
18,880 
36,860 
25,000 
25,000 
2,000 
4,000 
6,000 
2,000 
4,000 
6,000 
1,000 
2,000 
-65,209 
-111,925 
12,707 
-1,005 
-40,883 
-2,545 
11,132 
3,429 
32,220 
27,524 
Table 9.11 Effects of capital costs on profit of UK fishing vessels (£ per vessel) 
Type of vessel Profit Depreciation Licence Net Profit 
Pelagic 104,046 176,944 50,000 -122,898 
Beam trawl 
medium 
large 
Demersal trawl 
small 
medium 
large 
Demersal seine 
small 
medium 
large 
Nephrops trawl 
small 
medium 
Sources: SeaFish Survey of Costs and Earnings. 
Estimates of value of licences from the industry (1994 levels) 
The indications of the costs of licences during the recent past had been 
roughly £0.5m for pelagic vessels and f0.25m for beam trawlers. These have 
currently risen to around £2m for the former and around £0.5m for the latter. 
Depreciation on the vessel is currently the more significant capital charge, as 
table 9.12 shows, but using an annual charge of 10% of the licence value re-
sults in even greater potential losses. The explanation for the apparently un-
profitable operations may lie in the fact that almost no owners of vessels in 
these sectors will have to consider such charges in the short or even medium 
term. They may well have virtually writ ten off the capital asset of a 10 to 20 
year old vessel or it may be that their equity in a newer vessel will be such as 
to make interest payments small, as when trading up from an older but wholly 
paid off vessel; and in most cases the historical acquisition of the licence will 
have been at no cost. Only where a move out of the industry is a realistic op-
tion will the owner consider the opportunity cost of the asset and the potential 
yield of the capital invested elsewhere. This situation arises where there is no 
one in the next generation seeking to succeed. 
The lower costs of other demersal and nephrops licences, both in acquisi-
t ion at around £10,000 to £60,000 in this period and in the implicit annual 
charge, were more easily borne. The situation has, however, changed and at 
the end of 1996, licences were traded at around £600 per tonne of demersal 
track record. Where the sector exploits stocks subject to less pressure with 20 
to 30 year old vessels as wi th nephrops, even the annual charges over a ten 
year life from acquiring a licensed vessel look supportable. Where they are not, 
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the explanation may lie, as with the pelagic and beam trawl sectors, in the 
source of investment which may be crew and their families whose interests lie 
in the crew share earnings. The investment is in buying reasonably remunera-
tive jobs for those involved. 
Discussions with the industry throw little light on the reasons for current 
very high prices for licences. The extremes of second hand pelagic vessels selling 
at prices which indicate a licence value of £2m or more can not be explained 
in terms of track record and pelagic prices. To pay this for the entitlement to 
take perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 tonnes of mackerel and herring worth around 
£200 per tonne on average seems inexplicable. Apart from the explanations 
mentioned earlier that most licences did not cost anything, investment comes 
from family sources and the concern is not for return in terms of interest but 
rather in terms of secured future wages, it has been argued that at least three 
other factors come into play in the pelagic sector. 
The first concerns the trend in licence values and the fact that the very 
few historical acquisitions at what were thought to be high prices have 
proved very worthwhile in terms of current value. This encourages a be-
lief that the trend will continue upwards. To the extent that effective 
conservation and structural adjustment occurs, this belief may be justi-
f ied. 
The second turns on recent improvement in fish prices for certain species 
which continues that of the past; UK herring, mackerel (and whiting) 
prices were originally so low that lower regional prices (there and in Ire-
land) were set under the EC regime to avoid excessive withdrawals and 
compensation payments. Improving markets led to better prices and the 
ending of this provision for the UK and Ireland. Current worldwide scar-
city of mackerel in particular has led to sharp rises in prices to more than 
double those of a year earlier. 
The third factor is the effect of the marginal nature of the market. There 
are not many licences and exceedingly few become available - rather like 
Dutch sole ITQs - so that the prices tend to reflect what existing producers 
can pay at the margin or possibly what an individual desperate to enter 
the sector or eager to speculate on future developments is willing to pay. 
Additional factors are thought to come into play in the demersal and 
shellfish sectors. Perhaps the most obvious is the increasing coverage of the 
licensing scheme so that now there is no sector still operating under open ac-
cess, as there was in the recent past. This has changed the perception of the 
value of a licence. This learning process has been underlined both by the de-
commissioning scheme removing capacity and by the PO's and others acquiring 
track record to boost earning power. It takes little thought to realise that cut-
ting back capacity by 10 to 15%, as decommissioning and penalties on replace-
ment come into play, increases the share of each vessel remaining. Whatever 
the reason, the value of track record (entitlement to take a tonne of demersal 
fish) is now around £600 to £700. This figure is only slightly below the average 
value per tonne of a typical mixed demersal catch. (The track record element 
is augmented by that relating to the vessel's capacity especially where it has a 
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large number of VCU's and can provide the capacity needed to meet the penal-
ties on introducing replacement vessels.) 
What was perhaps encouraging initially was that the value of a licence 
and track record for most demersal or shellfish vessels looked more reasonable 
than that for a pelagic or beam trawl vessel in relation to potential earnings 
and profit. This is less so now with the average having increased more sharply 
in percentage terms than for pelagic and beam trawl vessels. The ratio of earn-
ings to licence value is only 1:2 or more for the pelagic vessels compared with 
roughly 1:1 for the demersal and shellfish vessels. This slightly more comfort-
able position may be eroded if the perception of the property rights as secure 
leads to developments in over investment matching those in the pelagic sector. 
It has already been noted that the costs and earnings survey suggests a 
wide range of profitability. The performance of vessels in the upper quartile 
indicates the availability of cash flows substantially above the average. The 
owners and operators of such vessels may well f ind the rising costs of licences 
and track records acceptable. This development will imply the departure of loss 
makers and others in the lower quartile. Possible results of this process are ex-
amined in a rough fashion in the chapter on modelling. 
9.3.3 Effects on investment and funding aspects 
Investment in licences depends on the same sources as that in vessels. 
These include retained profits, private savings, banks and companies such as 
those selling fish. In addition POs may get involved. Each source has different 
characteristics but similar aims - to secure the asset and get a return on it. All 
are, however, affected by the fact that a new element has been added to the 
capital cost and that more capital is needed in the short and medium term. 
While the expectation for the long term is that other factors of production will 
get lower returns to accommodate the return to licences, a decline in the cost 
of vessels and other operating capital in the near future is unlikely. 
The additional funding is only needed when the licence changes hands 
and only occurs infrequently but is cumulative. Over a period of years the 
change from the original owners who did not pay for the licences to an indus-
try where most have been bought will result in a virtual doubling of the capital 
involved. The value of the vessels in the fleet is probably around £500m on the 
assumption that the offer price in the decommissioning scheme reflects the 
current market. The combined estimates of pelagic, beam trawl and other 
licences runs at around £300m but the price of track record continues to in-
crease. 
Funding by banks 
It seems unlikely that the retention of profit will provide the basis for 
much of the extra funding needed. Dividing the landings between fewer ves-
sels wil l clearly increase the returns more than the costs, but not sufficiently. 
The main sources would look to be private saving and banks, wi th agents and 
POs contributing to some extent. Thus the importance of security becomes 
more important. This presents peculiar difficulties for the banks to let them 
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know they are not exposed to potential losses. The approach has generally 
been to have the licence as well as the vessel listed among the assets owned by 
the company borrowing from the bank. It thus can not be disposed of by the 
vessel owners separately. Equally the parties involved may have a legal agree-
ment achieving the same purpose. In many case the problem does not arise be-
cause the bank's exposure to risk is reduced by the large element of net worth 
resting with the owners. Re-possession and sale even without the licence would 
often cover the bank's position. 
Bank and companies investing in vessels and licences look for normal 
commercial rates of returns. The position with private savings seems to be like 
farmers investing in land. The return is in being able to continue in the chosen 
vocation. There may even be an element of expectation of some appreciation 
in the value of the licence as in the land. Recent rises in the prices of licences 
suggest this to be the case and the Shetland PO includes its 'ring fenced' track 
record (that belonging to the POs as opposed to those relating to individual 
member vessels) as a balance sheet item, currently appreciating in value. 
Future developments 
Whether such appreciation can continue into the future seems uncertain. 
The assumptions about future prices and TACs that underly recent investments 
depend on retention of something like current EU policy after 2002. It may be 
that prices will rise but helpful developments in consumer preference are per-
haps less likely than in the recent past. Despite the benefits f lowing from con-
tinuing problems with demand for meat, prices early in 1997 reacted unfavour-
ably to unexpectedly higher levels of supply reflecting unusually favourable 
weather. More quota per vessel seems likely as capacity is cut but further im-
provement in landings will depend in the short term on currently unexploited 
species rather than higher TACs. In the long term there may be some improve-
ment as capacity declines and conservation becomes more effective. 
While there is a cost of acquisition relating to rights, there is no certainty 
as to the value of the asset involved. It may increase as it has in the recent past 
due to decreasing availability of licences and some expectation of higher re-
turns, either from improving stocks or markets. There may even be a decrease 
to vanishing point if de-regulation occurs and the access implied translates into 
fewer or no fish to catch. The latter extreme is unlikely, given the commitment 
of all concerned to effective conservation. Nor does it seem likely that govern-
ments in 2002 or any other time wil l cancel existing entitlements to share of 
TACs and the derived quota allocations. Such an approach to remove existing 
rights would be certainly subject to legal challenge in the UK; reverting to a 
free-for-all would render valueless much of the investment made by the fisher-
men. This would lead to successful calls by the industry and individual fisher-
men affected for a judicial review of the inequitable aspects of the policy 
change. 
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9.3.4 Property rights and profit calculations 
The earlier paragraphs indicated the possible effects of including esti-
mated charges for property rights on costs and earnings. The expected losses 
for most sectors resulted from using a fixed rate of 10% for the return on capi-
tal whether in the value of the vessel or its licence. This may be appropriate for 
the longer term and on the assumption that all the capital is borrowed and 
that fishing risks are above the industrial norm. While the added risks are un-
deniable, the total dependence on outside capital is not for the reasons men-
tioned earlier. 
Quite apart from the aspects of private sources of finance and the interest 
in crew employment, tax considerations can be highly significant. The deprecia-
t ion allowance on vessels are high (25%) and until the mid 80's were poten-
tially 100%. This allowed charges against profit which exceeded the actual dim-
inution of the vessel's value. The actual realisation price on disposal resulted in 
an extra element of profit which was only assessed for tax if not rolled over 
into a replacement vessel. This concession enabled fishermen to increase and 
upgrade their investment at little cost. A further concession to fishermen al-
lowed the changing of partnerships to bring in new blood without having to 
dissolve the existing structure and pay tax on its undervalued assets. 
Similarly the tax treatment of the value of property rights varies accord-
ing to the circumstances and affects the profitability accordingly. One extreme 
relates to the acquisition of a licensed vessel where tax allowances will be given 
in relation to the cost. This will result in an undervalued asset over time and an 
enhanced cash flow to the operator. The correction for tax purposes naturally 
occurs when the assets are finally sold. The other extreme is where the property 
right has not changed hands and cost nothing. Their are no tax benefits to 
enhance the cash f low and only when disposal occurs will the owners realise 
their 'asset' and the tax authorities get their share of the 'profit'. Somewhere 
in between is the case where track record has been bought and qualifies for 
tax allowance at historic cost and its value is kept up to date as an appreciating 
asset in the balance sheet. Again the 'true' reckoning only occurs when the 
business or those assets are sold. 
9.3.5 Property rights and succession of ownership 
There are three main different situations to consider. All reflect the addi-
tional cost introduced by licences having values. The most important one re-
lates to vessels jointly owned by several persons; the second covers the vessels 
owned by firms; and the third with those owned by individuals. Joint owner-
ship is usually by current or retired crew members and their relatives. Outside 
investment within such a situation is usually by the boat's agent and confined 
to a minority share holding. Banks and other financial services tend to limit 
their involvement to loans as opposed to equity. This limited degree of finan-
cial involvement may also apply to vessels owned by firms or by individuals. 
The first group obviously depends on introducing new blood to replace 
those retiring. The barrier will be least where the investors remain the same; 
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the departing fishermen retains his investment and the incomer initially takes 
only earnings (crew share). It will be higher where the individual entrant buys 
out his predecessor. The value at which the share of the licence is transferred 
will depend on the circumstances. A low price will ease entry and minimise tax 
liability for the outgoer. As there is little transparency in the market the tax 
authorities are not well placed to set a higher price. Family finance may well 
enter the process, with the facility for making limited annual tax-free gifts be-
ing a relevant consideration. 
The firm has continuity and thus the problem only arises when the f irm 
is sold away. Otherwise, succession in the shape of new company directors is 
assured and the position of the investors remains the same. Even when the firm 
is sold, the provisions for rolling over the realised funds into another business 
minimise the tax liabilities of the investors concerned. 
The most difficult case is one owner being succeeded, on retirai or death, 
by a single individual. In retirai the incomer may be the sole heir and be given 
the assets, subject only to tax charges if the person retiring does not survive for 
a long enough period (seven years). Otherwise the incomer will have to pay the 
outgoer or the rest of those dependent on the distribution of the outgoer's in-
come. The typical situation may involve the rest of the family and necessitate 
the borrowing of funds to pay off those affected. Similar considerations apply 
when family succession follows a death. Problems are less extensive where the 
sale is to someone completely unrelated to the person departing and outside 
the current group involved. The main difficulty remains the increased cost. 
9.3.6 Conclusions 
The most obvious effects of property rights at the enterprise level are in 
increasing the costs to new entrants and those expanding their businesses by 
increasing their scale. The returns from such investment would appear to be 
negative at current costs of licences. Equally they introduce a new economic 
dimension for those wishing to leave the industry. Previously their assets con-
sisted of the vessel and the other related investment. Now they are augmented 
by the value of the licence. This value has increased over the years as tighter 
licensing rules and decommissioning have improved the balance between ca-
pacity and catches available. Thus for those acquiring their licences historically 
at no cost, there may be an additional benefit of improved stocks allowing 
higher earnings. However, for them as for all other licence holders there is now 
an higher opportunity cost of remaining in the industry. 
As to succession, there are clearly additional difficulties. Something more 
valuable than the vessel must now be transferred to the next generation. This 
added cost is simply a higher hurdle for those coming into the industry from 
outside. It contains much more complicated effects for transfers where families 
or other close knit groups are involved. Such partnerships mean that conflicts 
as to values at which assets are transferred and as to whether assets should be 
realised or not, become inevitable. Tax considerations also become more com-
plex. 
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10. PROPERTY RIGHTS EXPLORED IN MODELS 
10.1 Possible consequences of implementation of Individual Trans-
ferable Quotas in the Danish Fishery 
10.1.1 Introduction 
In Denmark an Individual Transferable Quota system (ITQ-system) has 
been discussed several times and suggested, latest in a report by the ministry 
of fisheries (Anon, 1993). The uncertainty about the effects of ITQs can be one 
of the reasons why ITQs have not been implemented yet in the Danish fisheries. 
An investigation of these sources to uncertainty can improve the planning of 
an future ITQ system and therefore be a valuable input in a new proposal 
about ITQs. 
Thus the purpose of this chapter is to analysis the effects of a potential 
ITQ-system implemented in the Danish multi-species fisheries in the North Sea 
and Skagerrak. 
ITQs have in the recent years been implemented in several fisheries. ITQs 
are in the literature shown to be a cost-effective regulation system, however, 
a number of factors can adversely affect the performance of ITQs (Squires et.al. 
1995), e.g. thin quota markets, multiple quotas in multi-species fisheries, lim-
ited alternative possibilities of vessels leading to a slow exit of the industry, and 
the degree of monitoring and enforcement. Whether these effects are signifi-
cant will depend on an examination of the actual fishery, i.e. case by case study 
is required. We will incorporate alternative fishing possibilities as a part of the 
fishermen decision problem and not only look at the effects in a given fishery. 
The method we suggest here can be used in assessing the gains of an potential 
ITQ system compared to the regulation system in force. However, the analysis 
is still partial and the results obtained can be used as inputs in a complete cost-
benefit analysis of ITQs. 
On three points the analysis will differ from former analysis of ITQ-sys-
tems. The analysis will compare the politics of the command and control type 
of regulation, in the fishery literature called open-access regulation, which 
were in force in 1993, wi th the market-based instrument of ITQs 1). Former 
analysis of ITQs have traditional compared an open-access or non-regulated 
situation with regulation by ITQs, e.g. Squires and Kirkley (1996). Secondly the 
analysis will use mathematical programming to construct/estimate the produc-
tion technology for each fisher/vessel given the command and control regula-
1) ITQs can be considered as a limited access regulation measure, where the access 
indirectly is restricted, because quota is needed if a fisher want to participate. 
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t ion. Based on the estimated production technology the potential effects of an 
ITQ system can be accessed by using Mathematical Programming. Former analy-
sis have been using econometric analysis to estimate the production technol-
ogy. Thirdly the analysis will assess the total short term gains from ITQs includ-
ing the gains obtained moving from open access regulation to Individual Non-
Transferable Quotas (INTQ), i.e. gains from allocation of effort to periods with 
higher profit and the gains from making the individual quotas transferable, i.e. 
gains from trade. 
10.1.2 Policy analysis and models 
The choice of model design for policy analysis depends not only of purely 
theoretical considerations, but also more practical issues like f.ex. what are the 
policy questions and purpose of the analysis, data availability, the appropriate 
level of aggregation and size of the model has to be addressed. 
The purpose of the analysis is to investigate the effects of a potential ITQ-
system implemented in the Danish multi-species fisheries for round- and flatfish 
in the North Sea and Skagerrak. The analysis wil l among other things assess: 
1. The short and long run effects on the fleet structure. 
2. Determination and stability of quota prices and resource rent. 
3. Advantages and disadvantages in relation to other regulation regimes, 
i.e. INTQ and the current regulation system. 
4. Gains in efficiency from allocation of Individual Quotas (IQs) and quota-
trades. 
Policy fishery models are often designed to assess how production and 
effort will respond to changes in regulation and economic conditions. For ex-
ample, the purpose of programming models is to analyze the impact of quanti-
tative policy scenarios which take form of changes in prices, technology or pol-
icy constraints on the system. In fisheries it is often important that the models 
can assess response to conditions that maybe are very different from the past. 
Therefore the models should describe the underlining physical and behavior 
rules. 
Models used for policy analysis are often required to be disaggregated 
by region, species/output and input use. Level of disaggregation depends on 
the policy, but for analysis of the interaction between regulation and out-
comes, the model requirements exceed often the capacity of the data base for 
direct estimation. Modellers may face the added difficulty of a severely restric-
ted data set which requires a compromise between the specification complexity 
of the model and the degree of disaggregation or size. This f.ex. forced to use 
linear relationships instead of convex relationships. 
When using aggregate sector models the diversity between firms and 
regional differences can disappear. Aggregation allows for some degrees of 
freedom so econometric models can be used, but may mask important, e.g. 
regional, differences with resulting distortions in predicted policy response. The 
ability to disaggregate from a nation/sector level has the advantages that the 
impact of policy changes can be assess on the regional and fleet level. A further 
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problem with aggregate or sector level LP-models is that using data on average 
catch and costs to predict marginal reactions from the fishers to policy changes 
can only be appropriate when small changes in policy are analyzed, assuming 
average and marginal conditions equal. 
A policy model includes implicit two decision problems on two different 
levels. The effects of a given policy are assessed by the model and the decision-
makers have to decide whether or not they will implement the policy change 
(if not the decisionmaker may come back and ask for analysis of other politics 
which the model maybe can handle - depending on the formulation of the 
model). In our case the purpose is to discuss the impacts of a given new policy 
compared to the current policy, and not to find the optimal and ideal best pol-
icy over a large range of policy options 1). 
Analysis of the impacts of policy changes requires, however, also a part 
where the fishers responses are reflected. Fishers are heterogeneous, because 
fishers differ widely in their resources and economic opportunities, and since 
the impacts from regulation also differ from fisher to fisher, a proper analysis 
requires at least models of several of representative fishers (often called sub-
fleets). 
The fishers response 
Prediction of the fishers response to property rights based regulation is 
difficult because a market for rights is established and interacts wi th the pro-
duction decision. Basically two different approaches have been used, an econo-
metric (parametric) and a mathematical programming (non-parametric) ap-
proach. 
The econometric approach estimates the production technology using 
either a cost function, a profit function or a revenue function and given the 
technology at work the likely consequences of f.ex. ITQs are addressed, see f.ex. 
Squires and Kirkley (1991) and Salvanes and Squires (1995). 
A branch of this approach finds, using virtual prices from the technology, 
the firms inverse derived function for quota which indicates how much the 
firms valuation of quota must change to induce the firms to hold one more 
unit of quota, see Squires and Kirkley (1995) and (1996). Having derived the 
firms demand for quota they simulate a quota market, where the market de-
mand curve for quota is found by summing the firms demand curve and the 
supply curve is fixed given by the total quota, e.g. TAC. 
This parametric approach has been used when an ITQ system is consid-
ered to be implemented in an open access fishery, i.e. an unregulated fishery. 
This is convenient, because then data series can be established that are so long 
ITQs is, however, a theoretically ideal solution to the fishery management 
problem. However, there are shortcomings with ITQ as well (f.ex. when the 
assumptions made - like no enforcement costs - do not hold), which may lead to 
rejection of ITQs. The point here is that comparing a new policy with the ideal 
policy where all problems are solved is not fruitful, the proper comparison is 
between the current policy and the proposed new policy, bearing in main the 
shortcomings of both systems, see Stavins 1995 for a discussion. 
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that econometrics can be used. The authors have overcome the data problem 
connected to vessel level cost information by estimating a revenue function 
assuming that all the inputs (and consequently the costs), for a fishing trip is 
fixed. Hereby costs data are not necessary, the vessels size is used as a proxy for 
the costs. As noted by Larson et.al. (1996) this approach requires a somewhat 
ad hoc grouping of vessels of similar type. 
The mathematical approach has been used by Lanfersieck and Squires 
(1992) and Squires, Alauddin and Kirkley (1994) to analysis the effect of ITQs 
on one species in a multi-species open access fishery. This approach has also the 
aim setting up a quota market. They use vessel level linear programming mod-
els to derive the marginal valuation of quota. They overcome the (linear) prob-
lem wi th staircase structure of the inverse derived demand functions (Paris 
1991) by estimating the demand functions using the (pseudo) data (shadow 
prices for given quota level) from the LP-problems. 
The calibration problem associated with LP-models did they partly over-
come by restricting the amount of effort in each timeperiod to the observed, 
implicitly assuming that the observed effortpattern is the optimal open access 
effortpattern. However, when reducing the quota the activity in timeperiods 
with lowest gross margin was first reduced to zero and next the activity with 
the nextlowest gross margin was reduced and so on, i.e. the vessels will in reac-
tion to quota reductions give up fishing in whole timeperiods. A expected reac-
tion is more gradual, i.e. fishermen reduce the activities wi th lower gross mar-
gin but with diminishing returns the marginal gross margin will increase with 
reduced effort leading to a positive activity level, because it becomes optimal 
to reduce other activities as well before the activity level is reduced to zero. 
The social planners problem 
Overall the social planners problem is to allocate public resources under 
goals and constraints, given predictions about responses from the fishers to 
each allocation. It is often very difficult to set up detailed policy goals because 
they are not available and in economic analysis it is common to look at the 
changes in the sectors overall efficiency, e.g. gain in producer and consumer 
surplus. In analysis of sectors operating under market conditions maximizing 
consumer and producer surplus can be shown to give a solution corresponding 
to the competitive equilibrium outcome (Hazell and Norton, 1986). The point 
is that the formulation of the model gives solutions which ex ante can predict 
the outcome, i.e. the issue is not whether the model is a maximization or simu-
lation model (réf.). In our case the problem is to assess the effects of property 
right based regulation compared to the current command and control regula-
tion (i.e. of the type 'what i f ) . 
Some of the political concerns are about the distributional effects. We 
will therefore, given predictions about the responses of the fishers to the pol-
icy, assess the consequences in terms of efficiency and distributional aspects, 
see section 10.1.3. 
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10.1.3 Measures of effects 
A main objective of economic analysis consists in the derivation of de-
mand and supply functions for the purpose of establishing market equilibria 
and predicting their response in relation to the displacement of some parame-
ters, i.e. comparative statics analysis. In our case the comparative statics analysis 
is conducted using the quota market, i.e. the derived market demand for quota 
and the exogenous given supply of quota (the TAC). 
The framework for the analysis is the neoclassical model assuming profit-
maximizing and competitive firms (i.e. fixed exogenous output and input pri-
ces) and the purpose is to measure the change in producer/firm welfare, if ITQs 
were replacing the current open-access regulation. The change in welfare can 
be measured using the concept of producer surplus or quasi-rent, see Just et. 
al., 1982, which is given by: 
n = TR - VC (3.1) 
where 
TR is total revenue 
VC is (total) variable costs 
D K K / 
t o n n e s 
/ H C 
/ 
t o n n e s 
Figure 10.1 Quasi-rent and producer surplus 
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Quasi-rent is a return to the fixed factors in the short run, but it may not 
persist over a long period of time since all factors are variable in the long run. 
Quasi-rent is also equal to gross margin. The quasi-rent for a single output/ 
species is the area under the exogenous price p and above the MC-curve, see 
figure 10.1. 
Using this welfare measure which is equal to the short run profit where 
some inputs are fixed, the effects of changes in regulation can be assessed at 
the firmlevel. Given fixed exogenous prices the measure also forms the basic for 
the analysis on the sector-, fleet- and regionlevel. The measure forms also the 
basis for analysis of the long run effects. 
The analysis of introducing ITQ in the Danish cod fishery can be separated 
in two parts: 
1. Moving from command and control regulation to INTQs. 
2. From INTQs to ITQs. 
10.1.3.1 The effects of allowing trade in an individual quota system 
We will first look at the effects from allowing trade, i.e. moving from 
INTQs to ITQs. The INTQs will to the extent that they are a limiting factor have 
a positive (shadow) value which is derived from the firms production technol-
ogy. The firms derived inverse demand curve for quota is shown in figure 10.2 
for two different firms, D, and D2. These curves can be derived from the firm 
level demand and supply of f ish from figure 10.1. It is inverse because on the 
margin the firms adjust the marginal value of quota instead of the exogenous 
given quota, see Squires 1995. 
The two firms are assumed to have the same allocation of quota under 
INTQ, T and the implicit marginal quota value for the firms are T, and T2, respec-
tively. The area under each demand curve up to T is the economic rent or the 
total producer surplus (TPS) 1). The total producer surplus can be divided into 
(implicit) rental/quota income (Ql) and harvest income (HI). The quota income 
for f i rml is the rectangle T, * T. Harvest income is the triangle under D, and 
above T,. 
The market demand curve for quota D,T0 is obtained by horizontal sum-
mation of the firms demands curves. Given the fixed supply of quota 2T a mar-
ket equilibrium with quota price TITQ is established. The production of firm 1 is 
reduced by T-q, (unit quota rent increases), while production of f irm 2 is in-
creased (unit quota rent decrease) by q2-T (=T-q,). The marginal quota values 
are equalized across firms. 
1) In the literature this area is called total producer surplus, or total willingness to 
pay. 
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Figure 10.2 Demand for quota, ITQ market and welfare effects 
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The welfare effects are also shown in figure 3.2. Firm 1 sells quota T-q, 
with a value of ABTq, for AETq„ implying a gain of AEB. Firm 2 purchase quota 
q2-T for EDq2T with a value of CDc^T, a gain of CDE. The aggregated gain in 
total producer surplus is therefore AEB+CDE (the shadowed area). The total 
change in quota income from trade (AQI) is T I T Q*2T - (T,*T + T 2 *T) and the total 
change in harvest income (AHI)is T|TQE'G - (T,BF + T2CG). The gains are obtained 
as less efficient vessels sell quota to more efficient vessels. Since it is not possi-
ble to increase the total gain further the economic rent from the species is max-
imized. The quota income T,T Q*2T corresponds to the resource rent and TITQ is 
the marginal user cost of biomass, if 2T is the optimal total quota (Moloney and 
Pearce, 1979). The change in TPS from trade is always positive 1). 
10.1.3.2 The effects of going from Command and Control regulation to 
INTQ regulation 
The type of open-access regulation executed in the Danish cod-fisheries 
(rations) is in principle an INTQ for the ration-period. The analysis of the effects 
Figure 10.3 The implicit inverse derived demand for rations 
1) Or zero. This very rare case happens when the initial distribution of quota 
corresponds exactly with the allocation created by the quota market. 
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contains therefore the same elements as the analysis above, however, now an 
explicit market for quotas is not established. The rations (to the extent that 
they are a limiting factor) will have a positive (shadow) value and for each ra-
tion period a demand curve for quota/ration is obtained and by summing the 
demand curves given the catch distribution on each ration period a implicit 
demand curve for yearly rations/quotas is obtained, see figure 10.3. 
The effects of introducing INTQ is also shown in the figure. The demands 
curves for INTQ can be obtained by summing the ration demand curves now 
without the catchdistributions on each ration period. The gain in producer 
surplus is the area under DINTQ and above DRUR2 up ti l l R1+R2. The gain is ob-
tained from reallocation of effort f rom rationperiods wi th low implicit unit 
quota value to period with high implicit unit quota value until TR1 = TR2. 
10.1.3.3 The effects on the incentives to invest 
The effects of trade and adjustment of fishing pattern are estimated, 
given the amount and composition of the capital stock. In practice the fisher-
men adjust both the level of quota, fishing pattern and the capital stock simul-
taneously to maximize the net present value of fishing. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to show whether existing vessels and fishermen following the implemen-
tation of the individual quota system do face changes in the incentives to in-
vest. Fishermen have the option to re-configured their existing vessels given the 
new operating rules in the IQ-system. However, this option is supposed to be 
very limited, since changes in the configuration of the capital of a given vessel 
is difficult without changing the whole ship, i.e. the proportions of a ship is 
more or less fixed. As noted by Segerson and Squires (1990) an existing vessel 
is typically sold and another one purchased or a new one is built. 
The operating rules under TAC and short term rations are, however, dif-
ferent than the rules under IQ and consequently it can not be expected before-
hand that vessels optimal under TAC and rations also are optimal under IQ. The 
ideal analysis allows for simultaneous adjustment in both quota and capital 
holdings. However, the approach adapted here is that adjustments in quota 
holdings are a short term decision and adjustments in capital holdings are a 
long run decision. Therefore, fol lowing the implementation of an ITQ-system 
the vessel-owner is optimizing the quota-holdings given the existing capital. 
The intention is to investigate whether an existing vessel will face incentives to 
exit the fleet following the implementation of the IQ system. If a vessel has 
incentives to exit the fleet the conclusion of the analysis is that this vessel will 
only stay in operation in the long run, if the capital holdings are changed. 
Open access and open-access regulation 
The exit rule under open-access regulation is: 
IT < PK K (3.2) 
233 
where 
IT is quasi-rent (or constrained variable profit) 
PK is the unit rental price of capital 
K is a capital measure 
If the quasi-rent to the capital per period is less than the rental price of 
capital then the vessel will leave. From this expression some interesting consid-
erations can be made. If the rental price of capital is low, then the vessels will 
receive higher incentives to stay in the fishery. These situations applies to fish-
eries wi th few alternative possibilities or when the vessels are old. 
If there are strict regulations in force about extension of the capacity of 
existing vessels then the vessels that have incentives to stay can not extend 
their capacity/capital in order to fish with lower average cost. 
The expression can also be used to evaluate under which circumstances 
there will be entry of capital (new investment). The rental price of capital is in 
these cases higher than for existing vessels. If there is open access regulation 
of the type as in the Danish North Sea fishery for human consumption then 
there will be very limited possibilities to increase the short run profit, because 
the catches can not be increased. Only through cost savings the profit can in-
crease. Hereto comes the expenses to buy an existing and similar vessel out of 
the fishery. The entry rule for new-comers can be formulated as: 
IV < (IT - PK K)/r (3.3) 
where 
IV is the cost of buying an existing and similar vessel out of the fishery 
r is the discount rate 
If the cost of entry is less than the capitalized value of future earnings 
then entry is possible. Comparison of equations (3.2) and (3.3) shows the asym-
metric between the exit and entry rule. 
Individual non-transferable quotas 
Under INTQs there is a shadow cost of quotas. It can be shown (see e.g. 
Squires 1993 and Vestergaard 1996) that adjusting each output price of the 
outputs subject to quota by the shadow prices of quotas and then optimizing 
the production plan without the quota constraints gives exactly the same solu-
tion as optimizing with the output prices and quota constraints. Therefore the 
implicit exit rule under INTQ is: 
0 > IT -_T Q0 - PK K (3.4) 
where 
Q0 is the initial quota holding of the firm 
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If IT - PK K > 0, the vessel is still making money, but if the inequality rela-
tion (3.4) is fulfilled, a vessel wi th another configuration or the existing vessel 
with changes in the capital composition may do even better. Anyhow there are 
incentives to disinvest and whether the vessel will leave or not or whether the 
vessel will be replaced or not is beforehand impossible to answer. However, the 
more negative the right hand side of equation (3.4) is the more likely it will be 
that the vessel will exit. 
In reality a combined market of quotas and vessels on the market for 
vessels is created, for an example see Flaaten, Heen and Salvanes (1996). Since 
a vessel with INTQ is more valuable than a vessel without INTQ the value of the 
quota is included in the price of capital, because the individual quota (IQ) is 
non-transferable. This implies that the price of capital is higher for a vessel with 
INTQ than a vessel without INTQ. 
Individual transferable quotas 
Under ITQs the exit rule for a given vessel can be formulated as: 
T I T Q Q 0 > I T - _ T ( Q - Q 0 ) - P K K (3.5) 
where 
Q is the quota holdings after trade 
If the payoff per period from exit (the left hand side) is higher than the 
income earned in the fishery per period (the right hand side) the vessel will 
exit. By reformulating (3.5) the fol lowing expression is obtained: 
PK K > IT - T Q (3.6) 
If the return to the capital measured by the rental price (left hand side) 
is higher than the actual return earned (right hand side) then the vessel will 
exit. 
The long run effect is that the demand curve for quotas is shifted out in 
figure 3.2 as inefficient vessels leave the fleet. 
10.1.4 The structure of the Danish fisheries in the North Sea and Skagerrak 
The Danish fishery 1) is normally divided into human consumption fisher-
ies and industrial fisheries, see chapter 5.1 and 6.1 for a detailed description. 
Since cod is the single most important species in the human consumption fish-
1) The concept fishery is here defined based on either target species strategy (e.g. 
lobster fishery) and may consist of single or multiple species targeted and caught 
or either a strategy where a mix of species is caught (e.g. the mixed human 
consumption fishery). The concept can further be specified based on area and 
time period (e.g. lobster fishery in Skagerrak in september). 
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eries, the analysis will focus on vessels (and consequently fisheries) for which 
cod is an important species. 
In the North Sea and Skagerrak there are the fol lowing fisheries where 
human consumption species and cod are important: 
1. Mixed human consumption fishery after round- and flatfish. The composi-
t ion varies over the year and between fishing grounds. The gears in-
volved are trawl, gill-netters and Danish seiners. The target species vary 
over the year and can vary according to the geartype used, but cod, had-
dock, saithe, plaice and sole are the main species. This fishery could prob-
ably be divided into several fisheries, but this will require very detailed 
data. 
2. The lobster fishery in Skagerrak (and Kattegat). Only trawlers are in-
volved in this fishery. Important (by-)catch of cod. 
3. Shrimp fishery. Also only trawl. Important catches of cod and lobster. 
4. Norway trout fishery. It is an industrial fishery conducted by trawl only. 
Important bycatches of cod, saithe and haddock. 
The fleet (or part of it) can beside these fisheries change to the following 
fisheries: 
5. Sandell in the North Sea. Mainly trawl. A single species and an industrial 
fishery. 
6. Cod in the Baltic Sea. Mainly trawl, but gill-netters participate as well. In 
general a single species fishery. 
7. Herring in the Baltic Sea and Kattegat. Mainly trawl. 
8. Sprat fishery. Trawl. In principle a single species and an industrial fishery. 
The cod fisheries in 1993 
The Danish fisheries after cod takes place in 4 different areas: the North 
Sea (ICES area 4AC), Skagerrak (3AN), Kattegat (3AS) and the Baltic Sea (3BD). 
4AC has border to 3AN, who also has border to 3AS. 3BD has border to 3AS. 
The catches for 1993 in the areas were 19,465, 11,940, 4,270 and 9,590 tonnes, 
respectively (appendix A3.1). 
The fleet participating in the fisheries is composed of three gear types: 
Gill-netters (258 vessels in 1993), Danish seiners (104) and trawlers (341). The 
total number of vessels is 703. The former proposal about ITQs suggests that 
only vessels longer than 12m are included in an ITQ-system. From table 5.1 the 
landings from vessels in a potential ITQ-system of the 5 main human consump-
tion species show that the system will cover a large part of the catches from the 
North Sea and Skagerrak. 
Nearly all the gill-netters participate in the fishery in 4AC and about 1/2 
of them also in 3AN. Only a few gill-netters take part in the fishery in 3AS and 
3BD. The gill-netters target different round- and flatfish. 
The Danish seiners have the same overall fishing-pattern as the gill-
netters: they participate in the fisheries in 4AC and 3AN and to a small extent 
also in 3AS and 3BD. The Danish Seiners target different roundfish and plaice. 
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The trawlers have a more variable fishing pattern. The trawlers have 
mainly less than 100 GRT and some of them participate beside the codfisheries 
in the sandell fishery and in the herring fishery. 
The regulation and the regulatory process. 
The regulation of the fishery 1) after cod, haddock, saithe and sole is 
based on TACs divided into quarterly total quotas which are divided into ra-
tions for a given period, in some cases depending on the size of vessels. How-
ever, the number of participating vessels is not regulated so during the year the 
rations can get smaller or the rationperiod can be shortened and in some cases 
the fishery after a species is simply closed. Also the herring and mackerel fisher-
ies are in principle regulated by this method. It is possible in a number of cases 
to transfer ration from one period to the next. 
Whether the regulation carried out in 1993 has been a limiting factor (a 
binding constraint) for the fleet can be investigated in several ways. It can be 
indicated by comparing the TAC and the total catch for the relevant species. If 
the catch is close to the TAC (say 10% deviation) the regulation can have been 
a limiting factor. In the North Sea the total catch for cod, saithe, sole, mackerel, 
herring and sprat was within 10% of the TAC. In Skagerrak the TAC for cod, 
plaice, mackerel, and sprat have been exploited over 90%. In Kattegat the total 
catch for cod and mackerel and in the Baltic Sea the total catch for Cod is 
within 10% of the TAC. 
Examination of how the regulation has changed over the year can also 
provide insight in which species have been a limiting factor due to regulation. 
If the regulation has been changed relatively often in a downgoing direction 
then the fishery is being constrained. The regulation for cod in the North Sea, 
Skagerrak and Kattegat was not changed significantly until november where 
the rations where cut down for all areas and the ration period shortened for 
North Sea and Skagerrak. The cod fishery in the Baltic Sea was stopped several 
times during the year and the rations were changed as well indicating very 
limiting conditions. The regulation of haddock in all areas was cancelled in 
august, while the rations of saithe in all areas was changed several times be-
fore the fishery was stopped in October. Finally the regulation of sole in the 
North Sea indicates limiting possibilities, change of rations several times and 
one stop, before the fishery finally was closed in November. 
From this it can be concluded that the cod and saithe fishery in all the 4 
areas have been constrained by the limited TAC. Sole has been constrained in 
the North Sea. The TAC for plaice in the Skagerrak was exploited over 90%, but 
no regulation was carried out. Other fisheries that have been limited in 1993 
are sprat (part of the industrial fishery) and mackerel in the North Sea and 
Skagerrak, and herring in the North Sea. 
1) In the regulation context the term fishery is not used as in the literature. Cod 
fishery is simple the situation where cod is (a part of) the catch. 
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Modeling or construction of the behavior from the actual allocation of 
effort in 1993 mostly takes into account this regulation environment, see also 
appendix A4a. 
10.1.5 Formulation of the empirical model 
The database and relevant vessels. 
Only vessels which fulf i l l the following three conditions are considered: 
1. Vessel length over 12 meter; 
2. Total catch of cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak in 1993 is more than 
15 tonnes. 
3. The total revenue from fishing in the North Sea and Skagerrak is over 1/4 
of the total revenue. 
The first condition is as mentioned based on former proposals about ITQs 
in the danish fisheries, which all exclude vessels wi th a length lesser than 12 
meter. The second condition secures that vessels are excluded if they in 1993 
had a minor catch of cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak. These vessels will 
therefore not be important in a potential ITQ-system based on the catch record 
in 1993. By the third condition are only vessels selected for which the North Sea 
and Skagerrak are important fishing areas. There are only 10 vessels out of the 
470 that fulfi l l condition 1) and 2) that didn't fulf i l l condition 3) as well. 
In order to have a manageable model only vessels from the port of 
Esbjerg and Thyboron were considered. Esbjerg and Thyboron are located on 
the west coast of Jutland and the vessels have the North Sea and Skagerrak as 
their main fishing areas. Thus they will be an important part of any regulation 
system of the cod fisheries in these areas. There are 18 vessels from Esbjerg and 
149 vessels from Thyboron, in total 167 vessels, see appendix A3.1. 
The data consists of: 
1. information on the volume and value of landings of each of the follow-
ing species: cod, haddock, saithe, plaice, sole, lobster, shrimp, herring, 
mackerel, species for industrial purpose. Other species are grouped to-
gether; 
2. the month of landing; 
3. the fishing area for every tr ip made in 1993 of the relevant vessels. 
The cost information is limited. Here are only aggregate data from a few 
ports available. 
The trip information allows for a division of the annual fishery activity 
based on month and area. The data allows to a minor extent for division into 
several different fisheries. The different fisheries - defined here by target spe-
cies and area - are: 
1. Mixed human consumption fishery in the North Sea, Skagerrak and Katte-
gat. 
2. Lobster in the North Sea, Skagerrak and Kattegat (>30%). 
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3. Shrimp in the North Sea and Skagerrak (>30%). 
4. Cod in the Baltic Sea. 
5. Herring in all 4 areas (>50%). 
6. Industrial (>50%). 
7. Mackerel (>50%). 
8. Sole(>15%) 
These fisheries can be separated from each other based on the mesh-size 
regulation. The general mesh size is 100 mm, but for herring, sole, mackerel, 
lobster, shrimp smaller mesh size can be used, if the total catch contains a cer-
tain proportion of the relevant and targeted species (the percentage in blanket 
above). 
This division gives 19 fisheries and consequently 12*19 different activities. 
The mixed human consumption fishery in the North Sea and Skagerrak can 
probably be divided into several different fisheries, but given the data it seems 
not reasonable to divide this fishery further. However, the division by month 
and area compensates to some extent for this, because the changes in species 
composition, i.e. change of fishery, are connected to a given time period. Each 
vessel take part only in 10-20% of the total number of activities and a large 
part do have a stable fishing pattern with participation in 1 to 3 fisheries in 1-2 
areas over the year, see appendix A3.3. 
The model 
A detailed description of the model and the data and the construction 
process is provided in appendices 3 and 4. The model is first formulated as a 
linear programmering model using 1993 as the baseline year. This model is 
then calibrated to the observed behaviour in 1993 using a new method called 
Positive Mathematical Programmering (PMP). The PMP approach is described 
in appendix 4. The calibrated model can be the used to forecast the effects of 
Individual quotas. 
Scenarios analysis of individual quotas 
The allocation of individual quotas (IQs) is assumed to be based on the 
catch-record of 1993. The allocation is also assumed to be assigned to each 
vessel as a percentage of the total quota. We will at the outset look at three 
overall and different scenarios: 
1. IQs for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak. 
2. IQs for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak and sole in the North Sea and 
all the other areas. 
3. IQs as in 2, but extended with IQs on saithe for all areas. 
These scenarios are based on how the TAC for each species is determined 
and on species that tend to be the most important. For cod there are TACs for 
all 4 areas. There are two TACs for sole. North Sea and all the other areas re-
spectively, while one TAC is formulated for saithe. 
The next two sections will analyzed the results of different policy scenar-
ios of INTQs and ITQs. 
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10.1.6 Results of individual non-transferable quotas 
In this section we will give the results of analyzing the different policy sce-
narios of INTQs (as outlined above) in the model. 
Allocation of INTQs for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak 
The total short run gain from allocating each vessel two INTQs for cod in 
the North Sea and the Skagerrak respectively corresponding to the catches in 
1993 is 7.43%, see table 10.1. 
Table 10.1 
Scenarios 
1 
2 
3 
Changes in quasi-rent, reveneu, 
Quasi-rent (%) TR (%) 
8,860(7.4) 12,486(4.4) 
6,260(5.4) 6,410(2.3) 
5,227(4.5) 4,083(1.4) 
and cost following INTQs. 1,000 DKK 
TC (%) 
3,806 (2.3) 
0,150(0.0) 
-1,114 (-0.7) 
Labour Other var. costs 
4,560(4.3) -0,754(1.3) 
2,281 (2.1) -2,131 (3.6) 
1,357(1.3) -2,501(4.2) 
Note: TR and TC is total revenue and total costs respectively. 
The gain comes from allowing each firm to allocate effort to the periods 
where the quasi-rent is highest. There are in principle three sources contribut-
ing to the gain: higher catches of other species, fishing in times of the year 
where the prices are relatively higher and cost savings due to reallocation. 
From table 10.1 it can be seen that the gain is not due to costs savings, since 
the total cost increase by 2.3%. However, since labor cost is a part of the reve-
nue it could be interesting to look at the changes in labor cost and the other 
variable cost separately. The increase in cost is due to increasing labor cost 
(4.3% higher), since the other variable cost falls by 1.3%, see table 10.1. The 
overall conclusion is therefore that the gain to a large extent (about 91 %) is 
due to higher gross total revenue from the fishery. 
Catches of other species increases, see appendix A3.4, mainly the catches 
in The North Sea (4AC) increases, especially sole, plaice and saithe respectively. 
This is an important feature of the joint production technology. Since it is a 
short term change, it can be expected that as the fisher's changes factor inputs 
the substitution towards other species will increase. However, the result here 
indicates that the substitution possibilities are limited for this fleet to the North 
Sea and to sole (catches increase over 40%), while catches of plaice and saithe 
increase about 5% and 11 %, respectively. Changes of fishing activities to other 
areas seem also not to be any serious problem in the short run. 
Allocation of INTQs for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak and sole in the 
North Sea and in all other areas. 
Each vessel is here allocated four INTQs. Referring to tables 10.1 and ap-
pendix A3.4 the results of adding quotas on sole are as expected. Compared to 
allocation of INTQs for cod the gains in quasi-rent and the catches of other 
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species decrease. By adding more quota constraints the firm's substitution pos-
sibilities wil l decrease, because of increasing limitations in reorganizing the 
firm's joint harvesting, i.e. Le Chatelier effect. Since the Le Chatelier effect oc-
curs, the firm may have increasing difficulties in matching the harvesting rates 
wi th quota holdings and therefore INTQs can contribute to the problems of 
quota overage. In appendix A3.4 it seems not to be a problem on the industry 
level, since the catches are the same as in 1993. 
Allocation of INTQs for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak, sole in the North 
Sea and in all other areas and saithe in all areas 
Five INTQs are allocated to each vessel. The gains in quasi-rent and 
catches of non-quota species decrease further, but compared to the outcome 
of 1993 there are still gains of allocating each f irm INTQs (table 10.1). An in-
spection of the catches of the quota species indicates that adding the quota on 
saithe might lead to problems of quota overage, see appendix A3.4. Since the 
model requires the firm's to comply wi th the quota constaints, the firm's can 
not continue harvesting species with binding quota constraints even if there 
are still quota left for the other quota species. In reality the f irm might con-
tinue harvesting and dispose the excess production beyond quota either as 
discard at-sea or landings beside official channels. 
Distributional effects and incentives to investldisinvest 
Appendix A3.5 shows that out of a total number of 168 vessels 54 faced 
negative profit and 113 had positive profit in 1993. The distribution on gear-
type indicates that more trawlers (12 out of 27) and Danish Seiners (30 out of 
77) than the average have negative profit, while more gill-netters (51 out of 
73) obtain positive profit. Under the current regulation scheme it must be ex-
pected that some adjustment still will take place, mainly towards gill-netters. 
Under INTQs the profit of each firm will increase and for a number of ves-
sels this increase may result in positive profit. However, the analysis shows that 
vessels which under the current regulation scheme had negative profit con-
tinue to have negative profit under the INTQ system, only 2 out of 54 vessel 
change from negative to positive profit in all the scenarios. The reason is that 
the vessels with negative profit were not in any significant way influenced by 
the 1993 regulation scheme and therefore optimized more or less without any 
constraints. Under INTQ these vessels are not expected to change behaviour, 
since relaxing the constraints wil l not change the optimal production plan of 
these vessels. INTQ will, however, increase the profit of vessels which were con-
strained by the 1993 regulation. The conclusion is therefore (based on profit 
comparisons) that an INTQ system is a benefit for the vessels which were con-
strained under the 1993 regulation. 
10.1.7 Results of individual transferable quotas 
In this section we will give the results of analyzing the different policy 
scenarios of ITQs in the model. 
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Allocation of ITQs for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak 
The total short run gain from allocating each vessel two ITQs for cod in 
the North Sea and the Skagerrak respectively corresponding to the catches in 
1993 is 13.2% or 15.4 million DKK, see table 10.2. 
Table 10.2 
Scenario 
1 
2 
3 
Changes in quasi 
Quasi-rent 
15,410(13.2) 
14,133(12.1) 
13,805(11.8) 
-rent, revenue, 
TR (%) 
8,589 (3.0) 
3,556(1.3) 
1,919(0.7) 
and cost following ITQs. 1,000 DKK 
TC (%) 
-6,821 (-4.1) 
-10,577 (-6.4) 
-11,886 (-7.2) 
Labour Other var. costs 
2,848(2.7) -9,668 (-16.4) 
884(0.8) -11,461 (-19.4) 
336(0.3) -12,222 (-20,7) 
Note.TR and TC is total revenue and total cost respectively. 
These gains (compared to 1993) comes from two sources, better planing 
of fishing operations for each vessel due to individual quotas and reallocation 
of quota holdings from less efficient vessels to more efficient vessel through 
trade of quota. From table 10.2 it can be seen that increase in revenue counts 
for about 1/3 of the gains and cost savings (i.e. savings in other variable cost) 
for about 2/3 of the gains. Compared to the gains under INTQs the gains under 
ITQs is mainly due to cost savings which arises when the quotas are traded. This 
result is in accordance wi th the main hypotheses about ITQs. 
Catches (appendix A3.6) of other species than cod will increase under ITQs 
except plaice in Skagerrak. The catches of plaice (and in limited extent sole) in 
the North Sea will increase less than under INTQs, see appendix A3.6. This indi-
cates that the vessels which sell quotas are vessels which catch the main part of 
the plaice, i.e., first of all the Danish seiners. 
The catches of other species than sole in the North Sea and plaice tend 
to increase more than under INTQs which shows that ITQs not only lead to cost 
savings but also a better utilization of the catch possibilities of other species, 
i.e. higher revenues. 
Allocation of ITQs for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak and sole in the North 
Sea and in all other areas 
The gain is 12.1% which mainly comes from cost savings. The revenue in-
creases but the contribution to the overall gain is more than halved compared 
to scenario 1. This shows that the fleet at the overall level after the introduc-
tion of ITQs on sole can not compensate in full extent by substitution of catches 
of other species. In fact the catches of other species fall compared to ITQs on 
cod (i.e. scenario 1), but the figures show that the decrease is moderate. The 
increase in revenue is less than under INTQs although catches of many of the 
other species are higher. However, the catches of plaice in the North Sea are 
substantial lower under ITQs than under INTQs which explains the lower in-
crease in revenue. Again the vessel selling quota's have plaice as a important 
part of their catches, i.e., Danish seiners. 
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Allocation oflTQs for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak, sole in the North Sea 
and in all other areas and saithe in all areas 
The gain in quasi-rent is 11.8% which is over 2Vi times higher than the 
gain under INTQs. The gain under scenario 1 was about 1,75 times higher, so 
the fleet can at an overall level under ITQs adjust easier to implementations of 
more quota's than under INTQs. Almost the total gain in quasi-rent is coming 
from cost savings, only about 10% of the gain is due to increase in revenue. 
Under INTQs each firm expirience a loss (or decrease in gain compared to 
the 1993 situation) in quasi-rent as more and more quota's are added, see table 
10.3. However, when the IQs are made transferable, the fleet can reduce the 
loss by trading the quota's. This leads to an increase in the gain of trade when 
more and more quota's are implemented, see table 10.3. 
Table 10.3 
Scenarios 
1 
2 
3 
Quasi-rent and gain: > of trade. 
1993 
116,851 
116,851 
116,851 
1,000 DKK 
INTQs 
125,531 
123,112 
122,078 
ITQs 
132,262 
130,984 
130,656 
Gains of 
6,731 
7,872 
8,578 
The difference in gain in quasi-rent under ITQs for all three scenarios is 
within a range of 2 million DKK (or 10.4%) and substantial lesser than under 
INTQs which indicate that the fleet on the industry level has greater opportu-
nity to adjust to limited quotas when the quotas are transferable than when 
they are non-transferable. This is an important point because many ITQ-systems 
have de facto been more or less an INTQ-system and consequently, because the 
system has limited the transferability, the problems arising with discards ect. 
are enlarged. 
The results of the model show that at the industry level the fleet can 
match the quota levels set in 1993, i.e., positive quota prices are formed and 
in principle there should not be problems with discards or quota overage. This 
requires a well functioning quota market and enforcement. 
The quota price 
Since the quasi-rent and catches in all the scenarios are relatively equal 
the equilibrium quota price can also be expected to be more or less equal in 
the scenarios, see table 10.4. The quota price of cod for area 3AN is about 
3 DKK and 5.3 DKK for area 4 AC. For sole the prices are 19 DKK and 24.5 DKK, 
respectively, while for saithe the price is 8 DKK. The largest change in quota 
price is obtained for cod in area 3AN from scenarios 2 to 3, a drop at 0.5 DKK 
(17%). This drop is due to implementation of ITQ on saithe which lead to an 
decrease in catches of saithe in 4 AC and consequently makes cod quota less 
demanded, indicating complementarity between saithe and cod in area 4 AC. 
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Table 10.4 
Scenarios 
1 
2 
3 
Quota prices per species 
3AN 
3.02 
3.00 
2.49 
and area. DKK/unit 
Cod 
4AC 
5.31 
5.35 
5.14 
4AC 
19.09 
19.07 
Sole 
OA 
24.56 
24.60 
Saithe 
AA 
7.97 
Notes: OA means other areas and AA all areas. 
The quota prices is less than the output prices, but in several cases greater 
than the output price adjusted by the crew share. This indicates that under 
joint production the quota prices also reflect the value of other species which 
can be landed when additional quota is obtain. 
Trade of quota 
Since the trade of quota is voluntary, every vessel-owner who trades is 
better off under ITQs than under INTQs. The profit increases for all the vessels. 
Vessels wi th economic advantages by selling quotas are doing so and obtain 
earnings which are higher than the earnings they could obtain by using the 
quota themselves. The same argument applies to the buying vessels. There is 
an extensive amount of trading, in fact all the vessels are active in the quota 
market. There are 86 sellers and 81 buyers in the market under scenario 1. The 
main sellers are Danish Seiners, trawlers and gill-netters less than 20 GRT. 
Whether a trade-owner is a seller or a buyer in the market is in general inde-
pendent of the profit result in 1993. However, the main part of the sellers are 
vessels with negative profit in 1993 and the main part of the buyers are vessels 
with positive profit. After trade the number of vessels with negative profit fall 
to 39 from 54 in 1993 (scenario 1). 
Incentives to exit 
However, this is not the whole story. By creating an quota market the 
holdings of quotas have an opportunity value which is real expense for the 
vessel-owners. The profit for the vessel-owners must therefore be compared 
with the value of the quota. If the value of the quota is higher than the profit, 
the vessel-owner has incentives to leave the sector, see equation 3.5 in section 
10.1.3.3. 
In tables 10.5-10.7 are shown the number of vessels wi th positive incen-
tives and negative incentives to remain in the fleet in the three different sce-
narios, respectively. 
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Table 10.5 Number of vessels with incentives to exit by gear 
GRT 
E a) 
and size-groups 
No (E+L) 
Lb) 
(scenario 1) 
Total (E+L) 
Gill-netters 
Trawlers 
Danish seiners 
Total 
<20 
2 20 
<20 
2 0 - 5 9 
6 0 - 9 9 
2 100 
<19.9 
2 20 
+2/0-
+3/1-
+2/0-
+1/1-
+3/5-
+26/19-
+11/1-
+2/3-
+0/7-
+2/0-
+5/4-
+1/2-
+16/50-
+11/7- +63/86-
+28/19-
+14/2-
+2/3-
+0/7-
+4/0-
+6/5-
+1/2-
+19/55-
+74/93-
Notes: + indicates incentives to stay, - incentives to exit, 
a) Esbjerg; b) Lemvig (Thyboron). 
Table 10.6 Number of vessels with incentives to exit by gear and size-groups (scenario 2) 
GRT No (E+L) 
<20 
2 20 
<20 
20-59 
60-99 
2 100 
< 19.9 
2 20 
E a) 
+2/0-
+3/1-
+2/0-
+1/1-
+3/5-
Lb) 
+19/26-
+10/2-
+2/3-
+0/7-
+2/0-
+5/4-
+1/2-
+16/50-
Total (E+L) 
+21/26-
+13/3-
+2/3-
+0/7-
+4/0-
+6/5-
+1/2-
+19/55-
Gill-netters 
Trawlers 
Danish seiners 
Total +11/7- +55/94- +66/101-
Notes: + indicates incentives to stay, - incentives to exit, 
a) Esbjerg; b) Lemvig (Thyboron). 
The number of vessels wi th incentives to exit under scenario 1 increased 
f rom 54 to 93 vessels, which are mainly trawlers less than 60 GRT and Danish 
seiners. Under scenario 2 the number of vessels with incentives to exit is further 
increased to 101 due to higher number of gill-netters (less than 20 GRT). Sce-
narios 3 is almost like scenarios 2, number of vessels wi th incentives to exit is 
here 99. Common for all the scenarios is that vessels wi th negative profit in 
1993 should all also exit under the ITQ-system. A number of vessels wi th posi-
tive profit in 1993 (between 39 and 46) is also expected to exit the fleet. These 
are mainly Danish seiners larger than 20 GRT (25-26 vessels), trawlers between 
20 and 60 GRT (2-3 vessels) and gill-netters larger than 20 GRT (7-14 vessels). 
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Table 10.7 Number of vessels with incentives to exit by gear and size-groups (scenario 3) 
Gill-netters 
Trawlers 
Danish seiners 
Total 
GRT 
<20 
* 20 
<20 
20-59 
60-99 
> 100 
<19.9 
2 20 
E a) 
+2/0-
+3/1-
+2/0-
+1/1-
+3/5-
+11/7-
No (E+L) 
Lb) 
+19/26-
+10/2-
+2/3-
+1/6-
+2/0-
+5/4-
+1/2-
+17/49-
+57/92-
Total (E+L) 
+21/26-
+13/3-
+2/3-
+1/6-
+4/0-
+6/5-
+1/2-
+20/54-
+68/99-
Notes: + indicates incentives to stay, - incentives to exit, 
a) Esbjerg; b) Lemvig (Thyboron). 
10.1.8 Conclusions 
The results of the model indicate that the adjustment of the fleet which 
has taken place since 1987 is not finished. About 1/3 of the vessels operate with 
negative profits. The negative profit, particularly within the Danish seiners and 
trawlers, is consistent wi th the adjustments in the fleet up 1993. 
Implementation of an ITQ-system can increase the quasi-rent of the fleet 
by about 12%. For a comprehensive ITQ-system covering the vessels catching 
a significant amount of roundfish in the North Sea or/and Skagerrak the gain 
in quasi-rent could be up to 70 million DKK per year. Whether this is enough 
to cover the expenses of implementing and running the system is an open 
question. 
The resulting fleet structure under an ITQ system, i.e. the adjustments 
expected in the long run, is more or less in accordance with the development 
up till now. The number of vessels with incentives to exit the fleet increases by 
about 75%. The gain of the ITQ-system in the long run can therefore be larger 
because of exit of inefficient vessels and redundant capital. However, the pe-
riod for this adjustment can be long, if the alternatives for both labor and capi-
tal is limited and this could be an argument for still to support decommission-
ing vessels. The main change in the adjustment pattern compared to the ad-
justment up til l now is that trawlers between 20 and 60 GRT and gill-netters 
less than 20 GRT are affected by the ITQ-system to exit the fleet. 
10.2 Perspectives on continuity of individual enterprises in the Neth-
erlands 
The Dutch Agricultural Economics Research Institute has analyzed the 
economic consequences of measures such as TAC-decreases. The analysis is car-
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ried out using a fleet model (programmed in FORTRAN) which has already 
been developed some years ago (LEI-publication 5.79). 
The predictive value of the model has been tested in the past. In 1988 an 
analysis was done with respect to the Dutch cutter fleet. It was concluded that 
within 2-4 years about 100 to 140 vessels wi th 50-70,000 kW would probably 
leave the fleet. Overcapacity was especially evident in the roundfish sector and 
with respect to Eurocutters. 
In reality the number of vessels decreased from 603 in 1988 to 494 at the 
end of 1991. Total kWs of the fleet dropped by about 70,000 kW. Recession in 
the roundfish sector hit hard as earnings and effort of the vessels almost halved 
between 1988 and 1991. The number of Eurocutters changed hardly in this 
period. On the one hand, several Eurocutters retired from the sector as was 
predicted by the model, on the other hand a significant number of new Euro-
cutters were built by former owners of larger cutters having sufficient quota. 
In general, one can say that the model proved to be pretty accurate in the 
1988 analysis in predicting future developments of the fleet in the short and 
long term. 
10.2.1 Methodology of the model 
The Dutch cutter fleet consists mainly of beam trawlers which fish for flat-
fish in the North Sea. Less important target species are shrimp (smaller vessels) 
and cod (medium sized vessels). Quotas for plaice and sole dropped sharply in 
1996 and are even lower in 1997. The question is how many vessels will be able 
to survive in the short and long run, in light of these quota reductions. 
The model analysis was based on detailed information about: 
individual fishing rights (ITQs) in 1996 for plaice, sole, cod, whit ing and 
herring of the entire fleet ( 461 vessels); 
individual gross revenues of the vessels involved in shrimp fishing in 1994; 
average composition of costs in 1995, subdivided into some 25 compo-
nents, for 13 different kW-groups and two regions, based on LEI-DLO 
annual costs and earnings surveys, which involve about one third of the 
fleet; 
average annual fishing effort in kW-days for the same kW-groups; 
average level of solvability (debts) for small, medium and large vessels, 
average prices of fish and fuel in 1996 
Subsequently the following steps have been implemented: 
a. Potential gross revenues have been calculated for each individual vessel 
according to their individual quotas and average fish prices. To account 
for by-catches of species which are not regulated, 17.5% has been added 
to the potential 'quota' revenues. 
b. Costs were aggregated into the fol lowing components: 
- fuel; 
- remuneration of the crew including the owner; 
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- other variable costs; 
- interest costs and depreciation costs of investments not financed wi th 
debt; 
- costs of debt (repayment/interest on loans); 
- other fixed costs. 
c. Two levels of break-even gross revenues were calculated for each vessel, 
which were considered relevant as a requirement to survive in the short 
and long term: 
Long term (4-7 years) 
All costs are covered, including depreciation on the vessel and all costs of 
capital. 
Short term (1-3 years) 
Costs of depreciation and interest of investments not externally financed 
are not covered. All other costs, including costs of debt, are compensated 
by earnings. 
In the calculation of break-even gross revenues a constant productivity 
was assumed. In this way lower (potential) earnings lead to accordingly 
lower variable costs. This is also true with respect to the remuneration of 
the crew which is dependent on earnings minus fuel costs. 
d. For each vessel the following ratio could be calculated for both time peri-
ods: 
Ratio = potential gross revenues/ break-even gross revenues 
For each period the vessels were divided into 4 groups according to this 
ratio in order to qualify their apparent economic strength: 
Strong 
Reasonable 
Dubious 
Weak 
ratio > 1 
0.8 < ratio < 1 
0.6 < ratio < 0.8 
ratio < 0.6 
10.2.2 Results 
Using the model on the active Dutch cutters at the end of 1995, the fol-
lowing matrix was obtained, which assesses the economic strength of the cut-
ters. 
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Table 10.8 Economic strength of the Dutch cutter fleet on the basis of 1996 ITQs in the short 
term (number of vessels) 
HP-group Weak Dubious Reasonable Strong Total fleet 
0-
261 -
301-
1101-
260 
300 
1100 
Total fleet 
17 
20 
2 
14 
4 
11 
7 
18 
4 
18 
4 
59 
87 
85 
10 
101 
112 
134 
23 
192 
53 40 85 283 461 
It is expected that in the short term about 50 to 90 vessels classified as 
dubious or weak will run into serious financial problems. In one to three years 
these vessels will have trouble to meet their short term financial obligations. 
If these ships were to quit the fishing business about 35,000 to 80,000 HP en-
gine power would leave the fleet. This represents about 12% of the total fleet. 
However, these vessels posses only a very small share of the national quota. The 
obvious conclusion is therefore that vessel-owners who invested more than 
average in quota now have better chances for survival. 
A closer look at the 50-90 troubled ships learns us that most of them are 
small. However, this prediction is probably too pessimistic. Many of the smaller 
vessel-owners (0-260 HP) fish mainly for shrimp and are used to low incomes 
and results. A lot of them will probably continue their business. 
About 35% of the troubled vessels has more then 1,100 HP. Cutters from 
the northern ports face more serious problems than their southern colleagues. 
Only about 5 vessels of the southern fleet (south of Katwijk) may have to stop 
fishing before 1999. 
Table 10.9 Economic strength on the basis of 1996 ITQs of the Dutch cutter fleet in the long 
term (number of vessels) 
HP-group Weak Dubious Reasonable Strong Total fleet 
0-
261 -
301 -
1101 -
260 
300 
1100 
Total fleet 
33 
52 
8 
29 
17 
15 
5 
70 
18 
15 
4 
45 
44 
52 
6 
48 
112 
134 
23 
192 
122 107 82 150 461 
The prospects of the Dutch cutter fleet in the long run will further deteri-
orate if quota remain at the 1996 level. About 120 to 230 cutters will not be 
able to replace their vessels in time because of lacking earnings. This means 
that a significant part of the Dutch cutter fleet, 80,000 to 230,000 HP, is in dan-
ger in the long run. 
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The fishing rights of the concerned vessels amount for 37% of the na-
tional sole and plaice quota. The other vessels, which are expected to survive, 
posses 63% of the quota but only 53% of the total kWs in the cutter fishery. 
It seems that vessel owners, who have invested heavily in quotas, are on the 
right track. 
Of the 229 weak or dubious vessels 100 have engines over 1,100 HP. This 
amounts for almost 50% of the larger cutters at the end of 1995. Also about 
half of the Eurocutters will be in serious problems on the long run. 
As can be expected most of the ships older than 20 years are classified as 
weak or dubious. Only 82 of 197 older vessels are expected to survive. Ships 
younger than 10 years are considered to be in a stronger economic position. 
Possibly 50 of 130 vessels may have to leave the business. 
The above calculations are probably too pessimistic. Many of the smaller 
vessel-owners (0-260 HP) fish mainly for shrimp and are used to low incomes 
and results. A lot of them will probably continue their business. 
The above calculations are based on 1996 TACs, which were much lower 
than in 1995, and 1996 fish prices which were much higher. Further model 
analysis seems to indicate that these factors compensated each other to a large 
extent. 
In reality about 14 vessels retired from fishing in 1996 with about 
10,000 HPs. 
10.2.3 Sensitivity analysis 
In addition to the analysis of the real data a sensitivity analysis has been 
carried out wi th the model. It turned out that changes in fish prices have a 
bigger influence on the chances for survival of vessels than changes in fuel pri-
ces. For instance a decrease of fish prices of 10% leads to an extra 60,000 trou-
bled HPs on the long run. On the other hand an increase of fuel prices of 10% 
leads to about 35,000 HPs extra troubled in the long run. 
If the fuel price would rise by 20% this would endanger 50,000 HPs. It is 
clear that larger vessels are more vulnerable to this increase than vessels wi th 
engine power below 300 HP. 
10.2.4 Prediction for 1997 
The calculations in sections 10.2.1 to 10.2.3 are based on 1996 ITQs. In this 
section a prediction will be made for the Dutch cutter fleet on the basis of 1997 
ITQs. These ITQs are again lower, especially with respect to sole (-15%). Further-
more assumptions had to be made wi th respect to prices: (compared to 1996 
real prices); 
plaice 
sole 
fuel 
: -10% 
: + 3% 
: + 0% 
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17 
21 
2 
18 
5 
11 
9 
55 
4 
19 
2 
51 
86 
83 
10 
66 
112 
134 
23 
192 
Table 10.10 Economic strength on the basis of 1997 ITQs of the Dutch cutter fleet in the short 
term (number of vessels) 
HP-group Weak Dubious Reasonable Strong Total fleet 
0- 260 
261- 300 
301-1100 
1101-
Total fleet 58 80 78 245 461 
About 60 to 130 vessels are in trouble in the short term on the basis of 
1997 quota. These vessels wil l not be able to meet their financial obligations. 
The number of vessels classified as dubious wil l double compared to 1996 1). 
The vessels which are in trouble have relatively little options to buy or hire new 
quota. Quota prices are high in 1997 and most of these enterprises wil l have 
difficulties convincing their bank to lend them more money. 
Table 10.11 shows the average flatfish ITQs per vessel. The vessels up to 
1,100 HP are monthly involved in other fisheries (shrimp, cod, whiting), where-
as the size >1,100 HP consist of specialized beam trawlers. Sole and plaice are 
by far the most important target species for these vessels. 
7ab/e 10.11 Average sole/plaice ITQ per vessel in tonnes (1997 estimates) 
HP-group 1996 1997 1996 1997 
Sole Sole Plaice Plaice 
0- 260 
261 - 300 
301 -1100 
1101 -
Source: Ministry of Agriculture Nature Management and Fisheries, LEI-DLO. 
10.3 Modelling the effects of UK property rights 
10.3.1 Scenarios 
The information available for the UK on property rights does not lend 
itself to sophisticated modelling techniques. Nor, in the absence of such data, 
is it appropriate in this context to develop theory or techniques of analysis. It 
seems wiser to consider a few simple budgeting estimates of what might hap-
pen if property rights developed in certain ways. 
0.7 
11.1 
11.2 
80.5 
0.6 
9.5 
9.2 
66.6 
0.8 
24.6 
30.6 
156.5 
0.7 
21.7 
27.4 
140.1 
1) Vessels classified as 'in trouble' for the 1996 analysis have not been excluded for 
this analysis on the basis of the 1997 quota. 
251 
The basis for this somewhat rough approach comes mainly from the data 
on costs and earnings. As indicated earlier these figures do not relate to a suffi-
ciently large and random sample to allow reasonably accurate population esti-
mates; they do, however, represent a group of vessels and indicate what has 
happened to some if not all of the fleet. 
The two main scenarios under consideration relate to the possible impact 
of having to invest in property rights or alternatively of having to pay a signifi-
cant fee for that entitlement. In the first case, the impact is due to the entry of 
new owners replacing those who had the licences originally. The original hold-
ers' cost structure excluded anything related to the value of the licence which 
had been conferred on them for nothing. In the long run all licences wil l have 
a recognised value and the investment will need a return; other inputs wil l 
eventually earn less to allow this return on the new 'asset' of the licence but 
this wil l not happen in the short run; the cost wi l l either discourage the entry 
of below average performers or cause such new entrants to fail. Only after such 
departures is capacity likely to decline and bring the longer run benefits of 
added earnings from sharing the total quotas among fewer participants. 
The second case assumes that the government, which pays for the re-
search and negotiations involved in devising and setting TACs as well as the 
enforcement to secure them, charges for the licences. The indications for the 
UK are of the combined costs of research, enforcement and administration 
amounting to perhaps £60m. The charge therefore would be around 10% of 
the value of UK landings and a roughly similar percentage of the value of the 
fleet. 
10.3.2 Scenario 1, transfer of licences to allow for new entries 
We can look at the first scenario in two ways. One is to consider the an-
nual effect as licences are transferred to allow for new entries; the other is to 
consider the longer run situation when all the values are realised and a return 
on total investment is needed. In looking at the short term change, we have to 
use a variety of assumptions about turnover of vessels and or people. The 
sources on the subject are inadequate; the age distribution of vessels is avail-
able but one for fishermen is not. Table 10.12 gives the recent figures for the 
former; they suggest that just under half the fleet in terms of numbers and 
capacity is under 20 years old wi th roughly two thirds under 25; vessels over 30 
years old tend to disappear from the fleet and an average life of 25 years 
seems appropriate. This 4% rate of turnover wi l l understate the actual rate as 
there will be movement of vessels to new ownership due to the other changes 
affecting labour and capital as fishermen retire and investors disengage. 
The problems over definitions of fishermen and their small number na-
tionally makes reliance on the decennial population census figures to derive 
estimates of length of their working lives inappropriate. The indications are 
that fishing is an arduous and dangerous occupation; the average time in the 
industry reflects the balance between those leaving for other occupations and 
those remaining for all their working lives; it is probably no more than 25 years. 
The departure of labour and of investment may therefore double the rate of 
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change. Two figures for turnover (4% and 8%) may be therefore worth consid-
ering. It might be argued on the basis of the relatively few new vessels entering 
the fleet in recent years that the structure will stagnate as the average age 
increases. Thus the lower rate of turnover may be nearer the mark in the short 
run, wi th changing crew and investors being the main influence. 
Table 10.12 Ages of UK vessels over 10 metres at end 1995 
Number (Percent) VCU (Percent) 
Up to 5 
6-10 
11-15 
16-20 
21-25 
25-30 
31-35 
Over 35 
Unknown 
Total 
94 
522 
303 
342 
520 
368 
223 
449 
34 
3.3 
18.3 
10.6 
12.0 
18.2 
12.9 
7.8 
15.7 
1.2 
33,372 
112,641 
70,089 
93,628 
147,517 
83,978 
51,118 
70,423 
4,445 
5.0 
16.9 
10.5 
14.0 
22.1 
12.6 
7.7 
10.5 
0.7 
2,855 100.0 667,211 100.0 
Source: UK Sea Fisheries Statistics MAFF. 
Tables 8.13-8.15 indicated the financial results for various classes of vessel 
as well as those for certain high and low performers in the pelagic, trawling 
and seining sectors. The average figures allowed the estimate given in table 
9.12 of the impact of capital charges such as the additional costs due to the 
value of licences on these vessels. The calculations in the following paragraphs 
are based on the results from ranking the vessels according to the level of prof-
its and on the associated financial data; table 10.13 shows the range from the 
worst performers to the best. A straight line relationship, derived from the 
upper and lower quartiles, is extrapolated to give an estimate of the distribu-
tion of performance across the group. 
Deduction of a charge for the licence (at a rate of 10%) shows the finan-
cial consequences on the cost side. In the initial stages the annual change in 
ownership results in either 4% or 8% of the licences having to be bought and 
only this proportion is charged. There are no benefits assumed in the short 
term. In the longer term, all vessels will have changed hands and the charge 
will apply to the whole fleet. It is also appropriate to adjust the average earn-
ings in line with the expected larger individual share in the future (as vessels 
depart) and this shows the benefit. 
There are a number of weaknesses in the assumptions underlying the 
calculations. In particular, the use of averages for the costs of licences and for 
adjusting the levels of earnings when capacity declines, as well as the reliance 
on a non-random sample, makes the estimates very rough. This indicates an 
area needing further and more detailed analysis, as well as considerable im-
provement in the data. 
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Table 10.13 Percentage distribution of vessels ranked according to profit 
Group Profit (£) Profit plus 
Crew Share (£) 
a. Pelagic 
b. Medium trawlers 
c. Small seiners 
0-10% 
10-20% 
20-30% 
30-40% 
40-50% 
50-60% 
60-70% 
70-80% 
80-90% 
90-100% 
0-10% 
10-20% 
20-30% 
30-40% 
40-50% 
50-60% 
60-70% 
70-80% 
80-90% 
90-100% 
0-10% 
10-20% 
20-30% 
30-40% 
40-50% 
50-60% 
60-70% 
70-80% 
80-90% 
90-100% 
-48,868 
-16,948 
14,972 
46,892 
78,812 
110,732 
142,652 
174,572 
206,492 
238,412 
-3,311 
7,939 
19,189 
30,439 
41,689 
52,939 
64,189 
75,439 
86,689 
97,939 
-21,165 
-10,355 
455 
11,265 
22,075 
32,885 
43,695 
54,505 
65,315 
76,125 
137,280 
187,000 
236,720 
286,440 
336,160 
385,880 
435,600 
485,320 
535,040 
584,760 
74,205 
90,215 
106,225 
122,235 
138,245 
154,255 
170,265 
186,275 
202,285 
218,295 
65,258 
81,738 
98,218 
114,698 
131,178 
147,658 
164,138 
180,618 
197,098 
213,578 
Source: Estimates from SeaFish Survey of Costs and Earnings. 
Pelagic vessels 
The sample showed a range in profit from -£24,928 in the lower quartile 
to £214,451 in the upper one and in profit plus crew share from £174,570 to 
£547,440. Extrapolation of these figures gives the estimates in the table which 
imply that a positive move of 1 % in the distribution (from worst to best) is asso-
ciated with additions to profit and profits plus crew share of £3,193 and £4,972 
respectively. The impact of deducting charges based on a licence worth £2m at 
10% is considerable. In the short term, the likelihood is of perhaps 4% or 8% 
of the licences being transferred each year and entering as annual costs of 
£200,000. Such transfers generally move licences from the less successful to the 
more successful but it is assumed that the moves will bespread across the per-
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formance groups. Thus each will be subject to additional costs of 4% or 8% of 
£200,000, adding £8,000 or £16,000 to the loss or deducting it from the profit. 
The relevant comparison in the short run is with profit plus crew share. 
With an average of 10 men involved and an acceptable minimum wage of 
£20,000 (somewhat below the average recorded in the survey), the estimates 
indicate that around 19% of the distribution would not meet target crew share 
with 4% turnover and around 21 % with double that rate. These would change 
to virtually all vessels meeting the target if £10,000 was an acceptable short run 
wage. 
Over the longer run a charge of £200,000 on all vessels (10% of licence 
value) and an ajustment to earnings resulting from vessels departures seem 
appropriate. The indications are that a large part of the sector would be at risk. 
Only the top two groups exceed £200,000 in profit. Against that the average 
earnings of £821,188 would rise as the quotas were divided among fewer ves-
sels. For example if the least profitable 20% left, the others would each have 
something over £200,000 in extra returns. This would leave the others in profit 
after paying the licence charge. Clearly the results are very sensitive to the 
prices of mackerel and herring. Price increases of around 10%, not a high fig-
ure in relation to recent increases for mackerel of many times that amount, 
would see those vessels under pressure to depart drop to under 15%. Equally 
a cut in quotas of 10% would offset such a price increase. 
Demersal vessels 
The samples for trawlers and seiners similarly provided ranges of perfor-
mance. For medium sized trawlers, profits ranged from £5,126 in the lower 
quartile to £89,482 in the upper one. The corresponding figures for profit plus 
crew share were £86,213 and £206,257. Extrapolation of these figures gives the 
estimates shown in table 10.13 with changes of £1,125 for profit and £1,601 for 
profit plus crew share associated with a move of 1 % in the ranking by perfor-
mance. For small seiners the ranges were -£13,052 to £67,988 for profit and 
£77,618 to £201,218 for profit plus crew share. They imply changes of £1,081 
and £1,648 respectively associated with a change of 1 % in the ranking position. 
The main element in the cost of a licence in these sectors is that of the 
track record, with the value per tonne of entitlement roughly equal to the 
value of a tonne of fish for species under quota. (The impact of charging for 
the licence is less in the demersal sector than the pelagic because its cost in 
relation to earnings is much lower.) If the calculations carried out for the pe-
lagic sample are repeated, the results show the percentage of demersal vessels 
at risk. The medium sized trawlers would pay perhaps £300,000 for their licen-
ces, giving an annual charge of £30,000. In the short run this means an annual 
charge of £1,200 with a 4% turnover and £2,400 with 8%. If the need is to find 
wages of £15,000 each for a crew of 6 (total £90,000), over 15% would fall 
below target wi th the lower rate of turnover and perhaps 1 % more at the 
higher rate. If wages of £10,000 were acceptable, all vessels would meet the 
target return, at both rates of turnover. 
In the longer run the annual charge would amount to £30,000 and the 
critical comparison is with profit. The distribution shows roughly one third fall-
255 
ing below this level. As before departures of some of the vessels at risk would 
improve the fortunes of those remaining. If the least profitable 10% left, the 
rest would each have additional earnings of around £35,000 and be clearly 
profitable. The break-even point of removing the loss makers and paying the 
licence charge looks to be when something like the least profitable 5% leave. 
As before the calculations are sensitive to assumptions about acceptable wage 
levels and fish prices. It seems unlikely that price increases like the recent ones 
for mackerel will occur. What may be more likely in this sector is a reduction in 
overall quotas which would have substantial negative implications. 
Small seiners 
The results for the small seiners indicate a similar position to that for me-
dium trawlers. The licence cost would probably be around £200,000. This im-
plies a charge of £20,000, equivalent to £800 and £1,600 at the lower and 
higher rates of turnover. The impact in the short run in this sector would again 
be smaller than in the pelagic. With a crew of between 5 and 6 needing 
£15,000 each (total £82,500), the sample suggests that around 15% would not 
meet the target return at the lower rate of turnover and slightly more at the 
higher. As with the medium trawlers an acceptable wage of £10,000 would see 
all the vessels meet the target return at both rates of turnover in the fleet. 
In the longer run, the comparison between the profit levels and the an-
nual cost of a licence at £20,000 shows something over 40% in the distribution 
fall ing below the critical level. Again it is necessary to consider the impact of 
departures on the earnings of the remaining vessels. The departure of the least 
profitable 10% would add around £35,000 to the average earnings of the re-
maining vessels. This would remove the loss makers and is the break-even 
point, unlike the situation with the medium trawlers which moved out of losses 
with the departure of the worst 5%. The sensitivities to wage rates, fish prices 
and quota levels apply as with the other sectors. 
Assumptions 
It should be stressed that two crucial assumptions underly these estimates 
and they may be flawed. The first is that the samples give a reasonable impres-
sion of the industry and the second is that vessels leave the fleet in the long run 
if they make losses. It may well be that adjustment takes place over a series of 
periods. The first stage is of vessels remaining as long as some return to crew 
as wages is forthcoming; the second still discounts the value of fixed invest-
ment as long as normal wages are covered; the third only occurs when the 
fixed investment is exhausted. Compounding the complexity may be expecta-
tions concerning the appreciation of the value of licences. 
The assumptions under the first scenario did not reflect the value to own-
ers of the licences as well as the implicit costs generated by them. Thus the 
estimates of vessels at risk may overestimate the likely level of departures, if 
owners regard licences as appreciating assets. 
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10.3.2 Scenario 2, annual licence fee 
The second scenario is that the Government charges an annual licence 
fee. It seems certain that pressure to reduce capacity would be even greater 
under this alternative policy. An annual charge or licence fee of 10% would 
have a much more severe impact in the short run as it would affect all vessels, 
not just the small proportion of vessel changing hands in that year. In the lon-
ger run it would result in the remaining vessels having to pay a charge that 
rose in step with their larger share of the landings. 
The value of the licence varies wi th the sector and is relatively small for 
vessels operating in the shellfish sectors and certain others. Thus the move to 
charging in relation to the value of landings would produce a differential im-
pact. It would impose heavier burdens in the shellfish sector and increase pres-
sures to leave. It would probably increase the pressure on the demersal sector 
but not as much. The impact on the pelagic sector would be less as assessment 
on the value of landings would lead to a smaller cost than a charge based on 
the very high value of licences in this sector. The eventual outcome for the 
value of the licence is difficult to predict beyond judging that it will decline but 
wi l l not vanish unless the demand for entry is lower than the availability of 
access. 
Decommissioning 
A further factor needs to be kept in mind. Decommissioning is estimated 
to have removed something like 6.5% of capacity in three years at a cost of 
£26.2m since its re-introduction in 1993. It removes the licence as well as the 
vessel and in effect provides the floor to the market. Its future success in reduc-
ing capacity will depend on the values attached to vessels and licences by their 
owners; these seems to be on an upward trend. This may reflect an idea of 
what owners are expecting by selling the licence in the future or operating the 
vessel under better conditions. In any event they are reducing the impact of the 
decommissioning scheme; the first two tranches took out 4.5% of capacity at 
a cost of £16.6m while the third took out only 2% for £9.6m; this implies an 
increase in cost per unit removed of 30%. This upward drift in licence value, 
partly fuelled by quota hopping and by assumptions about increased earnings 
and appreciating values, implies ever increasing financial pressures on those 
wishing to enter the industry or expand. In compensation there may be in-
creased benefits for those wishing to leave the industry. 
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11. EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
11.1 Effectiveness of property rights for the Danish fisheries man-
agement policy 
11.1.1 Main conclusions regarding the Danish fishery limitations and prop-
erty rights 
The vessel licence and the recognition as a commercial fisherman are two 
types of property rights in the Danish fishery which give a general access 
to the benefit stream from the fishery. 
Apart from these general entitlements, individual rights exist for some 
fisheries, such as the herring licence. 
Rations, i.e. the right to fish a specified quantity of a certain species in a 
certain time period, can not be considered as property rights since these 
permits are issued to all the applicants. 
More individual rights will probably created in future. Trials wi th INTQs 
and assignments of fishing days indicate this and a working group has 
recommended (May 1993) to introduce ITQs for the main part of the Dan-
ish fleet. Moreover, the vessel licence will become valuable when the fish 
stocks would recover. 
Adverse economic results in the traditional main fisheries have caused, in 
combination wi th the decommissioning scheme, a reduction of 20% of 
the total GRT of the fleet in the period 1986-1992; 
The number of trawlers and Danish seiners decreased relatively more in 
this period. Attractiveness of the decommissioning scheme has been more 
important for the reduction of this latter fleet segment, consisting of 
older vessels, than adverse economic results. 
Fishery restrictions and low prices will probably determine the return on 
capital of the vessels involved in the human consumption fisheries in the 
medium term. 
The restrictions on extension of capacity add extra costs, to consider in 
decisions for investments in new vessels. 
The results of the ITQ model in chapter 10 indicate that the adjustment 
of the fleet, that has taken place since 1987, is not finished. 
Implementation of an ITQ-system could increase the gross margin of the 
fleet by about 12%. In case of a comprehensive ITQ-system the gain in 
gross margin could be up to 70 million DKK per year. It is an open ques-
tion whether this is enough to cover the expenses of implementing and 
running such a system. 
The gain of an ITQ-system could be substantial in the long run because 
of exit of inefficient vessels and of redundant capital. 
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11.1.2 Property rights in the Danish fishery and the objectives of Common 
Fisheries Policy 
Given the relatively poor quality of the entitlements in the Danish fisher-
ies, the effect of these property rights on the realisation of the goals of the 
Common Fisheries Policy can be considered as being minor. The goal of the 
Common Fisheries Policy is (Council regulation no 3760/92): 
To protect and conserve available and accessible living marine resources 
and to provide a rational and responsible exploitation on a sustainable 
basis subject to the needs of both the producers and the consumers and 
the implication for the marine eco-system. 
The established Community system is therefore aiming at management 
of the exploitation activities with the goal to achieve a permanent balance 
between resources and exploitation. To achieve this goal several Community 
measures has been implemented (e.g. catch limitations (TACs) and the MAGP). 
The main limitation created by the Danish fishery policy has been the 
introduction of vessel licenses and restrictions on the extension of the capacity 
of the fleet and the single vessel. This measure together wi th the decommis-
sioning scheme has contributed successfully to the realisation of the goal of the 
MAGP for reduction in the overall fishing capacity. 
However, because the main stocks exploited by the Danish fleet declined 
in the period the reduction in the fleet seems not to have had the intentional 
effect of improving the stocks and the main effect of the reduced fleet has 
been that fewer vessels are sharing the Danish part of TACs which all things 
equal gives higher average catches per vessel. 
11.1.3 Property rights in the Danish fishery and the national objectives of 
fisheries management 
The national policy can only operate within the framework of the Com-
mon Fishery Policy (CFP) and, consequently has to meet the requirements of the 
CFP, such as the TACs and the MAGP. This leaves very limited room for an inde-
pendent policy. National policy is more or less reduced to how to implement 
the CFP on the national level. 
The purpose of the Danish regulation of fisheries is more or less the same 
as the goal of the CFP, namely to protect the stocks, secure rational exploita-
tion and balance between capacity and available resources. However, the (ex-
plicitly) purpose of the Danish regulation is also to take economic and employ-
ment considerations into account both in general and for single regions as 
well. In the Danish case the overall objective is to ensure a better exploitation 
of the resources compared to the outcome of a free fishery. A better exploita-
tion is defined in relation to: 
the conservation of the resources; 
efficient, including good seasonal, exploitation; 
the relation between resource and capacity; 
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economic and employment considerations in general and in different 
regions. 
These objectives or considerations include both efficiency and social fac-
tors as well as resource conservation in the allocative process. In any actual allo-
cation the final outcome is based on a mixture or compromise of these objec-
tives. 
The Ministry of Fisheries prepares for every year detailed guidelines for 
the fisheries based on these goals using a set of different measures. Among the 
measures to fulfi l the national goals are: 
division of the available catch in time periods and areas; 
closure of fishery; 
distribution of the catch for vessel-groups, for single vessels or gear-type; 
maximal fishing time, number of landings and catch per tr ip; 
permissions or licenses to fisheries. 
As shown in chapters 5 and 6 the Danish fisheries are in principle open 
access fisheries, where exploitation of the resource is regulated by quotas, and/ 
or rations for a given time period (fishery related measures), while the access 
to the sector as a whole is regulated by vessels licence and authorization of 
commercial fishermen (fishing sector related measures). The fishery related 
measures regulate indirectly the access to the resource. This kind of regulation 
wi th allocation of the resource (for Denmark the available resources for the 
most important species are determined as a fix share of the TACs for EU) 
amongst different fleet segments is more or less political determined. The regu-
lation directly allocates the resource to the fishermen (or group of fishermen). 
Acceptance of the allocation mechanism by the fishermen is important, 
because the process creates winners and losers. The losers might even go bank-
rupt. An open process is central, because it can ensure compliance. It is also 
important that the outcome is perceived as equitable and fair. A central ele-
ment in the Danish regulation has been open access to the different fisheries. 
Hereby everyone can participate in the different fisheries. By the use of rations 
available for a limited period the allowable catch is directly allocated to the 
participating fishermen. This allocation system seems to be perceived by the 
Danish fishermen as a fair system. 
Finally it should be remarked that the representatives of the fishermen's 
association are member of a committee that provides advice to the Minister of 
Fisheries on regulation issues. 
11.1.4 The possible review of the Common Fisheries Policy related to prop-
erty rights, the Danish position 
The Danish approach to management is not in favour of creating individ-
ual property rights which can be subject to trade, i.e. become valuable. The 
position is to provide a regulation system where better planning of the fishing 
activities are possible, but without creating exclusivity of fishing rights or access 
rights to each of the fisheries. This fundamental feature is found in the two 
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fisheries regulated by yearly individual quotas. It is also possible to participate 
in these fisheries fishing under a regulation system based on short term rations 
and the access to these fisheries are consequently not 100% closed. 
So far property rights have been created on the sector level. If access to 
the sector is provided then, in general, the fishermen have open access to the 
different fisheries and can select an appropriate fishery pattern during the 
season if some of the Danish quota is available. To secure that the Danish part 
of the TACs is not overfished the fisheries are regulated by rations of limited 
duration (1 week to 3 month) and in a few cases by yearly rations. 
The effects of the decommissioning scheme and control of capacity is 
finally showing up in terms of higher average value of catch per vessel, because 
both the catch level and the price level has been stable/slightly increasing in the 
last 2-3 years. 
Under the review of the CFP the position is to change the current quota 
management system to an effort or fishing day based system, where each ves-
sel is allocated a certain number of fishing days. For the system to work it is 
necessary to drop the quotas. Biological information in the effort system is used 
to adjust the number of fishing days of the vessels. For example, when the fish-
ing level on a species is too high then the number of fishing days allocated is 
reduced. 
The limited access to the sector and control of the existing fishing capacity 
is crucial for such a system. The future control of the capacity should therefore 
be based on vessel licenses and control of the capacity of each single fishing 
vessel. Therefore the system of inserting new capacity only if equal amount of 
existing capacity is leaving the fleet is necessarily a part of a regulation scheme 
based on days-at-sea. 
Since the consequence is to eliminate the TAC system, allocation of the 
fishing possibilities to each Member State is based on a fishing power (days-at-
sea) of the fleet. It is therefore necessary to implement the system uniformly 
in the regulation in all the countries of EU or at least for the countries fishing 
in the same area. One of the problems with the existing CFP is that the benefit 
of behaving responsible does not fall to the responsible fishermen, because of 
the different kind of regulation on the national level. By regulating with the 
same means with the same purpose the potential benefit of regulation could 
be more clear and understandable. 
11.2 Effectiveness of property rights for the Dutch fisheries policy 
11.2.1 Main conclusions regarding the Dutch property rights 
The main findings and observations from the Dutch part of the previous 
chapters are: 
The evolution of the regulations shows a dynamic process. Limitations 
have been transformed into individual rights and these rights have devel-
oped from individual quotas (IQs) for sole and plaice (allocated in 1976) 
towards individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for all quota species. 
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The effectiveness of the ITQs has been promoted importantly by supple-
mentory measures such as a HP ceiling, decommission schemes, heavy en-
forcement, days at sea regulations and co-management by groups of 
quota holders. 
Eery limiting measure has (more or less unintentionnally) created a right 
in the Dutch sea fishery. HP imitations have led to valuable HP-licences, 
limitations for the coastal zone (EU file registrations) have been trans-
formed into rights to fish in this zone, limitations for shrimp fishery have 
resulted in two kinds of shrimp permits. All these rights are tradeble. 
Changes in regulations in the period 1993-1996 mainly regarded further 
individualisation of fishing rights and transfer of management tasks from 
the ministry 1) towards the industry, i.e. the co-management groups. 
Investments in high priced ITQs since 1988 indicate that these rights have 
become a separate production factor, which is, in the perception of the 
vessel owners, indispensable for the continuity of their enterprise. 
There are similarities between the milk- and the fish quotation with re-
spect to price increases of individual quotas and concentration of produc-
tion rights. Both sectors have faced problems of ownership succession and 
(fiscal) solutions for agriculture have been or will be applied to the fishery 
sector. 
Fishing rights have had important implications for the structure of the 
cutter fishery. The concentration tendency has been accelerated and in-
vestments have shifted from vessels to rights. This has resulted in a kind 
of freeze of the fleet. 
Lower price levels of rights in other EU countries have stimulated reflag-
ging of Dutch vessels. Money could be generated for reinvestment 
abroad by selling Dutch ITQs to other Dutch vessel owners. 
Concentration of ITQ ownership in the Dutch cutter fishery in the period 
1988-1997 has developed less than concentration of these rights in Ice-
land and New Zealand. 
Investments of ITQs include 'marginal' quantities and require a pay out 
period of at least nine years. 'Full' ITQs cannot be made profitable at mar-
ket prices so that insurmountable barrierres exist for newcomers. 
Purchased fishing rights have become important intangible assets on the 
balance sheet of Dutch fishing enterprises and cause 10-15% extra costs 
of depreciation and interest. 
The individual rights on the basis of the 1996 flatfish quotas were too low 
for 50-90 vessels, of which some 30 bigger cutters (17% of the size class 
> 1,100 HP). This number will be more than double on the basis of the 
1997 quotas. An important part of these vessels will run into heavy finan-
cial troubles on the short term (1-3 years) if the quota situation will not 
improve in the near future. 
1) Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. 
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11.2.2 Property rights in the Dutch fishery and the objectives of the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy 
The question is whether the system of property rights in the Netherlands 
has contributed to the realisation of the CFP goals or did this system of individ-
ual rights hamper the realisation of these goals? 
Four goals of the CFP are considered to answer these questions: 
stock conservation; 
viability of the fishing sector; 
availability of fish for the consumer; 
protection of the environment. 
Stock conservation 
The annual TACs are the most important measure for stock conservation. 
Sole, plaice, cod, whiting and herring are the main quota species for the Dutch 
fishing sector. The individual fishing rights (mainly ITQs) are a mean to distrib-
ute the Dutch part of the TACs for these species amongst the vessel-owners. 
Thus, the system of rights can only indirectly contribute to this CFP goal. 
The question is if this distribution system has been adequate to comply 
wi th the Dutch part of the TACs. 
Three periods can be distinguished in this respect: 
a. the period 1983-1988. Enforcement was inadequate in these years to get 
a good compliance with the quota. The sole and plaice quotas at that 
time meant severe limitations but overshooting of them was cheap so 
that 'the race for fish' continued. 
b. 1988-1990/91. Quota overfishing became more and more expensive due 
to increasing fines, resulting from heavy enforcement measures. How-
ever, individual fishermen still did not have a guarantee that they could 
take up their full quota. They still feared that fishery would be stopped 
before the end of the year wi th a part of their individual quota unused. 
In particular, the owners of the larger beamers, having an ITQ shortage, 
persisted in their cheating practices. The 'prisoners' dilemma was still 
working in this period 1) and the measures were more perceived as fish-
ing limitations than as fishing rights. 
c. 1991/92-1996. Fishermen felt their practices of quota overfishing more 
and more unsatisfactory, which led to a growing support for the policy 
of the Dutch Government to make the fishing sector more responsible for 
the compliance with the quotas. Moreover, the intention of this policy 
was to get a better price formation through a better distribution of land-
ings throughout the year. After some pressure of the ministry of Agricul-
ture, Nature Management and Fisheries, co-management of the quotas 
1) Elaborated more extensively in the thesis (forthcoming) of E.W.J. Hoefnagel, 
which studies the process towards collective action of Dutch fishermen. 
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by 'Groups' was implemented in 1993 1). The individual rights were 
pooled in these Groups (though the ITQ holders remained the 'owners') 
and the individual fishermen got more certainty about the full uptake of 
their quotas. Obliged sales via auctions and sanctions of the Board of the 
Groups resulted in a kind of protection of the individual rights. Hence the 
rights' side of the quota measures became more important in the early 
nineties. The important trade in ITQs and the high prices that were paid 
for sole/plaice ITQs demonstrates this. This also shows that the rights be-
came a seperate prooduction factor, apart from the vessel. Referring to 
the question posed above it can be concluded that the system of individ-
ual (output) rights has developed towards an adequate TAC distribution 
system. The situation in 1996 underline this conclusion since the Groups 
managed to reduce the fishing effort (days-at-sea) by 15-20% to get com-
pliance with the importantly reduced plaice quota. 
As a result of this, the price of plaice rose by 17.5% in 1996, compared 
wi th 1995, so that the skipper-owners were 'rewarded' for their good 
quota management. 
The developement described above regard individual output rights. Input 
rights i.e. HP-licences support the compliance with the quotas since an effective 
fence has been established around the capacity of the vessels. The licences are 
tradable, which result in rather costly investments in HP rights for vessel owners 
who want to expand their capacity. 
Viability of the fishing sector 
Individual tradable quota tend to promote efficiency in the fishery sector, 
as has been concluded from the experiences in New Zealand, Australia and Ice-
land (chapters 5 and 6). The question is if this also applies for the Dutch cutter 
fishery? 
There has been some concentration of ITQs in the cutter sector as has 
been shown in chapter 8.2. This means to some extent an improvement of effi-
ciency, since the tendency has been that the owners of the smallest quotas 
have left the fishery. The ITQs have been based (partly) on historical perfor-
mances so that it can be assumed that the least efficient operators have left the 
fishery. Efficient in this respect in a sense of landing the catches at the lowest 
costs per kilogramme. However, the developments have been more compli-
cated since: 
a. improvement of efficiency has not been caused by fishing rights alone, 
but also by decommissioning. Such a measure always tends to lead to effi-
ciency gains for the sector; 
1) Described more in detail by E.W.J. Hoefnagel and W. Smit in 'Experiences in 
Dutch co-management of marine fish resources', OECD-issue paper, Paris (forth-
coming). 
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b. quota hopping has led to reflagging of vessels that, in a number of cases, 
were exploited efficiently. This may have led to a more efficient exploita-
t ion of foreign quotas. 
On the other hand, there are some factors that indicate efficiency gains 
as a result of individual rights: 
1. the share of the sole/plaice ITQs of the bigger vessels in the TAC has in-
creased as a result of ITQ purchases. This means a better utilization of the 
capacity of these vessels; 
2. leasing of quotas became more important after the establishment of the 
Groups in 1993. This enabled a better utilization of the individual rights; 
3. the individualization of the cod/whiting rights in 1994 has led to a better 
adaptation of the rights to the fishing pattern of the beam trawlers. This 
results in a more efficient exploitation of the by-catches of those vessels, 
which otherwise had to be discarded. 
Barriers to new entrants could be a negative factor for the viability of the 
sector. 'New blood' in the fishery could induce efficiency improvements and 
prevent a kind of attrition. However, in this respect this is not a problem since 
competition and entry of sons of the skipper-owners lead to a continuous ten-
dency to increase productivity 1). 
Finally, it has to be added that efficiency gains may be reduced more or 
less by higher costs of quota purchases or leases. The financial position of big-
ger enterprises changed after 1991 as the level of debts increased substantially, 
amongst other things, as a result of quota investments 2). 
Availability of fish for the consumer 
There is no direct relationship between the system of fishing rights and 
the availability of fish for the consumer. The improved compliance with the 
quota is of importance in this respect. This means in fact a reduced availability 
off ish and higher prices for the consumer. In the longer run the supply could 
return at a higher level as a result of successfull management of the fish stocks. 
Protection of the environment 
One type of fishing rights, entry rights to the coastal zone ('EU file I and 
II') has some relationship with environment protection. Vessels that are entitled 
to fish in this zone are limited through this file registration. In the same way 
as for other fishing rights, the right aspect of the limitation has become more 
important. This meant growing attractiveness of the limited area for outsiders 
and increase of capacity (up to 221 kW) of those who were already in. The ten-
dency is that more and more vessels wi th entitlements for the coastal zone 
1) The study 'Return on Capital in the European Fishery Industry', Davidse et al., 
1996, DG XIV, BIOECO/93/14 p. 78-81 has devoted a section on productivity of 
beam trawlers. 
2) Annual editions 1991-1995 of LEI-DLO 'Fisheries and Figures'. 
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reach the 221 kW maximum. The result has been a substantial increase of the 
HP capacity in this zone (by 27.5% in the period 1983-1995, as is shown in chap-
ter 8). This means a shift from engine power used outside to inside the coastal 
zone. Hence, this rights system for the coastal waters is not discriminatory 
enough to realize the original objectives for fishing effort in this area. 
An interesting aspect of the individualized fishing rights is that the 'Green 
Movement' could consider to buy rights, e.g. ITQs, to protect the fishstocks 
more than according to the TACs. However, the problem has to be solved that 
these rights now may be seperated from a fishing vessel only for a limited pe-
riod. 
Finally, it can be stated that tradable individual (pollution) rights are a 
well-known instrument in the framework of environmental policy. In this re-
spect there is a parallel wi th ITQs, as has been emphasized by Hoefnagel (1996). 
11.2.3 Property rights in the Dutch fishery and the national objectives of 
fisheries management 
Objectives 
The Dutch sea fisheries policy is part of the Common Fisheries Policy of 
the EU. The Government is thereby bound by agreements made within the EU 
framework The specific objectives of the Dutch policy in this respect are: to 
meet the requirements f rom the EUs conservation policy (TACs) and from the 
structural policy (MAGPs) 1). Nevertheless, there is some freedom for an own 
national policy. The general objective of this policy is (Policy Document 'Bal-
anced Fisheries', 1993): 'to promote responsible fishing efforts and a balanced 
exploitation of fish stocks.' This means: 
a. fishing is promoted as an economic activity; 
b. the management of fishing resources is promoted in such a way that the 
continued viability of the fisheries sector is ensured; 
c. fishing effort must be harmonized with existing nature values. 
The own responsibility of the fishing sector is a basic priciple that has, 
more or less explicitly, driven the Dutch policy in the period 1983-1996 (and 
also in the seventies). This principle explains why the Dutch Government has 
issued individual quotas in 1976 to the vessel owners and it was also a driving 
force behind the striving for co-management of the quotas by groups of right 
holders (established in 1993). In this respect the Dutch Government has a spe-
cific policy which differs from other countries. France and Belgium for instance 
have a clear policy to maintain the disposition of the quotas on the side of the 
governement and allocation of individual rights is (so far) unthinkable 2). 
The specific aims of the Dutch fisheries policy are mostly consistent wi th 
1) Multi-annual Guidance Programmes. 
2) Prat J.L. (1996), 'Le droit des pêches maritimes en France face à la propiété des 
recources maritimes', Sevilla, September 5, 1996 and Maertens L, Zeevisserij-
dienst, Oostende (pers. comm. 1996). 
266 
the responsibility principle and they contain (in the Policy Document, men-
tioned before): 
a restricted role to creating the right conditions to ensure the continued 
viability of the fisheries sector. This approach leaves room for a more 
flexible TAC- and quota policy, which means multi-annual TACs and the 
merging of TACs for demersal fish species; 
a quota policy based on safe biological levels (MBAL), which leaves more 
room to the responsability of the sector than the so called 'economic fish 
stock management'; 
simplification of the fishery regulations in the longer run. One of the 
ways to reach this aim is by introducing effort-limiting measures, such as 
replacing the national quotas with days-at-sea at EU level; 
pressure for a freeze on the total engine capacity for the 12-mile zone 
and to control the engine power by a torsionmeter. 
Effectiveness of the property rights 
The objectives mentioned above under points a) and b) are comparable 
wi th the objective 'viability of the fishing sector' discussed under the goals of 
the CFP. This leads to the same conclusions: the growing confidence in the 
rights has enabled a better quota management, resulting in substantial price 
increases that have compensated (partially) the losses of catches. Effective en-
forcement has clearly contributed to this development. 
The aim of continued viability under b) refers to the longer term. In this 
respect there is a lack of effectiveness of the ITQs due to uncertainties regard-
ing future developments of the fish stocks. Fishermen don't have the confi-
dence yet that current limitations wil l result in much higher quotas in future. 
In fact, the property rights in fishing are a right to a (very) fluctuating benefit 
stream. This touches the manageability of the fish stocks. Experiences with 
TACs and catches for sole, plaice and herring in the period 1983-1996 point out 
that fish stocks may develop sometimes in an unexpected way. Influences of 
nature (e.g. severe winters) may affect the catches positively and negatively in 
a short term. Some biologists (Daan, 1996, p. 11) conclude that the North Sea 
is an open system and not very well manageable. 
These circumstances cause that skipper-owners don't feel that they have, 
in the long run, a strong interest to limit the catches in view of increases of 
quota values, as seems to be the case in New Zealand (Major and Wallis, 1996, 
p. 63). It must be added that these uncertainties limit the significance of any 
policy instrument. 
Also in view of these uncertainties it can be observed that the pooling of 
the individual rights by the co-management groups has created more inner 
strengh in the sector, which may lead to a favourable position compared with 
other European countries. 
Point c) of the Dutch policy objectives refers to nature values, comparable 
with the objective 'protection of the environment' of the CFP. Thus the same 
conclusions apply in this respect 1): Rights to the coastal zone are not precisely 
defined yet to prevent an increase of the engine capacity there and 2) ITQs 
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could in principle be bought by environmental organisations to reduce the 
pressure on the fish stocks more than in accordance with the TACs. 
The following comments can be given on the 'specific 'aims' of the Dutch 
fisheries policy: 
more flexible TACs wil l cause no or hardly any problems on individual 
quota level. It is very difficult for skipper-owners to land exactly the quan-
tities of sole, plaice and cod that they are entitled to, according to their 
ITQ. Possibilities to merge quantities of e.g. sole and plaice wil l meet the 
interests of the quota holders. This could be a feasible management mea-
sure when these transfers remain limited (Salz, et al., 1996, p. 204); 
a quota policy based on safe biological levels could lead to rather high 
TACs, as long as the relevant stock is above MBAL 1). The Government 
would expect too much of the responsibility of the industry when she 
assumes that Groups and individual quota holders will save a part of their 
quota allocations in view of future gains. 
replacing national quotas by communal days-at-sea would mean a shift 
f rom output- towards input rights. This could lead to a dilution of the 
Dutch ITQ rights, though the value of them could be maintained in an-
other form. Interviews wi th people f rom the industry (outcomes de-
scribed hereafter) have made clear, however, that stability in the regula-
tions is very important for the planning of fishing strategies and for in-
vestment decisions. 
a freeze of the capacity in the coastal zone could be realized wi th exist-
ing input rights, i.e. HP-licences. Therefore, it should be stipulated that 
vessel owners, entitled to fish in the coastal zone, are allowed to increase 
their engine capacity only when they acquire such licences from other 
owners with a similar entitlement. 
Perceptions of fishing rights amongst vessel owners 
Another method to assess the effectiveness of the Dutch fishing rights has 
been the interviewing of persons in the industry. Thirty one vessel owners were 
interviewed in the period December 1994-October 1996. Most of these fishers 
participate in the LEI-DLO costs and earnings investigation. All types of vessels, 
from small shrimp cutters to big beamers, were involved in this panel and the 
regional distribution included vessels from northern (23) and from southern (8) 
ports. The vessel owners have been visited personnally and structured inter-
views were held. The available questionnaire was used as a kind of checklist 
and was helpfull to structure the discussions. Because of this interview method, 
the sample is rather small (7.5% of the cutter fleet involved). However, the 
consistency in the answers (table 11.1) allows rather clear conclusions. The 
questions regarded 2): 
1) Minimum Biological Acceptable Level. 
2) Firstly, the vessel owners were asked to catagorize the answer in 'positive', 
'neutral' or 'negative' and in 'yes' or 'no' and then the reasons for this judge-
ment were asked. 
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appreciation of the system of individual transferable quota; 
bottlenecks in case of succession of ownership of the f i rm; 
need for changes of the regulations; 
opinions about the system of co-management groups 1). 
Table 11.1 Opinions of Dutch vessel owners on fishing rights 
Number of respondents 
1. Appreciation system of ITQs 
positive 25 
neutral 3 
negative 3 
2. Fishing rights bottleneck for succession 
yes 22 
no 8 
not clear 1 
3. Necessary changes in regulations 
yes 14 
no 11 
no opinion 6 
1. Appreciation of the ITQ system. A clear majority of the respondents eval-
uated the ITQ system as 'positive'. They expressed as reasons: 
- 'you know where you are now'; 
- 'more certainty'; 
- 'protection against big vessels which are also limited now'; 
- 'more tranquility in the sector'; 
- 'better planning possibilities'; 
- 'a fence around the fleet'; 
- 'possibility to get a better finance from the bank on the basis of a 
quota'; 
Negative qualifications included 'bad utilisation of quotas', 'wrong alloca-
tion of the rights' (still grievances about distribution of individual quotas 
in the past) and 'no chances for newcomers'. 
2. Rights bottleneck for succession? This is clearly the case according to most 
of the respondents and they mentioned the fol lowing reasons: 
- 'high prices of the sole/plaice quotas'; 
- 'fiscal claims'; 
- 'firm has debt to family after taking over'; 
1) Question posed to fourtheen vessel owners. 
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- 'we are condemned to each other' (the experience that the son(s) can 
no longer start an enterprise for themselves, but have to stay in fa-
ther's firm ); 
3. Necessary changes in regulations. In spite of a positive judgement, rather 
many vessel owners suggested changes in the regulations: 
- 'more certainty in future (allocations)'; 
- 'earlier quota allocations' (vessel owners now receive their individual 
quota allocation by the end of December); 
- 'more limitations for the coastal zone' and for 'shrimp permits'; 
- 'better opportunities for newcomers'; 
- 'special rules for taking over the firm within the family'; 
4. Opinions about the working of the co-management system. This question 
was posed to a part (14) of the vessel owners. Most of them (13) expres-
sed the qualification 'good' and the explanations therefore were: 
- 'better possibilities for hiring and renting of quota'; 
- 'more actions together', e.g. 'buying cod rights from other groups'; 
- 'good information on quota uptake from the group Board'. 
This brief enquiry to the Group system included ten fishermen from 
northern ports and three from southern ones. These observations are in line 
wi th the perceptions of vessel owners from Urk, as presented in a study on 
Dutch co-management experiences (nt). These fishermen also expressed a posi-
tive attitude towards the group system, whereby the unrestrained possibility 
to hire or rent quotas was mentioned by all respondents as the most important 
advantage of group membership. 
It has to be kept in mind that most of these interviews were held in a 
period (1994/95) when the Dutch sole and plaice quotas were not very limiting. 
Another situation occurred in 1996, when the plaice quota was decreased by 
32%. Rather many people in the industry feared in the beginning of that year 
that the Group system would not hold and that cheating practices of the pe-
riod 1988-1990/91 would return. However, management by the groups led to 
compliance with the low plaice quota in 1996 through diminishing of the fish-
ing effort by some 20%. 
Interviews with staff members from banks and with accountants were 
also held in the period 1994-1996. Representatives of four banks were asked 
for their policy and their opinions regarding: 
ITQs as a security for a loan; 
the value of the right to be considered in case of financing; 
the duration of the right; 
the effectiveness of the ITQ system; 
bottlenecks and disadvantages of the right system. 
Available fishing rights, i.e. ITQs are always an important security for a 
loan. One of the banks treats them as a collateral and takes the market value 
into account. The other banks combine the rights wi th the vessel whereby the 
ITQ has a P.M. value. The rights may lead to a higher finance if the other bank-
ing conditions are met. 
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The banks require a short pay-back period for the security aspect of the 
right and their time horizon therefore ends by 2002, when the CFP will possibly 
be reviewed. 
The representatives of the banks expressed a positive attitude towards 
the ITQ- and the Group system. 'The fishery is better manageable now' and has 
also a greater stability in their views. However, uncertainties through changing 
rules and 'too much politics' were considered as disadvantages. The bankers 
stressed the need for more certainty (e.g. with respect to 2002) and more con-
sistency in fisheries policies. 
Finally, the two accountants who were interviewed, also expressed a posi-
tive attitude towards the ITQ- and the Group system. They mentioned that the 
systems now have become clear and well established. Flexibility for the firms 
has improved through hiring and renting of individual quotas. There are still 
fiscal problems of succession to overcome, though progress has been made so 
far. An example of this is a limited liability enterprise whereby the ITQs can be 
estimated against the profitability value, which is lower than the markett value 
of 'marginal' quotas. Gains in case of transfers and thus taxation, can be lower 
in such cases. 
The following main conclusions can be drawn from these interviews: 
Fishing rights, especially ITQs, have evolved towards a rather effective 
management instrument, allowing a far better compliance with the TACs; 
The Groups have taken up responsibilities for quota management, which 
has created more support in the industry for l imitting measures; 
ITQs and the Groups are 'nested' in the Dutch fishery sector, which means 
that vested interests have been created; 
These interests mean a need for stability and continuity in regulations; 
The national fisheries management has reduced its efforts of control and 
enforcement and hence the costs of management. 
These conclusions confirm rather well the observations regarding the 
effectiveness of the rights from the viewpoint of the national objectives of 
fisheries management. 
11.2.4 Possible future developements wi th respect to the Dutch property 
rights 
The Dutch regime of property rights seems to have developed towards 
a well balanced system in a period of twenty years, up to 1996. The limitations 
on capacity and catches had evolved towards individual rights which were 
rather well accepted in that year. Co-responsibility through the co-manage-
ment groups was very important therefore. 
This section explores possible impacts of future developments on the 
property rights system. 
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Succession and transfer of rights 
In the UK section on modelling (chapter 10.3) appears that all licences will 
have a recognised value in the long run, due to the entry of newcomers. This 
will probably not fully the case for the Dutch situation, since fiscal allowances 
enable transfer of the rights at zero value as far as certain family relations are 
concerned. However, these allowances will not solve all problems of rights 
transfers so that a part of the rights has to be bought, probably at high prices. 
It can be expected that price barriers wil prevent ousiders from entry to the 
fishery so that rights will be bought by those who are already in the sector. This 
means further concentration of rights amongst existing enterprises which will 
lead to an ongoing process of adaptation of rights to the capacity of the vessel. 
This does not necessarily lead to a major concentration of rights as is the case 
in the Icelandic fisheries. The Dutch ITQ concentration level was far below the 
one in Iceland, in 1996, as has been explained in chapter 6.3. Furthermore, 
large purchased ITQ quantities cannot generate an adequate profit level be-
cause of the high prices for the rights, as has been pointed out in chapter 9.2. 
But markets are dynamic and this also applies for the future ITQ market. There-
fore, the concentration issue will be on the agenda of the future Dutch fishery 
debate. Dissatisfaction about renting of ITQs by those who are not active (or 
no more active) in fishing has already arisen 1). 
Development of fish stocks 
The current (1996/97) low flatfish quota wil l cause financial troubles for 
a substantial number of enterprises. Model explorations (Chapter 10.2) indicate 
that this could lead to a reduction of 12-15% of the 1995 HP capacity on a 
rather short term (1-3 years). This could be in addition to the departures de-
scribed above, which result from a more or less autonomous process of barriers 
for succession. 
The past 25 years show rather fluctuating fish stock levels. This could con-
tinue in future. There are signals 2) of a recovering plaice- and cod stock, 
though it is unsure yet whether this will result in substantial higher catches in 
future. Anyhow, fish stock levels will continue to fluctuate which requires flexi-
bility in property rights systems. The Dutch system seems to have this flexibility 
as the ITQs are in fact a percentage of the TAC and trade allows a better adap-
tation to individual circumstances. In case of necessity to leave the fishery an 
extra proceed can be received from the ITQ, or renting of the right can gener-
ate an income. The limited horsepower rights act as a ceiling, preventing exten-
sion of capacity. 
1) 'Visserijnieuws' of April 18, 1997 reports about this dissatisfaction, expressed 
during the annual meeting of the Dutch Union of Fishers. 
2) The Dutch biological institute RIVO-DLO reports a strong new year class of 
plaice, on the basis of quantities of zero-year plaice caught, in Visserijnieuws of 
November 1st, 1996 and the edition of April 18st of this magazine reports big 
quantities of one year cod, observed during a February 1997 assessment of diffe-
rent institutes. 
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Development of the fleet 
The current aging of the fleet will probably continue in future. Purchases 
of rights, i.e. ITQs, will require financial means which may partly absorb the 
reservations (depreciations) for replacement of vessels. Expansion of capacity 
has become more expensive since additional HP rights have to be bought. This 
situation of rights and also the capacity limitations abroad will continue to 
hamper the market for second-handed vessels. Hence, there are no signals that 
the 'freeze' of the cutter fleet will disappear in the near future. Nevertheless, 
innovations will be implemented, whereby the quality aspect of fish handling 
on board is getting more attention. 
Possible review of the CFP in 2002 
Different scenarios are thinkable now (spring 1997) with respect to a CFP 
review in 2002. The following intends to consider some possible consequences 
for the Dutch property rights of each of these scenarios. The choice of these 
scenarios has been based more or less on 'what's in the air now', i.e. statements 
from EU side and the views of the UK CFP Review Group 1). 
1) The CFP will remain broadly the same as the current approach. In that 
case the time horizon of the Dutch current property rights regime ex-
pands. This may create good opportunities to stabilise and to secure the 
rights more than they are now. Interviews during this study have revealed 
some uncertainty wi th respect to the rights because of '2002'. It will be 
in the interest of the right holders and of other 'players' in the sector like 
banks, to give the rights more explicitly juridical security. In this respect 
there might be a development towards the situation in Iceland where 
'ITQs are in all major aspects analogous to conventional property 
rights' 2). 
2. Management and control of the fisheries will devolve to a regional 
grouping, e.g. for the North Sea. The UK CFP Review Group has plead for 
such an approach. A similar developement would probably be not unfa-
vourable for the Dutch property rights situation. TACs will probably con-
tinued to be set and the Dutch rights distribution does not necessarily be 
changed. The co-management groups seem to form an adequate socio-
economic infrastructure to face such a policy change. Complications with 
respect to the jurisdiction might arise when a specific management or-
ganisation would be established. 
3. The continuation of the derogation from the 'equal access to a common 
resource principle' will be considered. A paper of the rapporteur of the 
Fisheries Committee of the EU Parliament contains such a view 3). This 
could lead to a developement towards 'free movement of people and 
1) 'Fishing News', August 2, 1996, 'Summary and recommendations of the CFP 
Review Group'. 
2) Magnusson, S., (deputy Judge), 'Constitutional property protection and transfe-
rable fishing quotas in Iceland', p. 67 in 'Property rights in the fishing industry', 
Pétursdóttir G., editor, Fisheries Research Institute, Reykjavik, 1997. 
3) As reported in 'Fishing News', March 26th, 1997. 
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goods', a fundamental priciple of the Common Market. This scenario is 
very controversial and will meet heavy resistence, in particular from UKs 
fishing industry. 
The Dutch attitude towards this scenario seems to be rather positive. The 
Dutch policy (not only in fisheries) has been always in favour of free trade 
f rom the circumstances of an open economy. Quota hopping by Dutch 
fishing enterprises is quite understandable from this position. The Dutch 
Fishers Union (one of the two national Fishers Organisations) has pub-
lished a view on '2002' 1), which contains a plead for individual distribu-
t ion of rights in all EU countries whereby these individual catch rights 
should be transferable. 
The conclusion from this brief exploration of possible scenarios is that the 
Dutch property rights regime does not contain major bottlenecks in view of 
eventual changes of the CFP in 2002. 
Possible future changes in the Dutch property rights 
The Dutch system of rights seems to have arrived, after a period of twenty 
years, in a phase where no major changes are needed. Aspects to be consid-
ered, however, may be: 
Rights for fishing in the coastal zone. A freeze of the HP capacity for the 
coastal zone could be considered. The Policy Document 'Balanced Fisher-
ies' already contains such an intention 2).Therefore, a shift from fishing 
entitlements from outside the 12 miles zone to this coastal area could be 
made impossible. 
Succession of ownership. Not all fiscal allowances for agricultural holdings 
are applicable yet (April 1997) to fishing enterprises. There should be 
equality in this respect because of the similarities between property rights 
in agriculture and in fishing. A Parliamental vote (in 1994) already fore-
sees such an equality, but this has not led to a relevant regulation so far. 
Barriers for newcomers. High prices of rights prevent newcomers, in par-
ticular non-family members of the right holders, to enter the fishery. Spe-
cific allowances for outsiders could be considered to remove these barri-
ers. A LEI-DLO study for the dairy sector (Daatselaar et al., 1994) suggests 
'skimming of' milk quota in case of transfers, to reserve quantities for 
newcomers. The outcomes of this study were, however, not very wel-
comed by the industry, apart from an organisation of young farmers. Be-
side this, it may be difficult to prevent the use of such allowances, e.g. 
lower prices, for speculative purposes, when they have been handed out. 
A charge for management costs on the rights, as is the case in the Icelan-
dic and New Zealand fisheries. This would lead to an unbearable taxation 
1) 'Vissers regisseren hun toekomst'. Lange Termijn Nota Visserij, Nederlandse 
Vissers Bond, 1996. 
2) Policy Document 'Balanced Fisheries', Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Management and Fisheries, 1992, p. 17. 
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for many right holders in the current situation of low quotas. Moreover, 
the industry already bears costs of management through the co-manage-
ment groups, which monitor the uptake of the quota. 
More emphasis on effort policy in stead of output measures. This could 
need a translation of ITQs into input rights, as has been suggested by the 
chairman of the Dutch Fish Commodity Board 1). The advantages of these 
input rights ('new chances for the Dutch fleet') should be weighed well 
against important aspects such as: vested interests- stabilisation of regula-
tions and the increasing management attitude of the ITQ holders. Input 
rights might stimulate again the hunting behaviour of the fishermen. 
11.3 Effectiveness of property rights for the UK fisheries manage-
ment policy 
11.3.1 Main conclusions regarding the UK fishery limitations and property 
rights 
The UK management policy consisted of two strands, both before and 
after entry to the Community. The first was conservation, which lay 
wholely within Government hands; the second was structure, which was 
left to the industry to decide, with the Government providing investment 
aid and other assistance, such as decommissioning. 
Both the Government and the industry did not originally envisage the 
creation of private property rights in the sea fisheries. The industry pre-
ferred that central authority should control the licensing, from the per-
ception of the market leading to concentration and damage to fishing 
communities. 
The initial development of property rights related to the vessels. Subse-
quently, the importance of what the vessel had caught in the past, its 
track record, in determining its future entitlement resulted in this ele-
ment being the critical one in determining most of the value of a licence. 
Current discussions about setting fixed quotas (as opposed to the rolling 
averages of past performance which set track records) indicate continuing 
problems with property rights. Fixed shares of quotas could mean a move 
towards ITQs, despite a lack of support for them. 
The markets for rights are neither transparent nor well understood gen-
erally. Whether the changes after considering fixed shares of quotas leads 
to more clearly defined markets or whether POs will dominate in private 
transactions remains uncertain. 
Langstraat D.J. 'Een behouden vangst', in the publication 'Met de toekomst in 
zee', North Sea Directorate of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management, 1996. 
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Combination of conservation, new technology and structural measures 
has resulted in both a reduction in capacity and a concentration in 
entitlements. 
The move of responsibility for improving their property and defending 
it, from the Government to the individuals, still seems a long way off. 
11.3.2 UK property rights and CFP objectives 
It is clear on balance that the emergence of property rights in the UK 
industry is helpful in achieving CFP objectives. These objectives include conser-
vation, structure, socio-economic considerations, markets and external relation-
ships as well as the implicit though unspecified one of minimising the degree 
of derogation from the principles of the Treaty of Rome. 
Property rights, allied to decommissioning and other measures, ensure 
that the UK fleet is restructured in a way that reduces capacity. This helps to 
secure EU wide targets directly and by demonstrating equity to other Member 
States contributes to securing their MAGP compliance. It also results in dimin-
ished pressure on the stocks as a smaller but more efficient fleet should be able 
to target its species and markets more effectively. This has repercussions in 
terms of incomes with lower costs and better returns raising the level of pros-
perity. Conservation, wi th reduced discarding of over-quota catches or un-
wanted sizes or species, is also assisted. There should also be further environ-
mental benefits from decreased effort. 
Early indications of the impact of property rights on concentration and 
regional implication do not suggest problems of a socio-economic nature. The 
trend towards reduced numbers of vessels continues but there is little evidence 
of regional losses. The fishery dependent parts of South West England, North-
ern Ireland and the North and West of Scotland seem to have maintained their 
position. It may well be that property rights in fishing have the same effects as 
in dairying; milk production left the areas where better paying alternatives 
existed after selling their milk quotas; and track records have to some extent 
gone to the fishery dependent areas from regions with other available employ-
ment. 
To the extent that the UK fleet is reduced, so the external negotiations 
become easier. These relate to shared stocks as with Norway or access to Third 
Country grounds as with Canada. The related aims in conservation are more 
easily and demonstrably met. 
The implicit aim of minimising the degree of derogation from the princi-
ples of the Treaty of Rome is not an aspect specifically mentioned. There must, 
however, be an underlying belief that, as wi th other industries and markets, 
there exists freedom for capital, labour and enterprise to cross national bound-
aries within the EU. The problems associated with UK property rights in fishing 
being available for other EU nationals to acquire show the difficulties clearly. 
In effect property rights and their trade allow the principles of the Treaty to 
over-ride the derogations (the apparent national ownership of its share of the 
TACs). 
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11.3.3 UK property rights and national objectives 
The contribution of UK property rights to national objectives is broadly 
similar to that made to the aims of the CFP. They encourage the industry to do 
its own re-structuring and improve its efficiency. By so doing, capacity is redu-
ced and conservation and other environmental aspects are enhanced. The de-
gree of régionalisation and concentration that has occurred has not cut across 
wider interests in regional development and employment. The enhanced role 
of the POs (resulting from the management of track records) is promising; it 
holds out some promise that Government may be able to disengage to some 
extent from detailed regulation of the industry, though heavy enforcement 
costs remain. As to consumer interests, the improved industrial structure may 
be expect to serve them well wi th better quality and possibly lower prices. 
The one area where there is a clash is in the sale of entitlement to other 
EU nationals enabling them to fish against UK quotas. Without the property 
rights in vessels originally and now in track records as well, there could have 
been no acquisition of shares of the UK quotas. The previous Government pla-
ced a priority on recovering these shares despite the failure of an earlier at-
tempt under the 1988 Merchant Shipping Act to reserve entitlement to UK 
nationals. It is likely that the current Government will return to the subject. The 
probability of success seems open to question; the provisions of the Treay of 
Rome find an echo in the traditional UK welcome to inward investment even 
with foreign ownership and repatriation of profit. 
11.3.4 Possible CFP review of property rights - UK effects and views 
The CFP must be reviewed and its replacement introduced in 2002. There 
seem to be four possible scenarios for the future. The first and likeliest is that 
the derogation will still apply and the system will be broadly the same as the 
current approach. The second is that the 'open access' subject to EU control will 
come into being. The third and fourth are that ownership, management and 
control of the fisheries wil l devolve either to national level or to a wider re-
gional grouping (e.g. the North Sea). 
There is little doubt that concerns over conservation make some extension 
of the current regime the likeliest outcome. Prevention of over-fishing is cen-
tral to the continued existence of the EU industry. With TACs and their alloca-
tion being the basis, the current property rights in track records or fixed quotas 
provide a basis for further development. Whether such changes lead to ITQs 
alone or to some underpinning with other rights in capacity, effort or area 
entitlement remains to be seen. The benefits of having an annual charge on 
these rights to pay for the enforcement and other costs seem clear both in 
terms of equity and of encouragement to reduce capacity. What is less certain 
is whether the whole system will move under the control of the Commission or 
remain delegated as at present. 
The second approach seems more complex. If the system consisted merely 
of deregulating the EU industry, the ramifications would be extensive. It would 
be simple to turn the EUs extended economic zone (including territorial waters) 
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into a common resource for the EU fleet. It would be less easy to deal with 
wider fisheries and environmental management. If the solution lay in maintain-
ing current EU conservation and external agreements, there would be relatively 
little change from much of the existing system. Under these circumstances, ex-
isting property rights and any developments would be helpful. 
The third and fourth alternatives seem departures from the common aims 
of the EU. There would be sub-areas and sub-fleets to consider. The existence 
of property rights would facilitate the management but the enforcement of 
their entitlements might prove more difficult, as the sea areas decreased and 
the opportunities for cross-boundary activity and misdeclaring increased. 
A completely different opportunity might arise if the development of 
marine science allowed marine fish farming and ranching to be practical propo-
sitions. The offshore oil industry provides an example of property rights which 
are clearly defined and defensible. Similarly marine fish farming in cages or 
shellfish beds or rafts meet the criteria of clear ownership and defined legal 
status. It seems unlikely, however, that allocating blocks of sea will prove 
worthwhile until knowledge exists that a combination of structures, modified 
light and salinity and the encouragement of other useful environmental devel-
opments wil l allow controlled production. 
11.4 Comparison of the property rights systems in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
11.4.1 The nature of the property rights 
This study includes three quite different types of property rights systems 
which makes comparison interesting. The system in Denmark is least developed 
towards individual property rights. In fact, state property dominates in this 
fishery sector. The main individual Danish rights are the authorisation as a com-
mercial fisher and the vessel licence. These two kinds of rights give access to the 
benefit stream that arises from fishing on the quota species. Furthermore, 
there is (according to the definition of property rights from Bromley, quoted 
in chapter 5) a 'duty of all others to respect the conditions that protect that 
stream'. The Danish Government protects the fishing rights by limiting the en-
try to the fishery so that the two main rights meet this definition of property 
rights. 
On the other hand, the study includes the property rights system in the 
Dutch near water fishery, characterized by individual tradable rights for all the 
quota species and also for the (HP) capacity. These individual rights are the 
kind of property rights promoted by Christy (1996) and they are, as he states, 
'...the nuclei of larger sole-ownership corporations or collectives'. Co-manage-
ment groups are these collectives in the Dutch situation. This system seems to 
be well balanced now, after twenty years of development. It has come under 
heavy pressure in 1996, because of low flatfish quota. The experiences in that 
year have pointed out, however, that the system can withstand such a pressure. 
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The British property rights system can be situated between these two 
systems. The rights (licences, track records and vessel capacity units) are, in prin-
ciple, connected with the vessel. However, they can be identified seperately by 
selling vessels and disconnecting the right from the vessels. As such, they may 
have a substantial value in theirselves. The system is still developing and may 
be at a cross point, whereby one direction is ITQs and another one communal 
property rights (Goodlad, 1996). The latter option would mean a kind of com-
mon property by the POs. 
Figure 11.1 gives a survey of the property rights systems in the three coun-
tries. It also shows how they originate from the setting of TACs and the imple-
mentation of MAGPs. The key point is that limiting measures may have two 
sides: a limiting one and a property one. However, not every limiting measure 
creates a right. Technical measures like mesh size rules impose limitations but 
don't create rights. 
What does the limitation transform into a (property) right? That is the 
element of exclusivity. Mesh size rules do not create rights since they are not 
exclusive but apply to everyone who has the right to fish. The same applies to 
limitations for the coastal zone, e.g. only accessible for vessels of 300 HP or less. 
They do not create property rights when everybody having such a vessel is al-
lowed to fish there. Only when certain persons or vessels are entitled to fish in 
the zone a property right is created in the sense of Bromley's definition. There-
fore, the Danish monthly 'rations' for instance are not property rights since 
every fisher with a licensed vessel can apply for them. The OECD study on fish-
eries management 1) identifies them as 'trip limits: '... it is unclear that they 
function as individual quotas and they will be analyzed as trip limits wi th lim-
ited licence' (p. 75). These rights can better be considered as use rights in the 
context of this property rights study. Modifying Bromley's definition, an use 
right can be defined in this respect as: a right to a benefit stream that is 
owned, not by the user, but by another person or by an institution. 
Figures 11.2 and 11.3 compare the nature of the input and of the output 
rights in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
1) 'Synthesis report for the study on the economic aspects of the management of 
marine living resources', Paris, 1996 (forthcoming). 
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Right 
Country 
Exclusivity 
Quality of title 
Transferability 
Divisibility 
Duration 
Flexibility 
Vessel licence 
Denmark 
New licences issued 
to a limited extent 
To insert specified 
vessel into the Dan-
ish fishery 
Not transferable, 
only when the vessel 
is sold 
Not divisible, aggre-
gation allowed 
Indefinite 
Limited flexibility 
Horsepower 
licence 
The Netherlands 
Allocated to certain 
vessels, no new licen-
ces 
To fish on quota 
species with maxi-
mum, specified 
horsepower 
Transferable sepa-
rate from vessel 
Can be divided and 
aggregated 
Unlimited if linked 
to vessel, 6 months 
for free licenses 
Flexible, all quota 
species may be 
fished, no gear limit. 
Capacity (VCU) 
licence 
The United Kingdom 
Allocated to certain 
vessels. No new 
licences, reductions 
secured on entry of 
replacement vess. 
To fish on certain 
species, subject to 
track record 
Usually transferred 
with vessel, but may 
be separated 
Can be divided and 
aggregated 
For the lifetime of 
the current regula-
tion 
Vessel can be used in 
any fishery where 
track record allows 
and other regula-
tions such as gear or 
seasonal bans permit 
Figure 11.2 Characteristics of the main fishing input right in Denmark, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom a) 
a) The characteristics in the 'star' of Anthony D. Scott, included in chapter 5 of this study. 
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Right 
Country 
Exclusivity 
Quality of title 
Transferability 
Divisibility 
Duration 
Flexibility 
Ration 
Denmark 
Not exclusive 
To catch a given 
quantity of fish in 
the period of ration 
Not transferable 
Not divisible 
Period of ration 
Ration is defined for 
certain area 
Individual Trans-
ferable Quota 
the Netherlands 
Quantity exclusively 
allocated to vessel 
owner 
To fish quantity to 
maximum in certain 
year 
Transferable sepa-
rate from vessel 
Can be divided and 
aggregated 
Annual allocation of 
quantity, period of 
right only limited for 
ITQs free from ves-
sel: two years 
Only limitation: no 
sales of ITQ-partsto 
non-holders. 
Rent/lease of ITQs 
allowed 
Track Record 
the United Kingdom 
High degree, entitle-
ment allocated to 
vessel owner, subject 
to performance over 
the years 
Entitled to fish quan-
tity to maximum in 
certain year 
Transferable sepa-
rate from vessel 
Can be divided and 
aggregated 
Permanent unless or 
until legislation 
changes 
Specific to species 
but flexible in use 
and disposal 
Figure 11.3 Characteristics of the main fishing output right in Denmark, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom a) 
a) The characteristics in the 'star' of Anthony D. Scott, included in chapter 5 of this study. 
11.4.2 Factors influencing property rights regimes 
Comparison of different property rights systems could raise the question: 
which is the best system? FT. Christy has a rather clear answer to this question. 
In his paper to the 8th Biennial Conference of the Institute of Fisheries Econom-
ics and Trade 1) he states in this respect: 'The transition to property rights re-
gimes in fisheries is occurring wi th a speed which, I think, is not fully appreci-
ated. The process is inexorable' (p. 3). The command and control system of fish-
eries management is a paradigm lost in his view and property rights regimes 
represent the paradigm gained. In this respect he quotes Hannesson (in press, 
1996): 'The state would become redundant as a management authority and its 
1) 'Paradigms lost: the death rattle of open access and the advent of property 
rights regimes in fisheries', Francis T.Christy, prepared for the 8th Biennal Confe-
rence of the Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, Marrakesh, Morocco, 1-4 
July 1996. 
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only role would be the ultimate upholding of the rule of law and the honoring 
of contracts'. 
From this point of view the Danish command and control system is more 
or less obsolete and would or should move to the Dutch regime of property 
rights. This regime meets rather well the 'new paradigm' of Christy since ITQs 
have been established for all quota species, managed by user groups and the 
Government aims to reduce its role. However, the views expressed in Christy's 
paper can be critized by arguing that property rights systems cannot be consid-
ered in itself. There are several influencing factors which explain why the regu-
lations are as thery are: 
the policy of the Government, that may not be in favour of individual 
property rights, as is the case in Denmark and also in countries like France 
and in Belgium. Policy makers may have the opinion that they lose too 
much control over the fishery when they allocate rights to individuals or 
organisations; 
the attitude of the fishermen, e.g. they may opposed against individual 
property rights because they fear concentration of rights amongst bigger 
enterprises; 
the fleet structure and the fishery, which may be more or less suited for 
the implementation of property rights such as ITQs. In this respect the 
rather homogeneous Dutch beam trawl fleet is less complicated than the 
more diversified British and Danish fishery; 
the situation of the fish stocks, e.g. a stock in danger that needs a severe 
reduction in TACs, compared wi th the open access circumstances, may 
have other consequences for limiting measures and rights than 'healthy' 
fish stocks. 
costs of enforcement, which can be high in case of individual rights, since 
defending the rights can lead to extra litigation accomodated in the 
courts. 
Influences Effects 
Policy 
Attitude fisher 
Fleet/fishery 
Fish stock 
Property 
rights 
regimes 
-*- Concentration 
-» Quota hopping 
->. Change attitude fisher 
->. Profitability 
Figure 11.4 Selected influences on and effects of property rights in the fishing industry 
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Hence, property right regimes are to a certain extent dependant vari-
ables. On the other hand they may induce new developments when they have 
been implemented. Examples are quota hopping and concentration tendencies 
that have been accelerated because of trade in rights. Figure 11.4 intends to 
illustrate that property rights regimes cannot be considered in isolation but 
rather as a part of a comprehensive policy. 
Although property rights regimes have to be considered in their 'environ-
ment' it is useful to consider them from a number of criteria. This has been 
done in the schemes in figures 11.5 and 11.6. The first three and the last two 
criteria reflect the CFP objectives. The other criteria have been derived from 
Böhm P. and CS. Rüssel (1995) 1) ('information intensity', 'flexibility' and 'politi-
cal considerations') and from the Australian contribution to the OECD study 
(see note in 11.4.1) on management techniques in fisheries ('management 
costs' and 'income distribution effects'). 
The three types of licences in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom do not show major differences in possibilities to meet the CFP objec-
tives, to promote the viability, in the level of acceptance and in management 
costs. The Dutch and UK licence seem to be more flexible because of the trans-
ferability and the UK one appears to be somewhat more rigid since penalties 
on replacement are included. 
The output rights show some similarities between the Dutch ITQ and the 
UK track record, whereby the first one seems to be a more clear individual right 
than the track record. The POs play a more important role in allocating the 
quantities to be fished than the Dutch management groups. In the latter case, 
the ITQs are decisive, whereby the groups act as an intermediate for leasing 
and renting of ITQs. 
Comparing the ITQs and the track records wi th the Danish rations, it ap-
pears that extra incentives to leave the fishery result from the two first kinds 
of rights since they wil l provide an extra proceed in that case. 
The criteria 'viability' reveals another difference between the Danish ra-
tions on the one hand and the Dutch and UK output rights on the other as the 
rations secure a certain income distribution whereas the ITQs and the track 
records bring more dynamics in the sector and may cause some concentration 
by trade of the rights. 
Finally, it seems that the UK property rights regime is still developing 
whereas the Dutch system looks more stabilised in 1996. 
Again, this comparison of property rights system does not allow conclu-
sions on 'what is the best system'. Rather, it shows that such systems are de-
pendant variables to some extent, as has been pointed out in the beginning of 
this section. 
Property rights systems are not only dependant variables. As figure 11.4 
illlustrates, they may induce developements from the moment that they have 
1) Alternative policy instruments, chapter 10 in Handbook of Natural Resource and 
Energy Economics, Vol. 1, edited by A.V. Kneese and J.L. Sweeney. Elsevier 
Science Publishers. 
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been implemented. The structure of the industry in the three countries has 
been be influenced more or less by the rights (chapter 8), quota hopping has 
arisen and the attitude of a number Dutch fishermen is changing from a pure 
hunter towards a calculating quota manager. 
Property rights may provide another view on fisheries management. The 
scheme in figure 11.7 intends to consider fisheries management from this view-
point, whereby different property rights regimes are classified on a 'scale' from 
state towards private property. This might lead to a better understanding of 
the importance of an adequate rights definition for an effective fisheries man-
agement. 
11.5 Lessons from other countries 
11.5.1 Fishing rights in Iceland 
Contents of the right 
Fisheries involved 
Objective 
Duration of the right 
Transferable 
Accomp. measures 
Effects on structure 
: To land a maximum quantity in a certain year of 11 
species (cod, haddock, saithe, redfish, Greenland ha-
libut, plaice, herring, capelin, shrimp, lobster and 
scallops), based on a fixed share of the TAC, ITQ on 
each of the species. 
: All the fisheries within the exclusive 200 miles fishing 
zone of Iceland. The system of ITQs account for over 
95% of the total volume of the fisheries. The re-
mainder of the catch appears only as by-catch. 
: Allocation of the TAC to individual vessels to im-
prove the economics of the fishing industry and to 
conserve the fish stocks. 
: the shares are permanent 
: Yes, but subject to certain restrictions on the leasing 
of annual quotas. 
: Fishing vessel license and different technical mea-
sures 
: In the pelagic fisheries, herring and capelin, the ITQ 
system has produced an substantial increase in eco-
nomic efficiency. In the herring fishery the catch per 
unit effort increased by a factor of five in the period 
1980-1993, while the biomass increased by a factor 
2-3. In the capelin fishery both the total tonnage of 
the fleet and the fishing effort fell by about 25%. 
In the demersal fisheries the experience is more 
mixed, because the ITQ system has been operating 
together wi th an effort based system and because 
the TAC for cod (the main species) consequently has 
been set too high. High quota prices can, however, 
indicate that the system is generating substantial 
rents. 
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Policy effectiveness 
Since the fishing effort and capacity has been re-
duced in the period, mainly through exit of minor 
vessels, the number of firms and quota holders have 
decreased during the period, leading to some con-
centration of the fishing rights. 
The system seems not to have had an adverse impact 
on the regional habitation. 
The ITQ system has increased the economic efficiency 
of the fishing industry. The problems have mainly 
been about the equity aspects of the ITQ system and 
the latest changes in the system have had the objec-
tive to limit the transferability of the annual quotas 
in order to reduce the speculative element of quota 
holdings. 
11.5.2 Fishing rights in Norway 
Contents of the right 
Fisheries involved 
Objective 
Duration of the right 
Transferable 
Accomp. measures 
Effects on structure 
Policy effectiveness 
: Fishing and vessel licenses and vessel quotas. The off-
shore fisheries are regulated by vessels licenses and 
in many cases also by individual yearly quotas. The 
coastal fisheries for cod is regulated by vessel quotas. 
: About 80% of the Norwegian fishery in value are 
regulated by some sort of license limitation or vessel 
quotas. 
: To prevent further increase of the fishing effort and 
to increase economic efficiency and maintain settle-
ment and employment in outlying districts. 
: The vessel licenses are permanent, while the vessel 
quotas are annual 
: No, but in practice the rights fol low the vessel 
: Different technical measures and a scrapping pro-
gramme 
: The number of full-time vessel over 13 meter has 
been relatively constant from 1980, while the num-
ber of part-time vessels has declined. Vessels under 
13m have declined in the number in this period and 
the coastal fleet has declined by 6% in the period 
1990-95. 
There has been in the 80s a relatively large reduction 
in the fleet from the northern part of Norway be-
cause of poor resource conditions in the Barents Sea 
(mainly cod). The introduction of vessel quotas in 
1990 has therefore freezed this reduction and redis-
tr ibution of fleet. 
: The biological effects of the regulation seem to have 
been quite good, especially since the late 80s. 
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The main problem of the system has been the lack of 
adjustments in the fleet, because of the overcapacity 
at the time of implementation of the system. Merg-
ing of vessel quotas and licenses are allowed, if ves-
sels are withdraw permanently from fishing. The 
principle of non-transferability of the rights will be 
maintained. 
11.5.3 Fishing rights in Canada 
The size and variety of the Canadian fisheries, as well as their importance 
to the national economy, have meant that most of the problems as well as pos-
sible solutions have been encountered there. The principal lessons to be 
learned from these experiences number three. 
1. The first is the inventiveness of the industry in reaction to regulations; 
2. the second is the need for and high cost of effective enforcement; 
3. the third is the benefit that can be realised from successful policies. 
Inventiveness 
The inventiveness of the industry in devising ways to get round regula-
tions is hardly surprising in a competitive situation. Many of the measures, 
whether in terms of licensing vessels, imposing gear or area bans and allocating 
quotas to different sectors, added only to costs; they did not take away the 
incentives to 'race to fish'. Advantage still accrued to whoever got the most. 
Thus 'capital stuffing' and other attempts to maintain a competitive edge were 
conspicuous. The difficulties resulting ranged from unemployment at all levels 
in the industry, waste and inefficiency through over investment and failure to 
meet consumer demand adequately. 
Cost of enforcement 
The need for regulations (and the ways in which they were avoided) 
made compliance a major issue. With conservation needs pulling one way and 
short term catching necessities pulling another, compliance was neither auto-
matic nor easily obtained. Enforcement costs in aerial surveillance, sea patrols 
and inspections, as well as land based investigations were very high. When 
these costs and the limited success of the various conservation measures were 
considered, the benefits seemed slight. A change in policy to accommodate the 
peculiar nature of the industry was recognised as needed and duly introduced. 
Po//cy effectiveness 
The introduction of Enterprise Allocations in the Atlantic groundfish fish-
eries in 1982 took account of the economic dimensions of the problems and 
their solution. The individual allocations of quota to the large companies con-
cerned removed the incentive to race. Improvements occurred not just in the 
reduction of catching costs for the companies but in the processing sector, with 
less seasonal unemployment, and in markets, with better quality. For the com-
panies control over the resource stretched the season and allowed reduction 
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in the number of vessels as well as better utilisation of the factories. For those 
working on the processing side, lay-offs were less frequent and employment 
more secure. As to the marketing side, catching and processing to order pro-
vided more of what the consumer demanded. 
The extension of this system into a more general one of ITQs on the East 
Coast showed the importance of f i t t ing the policy to the situation. Benefits 
were realised in reducing over-investment, extending the catching seasons and 
reducing market gluts. Problems did, however, arise. Arguments arose over 
initial allocations as did worries about transferability and concentration of 
ownership. Enforcement costs increased in some sectors but fell in others where 
the previous monitoring system had been complicated by the co-existence of 
differing management regimes. 
The Canadian experience shows that the benefits of allocating quotas to 
the industry are considerable in theory and realised in practice. There is a re-
duction in over-investment in catching and processing; seasons are extended 
wi th benefits in more stable employment and better meeting of consumer 
demand; and excessive political lobbying is reduced. These naturally contribute 
considerable economic benefits. The offsetting costs lie in securing compliance 
and these vary according to the sectoral features. 
11.5.4 Fishing rights in the United States 
As with Canada, the historical situation in the United States provided an 
industry wi th competitive enterprise co-existing wi th a need for conservation 
as well as local and sectoral interests concerned with employment and incomes. 
The lessons to be learned relate to the swift moving nature of the industry; its 
ability to turn the opportunities of the late 70s (when extended limits brought 
additional resources) into the problems of subsequent decades was remarkable. 
Some of the examples from the United States, such as the one from Wis-
consin relating to Lake Superior trout (chapter 6), show the need to keep costs 
and benefits in balance. While the programme reduced numbers and operating 
costs while improving market returns, the enforcement costs were very high. 
They even included a 'sting' operation to catch and imprison those illegally 
catching and marketing the trout. 
Perhaps the most significant lesson to be learned is how extreme the de-
gree of 'capital stuffing' can be. The Pacific Halibut fishery saw its length of 
season go from 56 days in 1981, through 12 in 1987 and 2 in 1989, to less than 
half a day in 1993. Increase in vessel numbers and sizes explained this develop-
ment. Similar problems of over-investment affect other Pacific fisheries such as 
salmon. 
The East coast provides a contrasting example in the Atlantic Surfclam 
fishery. The introduction of an ITQ programme in 1990 led to a substantial 
drop in the number of vessels from 128 to 59. This improved productivity and 
efficiency. Against these improvements must be set a reduction in local employ-
ment (possibly transferred to other sectors) and a high degree of concentration 
in ownership of ITQs. In the first two years the numbers of owners declined 
from 67 to 50 and the share of the three largest rose from 51.3% to 58.1%. 
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The relevance of appropriate legislation in allocating quotas is underlined 
in the Magnuson Act which generally reserves ownership of sea fisheries to the 
Federal government. This indicates that resources may only be expropriated for 
the period of the specific programmes introduced. Thus the various ITQs, 
though bought and sold freely, do not have the duration and quality of tit le 
of a permanent property right. 
11.5.5 Fishing rights in New Zealand 
Contents of the right 
Fishery involved 
Objective 
Duration of the right 
Transferable 
Accomp. measures 
Effects on structure 
To harvest a specified percentage of the TAC from a 
stock in a given Quota Management Area 
Most commercial fisheries (32 species), representing 
appr. 80% of the commercial catch from the New 
Zealand Economic Zone. 
To ensure sustainable harvests and an efficient fish-
ery 
Perpetual 
Yes, high level of transfers, three times the amount 
issued since 1986. 
Flexibilities in taking up ITQs, e.g. to solve by-catch 
problems. Surrender overcaught fish to Government. 
Maximum percentages for individual ITQ ownership 
(35% in case of deepwater species). Mesh size rules, 
closed seasons. Permits for non-quota species. 
Change in quota ownership, in that processors have 
acquired ITQs. Concentration of ITQ ownership: 
three largest consortiums owned 50% of the quota 
in 1992. Increased significance of the fishery in terms 
of production value (rise of 80% nominally in the 
period 1986-1995) and of employment (rise of 38% 
in this period). 
Fish stocks were in a rather good shape in 1995, only 
8.7% of the 149 stocks were estimated below MSY 
level. High capital value of ITQs created (1 bin ECU). 
Vested interests of the fishers in stock recovery. Ra-
tionalization of the inshore fleet. Rather high costs 
of enforcement (some 100 fisheries officers). Two-
thirds of management and research costs are recov-
ered from the industry. Expensive court cases. The 
system has become complex. The governement has 
redefined its role: responsibility for a sustainable use 
of the fish resources, whereby the fishers may be 
more involved in managing the fishery. 
The New Zealand experiences learn that fish stocks can be brought in a 
rather healthy state by a property rights regime in the form of ITQs. However, 
Policy effectiveness 
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the system concerns sole ownership of an Economic zone by one country, which 
is less complicated than in the EU fisheries management situation. 
Recovering management costs as in the NZ fishery could be considered 
also in EU fishing nations. The current low EU TACs, however, will leave hardly 
any or no room for such costs coverage. 
Fishers in New Zealand have vested interests in the fish stocks since a 
stock recovery increases the value of their quotas (Major and Wallis 1996, p.65). 
This would also be a positive factor for the EU fisheries management. It seems, 
however, that uncertainties wi th respect to fish stocks in EU waters are too 
high to rely on good returns when fishers invest in stocks by effort reductions. 
The level of ITQ trade is much higher than in the Dutch situation (shown 
in chapter 6) and indicates that there are incentives for improvement of effi-
ciency. 
The New Zealand system also learns that there is a nearly continuous 
need for adaptations. The major concentration of ITQ ownership may meet 
objections when the New Zealand system is considered as an example for im-
plementation in other countries. 
An interesting feature is the development towards co-management by 
the fishers which seems to be somewhat parallell with the development of the 
Dutch ITQ system. 
From a social point of view there seem to be some disadvantages. Dun-
can, (Fishfolk message on Internet, 7 March 1996) describes the impact of ITQs 
in the northern part of New Zealand. He observes a major decline in direct 
employment in the fisheries in this region (Northland). Local perceptions of the 
impact of the ITQ system seem to be quite negative. Fishermen feel a 'lot of 
pressure to sell their quota to the larger companies'. Reduced profits from leas-
ing quota 'increases the incentive to high grade'. Furthermore, 'there was cer-
tainly good anecdotal evidence that the informal economy was thriving' (a 
black market was mentioned). This is only an observation in one region and 
such circumstances might be of minor importance in the whole situation of the 
New Zealand ITQ regime. Nevertheless it illustrates that (social) disadvantages 
of ITQ systems, which are feared for instant in the Danish and in parts of the 
UK fisheries, occur in practice. 
11.5.6 Fishing rights in Australia 
Contents of the right To harvest a specified percentage of the TAC for the 
relevant species or to participate in the fishery with 
a specified capacity. 
Fishery involved Southern bluefin tuna, South-east fishery (ITQs) and 
input rights ('Class A' and 'Class B' units) for the 
Northern prawn fishery 
Objective To conserve the stocks and to improve the economic 
performance of the fleets. 
Perpetual. 
Yes. 
Licenses, restrictions for owning quota (South-east). 
Duration of the right 
Transferable 
Accomp. measures 
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Effects on structure : Concentration of ITQ ownership: 5%of the quota 
holders held 62% of the southern bluefin tuna 
quota in 1992/93. Gains in resource rents. Reduction 
of fishing capacity, the lowest in the south east fish-
ery. 
Policy effectiveness Improvement of efficiency. Rather high costs of sur-
veillance and compliance, but most of the costs are 
fully recovered by the industry. It is not sure 
whether the conservation objectives (for the tuna 
and for the south-east fishery) has been met. Impor-
tant reduction in boat capacity. Effectiveness for the 
south-east ITQ scheme not very clear because of 
multi-species character, multiple jurisdiction and 
inadequately defined user rights. 
An important lesson from the Australian experience is that input controls 
(in force before the ITQ regime) may not work well. The fishing effort has been 
increased through substitution of unconstrained for constrained inputs. 'The 
input controls have not provided an incentive for excess capacity to be re-
moved' (Campbell et al., 1996, p. 2). 
Lessons can also be drawn from one not very succesfull implementation 
of ITQs (in the south-east fishery): good consultations wi th the industry, well 
defined rights and a sound, uniform jurisdiction are a prerequisite for succesfull 
implementation. 
Major concentration of rights has also occurred in the Australian fisheries, 
in particular in the Southern bluefin tuna fishery. Good opportunities in other 
fisheries may have stimulated this process. 
Increased industry involvement in the management of the Australian 
fisheries is also an issue there. It has been argued that it is only the task of the 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority to get sustainability in the fishery 
by setting biological reference points whereas the industry should strive for 
economic efficiency in his own way. Exel and Kaufman state in this respect (p. 
26): 'While cost recovery is not a prerequisite to increased industry involvement, 
it appears to be a powerfull stimulant'. For the European situation it seems to 
be an important prerequisite that the catching sector expects benefits from a 
sound management of the stocks to be prepared to recover costs. 
11.5.7 Fishing rights in Japan 
Contents of the right : Licence to participate in a certain fishery in a de-
fined area. Common rights, granted to a Fisher-
men's Cooperative Association (FCA), are important 
for coastal fisheries. 
Fishery involved : Coastal fisheries, Ministry licensed fisheries in off-
shore and in distant waters, Governor licensed fish-
eries, located between coastal and offshore fisher-
ies. 
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Objective : To protect fishery resources, regulate and minimise 
conflicts between various fisheries and to establish 
a fishing order (Coastal and Governor licensed fish-
eries). 
Duration of the right : Different for various rights: 5 years (set-net, demar-
cated fishery), 10 years for common fishery right. 
Ministry licensed fishery 1-5 years. Governor licensed 
normally 5 years. 
Transferable : No, for the common rights of the FCAs. Ministry and 
Governor licensed: yes, under certain conditions. 
Accomp. measures : Closed seasons, minimum size, limit fishing days, 
pooling systems 
Effects on structure : FCAs seem to have generated more stability and 
also greater levels of price and quality stability. 
Policy effectiveness : Co-management by the FCAs seem to decrease the 
costs of enforcement since fewer formal measures 
are needed. Homogeneous technologies and modes 
of operation are important factors for success. There 
are questions regarding the success of Japanese co-
management in achieving stock conservation and 
economic optimization 1). 
The situation in Japan shows that input rights may get a (high) value. 
Tanaka (1993) states that financial institutions accept the rights as a collateral 
for a loan. Even the non-tradable common rights of the FCAs appear to have 
a high value when rights are lost because of coastal development projects. This 
may result in high compensation payments to the FCAs. 
Co-management has a long tradition in Japanes fisheries and it may serve 
to some extent as an example for the European situation. It does illustrate, 
however, that property rights regimes are nested in a specific socio-cultural 
environment, so that these regimes can not be considered in itself, as has been 
stated before. 
11.5.8 OECD Synthesis report for the study on the economic aspects of the 
management of marine living resources 
This report contains a review of the fisheries management practice in 
OECD member countries. The report has been supplemented by an 'Executive 
Summary' which evaluates the different management instruments. The synthe-
sis report has a set of 25 national reports as a principal source of information. 
The report has a somewhat different point of view, all kinds of management 
instruments, but some findings are relevant for this study on property rights. 
1) Sources: mentioned in chapters 5 and 6, supplemented by the OECD Synthesis 
report for the study on the economic aspects of the management of marine 
living resources, (forthcoming, 1996), in particular pp. 131-135. 
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The OECD study distinguishes between output and input controls. As figure 
11.1 shows controls (l imitations) are one side of the coin of the measures and 
rights represent the other side. In this respect conclusions in the OECD report 
on l(T)Qs and limited licenses are interesting. l(T)Qs are evaluated most posi-
tively (p. 7 of the Executive Summary): They '...are shown to be an effective 
means of controlling exploitation, of mitigating the race-to-fish and most of 
its attendants effects, of generating resource rent and increased profits, and 
of reducing the number of participants in a fishery'. However, the report points 
also on problems with initial quota allocation and with enforcement and com-
pliance. Under limited licenses (p. 8) 'over-capitalisation and increased harvest-
ing costs are shown to occur..., but the evidence is confounded by the presence 
of TACs in many of the reported cases'. Under 'Institutional chracteristics' it is 
stated that '...the biological uncertainty and the difficulty associated with de-
fining property rights in fisheries often inhibits the succesful use of manage-
ment programs based solely on market systems'. Nevertheless, the OECD ad hoc 
Expert Group on Fisheries recommends (p. 14) '... to introduce right based man-
agement systems (e.g. transferable individual licenses, individual quotas, and 
exclusive area user-rights)'. In fact the outcomes of the OECD study point in the 
same direction as the 'new Paradigm' of Christy, mentioned before. 
A main conclusion from this property rights study, however, is that the 
effective establishment of property rights in fisheries costs much time, may be 
accelerated by a crisis and mainly depends on the acceptance of the fishers. This 
is not quite surprising, since the limiting measures in Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom have been the origin of these rights. 
11.6 The implementation of property rights in a fishery 
Property rights have, in many cases, developed gradually and uninten-
tionally from limiting measures, as has been stated in previous parts of this stu-
dy. This observation stresses the need to implement rights on a sound basis. A 
survey of points to consider before such an implementation is given hereafter. 
Experiences with property rights, investigated in this study, provide a basis for 
these 'checkpoints'. 
It should be clear what the management objectives are, whereby the 
initial aims may be management of the fish stocks, management of the 
fishery or a combination of both. 
It is recommendable to define the ownership of the rights clearly from 
the beginning. Therefore, a distinction can be made between state-, 
common- and private rights, as has been explained in chapter 5. 
State property leaves control of the fishery to an important extent in the 
hands of the Government and may establish barriers for foreign fishers 
to acquire rights. 
Common property of rights by the fishermen includes transfer of man-
agement responsibilities to the industry and may result in better adapta-
tion of measures to the fishing practice. General management objectives 
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have to be set in this case by the Government, e.g. to meet the require-
ments from the CFP. 
Allocation of private rights to individual fishermen starts an irreversible 
process which mostly moves into the direction of tradable rights. Input 
rights (licences, specifying a certain capacity) and output rights (IQS or 
ITQs) are the main distinction between kinds of individual rights. 
Definition of the allowed input into the fishery is very important, since 
non-constrained inputs will be maximized, as for example experiences in 
the Australian fisheries have shown. Days-at-sea per vessel must also be 
considered as the fishing effort has to be controlled. 
IQS and ITQs probably have been mostly applied and discussed. The fol-
lowing aims to summarise briefly the main points to consider when im-
plementation of these individual rights is intended. 
1. Control on individual catches should be possible since there will be 
a strong tendency to catch more than the individual quota when the 
limitation is severe. Heavy enforcement may be necessary. 
2. Stake-holders in a particular fishery should be well identifiable and 
rather stable. 
3. A clear and uniform jurisdiction must be available or should be es-
tablished in view of enforcement of the individual quotas. 
4. Support from the industry should be obtained as much as possible. 
5. The initial allocation of the quotas should be done carefully and 
preferable wi th intervention of an independent body. In this way 
there may be less resistance against the organisation which has to 
manage the l(T)Q system. 
6. Multi-species fisheries may lead to a need for l(T)Qs for all species or 
to detailed by-catch regulations. 
7. Stock assessment may be difficult and unreliable since an important 
difference may arise between catches and recorded landings. Unre-
ported catches, which are sold in the 'black' or 'grey' market, may 
occur and discarding of fish may be encouraged by selection of the 
most valuable fish to be landed ('high grading'). 
8. Gains of an l(T)Q system may be substantial when the current fishery 
is not very efficient. Therefore, an ITQ market has to work as free as 
possible. However, these gains have to be weighened against social 
costs that may occur, possibly as a result of a concentration process. 
9. ITQs will probably get a high value after some time and possible 
market effects (high concentration level, speculative quota trade) 
have to be foreseen, in view of the desired policy effects. 
10. The system can not be ideal in the beginning and the regulations 
probably will show a dynamic process, whereby consultations with 
the industry are essential for successful operation of the system in 
the long run. 
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11.7 Some juridical aspects wi th respect to property rights 
This study focuses mainly on the economic aspects of property rights. 
There are of course also important juridical aspects in defining the rights on 
different levels. Chapter 5 distinguishes in this respect state, common and pri-
vate property. This matter is rather complicated since the Common Fisheries 
Policy affects national policies so that the competence to protect the property 
ownership is involved. 
An Article in the EEC-Treaty of Rome (nr. 222) regards property ownership 
in the context of European and national laws. The article is 1): 'This Treaty 
leaves the regulation of the property ownership in the Member States unim-
peded'. 
Two questions are important in this respect from the viewpoint of prop-
erty rights in fishing: 
1. Does article 222 mean that member states have the ful l competence to 
define national property rights? 
2. Does this article leaves room for the Commission of the EU to establish 
rights on community level? 
The answer on the first question is that national rules on property owner-
ship are bound by EU principles 2). This was confirmed for example by a judge-
ment of the European Court of Justice regarding a case between the Commis-
sion and Italy (Case C-235/89). An Italian Law stipulates that a patented inven-
t ion has to be applied in Italy sufficiently to meet the domestic needs. The 
Commission considered this as an infringement of the principle of free move-
ment of goods and was put in the right on this point by the EU Court of Justice. 
Legal experts assume that with respect to article 222 a distinction can be made 
between the existence of property and the exercise of the right. However, re-
cent jurisprudence brings Bartels (1995) to the conclusion that not only the 
exercise but also the interpretation of the property ownership is bound by the 
requirements of the primary EU Law. This makes clear that limitation of owner-
ship of national fish quota to fishermen of the relevant country only is allowed 
on the basis of the principle of relative stability of the national quotas. This 
principle has been acknowledged by the European Court of Justice in the 
'Romkes' case (Holden, 1994, p. 240). 
The second question regards the competence of the Commission to imple-
ment rules on property ownership. A number of EU Regulations and judge-
ments of the Court seem to confirm this competence of the Commission. There 
is for instance an EU Regulation that prescribes a protection period (70 years) 
for computer software, in the framework of harmonisation. Furthermore, in a 
1) Translated from Dutch. 
2) This section draws heavily on S.E.Bartels, 'Europees privaatrecht: over de be-
voegdheidsverdeling tussen Unie en Lid-Staat met betrekking tot het eigen-
domsrecht'. Ars Aequi 1995, p. 244-251 and S.E. Bartels, 'Harmonisatie van het 
Europese goederenrecht'. Weekblad voor privaatrecht, notariaat en registratie, 
1996, p. 359. 
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certain case (Spain/the Commission) the Court has judged (13 July 1995) that 
article 222 does not preserves the competence to rule the patent law only to 
the national legislator, excluding every action of the Community in this area. 
This meant in the concerning case that the Commission has the competence to 
implement supplementary protection certificates for medicines in all Member 
States for reasons of harmonisation. 
The relevancy for the fishery sector is that the Commission may have the 
competence to establish or influence private property rights, such as (EU) licen-
ces, on the basis of EU Regulations. However, interpretations of article 222 may 
develop further and therefore hard conclusions on this subject can not be 
drawn (Bartels, 1995). 
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Appendix 2 Dutch cutter fishery 
Table A2.1 Dutch cutter fishery. Regional distribution of flatfish ITQs, situation 1 January 
1994 
Port/region 
South: 
Breskens 
Vlissingen 
Goedereede 
Scheveningen 
Region South, other ports 
North: 
Umuiden 
Den Helder 
Wier ingen 
Urk 
Region North, other 
Total 
ports 
Total of ITQs 
sole (tonnes) 
369 
1,749 
4,299 
83 
395 
1,314 
5,339 
385 
7,849 
261 
22,043 
plaice (tonnes) 
1,042 
4,954 
12,626 
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1,329 
4,518 
14,342 
1,593 
24,192 
1,086 
65,982 
Number of 
vessels 
13 
18 
61 
9 
24 
35 
66 
63 
123 
108 
520 
Table A2.2 Dutch cutter fishery. Regional distribution of cod/whiting permits, situation 1 
January 1994 
Port/region 
Breskens 
Vlissingen 
Stellendam 
Scheveningen 
Region South, 
Umuiden 
Den Helder 
Wier ingen 
Urk 
Region North, 
Total 
other 
other 
ports 
ports 
Number of 
ful l year 
3 
4 
2 
1 
13 
6 
18 
17 
2 
66 
permits 
season 
5 
1 
6 
3 
13 
6 
4 
5 
5 
4 
52 
Total quant i ty 
(tonnes) 
Cod 
142 
316 
584 
307 
464 
1,479 
780 
1,870 
1,895 
305 
8,142 
Whi t ing 
56 
126 
246 
136 
184 
617 
352 
746 
810 
121 
3,394 
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Appendix 3 Data regarding the Danish ITQ model in chapter 10 
Table A3.1 Danish landings in 1993 (tonnes) 
COD 
3AN 
3AS 
3BD 
4AC 
HADDOCK 
3AN 
3AS 
3BD 
4AC 
SAITHE 
3AN 
3AS 
3BD 
4AC 
PLAICE 
3AN 
3AS 
3BD 
4AC 
SOLE 
3AN 
3AS 
3BD 
4AC 
Total catches 
1993 
11,989 
4,469 
10,280 
19,547 
1,603 
3,582 
4,310 
9,127 
1,293 
287 
16,452 
1,430 
1,661 
Landings from vessels 
in a potential IT 
Q-system 
28,826 
7,516 
2,024 
5,739 
13,548 
3,426 
1,095 
15 
2 
2,314 
4,214 
1,303 
44 
31 
2,836 
16,269 
5,914 
470 
136 
9,749 
1,400 
185 
335 
41 
839 
Esbjerg + Lemvig 
1,173 
62 
73 
6,260 
225 
0 
0 
578 
89 
5 
0 
368 
2,193 
12 
5 
6,184 
22 
9 
0 
248 
312 
Table A3.2 Number of vessels 
Gill-netters 
Trawlers 
Danish seiners 
GRT 
<20 
2 20 
<20 
20-59 
60-99 
'i 100 
<19.9 
ï 2 0 
No 
191 
67 
177 
86 
24 
54 
21 
83 
E a) 
2 
4 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
8 
No (E+L) 
Lb) 
45 
12 
5 
7 
2 
9 
3 
66 
Total 
(E+L) 
47 
16 
5 
7 
4 
11 
3 
74 
a) Esbjerg; b) Lemvig. 
Table A3.3 Number of fisheries (target of species and area) 
Number of fisheries 
4+ 
Esbjerg 
Gil-netters 
Trawlers 
Danish seiners 
Lemvig 
Gill-netters 
Trawlers 
Danish seiners 
1 
7 
5 
3 
!1 
1 
1 
1 
30 
9 
39 
4 
20 
6 
7 
3 
2 
5 
2 
Different area 
Esbjerg 
Gill-netters 
Trawlers 
Danish seiners 
Lemvig 
Gill-netters 
Trawlers 
Danish seiners 
2 
1 
7 
34 
7 
23 
4 
1 
1 
21 
6 
37 
2 
2 
10 
9 
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Table A3 A Total catches of important species under INTQ (tonnes) 
3AN 
4AC 
All other areas 
COD 
HAD 
SAI 
PLA 
SOL 
COD 
HAD 
SAI 
PLA 
SOL 
COD 
HAD 
SAI 
PLA 
SOL 
1993 
1,173 
225 
89 
2,193 
22 
6,259 
578 
368 
6,184 
248 
135 
0 
5 
16 
9 
1 
1,172 
246 
91 
2,215 
29 
6,259 
579 
411 
6,518 
342 
151 
0 
6 
20 
12 
Scenarios 
2 
1,172 
244 
88 
2,176 
22 
6,259 
578 
411 
6,495 
247 
144 
0 
5 
18 
8 
3 
1,169 
243 
81 
2,172 
22 
6,227 
568 
355 
6,450 
247 
140 
0 
4 
18 
8 
Table A3.5 Number of vessels with profit >\< 0 by gear and size-groups (1993) 
GRT No (E+L) 
Esbjerg Lemvig Total (E+L) 
Gill-netters 
Trawlers 
<20 
2 20 
<20 
2 0 - 5 9 
6 0 - 9 9 
Ä 100 
+2/0-
+4/0-
+2/0-
+1/1-
+33/12-
+12/0-
+2/3-
+3/4-
+2/0 
+5/4-
+35/12-
+16/0-
+2/3-
+3/4-
+4/0-
+6/5-
Danish seiners 
Total 
< 19.9 
2 20 +5/3-
+14/4-
+2/1-
+40/26-
+99/50-
+2/1-
+45/29-
+113/54-
Note: + indicates positive profit, - negative profit. 
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Table A3.6 Total catches of important species under ITQs (tonnes) 
3AN 
4AC 
All other areas 
COD 
HAD 
SAI 
PLA 
SOL 
COD 
HAD 
SAI 
PLA 
SOL 
COD 
HAD 
SAI 
PLA 
SOL 
1993 
1,173 
225 
89 
2,193 
22 
6,259 
578 
368 
6,184 
248 
135 
0 
5 
16 
9 
1 
1,173 
265 
96 
2,175 
31 
6,259 
593 
443 
6,293 
336 
148 
0 
5 
20 
12 
Scenarios 
2 
1,173 
265 
96 
2,165 
25 
6,259 
590 
442 
6,264 
248 
140 
0 
5 
19 
6 
3 
1,173 
256 
67 
2,168 
25 
6,259 
571 
393 
6,257 
248 
125 
0 
1 
18 
6 
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Appendix 4 Specifications of the Danish model 
The regulation constraints 
The relevant regulation constraints are for cod, haddock, saithe and sole. In the 
model the weekly or fortnight allocations were formulated as monthly constraints, 
because the data do not allow for shorter t ime periods, this aggregation can result in 
making constraint vessels to unconstrained vessels. However, the regulation system 
alow vessels to add together two consecutive week or for tn ight allocations. We ad-
dress the problem in the model formulat ion by saying that a vessel were constrained 
if it had caughts its ration minus the expected catch of the marginal tr ip. 
Another factor the formulation of the constraints had to take into account is 
that it was possible for a vessel to change between areas within rationperiods. The ra-
tions were then adjusted according to the t ime spent in each of the areas. For species 
regulated by equal ration periods in all 4 areas the formulat ion of constraints taken 
this into account was uncomplicated. For species, here only cod, regulated by different 
rationperiods in the four areas, we formulated constraints for each of the different 
timeperiods. The rations were as before determined by the t ime spent in the fishery 
minus the catch of the marginal tr ip. 
Cod 
The constraints for cod were formulated as constraints for the fishery in North 
Sea and Skagerrak and constraint for the fishery in Kattegat and Baltic Sea, because 
of different ration periods. 
For cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak the ration periods in 1993 were January 
to Marts, April-Maj, June-July, August-September, October-November and December. 
For each of these periods rations have been allocated to each vessel. The size of the 
ration was depending of the length of vessel. 
For cod in Kattegat and Baltic Sea the rations were weekly allocations. 
Haddock 
The rations were fortnight allocations until September where the regulation 
were suspended. 
Saithe 
The rations were weekly allocations in all 4 areas. 
Sole 
Weekly allocations in all 4 areas depending on the length of vessel. 
The LP model 
Based on the structure of the fisheries, the regulation of the fisheries in 1993 and 
the availability of data, a model is formulated where the firms for each month decide 
the allocation of effort, given fixed prices of output and input and the regulation. 
Let 
I = species (which indirectly defines the fishery) 
f = fishery 
j = period, here month 
k = area 
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g = type of gear 
s = vessel class (type of gear and size-group) 
The technology of each firm in fishery f in period j and area k can be described 
as: 
T,jk(yfjk. Vz ' 'Mi,k) = 0 
where 
yfjk is a vector of catch of species wi th element yi 
je.,,, is a vector of inputs wi th elements xr 
z a vector of fixed factors 
u i jk is the regulatory constraint 
The f irm choses inputs to maximize the monthly quasi-rent in fishery f in area k: 
nfjk(p,w;Tfjk) = I , piikg yifjk - 1 , w1k x ^ 
where 
pijkg is ex-vessel prices 
w f jk is the prices of inputs 
For each vessel a LP-problem can now be formulated, where the annual short run 
prof i t or the quasi-rent is maximized. The decision variable is the effort allocated to 
each activity, i.e. in each fishery in each area for each month: 
MaxE Z = I i f j k ((1 - vs) pijkg am - V Q Eflk (B.1a) 
subject to 
regulation in 1993, i.e. 
Sfjik! a i f j,kl Efjlk, < ration, (B.1b) 
E f ik<Ema* (B.1c) 
E f l k>0 (B.1d) 
where 
vs is the crew share of revenue for vessel class s 
aifjk is average catch per unit of effort of species i for the vessel 
VCS is the variable cost per unit of unit of effort for vessel class s 
Efjk is effort (here number of trips) 
Ema* is the maximal possible effort in a month for the vessel 
j 1 , k1 is subsets of j and k, respectively 
The short run profit Z is total revenue minus variable costs. We use actual cost 
instead of opportunity costs, because the purpose is to investigate the effects of ITQs 
and quota markets. This means that the actual payment of the crew, i.e. crewshare, is 
included in B.1a. The first group of constraints (B.1b) contains the regulation scheme 
formulated here in overall terms. See appendix A for more details. The second con-
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straint (B.1c) limits the effort in each month to the maximal observed in a month in 
1993. 
This formulation only incorporates empirical justified constraints, here i.e. the 
regulation. Other incorporate normally constraints about input, f.ex. the fishing time, 
more or less ad hoc. A common procedure is to set an upper limit for the total fishing 
t ime per year to the observed in a certain year and limit the fishing t ime per time-
period. Other have set the limit based on activity of the average active vessels or forced 
the vessels to participate in certain fisheries in order to get realistic fisherypatterns. 
Nevertheless fishing effort over a large range is not a real constraint, it is avail-
able also beyond average production levels to a higher costs, because it often results 
in increasing costs to labor, maintenance and repairment. However, there is some level, 
where it is not physically possible to expand effort more, but normally the costs are 
prohibited high at these effort levels and therefore not considered economic realistic. 
We include in our model, however, a proxy for the physical upper level of effort, see 
(B.1c). 
The model and LP models in general are using a Leontief production technology 
for each activity 1). However, our specification of the technology captures the fisher-
men's ability to shift the mix of species in response to changing parameters and regula-
t ion because the fishermen can change activities. For example in response to t ighten 
quota for cod, the fishermen wil l allocate the fishing effort to other fisheries and activ-
ities which have a smaller share of cod and consequently a larger share of other species 
in the catch. The model captures therefore an important aspect of the production tech-
nology and the behavior of the fishermen, the substitution among areas and times of 
the year. Therefore the non-joint independent activity functions are made joint by the 
common effort allocation constraints (or quota constraints). 
Data 
The prices of each species are assumed to be dependent on season, the kind of 
gear used and in which area the species are caught. From the tr ip information the 
prices are calculated as total revenue divided by total catch of the relevant trips. 
The average catch of each species pr unit of effort for each f i rm in each fishery, 
month and area aifjk is calculated as total catch f rom the relevant trips of each firm 
divided by the number of trips. 
Average variable costs VCS pr tr ip for vessel class s included expenses to fuel, 
landing, ice and gear replacement, while the costs to labor were calculated as a share 
vs of total revenue. Variable costs data were obtained from accounting statistics from 
the two harbors, Esbjerg and Thyboron. We use number of trips, since the are no infor-
mation available about the length of the trips. Since the fisheries in question are hu-
man consumption fisheries, where the trip length varies between 1-5 days, it is not 
assumed that the use of trips instead of number of days wil l give biased results. In 
other studies (Squires et. al., 1994, Larson et. al., 1996) using LP the number of trips 
have been converted into weeks by assuming that if at least one landing were re-
corded in a week then the vessel was active in this week. The problem wi th the length 
of tr ip is not solved by this method, but reduced to some extent. In econometric studies 
the problem is 'solved' by assuming that all the inputs and costs for a fishing tr ip is 
fixed, since in the short production period of 1-5 days the inputs are largely fixed and 
1) Other shortcomings of the LP approach is constant returns t o scale and non-
jointness in inputs (separate production process for each output or as the case 
here for group of outputs). 
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determined by the vessels size or capital stock (see for example Squires and Kirkley 
1991). In principle we fol low the same approach in our study. 
Reconstruction of the production technology 
By introduction of ad hoc constraints on fishing time, another problem wi th LP-
models are solved, the calibration problem. The ad hoc constraints on the fishing time 
result in realistic solutions to the problem, not far away from the observed behavior. 
Wi thout the constraints on fishing t ime the solution wil l normally diverge from the 
actual production. 
Our LP formulat ion wi l l probably, because of the few empirical justified (bind-
ing) constraints, contain a calibration problem, meaning that the solution involves only 
a few of the observed activities/different trips. Instead of introducing constraints more 
or less ad hoc in order to produce the observed behavior in the base year, we wi l l use 
the PMP to calibrate and estimate the model. The introduction of constraints in order 
to produce the base year outcome, wil l also limit the ability of the model to predict 
production etc. under policy changes. 
We use a five stage procedure of the PMP approach to estimate the production 
parameters. 
In the first stage the PMP model is formulated and solved. The solution contains 
information about which fisheries that are marginal and non-marginal, respectively 
and about the shadow values of the resource/regulation constraints and the calibration 
constraints. 
The variation in catchrates of the marginal fisheries are used in the second stage 
to estimate the production parameters for the marginal activities/fisheries. 
In the third stage the shadow values of the regulation constraints are calcu-
lated/updated based on the variation in the catchrates of the marginal fisheries. Given 
the updated shadow values of the regulation constraints the shadow values of the 
calibration constraints of the non-marginal fisheries are updated as wel l . 
The parameters for the non-marginal fisheries are then in the fourth stage esti-
mated based on the updated shadowprices. 
In the f i f th and final stage the calibrated (estimated) problem using the esti-
mated parameters are formulated. The optimal solution to the calibrated problem 
gives exactly the observed catches in 1993. This calibrated problem is going to be used 
in the analysis of INTQs and ITQs. 
We assume as mentioned in section 10.1.4 that short run profit pr unit of effort 
is a declining function of effort. Because of fixed proport ion of outputs/species the 
netrevenue for each activity NR,jk can be specified as: 
NRfjk = (1 -vs) I , pijkgaifjk = (1 -vs)pfjk9aveafjk (B.2) 
Where 
pfjkg is the price of the target species in fishery f 
avea,jk is a weighted index of catch (= I ; Pijkg aifjk / p,jkg ) 
The weighted index of catch is by the PMP method replaced by a non-linear 
function, i.e.: 
aveafjk = cfjk - d f jk Efjk (B.3) 
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The catchshare of species i csifjk is: 
csiflk = aiflk/aveaflk (B.4) 
The first stage 
The modified LP-problem (the PMP-problem) to (B.1) is completed by adding the 
two following groups of calibration constraints: 
Efjk<Efjk'"3 + e (B.1e) 
Efik>E,k1993-e (B.1f) 
From the shadow value of the calibration constraints (B.1e) the marginal and 
non-marginal fisheries can be found. The non-marginal fisheries have a positive sha-
dowvalue, while the marginal fisheries have a shadowvalue of zero. If there are 4 activ-
ities limited by 1 (2) regulation constraint then 3 (2) of the fisheries are non-marginal 
and 1 (2) marginal. The fisheries with negative quasi-rent is found by constraints B.1f, 
given by a positive shadowvalue. This shadowvalue is then used to adjust the variable 
cost of the fishery leading to a non-negative quasi-rent. 
The second stage 
Having found the marginal fisheries, we use information about the variation in 
the catches 1) to replace the linear term with average catches with a non-linear func-
tion. The variation in the catches can be interpreted as the marginal catch of effort. 
The variation in the weighted index of catches for each fishery is calculated as the aver-
age percentage variation in the weighted index of catches. In the calculation of the 
variation is only included trips with positive quasi-rents, because it is the expected vari-
ation 2), assuming that trips with negative quasi-rent were expected to give at least 
brake-even. 
The parameters (c k^ and dflk) of the non-linear functions for the marginal fisheries 
can now be found by solving two equations. One of the equations is B.3. The other 
equation is: 
NRfik var^ = pfjkg (c,jk - d,jk Eflk) - pfjk9 (c^ - 2 dflk Efjk) (B.5) 
where 
varflk is the variation in the weighted catch 
Equation (B.5) says that the different between the value of the observed average 
and the marginal weighted catch given by the variation in the weighted catch (left 
hand side) is equal to the different between the value of the average product and the 
marginal product (right hand side). Equation B.3 and B.5 can then be solved for c^ k and 
dfjk-
The third stage 
Recall that the first order conditions for the marginal activities of the modified 
LP-problem are: 
1) More exact: variation in a weighted index of catch. 
2) SeeHowitt(1995). 
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*i (d - vs) pijkg aifjk) - VCS - I , aifjk A1(| = O (B.6) 
After replacing the linear term with the non-linear function the first order condi-
tions for the marginal activities are: 
(1 -varfjk) I,((1 - vJp^aHjJ - VCS -1,(1 - v a r ^ a ^ A , , ™ = 0 (B.7) 
Most often the number of marginal activities wi th in a given constraint set is 1 
and A,,,"6™ can be solved directly from equation (B.7). With 2 marginal activities indicat-
ing that two resource constraints are binding, two equations are needed, because two 
of the constraints have a positive shadowprice, i.e. A,i(new > 0. The equation-system 
given by B.7 can be solve subject to X,ijnew. 
The first order conditions for the non-marginal activities f rom the modified LP-
problem are: 
* i ( d - v j pijkg aifjk) - VCS - A2fjk - I , aifjk A,, = 0 (B.8) 
By using the updated shadow value of the regulation constraints A,,™" the 
shadow values of the calibration constraints A2(jk is updated by the above equation B.8. 
The fourth stage 
In the fourth stage the parameters of the non-linear functions for the non-mar-
ginal activities are estimated. Again we use two equations, whereas one is B.3. The 
other equation is that the first order condition for the PMP problem is equal to the first 
order condition of the calibrated problem in order to produce to base-year solution, 
i.e. 
I , ((1 - v j p ^ a ^ ) - VCS - A2fjk - 1 , a « , ^ " " = 
p l jkg (cfjk-2dfjkEfjk) - VCS - 1 ; cs, (cfjk-2dfikEfjk) À,,,"" (B.9) 
Solving B.9 using B.3 gives: 
d f ik = A2 f i k / (p l j k gE f j k - I ics iA l i j"e") (B.10) 
Equation B.10 inserted into equation B.3 gives the value of the intercept cfjk. 
The fifth stage 
Finally the calibrated model can be formulated using the estimated values of cfjk 
and d f )k. 
MaxE Z = Xfjk ((1 - vs)pfjkg(cfjk - d f)k E<jk) - V Q E<)k (B. 11 a) 
subject to 
regulation in 1993, i.e. 
Zfjiki «ifjiki(Cfjiki - d f j1k l Efjlkl) Efj1kl < ration, (B.11 b) 
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E f jk<Emax (B.11c) 
E f j k>0 (B.11d) 
This model will calibrate to the observed efforta I location in 1993. The model can 
now be used to policy analysis, e.g. by replacing equation B.11b wi th other regulation 
systems. 
Implementation oflNTQs 
For each vessel an annual quota is allocated corresponding to the vessels total 
catch in 1993 1), i.e. based upon historical catches. Equation B.11b in the model is then 
replaced by equations of the fol lowing type: 
Sfl csjfjk(Cfjk - d f jk Efjk) Efjk < catchik1993 (B.11e) 
In some cases the quotas are specified for all areas (i.e. summation over k in 
B.11e). 
Implementation of ITQs 
Under ITQs the model has to be extented by the ITQ markets. Formally it is a 
two-stage problem. The first stage is solving the model B.11 under INTQs treating the 
quota as a constant. In the second stage the quota is a variable and the model of each 
vessel (B.11) is aggregated into a model, where the total quasi-rent is maximized and 
extended by a constraint that the quotas are lesser than the total quota. The solution 
to this model gives the quota price and the optimal allocation of quota. This two stage 
problem is solved in one step by the fol lowing formulat ion: 
MaxE,q InZn = I n ( I f l k ((1 - vs)ptjkg(cfjk - d f)k Efjk) - V Q Efjk) (B.12a) 
subject to 
*fj csjfjk(cfjk - d f jk Efjk) Efjk < q ikn (B.12b) 
Ef jk<Emax (B.12c) 
q ik", E f j k>0 (B.12d) 
W s Q u . (6.12e) 
Because this formulation also maximizes each vessels quasi-rent, the reactions of 
the fishermen to ITQs are incorporated in the model B.12. This can be seen from in-
spection of the first order conditions of the model B.12 and the first order condition 
of a model of a firm under ITQs. 
The calibrated model 
If the constraint set for 1993 (formally equations B.1b) is binding then the fisher-
men in general will have incentives to reallocate their fishing activities. Put in another 
way if a vessel is not constrained by the regulation in 1993, then l ift ing the regulation 
1) This is the common allocation scheme used in other ITQ fisheries. 
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wil l not induce the vessel to changes in the fishing activity. An investigation of the 
shadow prices of the constraint set can therefore give an insight into which vessel that 
wil l adjust fishing activities and which fisheries that are the most profitable. 
In table B.6.1 is shown number of vessels that were limited, grouped according 
to number of binding constraints. 
Table A.4.1 Number of vessels and number of binding constraints 
Number of 
limitations 
E a) L2) 
gill trawlers Danish gill trawlers Danish 
netters seiners netters seiners 
Total 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
6 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
4 
5 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
9 
4 
11 
10 
6 
8 
3 
3 
2 
57 
4 
2 
6 
7 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
23 
12 
16 
18 
9 
7 
8 
0 
0 
0 
69 
30 
26 
37 
26 
16 
19 
4 
7 
2 
167 
Binding Non-binding Binding Non-binding 
Cod 
Saithe 
Haddock 
Sole 
12 
3 
1 
5 
6 
15 
17 
13 
122 
14 
1 
31 
27 
135 
148 
118 
a) Esbjerg; b) Lemvig. 
Over 2/3 of the vessels have < 3 binding constraints (about 1/2 of the vessels have 
< 2 binding constraints) indicating that the fishing activities have been constrained, but 
not to a large extent. For a large part of the fleet major reallocation of effort is not 
expected fol lowing change of regulation to IQ. However, this vary according to the 
gear-type. The gill-netters seems to be more constrained than the trawlers and the 
Danish seiners. 
The table also shows the number of vessels constrained by the different species 
regulation. Only about 20% of the vessels have not been constrained by the regulation 
of cod. The regulation of sole have for about 20% of the vessels been a limiting factor, 
while regulation of saithe has had impact on ca. 10% of the vessels. The regulation of 
haddock have not been a l imit ing factor. In general the gill-netters have been con-
strained by the regulation of cod and sole, the trawlers by the regulation of cod and 
saithe, and the Danish seiners by the regulation of cod. 
These results are both in agreement with how the regulation proceeded in 1993 
and what can been expected when the vessels in questions are part of the human con-
sumption fleet. 
323 
Since the vessels (table 5.2) participates in 2-3 fisheries overyear implying that 
the number of activities, i.e. variables, is much higher than the number of binding con-
straints, a normal LP-formulation would have calibration problems. 
The shadow prices of cod varies between 0.1 DKK and 155.4 DKK. The shadow 
prices of saithe and sole varies between 1.5 DKK and 470.7 DKK, and 9.4 DKK and 
6715.8 DKK, respectively. These shadow prices indicate very different conditions for the 
constrained vessels. 
Shadow values over the ex-vessel prices (or ex-vessel prices net of crewshare) can 
be obtained because of joint production. Extra amount of the limited species means 
also extra catches of the unregulated species and their value are incorporated in the 
shadow price. Formally (k, j and n subscript omitted): 
A, = (p - MQ/CS; 
where 
p is an price index of total output 
MC is the marginal cost of total output 
Under joint production the shadow price is equal to the different between out-
put price and marginal cost scaled by the catchshare of the quota species. 
Specifications mathematical programming and the PMP approach 
Common to the studies mentioned in section 10.1.2 is that the effects of imple-
mentation of ITQ is simulated in unregulated or open access fisheries. However, in 
many cases such as the Danish codfisheries the fisheries are regulated by open-access 
regulation which from year to year or even from month to month can change (e.g. 
different rations). Construction of the technology or the fishers response function is 
more difficult because of this interaction between policy and fishermen. Further the 
construction is handicapped by the many changes in regulation, both during the year 
and between years, which do not give much room for establishing the necessary time 
series of information, where the regulation environment is relative stable, so econo-
metric analysis can be meaningful applied. 
In this study mathematical programming is applied in order to estimate the fish-
ers response. LP-models have often been used in policy analysis because they can be 
constructed from a minimal data set. Secondly the constraint structure is well suited 
to incorporate resource and policy constraints. Thirdly they can explicitly show how 
resources are used. Fourthly LP is a flexible tool, allows for appropriate representation 
of multiple inputs and outputs, e.g. complementary and competitive relationship. Last 
and maybe most important they can show the effects of policy constraints and are 
more understandable for policymakers than econometrics (Squires et. al., 1994). 
However, there are problems with the linearity. It gives poor base-year calibra-
tion without ad hoc constraints that may bias policy results. Changes in f.ex. prices/ 
input costs do not cause changes in the dual values or type of output, unless they cause 
a change of basis. The range between change steps may be larger than many levels of 
policy change, thus making the models inflexible for some type of analysis. A LP model 
has to be specified in more detail because if its discontinuous response features which 
results in a number of problems, if the database is insufficient. 
The Leontief technology on the inputs can not reflect the gradual substitution 
of inputs as their costs or quantities are changed. 
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Calibration problems in LP-models 
The LP solution is an extreme point of the binding constraints and normally the 
number of positive activities in the base year is greater than the number of binding 
constraints leading to overspecialization of activities compared to the base year. From 
a mathematical point of view will the resulting solution suffer from overspecialization, 
when the basis matrix has a rank less then the number of observed base-year activities. 
To reduce this calibration error one approach has been to include more or less 
ad hoc constraints in order to reproduce the base year solution. An another approach 
has been to endogenize prices and risk leading to non-linear functions. 
Aggregate policy models have often a too simplified production and cost tech-
nology, based on average values of catch and costs, and it is still a normative approach, 
attempting to estimate the marginal behavioral reactions to policy changes based on 
average data. Fishery practices are rare fixed on the margin. They reflect profit maxi-
mizing, i.e. trade-offs between catchrates, costs in different fisheries etc. 
However, calibration of a model to the base-year data set and constraints is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for a meaningful policy model. The ultimate test 
for a policy model is its ability to predict behavioral responses out of the sample base-
year. 
Positive mathematical programming 
Instead of introducing constraints more or less ad hoc in order to produce the 
observed behavior in the base year, another track or method is followed. The introduc-
tion of constraints in order to produce the base year outcome, will also limit the ability 
of the model to predict production etc. under policy changes. 
The method is called positive mathematical programming (PMP), see Howitt 1995 
and 1995b for a introduction to the method, 'positive' because the method is based 
on the owners actual behavior and it uses all the available information and reproduce 
solution equal to realized decisions taken by fishers (use positive information in a nor-
mative programming structure). The method can be seen as a compromise between 
the extremes of LP and econometric estimation. The basic idea in the method is to ex-
change the linear production functions with non-linear functions, so that the marginal 
profit is equated across all activities within the constraint set using the base-year out-
come. It could also be the linear cost function that was exchanged. Since data on catch-
variability are more easily obtained than cost variation, if it more appropriate to cali-
brate the output and not the cost function. 
An alternative explanation to linear technology with constraints is that the profit 
function is nonlinear in effort 1) for most fisheries and the observed allocation of ef-
fort are a result of a mix of unconstrained and constrained optima. Reasons for de-
creasing gross margin per unit of effort are declining catches due to heterogeneous 
fishing grounds, risk aversion, increasing costs due to restricted management or vessel 
capacity or the fixed amount of seasonal operation time available in most fisheries. 
This relationship describes both the variability in catchrates and the technology and 
condition for the fishery in general. The fishermen know which fisheries and grounds 
are the most profitable. The PMP approach assumes that the fishermen uses this knowl-
edge of the effect that expansion or contraction of effort will have on profit per effort. 
1) A simple nonlinear relationship - declining gross margin per unit of effort as a 
linear function of effort - to capture the essential behavior response of fisher 
and to work with available restricted databases and model structures. It is a 
simplication of the complete production process. 
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The marginal conditions that reflect this knowledge are revealed in the fishery-effort 
allocation made by the fishermen. By analog to revealed preference, PMP can be 
thought of as revealed efficiency based on observed effort allocations. 
Information about catches is usually available while information about produc-
t ion costs is more rare. The fishermen takes into account several types of costs. The 
observed level of outputs are therefore the result of a complex decision based, in part 
on a cost function known to (or perceived by) the fishermen but diff icult to observe 
directly. The PMP approach uses the observed effort allocation and catches which var-
ies from fisher to fisher to infer marginal costs conditions for each observed effort allo-
cation. This inference is based on those parameters that are accurately observed and 
the usual profit-maximizing and concavity assumptions. The PMP approach views the 
vessels production as a boundary point, which is a combination of binding constraints 
and first-order conditions. The relevant constraints should be based on either economic 
logic or the technical environment. The observed behavioral reactions provide a basis 
for model calibration in a formal manner that is consistent wi th microeconomic theory. 
The PMP specification leads to smooth respond to policy scenarios and thus the 
method wil l produce more realistic reaction behavior to small changes in parameters, 
i.e. constraints, prices and catchrates. The input demand and supply functions are con-
tinuous and differentiable wi th respect to prices, costs and right-hand side quantities 
(however, not differentiable at the points of change in basis) in contrast to LP prob-
lems where these functions are unchanged until a change in basis and the functions 
jump to a new level (staircase structure). 
In general a calibration problem arise when the number of non-zero activities 
in the base-year (k) is greater than the number of binding constraints (m). From basic 
linear algebra we know that any feasible solution wil l contain a number of variables 
equal to the number of constraints (equations). The number of variables is the total 
number of activities and slack variables. Given that for every binding constraint a slack 
variable leaves the basic, i.e. slack variable = 0, then the optimal number of non-zero 
activities is equal to the number of binding constraints. 
Howitt 1995a discuss the mathematical properties of the method. He shows that 
a necessary and sufficient condit ion for prof i t maximization at the observed level is 
that the profit function is nonlinear in some of the non-zero activities (k). Exact calibra-
t ion of the model is possible if the objective function have at least k-m independent 
instruments/terms to calibrate the k-m activities (non-marginal or independent vari-
ables). If calibrating 3 variables and only 1 nonlinear terms available exact calibration 
is not possible. 
In order words: If k-m nonlinear parameters/terms are calculated for the k-m 
activities the model wi l l exactly calibrate to the base-year values wi thout additional 
constraints. 
If the m still linear terms in the objective function also have to have declining 
catch/effort then more information is required. The information could be expected 
variation in catchrates or supply elasticities. 
PMP in a simple fishery model 
To illustrate the calibration problem and using PMP in a fishery model, a simple 
example w i th observation of average catchrates (a, and a2) of one species that have 
been caught in 2 fisheries can be used. The fisheries are regulated by a total quota Q 
and the total gross margin f rom both fisheries is optimized. 
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MaxE GM = (p a, - VC) * E, + (p a2 - VC) * E2 (1) 
subject to 
a, E, + a2 E2 <= Q (2) 
where 
p is the ex-vessel price 
VC is the variable cost 
E is effort 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
dGM/dE, = p a , - V C - a , A, <=0 (3) 
dGM/dE2 = p a 2 - V C - a 2 A , <= 0 (4) 
The solution to this problem implies that the whole quota is taken in the fishery 
w i th the highest gross margin, here e.g. fishery 1. The value of marginal catch from 
each fishery is therefore not equated and E2 = 0. However, the observed fisherypattern 
for the base year is different, there have also been effort in fishery 2, i.e. E2 > 0. 
The calibration method finds a non-linear function for the activity with the high-
est gross margin to replace the constant catchrate: 
a, = b, - d, E, (5) 
The first-order conditions of the calibrated problem, where (5) have replaced a,, 
are then: 
dGM/dE, = p (b, - 2 d, E,) - VC - (b, - 2 d, E,) A, <= 0 (6) 
dGM/dE2 = p a 2 - V C - a 2 A , <=0 (7) 
By adding the fol lowing two calibration constraints to the linear problem the 
conditions which the base-year allocation has to ful f i l l in order to be an optimal solu-
t ion can be found. 
E, <= E, + e, (A2) (8) 
E2 <= £2 + e, (A3) (9) 
where 
E is the effort in the base-year 
e a perturbation term, > 0 
The first step of the PMP approach is to solve this modified LP-problem (the PMP 
problem). The solution implies that: 
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dGM/dE, = p a, - VC - a, \ , - K2<= 0 (10) 
dGM/dE2 = p a2 - VC - a2 A, <= 0 (11) 
Both E, and E2 are now positive and except for the perturbation term equal to 
base year effort. A, and A; are also positive, while the shadowprice À to the second 
calibration constraint (9) is zero. In this first step the dual values are generated and the 
fisheries are grouped in marginal and non-marginal fisheries. The non-marginal fisher-
ies are the fisheries with positive shadowprice (here A2 > 0) and these fisheries are go-
ing to be calibrated by the method. Beforehand the non-marginal and marginal fisher-
ies are not known. Remark also that the shadowprice of the regulation/resource con-
straint (A,) is determinated solely by the marginal fishery. The optimization problem 
after calibration wil l have exactly the same second first order condit ion as the PMP 
problem (7 and 11) and therefore A, has to be unchanged. 
In the second step the parameters are derived. The non-linear function (b, - d, E,) 
to replace a, has two parameters which have to be 'estimated'. It requires two equa-
tions. One is that the average catchrate at the observed level of effort is equal to the 
observed catchrate, i.e. equation (5). 
The second equation is the first order conditions from the above PMP problem 
(10) and the calibrated problem for E1 (10), i.e. 
p a, - VC - a, A, - A2 = p (b, - 2d,E,) - VC - (b, - 2d,E,)A, (12) 
Solving for the slope d „ using that a, = b, - d, E„ gives 
d, = M P E, - A, E,) (13) 
Having estimated the parameters of non-linear function the calibrated problem 
can now be formulated as the third step: 
max GM = (p (b, - d, E,) - VC) E, + (p a2 - VC) E2 (14) 
s.t. 
(b,-d1*E,)*E1 + a2*E2<=Q (15) 
The solution to this problem gives exactly the observed effortpattern and value 
of the gross margin. The calibrated problem can now be used in policy analysis. 
From this process several points can be made: 
1. The PMP approach draws a distinction between the two modeling phases of cali-
bration (estimation) and policy prediction. 
2. The procedure is simple and can be used both when the observed number of 
binding constraints is less than the number of non-zero activities in the base year 
and when the number of optimal activities is equal to the number of non-zero 
activities in the base year but at different levels. 
3. The method is implemented in three stages: 1. Generation of the dual values us-
ing the modified LP-problem. 2. The dual values are used along with the average 
catchrates to derive catchfunctions parameters. 3. The catch parameters are used 
with the base year data to specify the calibrated model. 
4. When the constraint set gives the base year activity then there is no calibration 
problem, but if the model is used for policy evaluation, e.g. changing some of the 
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political constraints, then the model probably will give extreme answers, because 
of the linearity. 
5. All the errors from specification of the catch and cost coefficient are incorporated 
in the non-linear part. The method do not replace proper datacollection, but can 
be useful in (reel world) situations where the database is limited, so econometrics 
can be applied properly. 
6. One of the activities (the marginal or dependent) in the example still has constant 
catchrates. The method will only calculate nonlinear parameters for the non-mar-
ginal activities which total number in general is the number of non-zero activities 
in the base year set minus the number of binding constraints, i.e. in the example 
2-1=1. More information is needed if all activities shall be made nonlinear. One 
can for example use information about variation in catchrates within the given 
fishery. This will also change the calculation of the non-linear parameters of the 
most profitable activities, see Howitt 1995a. 
7. In fisheries, where one kind of question is to see what will happen if another 
regulation system was introduced, for example going from regulation by rations 
for a certain period less than the fishing season to regulation by INTQ or ITQ, i.e. 
relaxing the constraint set, the effect will be that the (still) linear activities will 
used to an extreme point. It is therefore important, at least in this kind of models, 
to introduce also for the non-calibrated activities some non-linearity using other 
sources of information, for example about variation in catchrates. 
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